

Motive Structures and Violence among Young Globalization Critics: A Statistical Typology of the Motives for Protest at the 2007 G8 Summit

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Motive Structures and Violence among Young Globalization Critics: A Statistical Typology of the Motives for Protest at the 2007 G8 Summit

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The results of a questionnaire survey of 3,578 young protesters aged 15 to 24 were used to create a typology of the motive structures of the young globalization critics who participated in protests against the G8 summit in Heiligendamm in June 2007. Eight groups with different motive structures identified using cluster analysis reveal the spectrum of motives of the young demonstrators, ranging from social and political idealism to hedonistic fun-seeking and nationalist motives. Despite the diversity of motives, two cross-cluster motives can be identified: the results clearly show that the majority of respondents were motivated by political idealism and rejected violence. Two overlapping minorities were found: one where political idealism was largely lacking, and another where violence was a prominent motive.

1. Introduction

The growing dynamism of globalization has brought forth a new social movement protesting against what it sees as the negative repercussions of the process. In recent years the critics of globalization have attracted much public attention worldwide through headline-hitting demonstrations and violent clashes with the police. One rallying point of this global protest movement is the annual G8 summit meeting, which is held in a different country every year. In 2007 the venue was the German seaside resort of Heiligendamm. This major political event attracted tens of thousands of protesters, many of them young. Although the media portray the globalization critics as a large and uniform social movement, the publicity and statements of the groups involved show very clearly that their motives are by no means uniform but highly varied and in some cases even contradict one another. The ways the motives of the young globalization critics may be grouped together to form motive structures have not previously been subjected to sociological analysis and systemization. What moved young

people in 2007 to participate in the protests at Heiligendamm? What different motive structures can be identified among young activists? And is there a connection between the motive structures of the globalization critics and the forms of protest they practice, and if so, to what extent?

In order to find answers to these questions the Center for Child and Youth Research at Bielefeld University conducted a questionnaire-based survey during the G8 summit at Heiligendamm to record statistically the motives of young globalization critics. In this contribution we present a typology of the motive structures of the young demonstrators generated by cluster analysis.

2. Existing Research

The global justice movement (also known as the anti-globalization movement) has been addressed in many social science publications, especially in the field of political science (e.g. Cohen and Rai 2000; Guidry, Kennedy, and Zald 2000; Klein, Koopmanns, and Geiling 2001; Leggewie 2003,

The authors would like to express their gratitude to the student interviewers who conducted the survey, especially the teams working in the "Black Bloc" who

succeeded in persuading members of that group to complete the questionnaire (often wearing gloves).

della Porta, and Tarrow 2005; Bemerburg and Niederbacher 2007; Schäfer and Witte 2007; della Porta 2007; Fillieule and Blanchard 2008; Moghadam 2008; Rucht and Teune 2008; Wennerhag 2008). There has been comparatively broad study of the annual meetings of the World Social Forum established by globalization critics as a counterweight to the meetings of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Davos World Economic Forum (WEF), and the annual world economic summits of the heads of state of the G8 states (e.g. Hammond 2003, Fisher and Ponniah 2003, Schönleitner 2003, Patomäki and Teivainen 2004, IBASE 2005, 2006, Reitan 2007, Herkenrath 2008). For example, Herkenrath's study sought to "investigate the political attitudes of participants at the WSF using multivariate methods and uncover possible connections with socioeconomic and sociostructural background factors" (2008, 1). His findings speak "for a theoretical model of activist behavior that builds on fragmented social identities and malleable interests and on a capacity for empathy, tolerance, and intercultural learning. Not least, it becomes clear that neither activists from the global north nor those from the global south travel to the WSF in order to defend their preconceived opinions and rigidly entrenched interests there" (19). The objective of the World Social Forum itself is to promote coordination and exchange of ideas among globalization-critical groups and individuals, rather than to stage demonstrations and protest events aimed directly against a G8 summit, as in Genoa or Heiligendamm.

The most prominent of the few empirical studies of globalization critics actually participating in demonstrations against a global economic summit is the Italian study of the protests at the G8 summit in Genoa in 2001 (Andretta et al. 2003), which found that there was a hard core of organized globalization critics, but also a "much larger contingent of 'disorganized' but 'affiliated' activists" (203). The authors characterize the global justice movement as a transnational collective actor (36), but it is actually a strikingly heterogeneous social group. The political origins of the actors, their demands, their protest forms and their radicalism vary, but they are united by a "common sense" understanding of the

negative impact of neoliberal globalization on democracy, ecological sustainability, and social justice. "The movement's master frame identifies neoliberal globalization as the enemy and demands a more equitable distribution of rights and resources as well as participatory democracy (at the local, national, and global level). This frame makes it possible for any actor to join the protests and feel themselves part of the movement, without losing their own specific identity" (Andretta et al. 2003, 110f.). The master frame of the movement integrates it internally and allows it to appear as a collective actor to outside observers. The question of what different motives lead the (mostly) young activists to participate in the protests is not explicitly addressed by this study, so there is a research desideratum here.

The quantitative study by Olivier Fillieule and Phillip Blanchard (2008) characterizes the political motives of the investigated globalization critics who participated in 2003 in the European Social Forum in Paris and the No-G8 demonstrations in Evian as follows: "In accordance with the 'altermondialiste' label most of them agree on, their ideological world is centered on worldly issues and their attacks target international institutions and phenomena. North-South inequalities, fight against capitalism, against multinational firms and against war come first among the political issues that drove them to come to the events" (12). This study did not, however, examine non-political motives.

The three-year DEMOS research project funded by the European Commission (Democracy and the Mobilization of Society in Europe) also touches on the question of motives.¹ This international project addresses not the motive structures of globalization critics, but rather the forms of participatory democracy that emerge "from below" in the organizational structures and deliberative processes of social movements.

One important German-language contribution is an explorative ethnographic study led by Ronald Hitzler that describes the globalization-critical scene in Germany "from within." On the motive structures of the activists, it found

¹ <http://demos.iue.it>.

“that globalization-critical actors get involved not solely out of socially critical idealism, but always also act out of egoistic or egocentric motives, which can be seen in the importance attached to the experiential fun-seeking aspect” (Bemerburg and Niederbacher 2007, 239). This finding already provides clues to the diversity of the motive structures of the globalization critics.

The high proportion of adolescents and young adults at the protests is a characteristic feature of the global justice movement. Already at the demonstrations in Seattle against the World Trade Organization in 1999 “the low average age of the demonstrators, in particular, was a conspicuous new element that led observers to speak of a new political generation” (Andretta et al. 2003, 24f.). The protesters interviewed by Fillieule and Blanchard (2008) are also characterized by their low average age: “They are much younger: 40% to 60% of them are less than 30 years (two to four times more than the population) and only 1% to 5% more than 64 (4 to 12 times less than population)” (Fillieule and Blanchard 2008, 11). So it appears—notwithstanding a wealth of empirical data showing the political interest of the younger generation declining over the past decades (Schneekloth 2006)—that it is above all young people who get involved in the globalization-critical groupings. Yet little is known about the motives on which their participation in globalization-critical demonstrations is based.

3. Data Collection in the Field

3.1. The General Situation: The G8 Summit in Heiligendamm

The thirty-third G8 summit was held in June 2007 in Heiligendamm on Germany’s Baltic coast, under the motto of “Growth and Responsibility.” From May 31 to June 8, 2007, globalization critics held countless planned and spontaneous protests in and around Heiligendamm and the nearby city of Rostock. These included marches, rallies, human chains, sit-down blockades, discussion meetings and tribunals, commemorations, vigils, religious services, concerts, and workshops, as well as smaller actions at other locations in the region. The number of people who participated over the whole week of protests is difficult to estimate, and the figures given by the organizers and the police for individual events often diverge widely. For example, while the organizers of the big demonstration on June 2 spoke of eighty

thousand participants, the police estimated the number to be no more than thirty thousand (Rucht and Teune 2008).

3.2. Study Design


The objective of the present study was to collect quantitative data on the motive structures of the participants in the protests in Rostock and Heiligendamm at the time of the G8 summit. To achieve this—and especially in order to capture the *diversity of motives* of the participants—we chose to conduct surveys at the opening and closing events, because this was where the broadest spectrum of different protest groups was to be expected. Surveys were also conducted in the camps, where we expected to find the most active “summit-stormers” during their breaks between activities.

The international demonstration under the slogan “Another world is possible!” on Saturday June 2, 2007, in Rostock can be regarded as the real starting point of the organized week of protests in and around Heiligendamm. This event was selected as the first occasion for data collection. That day 105 interviewers collected data from 1,655 young protest participants. The interviews were conducted at the various meeting points *immediately before* the events started, because it seemed unlikely that questionnaires could be successfully distributed, completed, and returned *during* the marches. A second major survey was conducted in Rostock Stadthafen on June 8, when the concluding protest event was held. Here 1,183 participants were interviewed by 109 interviewers, and here, too, the survey was conducted at the meeting points in order to avoid the foreseeable problems of collecting data during the marches.

During the days in-between surveys were conducted in the camps at Rostock and Reddelich and at the convergence center in Rostock-Evershagen. The camp at Reddelich, about five kilometers from Heiligendamm, accommodated up to five thousand activists, while the camp in Rostock housed up to six thousand. On June 4, 5, and 6 our forty-one interviewers conducted 740 interviews, specifically at times when there were *no* major protest events planned.

Altogether 3,578 interviews were conducted on five days by 255 interviewers organized in twenty-four teams. Repeat interviews were systematically avoided.

Figure 1: Survey concept



3.3. The Problems of Collecting Data at Protest Events

The survey was conducted by 255 students from Rostock University, who were trained for the task in an accompanying seminar and conducted the work in teams led by more experienced students. The teams and their leaders found themselves facing two main problems: Firstly, the data had to be collected in the context of the protest event, i.e. during a demonstration. Because a moving mass of people—the protest march—is ill-suited for carrying out written surveys, the team decided to conduct the interviews at the official meeting points immediately before the actual demonstration began. This approach offered the following advantages: (1.) The demonstrators were not yet in motion physically, so it was technically possible to complete a questionnaire. (2.) The demonstrators were, however, already mentally “in motion.” The assembly phase is always associated with a certain degree of boredom (and sometimes also tension), a mental state in which people are more likely to be willing to complete a questionnaire.

The second problem was making a random selection of participants, taking into account the diversity and size of the different protesting groups. It being impossible to implement a precise sampling strategy under the conditions of a demonstration that is about to begin, the interviewers were instructed at least to try to achieve this goal. In this respect, too, the meeting points were appropriate places to conduct the survey. The different groups gather not at random, but

in blocks that are identifiable by their manner, clothing, and/or use of particular symbols and banners, making it possible to at least roughly estimate their size. On the basis of these estimates we were able to decide how many people the teams were to interview within each block. Following an ad hoc procedure, the teams were told to ask every n th person in the block to which they were assigned, whereby n was selected such as to achieve the planned number of interviews. This prevented the questionnaire from being completed by, say, couples or by all the members of a group of friends.

Because we used such a large number of interviewers, we actually came quite close to collecting a random sample. The survey situation made it impossible to systematically record refusals, but the interviewers reported the proportion was less than 1 percent. We believe that this unusually high level of acceptance of the survey has its roots in the use of periods of “enforced idleness” while waiting for the protest to begin, and would not have been possible to achieve in a march “on the move.” Critically, it must be noted that the method we chose recorded people who moved from one group to another only inadequately and individuals who joined the march after it began not at all.

3.4. Survey Instrument

To survey the young protesters about their motives for joining the protests in Rostock and the surrounding area,

the project team developed a battery of forty-three items. Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with different statements addressing motives for protesting on a four-response scale ranging from “do not agree at all” to “agree completely.” The young protesters were also asked to state their position on different forms of protest ranging from non-violent actions to violence against persons and property: whether they rejected them, believed they made sense, or participated in them themselves.

Sociodemographic data was also collected, in particular concerning educational qualifications and employment status. Because the survey was to be conducted in the scope of a protest event the questionnaire had to be short and easy to use; i.e. the questions had to fit onto a single sheet of A4 paper. This made it imperative to focus on the essentials.

4. Typology of the Motive Structures of Young Globalization Critics

In the following we describe a typology of the motive structures of young globalization critics generated using principal component analysis. We began by putting the forty-three items into discrete groups on the basis of their correlations. This analysis produced an eight-component model that explains 55 percent of the variance. The eight principal components or motive aspects cover a broad spectrum ranging from political and social idealism to hedonistic fun-seeking and nationalist motives.²

1. *Acting together against global social problems (13.6 percent)*³

The first principal component brings together variables relating both to substantive political grounds for a protest—such as human rights violations, poverty, and repression—and to forms of protest, namely raising one’s voice together with others. This component points to the wish to work for a better world, including political idealism as a motive.

2. *Using violence against state power and out of general frustration (11.8 percent)*

Principal component 2 filters out the motive of deviant violent activity: the conviction that “only with violence can

you achieve anything,” as well as the desire to escape from everyday cares and “let off steam.”

3. *Demonstrating as a fun experience (8.1 percent)*

Principal component 3 collects motive aspects connected with fun-seeking and enthusiasm for a big party-style event (as opposed to political commitment).

4. *Curiosity aroused by information from media and school (5.0 percent)*

These young protesters have heard about the G8 summit and the problems of globalization at school or through the media, and are attempting to gain a first-hand impression and more information by taking part in the protests themselves.

5. *External motivation by friends (4.7 percent)*

This component connects items that assign friends an active role, where respondents themselves were more passive: in other words, they were brought along by friends.

6. *Demonstrating as an expression of collective resistance (4.6 percent)*

The central feature of this motive aspect is the wish “to be part of a movement.”

7. *Nationalist and protectionist motives (3.9 percent)*

Principal component 7 underlines how the “national” can be seen as the opposite of the “global.” Here we find fear of Americanization and “loss of national identity,” and even fear of immigrants taking jobs away as the motive for participating in the protests.

8. *External influence (3.3 percent)*

This last principal component brings together items that indicate that the young protesters took part in the protests not on their own account but in response to the expectations of others.

On the basis of the principal component analysis indices were calculated for each of the eight motive aspects. The index indicates the average agreement with the items whose loading on the corresponding principal component is greater than 0.35.⁴

² The factor loadings of the individual items are listed in Table A1 in the appendix.

³ Proportion of total variance explained by the component.

⁴ The values range between 1 (do not agree at all) and 4 (agree completely). We speak of agreement when the index value is greater than or equal to 3 and rejection of the corresponding motive aspect when the value is less than or equal to 2.

Using cluster analysis the surveyed respondents were put into eight groups or clusters such that individuals within a group differed very little in their motive structures whereas those from different groups differed as much as possible.⁵ The clusters represent an empirically verified typology of motive structures, although of course it must be remembered that these are aggregates and the designations of the clusters should be regarded as ideal types.

Each of the eight clusters is characterized by a specific mix of the eight motive aspects, although, as it turns out, the patterns of agreement and rejection for two motive aspects remained constant across most of the clusters. For one thing, the overwhelming majority of the young protesters agree with the motive aspect of political idealism: “Acting together against global social problems.” For another, a large majority of the respondents reject the aspect “Using violence against state power and out of general frustration.” On the basis of these two aspects the clusters can be grouped as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Cluster groupings

		Political idealism	
		Agree	Disagree
Violence	Agree	Politically idealistic, violence-motivated Cluster 6 (383 respondents, 11 %)	Politically disinterested, violence-motivated Cluster 8 (294 respondents, 8 %)
	Disagree	Politically idealistic, non-violent Cluster 1-5 (2,751 respondents, 77 %)	Politically disinterested, non-violent Cluster 7 (144 respondents, 4 %)

In the following we will describe the agreement rates for the individual motive aspects in the eight clusters and report the attitudes of cluster members toward different protest forms with a view to discovering whether a connection can

be identified between cluster membership and the preferred form of protest. Other important dimensions, such as gender composition and sociodemographic background are outlined briefly after the cluster descriptions.

4.1. Non-Violent Political Idealists

4.1.1. Motive Structure of Cluster 1:

Politically Idealistic and Movement-orientated

Cluster 1 is the largest, with 619 respondents representing 17 percent of the sample. Of the young protesters collected in this cluster, 98 percent said that their motive was to protest against human rights violations, poverty, and corporate power. However, given the high overall level of agreement with this motive aspect in the sample as a whole (87 percent), this is not specifically a feature of Cluster 1. What particularly characterizes the motivation of the young protesters in Cluster 1 is collective struggle as part of a movement. The cluster mean for this aspect differs significantly from all the other clusters. For 83 percent of the young protesters in this cluster participation in collective resistance is important. The relatively high level of involvement in political groups also reflects this collectivist orientation. Three quarters of the respondents said that they belonged to a political group; 72 percent are actively involved.

External motivation through media reporting or discussions at school play little role in Cluster 1; the same goes for the fun-seeking aspect, which was named by only 12 percent of the respondents in this cluster as a reason to participate in the protests. The motive aspect indicating external influence is rejected much less strongly in Cluster 1 than in the other clusters.

Cluster 1 is one of the non-violent clusters. While 93 percent here decisively rejected the motive “Using violence against state power and out of general frustration,” the proportion in the sample as a whole was 79 percent. Rejection of nationalist and protectionist motives by respondents in this cluster was also disproportionately high.

⁵ First of all the single-linkage hierarchical clustering method was used to identify outliers, which were excluded from further analysis. The optimal number of clusters was determined using Ward's

algorithm and the scree test. In subsequent cluster-center analysis the clusters were further optimized by using an exchange algorithm to rearrange the clustered individuals until it was no longer pos-

sible to further reduce the distance between the respective personal data and the cluster centroid.

Actual participation in protest actions corresponded with the spectrum of motives: The young protesters from Cluster 1 demonstrate a disproportionately high degree of active participation in all non-violent protest forms, such as demonstrations, public discussions, street theatre, protest concerts, and handing out leaflets, although their involvement in blockades, other civil disobedience, and spraying protest graffiti was also disproportionately high. The proportion

from Cluster 1 actively involved in violent actions corresponds to the overall average. Conspicuous in this cluster is the large number of young protesters who express approval of violent forms of protest even though they do not participate in them themselves: for example dismantling fences and barriers, throwing paint-bombs, defense against police attacks, and even the destruction of corporate property.

Sociodemographic coordinates of Cluster 1

Table 2: Attitudes to violent protest actions comparing Cluster 1 with all the non-violent clusters (1–5 and 7)

	Clusters 1–5 and 7			Cluster1		
	Rejection	Agreement	Participation	Rejection	Agreement	Participation
Dismantling barriers	44.3%	37.0%	12.5%	30.7%	47.0%	15.8%
Attacks on the police	80.1%	9.7%	5.2%	70.1%	16.3%	6.5%
Defense against police attacks	34.3%	42.9%	18.2%	24.4%	50.2%	21.0%
Throwing paint bombs	49.0%	36.1%	10.3%	33.4%	47.0%	14.7%
Throwing stones, bottles	86.4%	6.7%	2.9%	78.0%	11.0%	4.2%
Destruction of corporate property	62.1%	25.7%	7.5%	44.3%	38.8%	9.9%

In comparison to the overall sample, Cluster 1 has a slight overrepresentation of males and the proportion of over-nineteens is a little higher. Cluster 1 has the highest proportion of highly qualified school-leavers among the respondents and the highest proportion of graduates among their parents.

	Male	20 and older	Abitur (university entrance qualification)	Father graduate	Mother graduate
Cluster 1	59.5%	71.8%	57.6%	58.2%	54.6%
Overall	57.5%	68.5%	50.6%	53.2%	48.3%

4.1.2. Motive Structure of Cluster 2: Politically Idealistic Individualists

With 536 respondents, Cluster 2 comprises 15 percent of the overall sample. As in Cluster 1 almost all the young protesters here said that they were participating in the events to protest against human rights violations, poverty, and corporate power. What distinguishes these young protesters from all other clusters is their pronounced individualism. Collective protest is not a motive for them; they are neither interested in forms of collective resistance nor do they feel

part of a movement. Ninety percent of them explicitly reject the idea of external motivation through friends. Almost none of them said that they were in Rostock because their friends or political group expected it of them or because it was “in.” Respondents assigned to Cluster 2 cited fun-seeking as their motive for participation significantly less often than the young protesters in the other clusters, and the proportion reporting violent motives for their protest was 0 percent. With respect to their approval of and participation in the different forms of protest no notable differences were found to the distribution in the overall sample.

Sociodemographic coordinates of Cluster 2:

The proportion of males in Cluster 2 is above average. It is also the “oldest” cluster, highly qualified school-leavers are disproportionately represented, and their parents’ level of education is above average.

	Male	20 and older	Abitur (university entrance qualification)	Father graduate	Mother graduate
Cluster 2	61.2%	76.0%	57.1%	56.9%	52.2%
Overall	57.5%	68.5%	50.6%	53.2%	48.3%

4.1.3. Motive Structure of Cluster 3: Politically Idealistic, Seeking Fun, Information, and New Experiences

Cluster 3 comprises 556 respondents, representing 16 percent of the sample. These respondents are also politically idealistic, but they differ from the protesters in clusters 1 and 2 in that they explicitly cite the “fun and new experience” aspect of the demonstrations and big events as a motive for their participation. There is also above-average agreement with the motive aspect “Curiosity aroused by external information sources.”

Some of the young protesters in Cluster 3 became aware of the G8 summit and the protests through media reporting, and they did not want to miss the opportunity to experience the events first-hand. Alongside the idealistic aspect, we find a complex of characteristic motives here: to “have a party,” gather information, and enjoy the feeling of belonging to a movement. The latter is indicated by the fact that 76 percent of the young protesters in this cluster said they were

in Rostock because they wanted to express their resistance together with others. However, the number of respondents who are active in political groups is below average in this cluster.

The dimension of “external influence” was categorically rejected. Almost all the young protesters said that their participation was not dependent on others and that they were not following a trend. Cluster 3 is one of the non-violent clusters. The motive aspect “Using violence against state power and out of general frustration” has 0 percent agreement. The rejection of nationalist and protectionist motives is also disproportionately high. The proportion of young protesters in this cluster who take part in non-violent actions is average, while a disproportionately high number reject violent forms of protest such as damage to private and corporate property, attacks on the police, defense against police attack, and dismantling barriers.

Table 3: Attitudes to violent protest actions comparing Cluster 3 with all the non-violent clusters (1-5 and 7)

	Clusters 1 – 5 and 7			Cluster3		
	Rejection	Agreement	Participation	Rejection	Agreement	Participation
Dismantling barriers	44.3%	37.0%	12.5%	53.1%	32.7%	9.5%
Attacks on the police	80.1%	9.7%	5.2%	87.6%	5.4%	3.8%
Defense against police attacks	34.3%	42.9%	18.2%	43.3%	38.3%	14.2%
Damage to private property	88.7%	3.3%	2.7%	92.6%	2.0%	2.0%
Destruction of corporate property	62.1%	25.7%	7.5%	70.3%	20.3%	5.4%

Sociodemographic coordinates of Cluster 3:

The proportion of males in Cluster 3 is comparatively small, while it also contains an above-average proportion of highly qualified school-leavers. In terms of age structure and parents' education the cluster is average.

	Male	20 and older	Abitur (university entrance qualification)	Father graduate	Mother graduate
Cluster 3	54.2%	67.4%	56.8%	54.1%	49.6%
Overall	57.5%	68.5%	50.6%	53.2%	48.3%

4.1.4. Motive Structure of Cluster 4:

Politically Idealistic and Peer-orientated

This cluster brings together respondents who, as well as being politically idealistic and movement-orientated, were heavily influenced by friends to join the protests. Cluster 4 contains 539 respondents, representing 15 percent of the sample. The motive of political idealism achieves 96 percent agreement here, and for the young protesters in this cluster the feeling of being part of a movement and demonstrating together with others also plays a major role. But the influence of friends is decisive. It is because of them and their powers of persuasion that this group traveled to the protests. While this motive aspect is rejected by 65 percent of the overall sample, in Cluster 4 motivation through friends

is irrelevant for only 31 percent of the respondents. In other words, many respondents in this cluster came to the protests because their friends motivated them to. The motive “Using violence against state power and out of general frustration” is rejected by 95 percent of the protesters in Cluster 4, whose participation in demonstrations and signature-gathering was slightly above average. An above-average proportion supported public discussions, leafleting, street theater, and protest concerts, but they did not participate actively in these protest forms. All violent protest actions were rejected disproportionately often.

Sociodemographic coordinates of Cluster 4:

Cluster 4 is the only female-dominated cluster, and has a slightly above-average proportion of under-twenties. The proportion of school students is disproportionately high and this cluster has the highest proportion of university students. The educational background of their parents is average for the sample.

	Male	20 and older	School	University	Father graduate	Mother graduate
Cluster 4	44.6%	65.5%	29.2%	49.9%	55.8%	45.9%
Overall	57.5%	68.5%	24.9%	42.8%	53.2%	48.3%

4.1.5. Motive Structure of Cluster 5:

Politically Idealistic with Nationalist Tendencies

Cluster 5 brings together 501 respondents, representing 14 percent of the sample. They are politically idealistic and traveled to Rostock without the intention of participating in violent protests. The specific feature of Cluster 5 is the above average frequency of agreement with nationalist motives (29 percent). However, one should not jump to the conclusion that agreement with this motive aspect represents an expression of extreme right-wing ideology among these young protesters. These young protesters are afraid of Americanization and loss of national identity and express the fear that immigrants could take away jobs. While on average 45 percent of all respondents explicitly rejected this motive aspect, the corresponding figure within Cluster 5 is just 3 percent.

The proportion of these respondents who said they were also interested in the entertainment program, wanted to make new social contacts, and hoped to gather experience is above average at 24 percent. “Being part of a movement” and “demonstrating together” were also important motives here.

These young protesters participated slightly less than average in all non-violent protest forms but supported them slightly more than average. A disproportionately high number of respondents in this cluster rejected violent protest.

Sociodemographic coordinates of Cluster 5:

Cluster 5 is the only cluster with a balanced gender composition, while the age composition is the same as the average for the overall sample. In this cluster we find the highest proportion of individuals who left school with a qualification for non-university higher education, while the proportion of school-leavers with university entrance qualification is slightly below average. Of all the clusters, Cluster 5 exhibits the highest proportion of young people already in employment. Examination of the educational background of their parents reveals a below average proportion of graduates. The most commonly named parental educational qualification is an apprenticeship.

	Fachabitur (qualification for non-university higher education)	Abitur (university entrance qualification)	Employed	Father skilled worker	Mother skilled worker	Father graduate	Mother graduate
Cluster 5	13.6%	42.2%	11.6%	34.2%	45.7%	48.8%	40.9%
Overall	9.8%	50.6%	7.7%	28.7%	39.7%	53.2%	48.3%

4.2. Politically Idealistic, Potentially Violent

4.2.1. Motive Structures of Cluster 6: Politically Idealistic and Militant

Cluster 6 brings together 383 respondents, representing 11 percent of the sample. These young protesters, too, belong to the group motivated by political idealism but differ from the members of clusters 1 to 5 in that almost 20 percent of them explicitly agree with violence-orientated motives. The

aspect of violence is the decisive criterion demarcating them from the other politically idealistic clusters.

The respondents in Cluster 6 exhibit an explosive mix of motives: They are politically idealistic with above-average agreement with the violence motive aspect. These young protesters know their enemy, and violence plays a major role in the choice of means. This highly politicized cluster appears most closely to correspond to the so-called autonomists, who are part of the radical left-wing and militant wing of the globalization-critical movement (and whose Black Bloc enjoys a great deal of media attention). Their active involvement in political groups is slightly above average.

However, 26 percent of these young protesters were also motivated by the fun-seeking and experiential character of the demonstrations and big events, which is a disproportionately high share. Below average agreement was found in this cluster with the motive “Curiosity aroused by external information sources.” This could be an indicator that these young protesters were already informed and “in the know.” Although the protest behavior of this cluster is violence-orientated, violence is not their only medium of protest. Their participation in non-violent protest actions corresponds to the average for the sample. But they demonstrate by far the greatest agreement rates for violent actions. This can be interpreted as an expression of the view that without the use of violence nothing can be achieved and one will not even get noticed.

Table 4: Comparison of participation in violent actions between the politically idealistic, violence-approving Cluster 6 and the politically idealistic but non-violent clusters 1–5

	Cluster 1-5	Cluster 6
Damage to private property	2.7%	15.1%
Dismantling barriers	12.5%	32.4%
Attacks on the police	5.2%	29.5%
Defense against police attack	18.2%	42.8%
Throwing paint bombs	10.3%	27.9%
Throwing stones, bottles	2.9%	23.8%
Destruction of corporate property	7.5%	25.3%
Protest graffiti	14.8%	26.4%

Sociodemographic coordinates of Cluster 6:

With a ratio of nearly 3:1, Cluster 6 has the highest proportion of males, and with 45 percent under-twenties it is also the youngest cluster, which directly explains the disproportionate number of school students. The proportion of highly qualified school-leavers is lowest in Cluster 6, as is the proportion of university students. The proportion of young protesters who describe themselves as unemployed is more than twice the figure for the other clusters. In this cluster the proportion of graduates among their parents is below average. The most commonly named educational qualification of parents is an apprenticeship.

	Male	20 and older	Abitur (university entrance qualification)	In university-level tertiary education	Unemployed	Father skilled worker	Father graduate
Cluster 6	72.9%	54.7%	31.8%	28.5%	12.4%	34.7%	43.8%
Overall	57.2%	68.5%	50.6%	42.8%	5.7%	28.7%	53.2%

4.3. Violent but Non-Political

4.3.1. Motive Structure of Cluster 8: Fun-seeking Rioters

Cluster 8 comprises 294 respondents, or 8 percent of the sample. Only 42 percent of these young protesters agree with the motive aspect of political idealism, meaning that the majority were indifferent to the goals of the protests in which they were participating and did not define themselves as part of a movement collectively seeking to realize political goals and ideals of a better world; neither were they individualists, however. Rather they were disproportionately often motivated by friends and traveled together with them to the protests. What interests the respondents in this cluster about Rostock and the big events is the prospect of party and entertainment. Their experiential orientation is stronger than in any other cluster. Alongside the fun aspect a desire to riot is a key factor, although it would not appear to be politically motivated. Thirteen percent of the respondents from Cluster 8 explicitly agree with the violence-orientated motive aspect and only 18 percent explicitly reject it. The motive “Curiosity aroused by external information sources” found a similarly high level of agreement, above the average for the sample as a whole. The young protesters

had heard through the media that “something was going on” in Rostock, and wanted to be part of it. This corresponds with the above average frequency (20 percent) of respondents reporting that they were in Rostock because others expected this and because it was “in.” Like Cluster 6, Cluster 8 includes a disproportionately large number of respondents who support and take part in violent activities. But while the respondents from Cluster 6 also took part in non-violent protest actions, participation from Cluster 8 in such events was disproportionately small. This finding is no surprise, given that the majority of these young participants were not interested in the political dimension of the protests against globalization and the G8. The importance of experiential fun-seeking and motivation through friends and external information sources suggests that the members of Cluster 8 can be understood as media-networked “riot tourists” without genuine political interests. This clearly distinguishes them from the militant autonomists of Cluster 6 who are also violent, but highly political too. A weak feeling of group belonging and a comparatively low level of active involvement in political groups also matches this picture.

Table 5: Comparison of participation in violent actions between the politically disinterested, violence-approving Cluster 8 and the politically idealistic, violence-approving Cluster 6

	Cluster 8	Cluster 6
Damage to private property	13.3%	15.1%
Dismantling barriers	17.7%	32.4%
Attacks on the police	13.9%	29.5%
Defense against police attack	24.8%	42.8%
Throwing paint bombs	17.7%	27.9%
Throwing stones, bottles	12.2%	23.8%
Destruction of corporate property	13.9%	25.3%
Protest graffiti	20.1%	26.4%

Sociodemographic coordinates of Cluster 8:

Cluster 8 has a slight overrepresentation of males. The educational background of the respondents is below average: both the proportion of highly qualified school-leavers and the proportion of students are below the levels for the overall sample. The proportion unemployed is relatively very high, while the educational background of their parents is slightly below average.

	Male	20 and older	Abitur (university entrance qualification)	In university-level tertiary education	Unemployed	Father graduate	Mother graduate
Cluster 8	61.2%	70.4%	39.4%	33.2%	11.0%	47.1%	43.9%
Overall	57.2%	68.5%	50.6%	42.8%	5.7%	53.2%	48.3%

4.4. Non-Political and Non-Violent

4.4.1. Motive Structure of Cluster 7: Not Protest-orientated

With 144 respondents Cluster 7 is the smallest, comprising 4 percent of the overall sample. It differs significantly from all other clusters in all motive aspects. Agreement is below average for all motive dimensions. Thus only 3.5 percent say they are motivated by political idealism, which is a striking contrast to the overall average of 87 percent.

Table 6: Attitude to the individual motive aspects

Motive aspects	Reject motive aspect			Agree with motive aspect		
	Politically motivated Cluster 1-6	Unpolitical, violent Cluster 8	Cluster 7	Politically motivated Cluster 1-6	Unpolitical, violent Cluster 8	Cluster 7
Acting together against global social problems	0.0%	0.0%	42.4%	95.6%	41.8%	3.5%
Violence against state power and frustration	84.5%	18.0%	87.5%	2.4%	12.9%	0.0%
Fun-seeking	30.5%	5.4%	45.1%	15.0%	28.6%	10.4%
Curiosity aroused by external information sources	52.8%	6.5%	79.2%	11.0%	22.8%	1.4%
Motivation through friends	69.4%	13.3%	80.6%	3.5%	20.7%	1.4%
Part of a movement	6.0%	2.7%	52.8%	64.6%	34.7%	12.5%
Nationalist motives	45.3%	14.3%	88.9%	6.3%	18.0%	0.0%
External influence	92.4%	13.6%	98.6%	0.8%	20.1%	0.0%

If we examine Table 6, it is conspicuous that the respondents from Cluster 7 slip through the net of motives defined by the questionnaire. Only the aspects of fun-seeking and collective resistance achieve agreement levels exceeding 10 percent, and these are considerably lower than the comparable figures for other clusters. Thus 42 percent of the respondents from Cluster 7 say that they do not want to take action against social problems, 45 percent are not there to get to know new people and gather new experiences, 79 percent are not interested in information, and 53 percent do not see themselves as part of a movement. So one can say that many of the respondents collected in Cluster 7 were in principle not interested in the protest events against the G8 summit. The next obvious question is: “Why were they in Rostock at all?” One interpretation would be that these are people who got mixed up in the protests by accident or were observing the protesters “as outsiders.”

Sociodemographic coordinates of Cluster 7:

Cluster 7 too is characterized by a disproportionately high proportion of males. The proportion of over-nineteens is relatively high, the proportion of school students is relative-

ly low, and the proportion of university students disproportionately high. The educational background of their parents is also above average.

	Male	20 and older	School	In university-level tertiary education	Father graduate	Mother graduate
Cluster 7	65.3%	73.7%	19.9%	50.0%	57.9%	52.1%
Overall	57.2%	68.5%	24.9%	42.8%	53.2%	48.3%

5. Connections between Cluster Membership and Protest Forms

As already suggested in the description of the clusters, we find a connection between cluster membership and attitudes to individual protest forms. The questionnaire recorded attitudes toward seventeen different forms of political protest, and a statistically significant correlation was found for all forms.⁶ The higher the violence potential of the protest form, the stronger the correlation between protest form and motive structure (see Table 7).

⁶ $\alpha < 0.001$

Table 7: Strength of the correlation between cluster membership and attitude toward individual protest forms

Protest form	Cramer V
Non-violent protest forms	
Gathering signatures	.144
Street theater and protest concerts	.150
Handing out and posting leaflets	.173
Participation in marches and demonstrations	.179
Public discussions	.190
Violent protest forms	
Spraying protest graffiti	.209
Violence in defense against police attacks	.213
Blockading streets and access roads	.214
Violent protest forms involving attacks	
Damage to private property of local residents	.210
Dismantling barriers erected to protect summit participants	.219
Throwing paint bombs	.245
Bomb threats	.259
Destruction of corporate property (e.g. banks, McDonalds)	.281
Attacks on the police	.320
Throwing stones, bottles, etc.	.327

Non-violent protest forms find the greatest agreement among the young protesters, with more than 90 percent. But there are two motive clusters—7 and 8—where agreement is strikingly low. While the deviation in Cluster 7 can be explained in terms of strong disinterest in political protest, the obvious explanation for Cluster 8 would be that non-violent protests are unattractive for its members. Only a small number of the interviewed protesters participated in violent protest forms. The frequency of violence was above average in clusters 6 and 8. Among the respondents who “merely” supported violent forms (without participating in them themselves) we find members of clusters 6 and 8 over-represented.

The results for Cluster 1 are astonishing. Although the young protesters from Cluster 1 categorically reject violence as a motive, and refrain from participating in violent forms of protest, their sympathy for violent protest forms is above average. One explanation for this discrepancy can be seen

in the strong movement orientation of the young protesters from Cluster 1. They grant all members of the movement the right to express their protest in the form they choose themselves, which leads them to accept violent forms of protest by members of the movement who believe these forms to be right.

Violent protest forms involving attacks are rejected especially strongly in clusters 3 and 4. This could be grounded in the above-average proportion of women in these two clusters.

Two results of the comparison appear to us to be especially noteworthy. First, it turns out that rejection of violence as a motive for participating in the protest actions does not in every case mean rejection of violence as a protest form or refusal to participate in violent actions. Put another way, there are young protesters who came without the explicit aim of exercising violence but if, for example, clashes occurred would have participated in them or said they were justified. Secondly, in the two clusters where the violence motive plays a role—clusters 6 and 8—we find considerably higher levels of agreement for participation in and approval of violent protest actions. The levels of agreement in Cluster 6 (i.e. among the young protesters who came to Rostock for politically idealistic motives) are significantly higher still than in Cluster 8 (young protesters for whom violence is an end in itself).

6. Conclusions

In the overall sample we identified eight groups of participants, each with their own specific motive structure. Those wishing to be politically active against social grievances and growing global inequality found themselves side by side with groups motivated by a hedonistic desire for new experiences and fun as part of a group.

Despite the differences between the individual groups, we were able to identify two cross-cluster motive aspects shared by young protesters from several clusters: strong political idealism and rejection of violence. Thus 87 percent of the surveyed protesters agree with the motive “Acting together against global social problems,” which can be understood as the movement’s master frame (these respondents are

distributed among clusters 1 to 6). The protest participants want above all to join together with others to articulate their dissatisfaction with the political and economic shape of neoliberal globalization and the associated negative consequences for individuals and society. But that does not mean that all the young protesters see themselves as part of a homogeneous movement. Although the overwhelming majority are interested in the goals of the protests, we identified two clusters where political idealism was less marked. In clusters 7 and 8, which together represent just 12 percent of the sample, political idealism is a subordinate motive or de facto plays no role.

We found cross-cluster rejection of “Using violence against state power and out of general frustration,” with 0 percent agreement in clusters 1 to 5 and 7. Here clusters 6 and 8—with agreement at 20 percent and 13 percent respectively—stand out from a broad consensus of non-violent protest. Our data supports the findings of Andretta, della Porta, and Mosca’s study of the 2001 protests in Genoa (2003, 123ff.), that a widespread rejection of violence as a means of protest predominates within the global justice movement. In Cluster 6 we found a mix of politically idealistic and violence-orientated motives. This group shares the master frame of the movement and openly supports violence as a means to achieve its political demands. Cluster 8 is quite a different matter. Here the majority of respondents regard violence as an end in itself, a source of entertainment. Their actions are largely violence-centered and are *not* based on

any political (i.e. globalization-critical) stance. Seen from a sociological perspective, a large part of Cluster 8 cannot be assigned to the global justice movement, because it rejects its master frame or is not interested in it.

Alongside the cross-cluster aspects of political idealism and rejection of violence, we found a checkered spectrum of motives in the individual clusters. Only for Cluster 2, which comprises 15 percent of the sample, was political idealism the sole motive; in all the other clusters we identified a mix of motives. The spectrum ranges from social idealism to hedonistic fun-seeking and protectionist motives. Apparently, rebelling against the problems of the world is not automatically incompatible with the wish to have fun too. However, the plurality of protest motives also encompasses nationalist aspects. As many as 30 percent of the young protesters from Cluster 5 see globalization as threatening their national identity and economic opportunities; this can be interpreted as a defensive attitude toward the opening and loss of borders in the course of the globalization process.

The bandwidth of motives for participation in the protests against the G8 summit in Heiligendamm spans conflicting aspects of individualism and collectivism, idealism and hedonism, pacifism and militancy, internationalism and nationalism. This synthesis of apparently contradictory motives reflects the individualization and pluralization of the protests of the global justice movement and its young supporters.

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Appendix

Table A1: Eight-factor solution with factor loadings and items

Component/Factor	Items: I am here ...
Acting together against global social problems (13.6%)	0.80 because I want to draw attention to human rights violations
	0.78 to show solidarity with the poor and oppressed
	0.78 to draw attention to the situation in the third world
	0.76 because I oppose the concentration of power in the hands of the big corporations
	0.73 to protest for the rights of minorities
	0.73 to demonstrate against poverty and repression
	0.63 because I want to do something against the lack of perspective
	0.61 because I want to express my opinion together with others
	0.54 because you can only achieve anything together with others
	0.48 because I can express resistance here
Using violence against state power and out of general frustration (11.8%)	0.41 because I can discuss with other people here
	0.80 because I want a riot
	0.79 because you can only achieve anything through violence
	0.78 because I can work off my aggression here
	0.78 because I want to fight with the police
	0.76 because you can only do anything about globalization with violence
	0.67 to do as much harm to the system as possible
	0.62 because I can get rid of my everyday cares and frustration here
Demonstrating as a fun experience (8.1%)	0.59 to let off steam properly for once
	0.45 because an event like this relieves the boredom
	0.74 to party
	0.73 to get to know new people
	0.68 because there is plenty going on here
	0.61 to gain new experiences
	0.57 to experience something new
	0.55 because I want to be part of such a big thing
Curiosity aroused by information from media and school (5.0%)	0.48 because great musicians are performing
	0.44 because demonstrating is fun
	0.70 because I heard about the G8 summit in the media
	0.66 because we discussed globalization at school
	0.47 to find out about the machinations of the G8

External motivation by friends (4.7%)	0.76 because my friends brought me along
	0.63 because my friends told me it is important to demonstrate against the G8 summit
	0.50 because all my friends are here too
Demonstrating as an expression of collective resistance (4.6%)	0.65 because it is a great feeling to be part of a movement
	0.64 because it is a good feeling to be fighting together
Nationalist and protectionist motives (3.9%)	0.72 because globalization takes away our national identity
	0.59 because I am against globalization
	0.50 to demonstrate against America
	0.43 because you have to speak up against the destruction of jobs
	0.43 because immigrants are taking away our jobs
External influence (3.3%)	0.68 because I am a member of a globalization-critical group
	0.42 because my friends expect me to take part in the protest
	0.40 because being here is "in"

Table A2: Agreement/disagreement with motive aspects by cluster

	Cluster1	Cluster2	Cluster3	Cluster4	Cluster5	Cluster6	Cluster7	Cluster8	All
Number of respondents	619	536	556	539	501	383	144	294	3572
Proportion of sample	17.3%	15.0%	15.6%	15.1%	14.0%	10.7%	4.0%	8.2%	100.0%
Acting together against global social problems									
Agree	98.2%	94.8%	96.4%	96.1%	93.4%	93.2%	3.5%	41.8%	87.4%
Disagree	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	42.4%	0.0%	1.7%
Using violence against state power and out of general frustration									
Agree	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	19.6%	0.0%	12.9%	3.2%
Disagree	92.9%	95.5%	94.1%	95.2%	90.6%	17.2%	87.5%	18.0%	79.2%
Demonstrating as a fun experience									
Agree	11.5%	1.1%	20.9%	10.8%	24.0%	26.1%	10.4%	28.6%	15.9%
Disagree	30.4%	69.4%	18.9%	24.5%	17.6%	18.3%	45.1%	5.4%	29.0%
Curiosity aroused by information from media and school									
Agree	1.1%	2.2%	33.5%	11.5%	13.2%	3.4%	1.4%	22.8%	11.6%
Disagree	73.8%	77.8%	14.7%	44.5%	39.9%	67.6%	79.2%	6.5%	50.0%
External motivation by friends									
Agree	1.8%	0.0%	0.4%	12.6%	3.8%	2.6%	1.4%	20.7%	4.8%
Disagree	74.2%	89.6%	79.7%	31.0%	69.7%	72.3%	80.6%	13.3%	65.2%
Demonstrating as an expression of collective resistance									
Agree	83.4%	6.5%	76.4%	71.6%	68.7%	83.3%	12.5%	34.7%	60.1%
Disagree	0.0%	28.5%	2.0%	1.3%	3.4%	0.0%	52.8%	2.7%	7.6%
Nationalist and protectionist motives									
Agree	0.3%	0.9%	1.4%	1.9%	29.3%	7.0%	0.0%	18.0%	7.1%
Disagree	58.3%	64.0%	62.1%	43.0%	3.2%	31.9%	88.9%	14.3%	44.5%
External influence									
Agree	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%	0.2%	1.0%	0.0%	20.1%	2.3%
Disagree	79.5%	97.4%	97.3%	93.5%	95.4%	93.7%	98.6%	13.6%	86.2%

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