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The International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV) is a peer-reviewed periodical for scientific exchange and public dissemination of the latest academic research on conflict and violence. It was included in the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) in March 2011. The subjects on which the IJCV concentrates have always been the subject of interest in many different areas of academic life. Consequently, the journal encompasses contributions from a wide range of disciplines including sociology, political science, education, social psychology, criminology, ethnology, history, political philosophy, urban studies, economics, and the study of religions. The IJCV is open-access: All text of the IJCV is subject to the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives License. The IJCV is published twice a year, in spring and in fall. Each issue will focus on one specific topic while also including articles on other issues.

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Dear Reader,

This time our focus section features work from the first conference hosted by IJCV. In 2011 Donatella della Porta and Gary LaFree, both members of the journal’s advisory board, brought together in Bielefeld experts from around the world to thoroughly debate the question of radicalization and de-radicalization. In contrast to prior approaches that mostly focused on the context of terrorism, the aim of this focus section is to present work employing new theoretical and methodological approaches to generate findings that go well beyond terrorism and related phenomena and thus contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the processes, dynamics, and mechanisms of radicalization and de-radicalization. Our heartfelt thanks go to the two guest editors – as well as the entire conference team – for realising this ambitious project and for putting together this collection of papers.

The open section contains two articles of additional interest. Rafi Nets-Zehngut uses the example of the 1948 Palestinian exodus to describe the characteristics of internal and external collective memories in Israeli society. The section closes with a contribution by Claudia Diehl and Jan-Philipp Steinmann who explore the impact of the release and public discussion of Thilo Sarrazin’s book Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany abolishes itself) on public perception of immigrants in Germany.

May 2012

Wilhelm Heitmeyer  Douglas S. Massey  Steven F. Messner  James Sidanius  Michel Wieviorka
Guest Editorial: Processes of Radicalization and De-Radicalization

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Gary LaFree, START, University of Maryland, United States

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Guest Editorial: Processes of Radicalization and De-Radicalization

Donatella Della Porta, European University Institute, Florence, Italy
Gary LaFree, START, University of Maryland, United States

The study of radicalization and de-radicalization, understood as processes leading towards the increased or decreased use of political violence, is central to the question of how political violence emerges, how it can be prevented, and how it can be contained. The focus section of this issue of the International Journal of Conflict and Violence addresses radicalization and de-radicalization, seeking to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the processes, dynamics, and mechanisms involved and taking an interdisciplinary approach to overcome the fragmentation into separate disciplines and focus areas.


Radicalization may be understood as a process leading towards the increased use of political violence, while de-radicalization, by contrast, implies reduction in the use of political violence. Taken together, the study of radicalization and de-radicalization is central to answering the question of how political violence emerges, how it can be prevented, and how it can be contained.

Notwithstanding their theoretical and practical relevance, thus far most studies of radicalization and de-radicalization have been fragmented into separate disciplines and topical focus areas, which emphasize varying theoretical approaches and different aspects of the phenomenon. Different waves of violence have been addressed by specialists of different geographical areas, using different toolkits and often bringing to bear idiosyncratic explanations. In particular the wave of Islamist political violence during the past decade has attracted a great amount of research on processes of radicalization. This research has focused mostly on terrorism and has been largely restricted to the appearance of very specific groups that have emerged in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Moreover, historical perspectives on this contemporary phenomenon have been rare and most studies of radicalization have not taken into account its counterpart, processes of de-radicalization.

The major aim of this focus section of the International Journal of Conflict and Violence is to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the processes, dynamics, and mechanisms of radicalization and de-radicalization. This focus section began with an international conference on Radicalization and De-Radicalization held in Bielefeld, Germany, in April 2011 and generously supported by the Volkswagen Foundation. We want to thank Stefan Malthaner, Lorenzo Bosi, Chares Demetriou, Alex Veit, André Bank, and Teresa Koloma Beck for writing the original application and organizing the conference. We have relied greatly on their hard work in putting together and presenting this focus section. This volume seeks to enrich the burgeoning academic debate in this area with new theoretical approaches and methodologies. The contributors to this focus section approach the topic from a wide range of comparative and disciplinary perspectives, locate radicalization/de-radicalization in its broader transnational and global context, and in so doing, go well beyond the phenomenon of terrorism. Contributors analyze different forms of radicalization/de-radicalization across space as
well as time. The papers explore the complex interactions between the social, political, and cultural environment (macro-level), but also the role of internal dynamics in armed groups (meso-level) and individual life-experiences (micro-level) in radicalization and de-radicalization processes.

1. The State of Recent Research

In research on political violence in advanced democracies in the 1970s, the term radicalization emerged to stress the interactive (social movements/state) and processual (gradual escalation) dynamics in the formation of violent, often clandestine groups (Della Porta 1995). In this approach, radicalization referred to the actual use of violence, with escalation in terms of forms and intensity. In recent years, the term “radicalism” became prominent in research on terrorism, particularly research on Islamist terrorism in OECD countries. Scholars were especially concerned with the phenomenon of young Muslims with Western socialization who joined militant Islamist groups. Much of this research sought to explain processes of individual radicalization and ways of becoming part of violent groups (see, e.g., McCauley and Moskalenko 2008; Wiktorowicz 2005; Waldmann 2009). Some studies identified elements in the personal and social situation of Muslim immigrants that make them vulnerable to radicalization. A number of these studies also examined the role of certain groups and settings (e.g., mosques), as well as typical trajectories of radicalization processes on the micro-level. Closely connected with this were a number of studies focusing on processes of de-radicalization and disengagement from terrorism (in particular, Bjorgo and Horgan 2009) and discussions of how terrorism ends (e.g. Cronin 2009; LaFree and Miller 2008). With few exceptions, this research was characterized by its focus on individuals, on ideological and psychological processes, and on examining violent groups in isolation from their social and political context. Several recent works on Islamist terrorism in Middle Eastern countries deal with the emergence of violent groups and processes of decline and disengagement from terrorism (e.g. Hafez 2003; Hegghammer 2010). They contribute important insights, which, however, have so far only partially been integrated into the general debate on radicalization and de-radicalization.

Research on radicalization has also drawn heavily on the literature on social movements. Here, radicalization is understood as an escalation process leading to violence. This line of research analyzes patterns of movements’ interaction with police and other actors. The influential resource-mobilization (collective action) approach interprets the use of violence by movement organizations as a strategic choice under the constraints of particular opportunity structures and the availability of certain resources and emphasizes context and interactive dynamics. Radicalization is also traced to the level of the actors’ perceptions and attitudes, with scholars using the concept of interpretative frames and examining the role of violence-legitimizing narratives (see Della Porta and Diani 2006 for a summary). Whereas most social movement research focuses on non-militant movements, a number of works have dealt explicitly with the emergence of violent groups and processes of violent radicalization. These studies thus link social movement theory to the field of terrorism studies (Della Porta 1995, Tilly 2004, Wood 2003). Similarly, some works within the research on terrorism adopted approaches from social movement theory (in particular, Wiktorowicz 2004). Nevertheless, research on terrorism and research on social movements have remained largely separate.

Other fields of research relevant to this focus section are studies of civil war, insurgencies, and political violence. Numerous works among the broad array of research on revolutions and violent insurgencies deal with questions of how violence emerges, how conflicts escalate, or how actors and their aims transform in the process (Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007). Several studies specifically examine processes of escalation and de-escalation. Yet, with few exceptions (Waldmann 1993, 2003; Della Porta forthcoming), there are no comparative works on different forms of violence, and research on civil wars seldom considers results from the other research traditions and vice versa.

2. Processes of Radicalization and De-Radicalization

Many researchers conceptualize radicalization as a process characterized by increasing commitment to and use of violent means and strategies in political conflicts. Radicalization from this point of view entails a change in perceptions towards polarizing and absolute definitions of
a given situation, and the articulation of increasingly “radical” aims and objectives. It may evolve from enmity towards certain social groups, or societal institutions and structures. It may also entail the increasing use of violent means.

Radicalization in these approaches refers to patterns of both behavior and attitudes. These two dimensions of radicalization – action (behavior) and attitudes (aims and perceptions) – are closely linked, but must not be understood as necessarily depending on each other. Radical attitudes do not always precede or lead to violent acts. Groups voicing the most radical aims are not necessarily the first to engage in violence. Becoming involved in violent groups and engaging in acts of violence does not always presume adherence to radical aims and frames of reference, but can be motivated by, for example, personal relationships and loyalty to a group. It is therefore helpful to distinguish micro, meso, and macro levels of radicalization. Individual processes of radicalization should be distinguished from radicalization on the group and organizational level, and both need to be situated in prevailing structural conditions and discursive settings.

Radicalization, in other words, is a phenomenon composed of various processes which should be distinguished analytically as they seem to be driven by different mechanisms, follow different patterns, and need to be understood in their social and political context. Especially the latter aspect needs further scrutiny. The concept of radicalization is often used in a way that focuses attention on “radical groups” or certain individuals considered prone to radicalization, suggesting that the problem of violence lies with some quality intrinsic to these groups and individuals, rather than being a result of a larger conflict and societal and political conditions. Radicalization may more profitably be analyzed as a process of interaction between violent groups and their environment, or an effect of interactions between mutually hostile actors. It takes, for example, the form of escalation processes between protest movements and state security forces, or of escalating confrontations between different social groups. Moreover, radicalization may be an expression as well as a trigger of larger social change.

The term de-radicalization can be understood to simply denote the reversal of radicalization processes. Yet even more than radicalization, the concept of de-radicalization suffers from a lack of precision concerning the actual processes involved. Often what is meant is the prevention and disruption of radicalization (i.e. non-radicalization) rather than its reversal, and often behavioral and cognitive elements are not clearly identified.

Again, de-radicalization needs to be scrutinized on micro, meso and macro levels, and most importantly the interplay between these dimensions. On the individual level, it is important to distinguish between the de-radicalization of attitudes and beliefs, the disengagement from violent behavior, and the process of leaving violent groups and re-integrating into other social groups and structures. Again, these processes do not necessarily correspond. People can, for example, disengage from violence or leave violent groups but retain “radical” beliefs and attitudes. On the meso-level, the ending of violent campaigns by radical groups can result from defeat, declining resources, organizational disintegration, or, connected to the macro level, from changing political opportunity-structures. Thus, aims and attitudes can remain the same, be adapted to changing circumstances, or be even further radicalized.

At this point we know relatively little about how processes of de-radicalization are involved when the disengagement from violence is not voluntary. Individual and group processes of disengagement can be linked in various ways. Groups can disintegrate or radicalize as a result of defection. And individuals can de-radicalize in parallel with their organization. On the other hand, it can also often be observed that new, even more radical groupings emerge.

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1 This understanding of radicalization is partly based on McCauley and Moskalenko, who define radicalization as follows: “Functionally, political radicalization is increased preparation for and commitment to intergroup conflict. Descriptively, radicalization means change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the group” (2008, 416). Our understanding differs from theirs insofar as we put greater emphasis on the element of violence and do not use the concept of intergroup conflict – both in order to keep the definition more open and to make it applicable to various forms of political conflict and political violence.
when the leadership of an organization decides to stop a violent campaign. How social changes, sometimes enhanced by radicalization processes themselves, and changing discourse in larger society, affect radical groups and individuals also remains a largely open question.

Considering the social quality of radicalization and the role of political context, the analysis of de-radicalization, too, has to take account of interactions and relationships. De-radicalization involves the disruption (or reversal) of cycles of escalation and self-reinforcing dynamics in violent confrontations, for example between protest movements and police, insurgent and incumbent forces, or between different armed groups in a civil-war situation. In addition, de-radicalization may involve changes in the structure of violent groups as well as changes in the conflict structure. For example, ending violent campaigns may entail (or require) a shift in power between different factions or political and military wings of an organization. Finally, de-radicalization may involve – or even may result from – changes in the relationship between violent groups and certain audiences, in particular the legitimacy of radicalism in the perspective of groups’ constituencies and other audiences.

In line with the interdisciplinary and international scope of the IJCV, in this volume we seek to establish a comparative perspective on processes of radicalization across national and cultural contexts as well as with respect to different phenomena of political violence and violent conflict. Our aim is to encourage comparative interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary perspectives on radicalization and de-radicalization that adequately address the complexity of these phenomena.

2.1. Radicalization and De-Radicalization in Repressive Settings

The literature on radicalization processes has so far focused mainly on episodes of radicalization in non-repressive settings, such as political violence perpetrated by small groups in Western democracies or collective riots in large Western cities. Thus far few researchers have considered radicalization processes in repressive settings, such as authoritarian regimes. Two papers in this focus section deal directly with this issue. Pénélope Larzillière examines how radicalization and de-radicalization operates in Jordan, a highly authoritarian regime, pointing out how professional associations and the Islamist social movement have been critical to these processes. Larzillière’s work underscores the need for less state-centered explanations of radicalization and de-radicalization processes. Similarly, Felix Heiduk examines how radicalization and de-radicalization processes play out in post-Suharto democratic Indonesia. Observing that political liberalization has at the same time witnessed a strengthening of moderate Islamic civil society organizations and Islamic parties, but also the emergence of violent Islamist groups, he points out the highly ambiguous relationship between state and political Islam, with parallel policies of repression and co-optation. The resurgence of political Islam is therefore linked to the power politics that lies behind the post-1998 creation of democratic institutions in Indonesia.

2.2. The Legitimacy of Radicalization/De-Radicalization

Given that de-radicalization – just like radicalization – occurs in front of audiences, the legitimacy the audience may bestow on, or withhold from transforming radical groups, is highly relevant for the course of de-radicalization. Radicalized electorates, for example, may exert pressure against conciliatory policies; religious leaders may influence radical sects to reconsider the religious mainstream; counter-cultures may sanction a return to mainstream behavior; the opinion of a social movement’s base may lead it to return to the fold; and the certification an international body (e.g., the UN Security Council) may provide to the parties engaged in a peace process can supply incentives to either continue or break the process, depending on the circumstances.

When and how, therefore, is legitimacy an impediment, and when and how does it boost de-radicalization? The phenomena connecting legitimacy and de-radicalization fall into the purview of a range of academic disciplines and sub-disciplines. Yet, on a basic level, they all concern the relationship between actors and audiences. Bill Kissane examines many of these legitimacy issues in a paper on the effects of elections on the development of nationalism in Ireland. Examining the victory of Sinn Fein’s moderate wing in 1922–23, he focuses on the potentially de-escalating effects of elections as crucial mechanisms for making nationalist elites accountable to their citizens.
2.3. Institutional Radicalization/De-Radicalization

States may of course play a major role in radicalization and de-radicalization. Extreme examples of radicalized states, societies that murdered large proportions of their own population, are Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union under Stalin, and Cambodia and Rwanda in the mid- to late-twentieth century. But less obvious cases of state radicalization dynamics, such as the contemporary “war on terror” in nominally liberal states, also need to be investigated. In ordinary situations, state institutions often respond to challenges with repressive means that are prone to escalate conflicts with social movements, oppositional groupings, or external contenders. In many cases, interactions between states and their societal opponents result in processes that are difficult to halt or turn around.

This focus section includes two papers that deal with institutional processes of radicalization and de-radicalization and examine the role of states in resisting radicalization. Hank Johnston adopts a cross-national approach, focusing on the processes of radicalization within the states themselves. Drawing on the experiences of high-capacity states, he observes how states use violence against oppositional groups. He examines as examples China, Russia, Iran, and the Middle East, stressing the complexity of the State’s repressive apparatus, but also the creativity of the opposition in finding ways to voice protest. Christian Davenport and Cynne Loyle focus on the relationship between the United States government and the Republic of New Africa, a black nationalist organization that was active in the late 1960s and early 1970s. They find that long-term plans to eliminate challengers deemed threatening to the U.S. political economy and a crusade against black radicals increased the likelihood of continued government coercion despite short-term failure.

2.4. Organizational Dynamics of De-Radicalization

Violent groups, organizations, and movements are complex entities. Leaders face the challenge of maintaining organizational cohesion and discipline, of securing economic resources, and of gaining sustainable approval for their role and strategies. Violent organizations are composed of different factions and sub-groups that compete over power and over the group’s political and strategic direction. Moreover, different organizational structures may entail different degrees of segmentation, isolation and autonomy of sub-division, and hierarchy, which affects the way they react to external challenges.

Veronique Dudouet focuses on the organizational dynamics of what she defines as non-state armed groups. Noting that these represent important stakeholders in political conflicts, she presents original empirical findings on the rebel leaders’ own accounts of the internal dynamics in rebel organizations. Based on participatory action research, the paper contributes new knowledge on negotiation processes in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Nepal, Aceh, El Salvador, Colombia, and South Africa. In all seven countries and territories, processes of negotiation, demobilization, disarmament, and democratic institutionalisation ended up in successful transitions from violent insurgency to peaceful political participation.

2.5. The Outcomes of Radicalization/De-Radicalization

If radicalization is understood to be the strategic use of physical force to influence several audiences, and de-radicalisation as an intended reverse process, what are some of the intended and unintended outcomes of radicalization and de-radicalization? Lasse Lindekilde directly addresses these issues. Using the Danish case as an example, he observes the potential dangers when the term radicalization has been stretched to include beliefs (rather than behaviors) and used for so-called anti-radicalization policies that stigmatize large portions of the population. Just belonging to a group with potential grievances, identifying with a certain community, or being particularly religious can come to be considered as indicators of high radicalization potential. The unintended outcome is then mistrust among the affected population and a de-legitimization of the regime.

3. Concluding Thoughts

Radicalization and de-radicalization emerge as important concepts both in our understanding of political violence and in the choice of policy strategy to contain it. In focusing on these concepts, this special set of articles presents diverse theoretical approaches, methodological choices, and disciplinary contributions, in the context of a broad
range of countries and types of violent political action. When selecting these papers for publication, we, as editors, have explicitly sought diversity as a way to enrich our knowledge on political violence and policies addressing it. In line with this journal’s emphasis, we believe in the virtue of cross-fertilization between disciplines and approaches as a necessary balance against trends towards over-specialization which are present in most disciplines. Of course, interdisciplinary, theoretically eclectic, and methodologically pluralist knowledge is difficult to develop—but we hope this volume can represent a step in this direction.

References
Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime: Professional Associations and the Islamist Movement as Alternative Arenas in Jordan

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Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime: Professional Associations and the Islamist Movement as Alternative Arenas in Jordan

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How does political commitment develop when actors are confronted with authoritarian processes? Under a liberal authoritarian regime, even the creation of democratic institutions may mean authoritarian stabilization (contradicting classical transition theories) rather than open an arena for political protest. However, alternative contentious arenas may appear, where resourceful organizations can be partially transformed into a basis for protest with challenging frames of reference. In the Jordanian case, the professional associations (in contravention of corporatism theory) and the Islamist social movement have thus gained oppositional capacity. However, apart from repression, their own economic and social roles, and their integration in the regime frame and limit the kind of political commitment they can lead. Ambivalence arises between challenging and integrated positions and when alternative arenas become so integrated in the regime that they lose their contentious role, radicalization processes appear. Both cases underline the versatility of political arenas and their relational characteristics. These political arenas are also the places where alternative ideologies are produced. At that level, the Islamist movement has a very specific position as a hegemonic ideological producer with no hegemonic power and position. The case thus supports an analytical separation between power position and ideology and confirms the need for less state-centred definition of ideology.

Authoritarian regimes attempt to control, repress, or even eradicate any political challenge. Repressive settings reduce the possibility for collective action and increase the risks of political commitment, but do not eliminate contentious politics. However stable the regime may appear, the dynamics of opposition are in play and lead to an ebb and flow of mobilization. So how does political commitment develop when actors are confronted with coercive processes? What arenas, dynamics, and repertoires of action are involved? Is it possible to identify processes of (de)radicalization in such contexts? A meso-level analysis of the Jordanian case addresses these questions and identifies arenas of mobilization and the different ways they interact with the state, from co-optation to anti-system positioning (Albrecht 2009, 7).

In Jordan, alternative political arenas have been found to exist outside the very well controlled democratic institutions. They have gained oppositional capacity by combining a widely recognized social utility (professional and charitable roles) with political activities. I will argue that in repressive settings (de)radicalization processes are linked to the emergence of such alternative political arenas. These arenas, in which political commitment is institutionalized, are framed by a constantly shifting relationship with the regime, in that sense they can be analyzed as relational action fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2011; Goldstone 2004). The notion of relational action field is useful in allowing a non-static view of political commitment in authoritarian regimes and a focus on its institutionalization in different arenas. However, rather than proposing a purely strategic analysis of these action fields, the study articulates it with an analysis of the frames of reference and ideologies used by incumbents and challengers and the legitimacy processes at work. I argue that forms of cultural hegemony

I would like to thank André Bank and the two anonymous referees for their insightful comments on and criticisms of a first version.
may appear outside the state, confirming the need for less hegemonic and more differentiated analysis of the state, even in authoritarian contexts, as well as a less state-centered definition of ideology (Hall 1982).

I will first analyze the repressive and authoritarian processes at work in Jordan and assess their impact on political commitment. Democratic institutions have not truly opened up a protest political arena, but rather confirmed the shift toward a liberal authoritarian regime, contradicting classical transition theories. I will therefore focus on the alternative arenas of mobilization represented by professional associations and the Islamist social movement, and how they have had deradicalizing effects. While professional associations in Jordan do indeed open space for opposition (in contravention of corporatism theory), the Jordanian case also shows how integration may have radicalizing effects when the possibility to change the political agenda is denied. Lastly, I will analyze how political disaffection is channeled by the regime through use of tribal networks, and identify the link between this depoliticization and intertribal social violence, especially by youth.

1. Stability and Change in Authoritarian Control of Political Commitment

The Jordanian regime’s apparent stability is based on complex, changing authoritarian processes operating in different arenas. This is the background to the many complexities of the political situation, where coercive measures coexist with legitimacy. In this context, democratic institutions may be created in a context of authoritarian stabilization, and will consequently not be the place where political commitment and opposition occur.

Jordan has been a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament since 1952, but politically it is a system of exclusion where “participation is not a legal right but accorded top-down” (translated from Droz-Vincent 2004, 208). The constitution itself gives almost absolute power to the king, who appoints the government and can dissolve parliament to rule by decree. Many coercive processes have been implemented, and the security apparatus is omnipresent. The political scene is highly constrained, and defined by strict limits and “red lines” that the monarchy imposes. Two phases can be distinguished: before and after the limited opening of 1989. Before 1989, all parties were forbidden and activists operated under semi-underground conditions, except for the Islamists, whose movement was the only authorized one.

In 1989, King Hussein announced a democratic opening with the intention of calming unrest and social demands, and in 1992 political parties were authorized. However, substantial limitations on the functioning of parties and democratic life have remained in force, reducing the real difference between the two periods. Scholars have many terms to describe this ambivalent change: “defensive democratization” (Robinson 1998; Bennani-Chraïbi and Filieule 2003, 44) or “paradoxical liberalization” (Droz-Vincent 2004, 197). This is an authoritarian power where democratic institutions and political opposition exist but there are severe limitations on the issues that can be raised. Although this was the time when democratic institutions came into existence, the process was in no way a democratic transition. The shaping of the political space stayed completely under the monarchy’s control. At that level, the Jordanian regime is another example of how democratic institutions are not incompatible with authoritarian processes. Indeed, most authoritarian regimes possess such institutions. Contrary to the claims of classic democratic transition theories, such a “democratic opening” may in fact mean authoritarian stabilization (Camau 2005) rather than democratization. Albrecht points out the democracy bias of theories “based on the assumption that authoritarian regimes would experience systemic change along certain waves of democratization processes” (2009, 2). On the contrary, democratic institutions are integrated into the system. Rather than being the basis for contentious politics, authoritarian elections become a way of permitting co-opted figures to appear.

1.1. Building Authoritarian State Legitimacy

In parallel to coercive processes, the Hashemite monarchy has historically constructed a legitimacy based on a specific Jordanian identity with ties between social elites and political power, and weakened challengers by integrating them into a national identity framed by the monarchy while dividing them along social lines. Jordan is a relatively new state (created in 1921) and was not based on any specific
national movement, although Arab nationalist anti-colonialist movements were present. Locally it is often considered to be purely a creation of the British. However, ninety years later, even its most extreme opponents, still arguing about its artificiality, nonetheless position themselves within the state framework. Even actors who deny the legitimacy of the monarchy and consider it subordinate to American foreign policy, permanently refer to its institutions as their frame of experience. That they do so on a daily basis is not only because Jordan is a repressive state and that they fear its security apparatus; the State’s institutions, especially the army and the legal system (Massad 2001), have indeed played an integrative role. The creation – out of nowhere – of a specific Jordanian identity is one of the greatest successes of the Hashemite monarchy.

One element of the strategy deployed by the monarchy since the 1950s to build a specific Jordanian identity was to gradually transform the post-1948 Palestinian-Jordanians and the Palestinian national movement into a foreign figure, an “Other” (Massad 2001, 274). In the same paradoxical mode, King Hussein called for unity yet fostered divisions between the two groups by specifically recruiting Transjordanians to the public sector, which led Palestinians to remain mainly in the private sector. Tribes have been promoted as the core of the Transjordanian identity. The monarchy’s differential treatment of the two populations, clearly designated as Palestinian or Transjordanian, has created two different communities with different backgrounds – which was not necessarily the case at the beginning. While these differences are often denied by opposition leaders, they are clearly segmented along these lines.

1.2. Tribalization and Depoliticization

The creation of links between the monarchy and the tribal networks and the tribalization of political life represented another way for the monarchy to find social support in King Hussein’s time. This does not mean that tribal networks automatically supported the monarchy; in fact they had to be won over. In 1992, the king introduced the “one-person one-vote” electoral law (a one-round uninominal system), whose purpose is to favor a vote along tribal rather than partisan lines. The move was part of Hussein’s strategy of tribalization of society, and has been successful. Tribalization was seen as a method of depoliticizing society and weakening the opposition. Indeed, whatever their political role, tribal networks are not an ideological power. The new role they have been given, notably through electoral laws that under-represent urban areas, has further increased the importance of these networks (Chatelard 2004, 333). Depoliticization has been reinforced by a political and economic strategy of “brain export,” encouraging intellectuals to emigrate. This is seen as having a double advantage: exporting skilled manpower provides economic benefits, but is also a way to export protest (Cantini 2008; De Bel-Air 2003, 21).

1.3. Authoritarian Liberalism

While the opposition remains segmented, the transition from King Hussein to King Abdullah II has led to changes in the basis of the monarchy’s legitimacy and social support. Here, authoritarian stability does not exclude real evolution in implementation processes. Abdullah II is not the expert in tribal networks that Hussein was and has not enjoyed the same legitimacy in that field. When he came to power in 1999, he was portrayed in numerous political jokes and talks as a foreigner speaking better English than Arabic. Political criticism was expressed in a more public way at that time. Now, some years later, the atmosphere has changed, with Abdullah II, like his father, dissolving parliament and ruling by decree (Bank and Valbjørn 2010, 311). He has steered the monarchy towards a kind of authoritarian liberalism with strong priority given to economic reforms, in a concomitant process of economic liberalization and authoritarian consolidation that is not specific to Jordan (Kienle 2008). This also means that the monarchy now relies more on businesspeople and experts than on tribal networks (even if the two are not mutually exclusive: a businessman can be chosen from the same tribe where previously a traditional notable would have been favored).

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1 Rather than “brain drain” in this case, because it is a deliberate economic and political strategy (Larzillière 2010).
One of the results of the 2007 elections was that the “old guard” lost its seats to an economic – and very wealthy – new guard with no political background, which was backed by the monarchy. Many electors sold their votes to it, and promises were made on the basis of the wealth of the candidates. Indeed, the role of parliamentarians is increasingly perceived as one of patronage and dispensing services (Clark 2010; Lust-Okar 2001), and political position is not really at stake. While this capitalist new guard has formed a bloc in parliament, “the national brotherhood,” it does not appear to have a real ideologically coherent liberal platform (Rantawi 2009). Votes for them do not mean that liberal economic reforms are well accepted. There have been reactions against privatization policies and the price increases implied by the proposed and partially implemented ending of state subsidies.

The case of the “new guard” shows how elections in an authoritarian system can be mere democratic “window dressing” for the regime, where parliament has no real political role and the electoral process is massively biased. At the same time, the electoral process is used to permit new co-opted elites to emerge, as in Morocco (Barwig 2009) or Egypt (Koehler 2009), and “elections are more frequently contests over access to state resources” (Lust-Okar 2006, 468). The success of such an operation is only short term, since the favored figures that emerge in this way fail to acquire the legitimacy that the Islamists obtain by other means.

In the absence of a real partisan system, the focus of politicization and mobilization has been much more on the creation and development of alternative arenas than on participation in these “democratic” institutions. This has taken two main forms in Jordan. On one hand, professional associations have taken advantage of their expertise, which is needed by the monarchy, to express some limited opposition. On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood has created a grassroots social network based on charitable associations. The definition of these different arenas is also linked to the theoretical evolution in the analysis of authoritarian regimes, which “insists on juxtaposing different political arenas with different logics, rather than analyzing them as a homogeneous entity” (translated from Dabène, Geisser, and Massadier 2008, 21).

If a limited political pluralism characterizes authoritarian regimes, and does not exclude extensive social pluralism in the same regimes (Linz 1975), it is a “pluralism by default” which emerges from the limitation of authoritarian processes and not from a political project (translated from Camau 2005, 21). Alternative arenas are part of this pluralism; however, the analysis also shows the limits of their political role and, in that sense, their status is ambivalent.

2. Ambivalent Alternative Arena of Mobilization 1: Professional Associations

When political parties are forbidden or tightly controlled, professional organizations are one of the rare places, along with universities, where collective action and mobilization are possible. Their professional role guarantees them institutional existence, even in authoritarian regimes. That is why their possible politicization is an issue, and why such associations face important state pressures, in particular during their internal elections. In the Arab world, their positioning vis-à-vis the political power takes two forms. One is “corporatism,” where the state instrumentalizes professional associations for power implementation (Ayubi 1995; Bianchi 1989; Schmitter 1974). In the second case, associations use their professional activity and economic utility to gain leeway and become a place of opposition, an alternative to political parties.

In Jordan both cases exist. The former concern workers’ unions (niqabat al ‘ummal), in which membership is not compulsory; the latter corporative “professional unions” (niqabat mihaniyya), here referred to as associations (where membership is compulsory in order to work in the field concerned). The latter have three functions: providing services for their members, defining the profession, and political activity. They emerged from groups of professionals who wanted to organize themselves, often arising

2 Although currently members who do not pay their subscriptions are rarely excluded from the profession.
through the legal transformation of informal associations into official professional associations.

The situation of the workers’ unions is totally different. In 1953, workers obtained the right to form trade unions, but these were created top-down by government order, which could easily be revoked (Hamayil 2000, 74). The regime was highly suspicious of this working class trade-unionism, which was strongly influenced by left-wing political currents, in contrast to the professional associations that were perceived as a potentially supportive elite. The trade unions were involved in political mobilization and protest for a time, but since the 1990s their leaders have been co-opted by and financially dependent on the regime. Following a common model in the Arab world, they contribute more than the professional associations to a “state-centered corporatism” (translated from Gobe 2008, 269). Longuenesse explains this difference by the absence in the trade unions of a strong socio-professional identity, while there has been on the contrary a drive for mobilization and unification in the professional associations (2007, 109).

2.1. Politics and Expertise

The twelve professional associations which exist today in Jordan had about 130,000 members in 2011. The professional and political aspects have both been present since their creation, mainly from the 1950s to the 1970s. Their initial purpose was to regulate the profession by limiting access to those who had certain qualifications. In addition, professional schemes (training for example) and social services (pension fund, social security, and so on) were soon provided. These professional associations are financed by membership fees, returns on investments, donations and, in some cases, subsidies from the Jordanian state. The associations’ professional role has given them financial capabilities and a specific legitimacy based on knowledge. Composed of lawyers, doctors, engineers, and other professionals, they already represented elite groups whose opinions could not easily be ignored and who are indispensable for the implementation of modernization policies in the country. Politically, the six professional associations housed in the historical main headquarters building are the most important: doctors, engineers, pharmacists, agronomists, lawyers, and dentists. With 70,000 members, the engineers have the largest professional association, which is fully financially independent with substantial resources (Longuenesse 2007, 137). Ali H., engineer, explains the power relation:

Beyond their professional expertise, the professional associations enjoy another source of public legitimacy: they are the only institutions with truly democratic electoral procedures. The role of the professional associations was not diminished by the establishment of political parties in 1992, which are legally restricted and remain weak. Indeed, the leaders of the professional associations are better known than most parliamentarians, with the exception of those from the Islamist movement. Their political evolution echoes that of the political movements: mainly controlled by leftists and the PLO in the 1970s and 1980s (Al-Khazendar 1997, 112), the Islamists now have the majority, especially in the governing councils of the professional associations. Indeed, the Islamists have held the presidency of the engineering association since 1988, and later acquired the majority on its council.

Islamist political predominance is clear, but should not be overestimated. The direct election of presidents favors well-known figures regardless of their political affiliation, which can differ from the majority of the association’s council.

3 Common council of the professional associations, January 2011. The newly formed teachers’ association will add 105,000 members: Jordan Times, March 30, 2012.
4 Source: Engineering Association, October 2009.
5 Translated interviews, Amman, November 2007 and November 2009. This independent leftist activist is a civil engineering consultant and speaker for the professional associations. Aude Signoles describes a similar process (2003), showing how Palestinian engineers have become central political actors by obtaining responsibility for the technical verification of all building permits.
There are well-known leftist and nationalist figures, and the Islamists lost the presidency of the medical association to an Arab nationalist in 2009. Moreover, the Islamist campaigns focus on reprofessionalizing the professional associations, which limits their political relevance. A decrease in election participation and payment of dues can be observed, in parallel to increasing unemployment. This decrease also means that the base on which Islamists are elected is not as broad as it seems (Clark 2010).

2.2. A Limited Space

Whatever their main political affiliation, their great legitimacy and social utility has allowed professional associations to institutionalize a power relationship with the monarchy and they have never been banned, even if leaders have sometimes been imprisoned. That is why they can be described as an “oasis of opposition in a desert of authoritarianism” (Harmsen 2008, 121). The main theme of political mobilization is support of the Palestinian cause, which is the objective of several committees that cut across professionals associations: the Palestine committee, the prisoners committee and antinormalization (of the relationship with Israel) committee. However, professional associations have also taken a stand on internal issues including democratization, martial law, and freedom of expression. There is a broad consensus on political positions that strongly support for the Palestinian cause and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (but not for Palestinians in Jordan). This cause is less problematic for the Jordanian regime than internal freedoms, as long as Jordan’s foreign policy towards Israel is not targeted. Consequently, it is the particularly active and well-known antinormalization committee that has faced particular repression and been declared illegal several times, with its members experiencing imprisonment or intimidation.

Professional associations in Jordan constitute an alternative mobilization space that is used by many activists as the only available political arena. This is particularly true for long-term activists, whatever their generation. After universities, the professional associations are the institutions that are most strategically important for pursuing mobilization. Many political struggles in Jordan take the form of a fight for the creation of new professional associations. Even in the trade unions there is now a reform current seeking to give workers’ unions some degree of independence.

Nevertheless, the scope of independence is still very limited, both in action and mobilization capacity. The monarchy has often modified or threatened to modify laws defining the professional associations’ status – especially their election arrangements – in order to control them more effectively. Each time the reactions of the professional associations, which also used their links with the elite of the regime, allowed them to maintain their status. In such periods, the professional associations sustain their capacity for action by insisting on their professional role. This restrictive situation is created by a combination of direct injunctions issued by the monarchy and self-censorship by the professional associations, which do not want to involve themselves in direct confrontation. It is comparable with the Moroccan case, where institutionalization of the opposition has also led to the emergence of limits and forms of closure (Vairel 2008, 231). As in Morocco, these forms of closure are spatially visible, as the professional associations’ main form of action is meetings in or near their headquarters rather than demonstrations circulating in the city. Therefore, although the exact terms of the power relationship change a little according to the political situation, it remains constrained within a very narrow space.

In addition to coercive processes, a second kind of limitation of the themes and form of mobilizations stems from the class heterogeneity of the professional associations. For example, the head of a professional association may be respected as a political opposition figure but at the same time...
have a negative reputation as a manager because of the pay and working conditions at his firm. This will limit his capacity for political mobilization while his position at the head of the association impedes social conflicts over working conditions. Heterogeneity also plays a role in relations with the state, where professionals have different interests depending on their position in the rent economy and the “neop-atrimonial redistribution circles” (translated from Dieterich 1999, 316) and are therefore more or less inclined to criticize the economic system. Moreover, if these professional associations become not just one place of political opposition but the place of political opposition, the social basis for political commitment is restricted. Members must have a degree, even if there has been some social evolution from the nationalist and leftist period, when leaders were drawn mainly from the traditional elite and notables, to the Islamist time, where leaders come more from the middle class.

Inside the professional organizations there are debates about the objectives of political commitment. This relates not only to their positioning in a repressive national context, but also concerns a general evolution of political activism towards greater use of political expertise. In the professional associations, this trend results from a set of three ongoing forces. First, the direct influence of international donors and the theme of “good governance,” which emphasizes normative administrative practices and downplays ideological discourse on values. Second, the Jordanian regime itself has tended to apply the economic norms of international organizations, since Abdullah II subscribed to a liberal economic agenda. And finally, oppositional activism orients itself increasingly towards advising or reforming the state’s actions. A whole NGO sector has emerged and professional associations are also well positioned as their status places a premium on knowledge and competence. Here they find economic niches by ensuring a high level of competence for their members and contribute to Jordan’s national economic plan. This relatively new general trend in political practice is not limited to “peripheral” and non-hegemonic countries, although it is more visible there. One of the consequences is a reduction of the radical contestation posture, which does not satisfy all opponents and leaves important issues to one side. Consequently,revolts may appear in other places, beyond the control of the acknowledged and tolerated opposition (Dabène, Geisser, and Massadier 2008, 24).

Another kind of space has also emerged as an alternative arena of politicization: the grassroots social movement of the Muslim Brotherhood. The same ambivalent tension between contestation and integration can be observed here, with the same ambivalent consequences for activism. As mentioned above, the mainstream Islamists have lately been very present in professional associations and some Islamists are leaders in both arenas. The distinction between the two arenas highlights the specific legitimacy and repertory of action of the social movement and charity network, which differs from the professional association scene.

3. Ambivalent Alternative Arena of Mobilization 2: The Islamist Social Movement

The Islamist movement of the Muslim Brotherhood has become an alternative arena of mobilization not through its economic role, but by becoming the main social force – mainly through a charitable network that represents a real alternative to failing state institutions. It was long considered an ally by the monarchy and therefore less vigorously repressed than leftists and nationalists (Budeiri 1997, 199). The Muslim Brotherhood has never really been anti-monarchy, which has allowed them to occupy the social field as they were not really seeking political power. In spite of its opposition role, the Muslim Brotherhood has frequently had the same enemies as the monarchy, which has created a bond between them. Thus, this mainstream Islamist movement has slowly gained a kind of social hegemony (in the sense that they have no real challengers) while other movements (leftist and nationalist) have lost ideological significance along with their political place.

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8 Although in the 1980s, the possibility of scholarship in the USSR somewhat changed the leftist social profile.

9 Non-hegemonic or “peripheral” countries occupy a subordinate position in international power relations and lack the means to influence international agendas. They may, however, have some autonomy to format their national agenda and choose their cooperation partners. See Losego and Arvanitis (2009).
3.1. Social Hegemony?

Although the Muslim Brotherhood has been present in Jordan since independence in 1946, the movement only started to gather real support in society during the first intifada (1987–1993), when it organized a campaign under the slogan “Islam is the solution” (to which it still adheres). So its leaders positioned it as a very important social provider and the champion of the Palestinian cause (which it redefined with a religious vocabulary). These have been the two main pillars of the Muslim Brotherhood's development in Jordan, two justifications that have had the advantage of not setting up the movement as a challenger to the monarchy, unlike the leftists and nationalists. Indeed, Islamist support for the Palestinian cause has largely taken the form of humanitarian aid for the West Bank and Gaza, and relates more to an incantatory nationalism as it never truly opposes the king’s peace policy with Israel. In this sense, the Islamists have been a deradicalizing factor, offering a vehicle for support of the Palestinian cause and a repertory of actions based mainly on collecting aid and organizing memorial meetings. In this way, the Muslim Brotherhood has consolidated its position without challenging the monarchy. Nonetheless, once legitimized, it went a step further, adding domestic demands concerning political freedom, social justice, and anti-corruption. These issues have also won them considerable public support.

Beyond their important role as a provider of services and aid, the Muslim Brotherhood is especially visible as an ideological power, in the sense that it has had a major impact on the paradigms through which the society understands itself and projects itself into the future. Many of the references they use have their source in other political trends; however, the Muslim Brothers have been able to recompose religious, nationalist, and even leftist references in a kind of syncretism in which they are now unchallenged. Their reformulation of Palestinian nationalism has already been mentioned; the same can be said about Arab nationalism. They have also integrated the social justice of the leftists. Above all, in a field where the religious reference has become the main source of legitimacy, their struggle to secure the monopoly on interpretation of Islam has been especially effective. This does not mean that they have no challengers at that level, but even their challengers tend to argue within a religious paradigm heavily influenced by the Islamist movement.

This is facilitated by the lack of real conflict about the liberal economic perspective, which is now essential to the monarchy and its foreign donors. Although the Muslim Brothers conflate liberal economic policy with the question of social justice and poverty, they fundamentally agree with the liberal perspective on the economy. The only real point of opposition is dependency on foreign donors, which they want to reduce while the regime often sees foreign aid as a solution. Their syncretic capacity became visible again in the 2011 mobilization where the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan (as in Egypt: Ben Néfissa 2011) quickly integrated some of the main demands raised by other actors.

However, their quite hegemonic position, especially in the most populous, predominantly Palestinian urban areas, reflects more lack of rivals than any massive support. With regard to both charity work and ideological impact, they have no real challenger. While leftists have massively converted themselves into NGOs and human rights associations (Larzillière 2012b), these rather elitist structures have never given them the legitimacy of the Islamic charity network. To acquire funding, they have to advance the priorities of international organizations, often creating a rift with the expectations of the population, which prefers the more “ad hoc” and personalized Islamic aid. These difficulties were highlighted when a coalition including the left was set up in Jordan in 2002 under the banner of anti-imperialism, but the dominant position of the Islamists allowed them to impose their themes. It therefore seems to many left wing activists that the step of forming a coalition was a strategic error, because they have been unable to oppose the Islamist argumentation. As one observed:

It is very difficult to convince people with our left discourse because you always have to face the fact that it comes from Western countries and then explain that not everything that comes from the West is bad. The Islamist argumentation is very simple:
When we were good Muslims we created empires, since we have abandoned Islam we have been divided.\textsuperscript{10}

The recently created leftist social forums allow new kinds of mobilization for short-term projects, where activists seek agreement on a mode of action and demand rather than on general ideology.\textsuperscript{11} Their flexible membership offers an alternative to the tight controls of the associations by the regime. However it has not been sufficient to give them a broad social base.

The specific social and ideological capacity of the Islamists in Jordan must be clearly distinguished from their access to political power. Here we can distinguish a social hegemony, in the sense of social leadership, ideas, and ideologies which do not flow down from the regime. The monarchy has never been the source of the predominant ideology. Gramsci’s categories allow us to distinguish the apparatus for direct domination, which belongs to the monarchy, from social and cultural hegemony (1978, 314). However, hegemony is generally understood as a creation of those in power, albeit an indirect one. Theories of ideology are mainly theories of distortion, whose purpose is to legitimize the power system (Ricoeur 1997, 17). Therefore, on a more theoretical level, this case leads us to reconceptualize categories such as hegemony and ideology in a manner that is less centered on the state. As Hall’s media analysis shows, ideologies do not mechanically produce consent for the state and there is competition and struggle at that level (1982). The Jordanian case seems to lead us one step further in that direction, showing how cultural hegemony can appear outside the state.

3.2. Integrated Opposition

The articulation between the social and cultural importance of the Muslim Brotherhood and the political apparatus is indeed highly problematic. The Muslim Brotherhood could be considered a social movement under Touraine’s definition, which combines social force and the defining of the historicity of the society,\textsuperscript{12} were it not for the real difficulty of transforming it into an efficient political opposition. This also specifically illustrates the ambivalence of such alternative arenas of mobilization under authoritarian regimes. The Muslim Brotherhood does not confront the monarchy but has managed to create real spaces of influence, which in a way “short-circuits” political power, while channeling and deradicalizing opposition. The Muslim Brotherhood never reacted in a militant manner to repression. On the contrary, it even had a calming influence during riots provoked by the rising cost of living (1989), or during student revolts at Yarmouk University in 1984 and 1986.\textsuperscript{13} This policy did, however, lead to a rift between local Muslim Brotherhood leadership at the university, who co-organized the demonstration with leftist elements, and the head of the movement, who wanted to avoid confrontation with the State.\textsuperscript{14} The Muslim Brotherhood participated in the parliamentary elections of 1993, while officially boycotting those of 1997, which were characterized by massive abstentions.\textsuperscript{15}

Here the Muslim Brotherhood maintains its delicate position of conflicting participation, as much through self-censorship as direct repression (Öngün 2008). They receive the greater part of their legitimacy through an aura of purity and integrity that is contingent on their distance from political power. They want to maintain this critical position while at the same time entering the political game enough to influence it. A position that is all the more delicate because: “since the critical decline of the left, the Islamist movement has become the main target of the government strategies of co-optation and exclusion” (translated from Krämer 1994, 278). The Muslim Brotherhood is held up as proof that there is indeed a real democratic process, since there is opposition. They have lost part of their radicalism and can be defined as an integrated opposition (Albrecht 2006; Bozarslan 2011), which rather consolidates the position of the monarchy.

\textsuperscript{10} Interview, Amman, December 2005.
\textsuperscript{11} Interviews with members of the social forum, Amman, November 2009.
\textsuperscript{12} Touraine defines “historicity” as the cultural field where conflicts on normative orientations operate. According to his theory, this field and the struggle over symbolic representations is essential to social movement (Touraine 1978, 87–88).
\textsuperscript{13} Following Sami Al-Khazendar (1997, 142–45).
\textsuperscript{14} Interview with one of the leaders of the student revolt, Amman, March 2007.
\textsuperscript{15} It is not certain, however, that the abstentions were a consequence of the boycott. It is also possible that the Islamists anticipated the development and boycotted the election for that reason (Augé 1998, 246).
The events of the parliamentary elections of 2007 and 2010 were particularly indicative of the limits of this “conflicting participation” policy on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood. Since 2005, the Islamists have been confronted with an intensification of government intervention, which has introduced new laws forbidding speeches in mosques, tightening control on the media and charities, and limiting the activities of professional associations (ICG 2005, 15).

Confronted with this situation, two competing trends arose inside the Islamic Action Front.16 The “doves” supported a cooperative attitude under the motto “participating not overpowering”; “the hawks” favored more confrontational methods, with some calling for a boycott of the elections. During the selection process, activists favored candidates from the hawks. The party leadership, however, decided not to take this path and instead appointed dove candidates. The Islamists candidates were accused of cooperation with the government while being repressed by it nonetheless, and became the real losers of the elections.

The results have strongly destabilised the doves inside the party and their strategy was partly delegitimized. This was confirmed two years later when new parliamentary elections took place in November 2010. This time the Islamists boycotted the elections, challenging the electoral law that favors tribal votes and rural areas. The changes in their position toward official democratic institutions, sometimes boycotting and sometimes participating, illustrates the dilemma for the opposition when a system is well controlled but not totally blocked. The opposition considered participating in well-controlled institutions a “no-win” situation which would have negative consequences on their own legitimacy and social support. The risk in that context is becoming too integrated to be considered as opposition, and thus losing legitimacy in the eyes of some activists.

3.3. Delegitimization and Radicalization

These political developments have consequences in terms of the public perception of the Muslim Brotherhood and its popular support, especially by youth (ICG 2005). Their legitimacy has gradually decreased because they seem increasingly associated with the Jordanian regime and its policies. This marginalization stems not from the success of other political trends but rather from dissatisfaction with the Muslim Brotherhood, and thus creates a real political vacuum (Hroub 2007, 3). Finally, indiscriminate repression against Muslim Brothers during certain periods, regardless whether they preach cooperation or radical opposition, has also contributed to the delegitimization of the cooperation option and to the radicalization of Islamist groups.

Thus, the policy of destabilization of the mainstream Islamists undermines the moderates and leads to a radicalization of the movement or support for other more radical Islamist movements. Some of their sympathizers have turned towards what they consider a more radical and less integrated opposition, the Salafist movement. Salafists are divided mainly between reformist and jihadist Salafists over the question of political violence. Heated arguments occurred between strategically opposed reformists and jihadists and only the latter can be considered a real opposition (Caillet 2011). The jihadists are distinguished by their refusal to cooperate in any way with the regime and by their informal network structure, maintained to avoid repression. They do not hesitate to launch fierce verbal attacks against the Muslim Brotherhood (Caillet 2011). They appear to have recruited among the poorer classes most affected by the economic crisis. The number of activists is said to be very limited, but they claim nearly as many sympathizers as the Muslim Brotherhood (Wiktorowicz 2000, 223–24). In the context of the 2011 mobilization, Salafists organized meetings and demonstrations, some of which ended in violent confrontations with the police and led to mass arrests.

Another sign of the weakening of the mainstream Islamists and the way this can lead to specific forms of radicalization is seen in the recent proliferation of tribal clashes, especially involving youth (Masri 2009). This non-political violence is clearly linked to depoliticization and tribalization as elements of repressive politics. Up to now, the

16 The Islamic Action Front is the political party created by the Muslim Brotherhood when political parties were authorized in 1992.
state’s tolerance for tribal violence and crime has been much higher than for political violence. Lucrative tribal-based trafficking (in stolen cars for example) continues.\textsuperscript{17} Clashes between tribal groups have been allowed to occur in universities whereas the smallest political demonstration was harshly repressed (Cantini 2008). As a consequence, the effect of depoliticization seems particularly strong among youth and is particularly visible in the universities, which were previously an important place of political activity. Even the leaders of the student movement thabahtoona, whose political activities could have been seen as a counter-example, mention their difficulty in mobilizing and how tribal identities now seem more important to the students.\textsuperscript{18}

Violence resulting from active tribalization processes to marginalize ideological opposition is not specific to Jordan. The regime’s policy designed to weaken political opposition has in fact engendered violent effects that were initially considered to be unimportant for a well-controlled state with extensive security services, but have gone further than expected. The proliferation of tribal clashes worries tribal leaders and fosters criticism about political use of tribes and interference in choice of tribal leaders.\textsuperscript{19} There is here a dual process at work: first an increase in intertribal violence and then an increase in the tribes’ confrontational stance vis-à-vis the monarchy. As long as tribes could be used as a largely unified network and identity, this strategy was indeed effective in strengthening the monarchy and weakening the political opposition. However, this policy has also intensified identity segmentation inside tribal networks. Paradoxically, the process has generated non-political violence with very political consequences, jeopardizing the monarchy’s security order and tribal support. In the arenas of the professional associations and the Muslim Brotherhood, the process underlines the shifting frontiers of politicization and mobilization and the changing status of actors, even under conditions of authoritarian stability.

Reaction in Jordan to the events in Tunisia since January 2011 also shows how regional mobilization can impact political commitment, even in the absence of direct changes in the national political configuration. This has reinforced the opposition capacity of both the professional associations and the social movement of the Muslim Brotherhood. They were not the initiators of the first demonstrations in support of the revolt in Tunisia (unlike the important demonstrations in 2009 against the Israeli attack in Gaza where Islamists and professional associations were involved at the very beginning). It was the leftists, marginalized but taking a more confrontational stance, who started this new movement, together with some long rarely seen actors: youth and Palestinians from the camps. However, Islamists and professional associations soon caught up with the movement, bringing in a much greater capacity of mobilization than the first actors. They have supported social demands like price controls and pay rises (there is no minimum wage in Jordan and one-third of the population is categorized as poor by international agencies).

At first, political demands concentrated on the usual and authorized criticisms against the parliament and the government: inefficiency and corruption. The monarchy made concessions. King Abdullah II changed the cabinet and officially asked the government to implement a more active social policy. Immediate salary and pension increases were announced. However, on the initiative of the Islamists, the movement has gone one step further, demanding that the prime minister be elected and no longer chosen by the king. In taking this step, the Islamist movement is going beyond its previous position of integrated opposition because this policy is a real challenge to the monarchy. It represents a radicalization of the opposition’s demands but not of its repertory of action. The Muslim Brotherhood had more and more trouble with its position of “integrated opposition,” which makes generational renewal difficult and leads some activists to radicalize or leave. Thus, they have slowly changed their strategy and are now using the

\textsuperscript{17} Interview with Geraldine Chatelard, Amman, October 2009.

\textsuperscript{18} Launched in April 2007, this is a movement for the defense of student rights and the creation of a students’ union. Interview with one of the movement’s leaders, Amman, November 2009. See also Adely 2010.

\textsuperscript{19} Interview with a professor and political columnist, independent Islamist, Amman, November 2009.
new impetus given by a regional mobilization to adopt a more confrontational stance.

Above all, the reaction of the Jordanian opposition shows the impact of international and regional processes on national political commitment and the complex articulation of these three levels (international, regional, national) should be further explored (Bank and Valbjørn 2010). Globalization has an impact on political commitment, and some trends in Jordan are clearly related to more global trends like the evolution of activists towards expertise (Larzillière 2012b; Signoles 2006; Wagner 2004). Their ideological references are mainly regional. Even when they refer to global theories, their understanding of them is clearly embedded in the regional history. As the 2011–2012 mobilization has shown, even if the national power relationship does not seem to change, regional events appear to impact activism more through identification than direct relationships. While the power relationship has not been directly impacted, the regional mobilization has, however, generated a “shared sense of uncertainty” among challengers and incumbents. The process confirms how such changes in perception are crucial to the occurrence of contentious episodes (Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 9).

4. Conclusion

Politicization is a specific and sensitive issue in authoritarian regimes, as it concerns the very possibility of a political arena appearing in front of a regime that seeks to erase any challenge. This approach is more classical than the recent focus in more democratic contexts on politicization as the inclusion in institutional policies of new issues (Arnaud 2005, 15; Lagroye 2004, 360; Ion 2005). The Jordanian case shows the possibility of dissociation between democratic institutions and political arenas. This does not mean that democratic institutions have no role at all, but rather that they serve as an intermediary for the regime in the process of forging integrated elites and patronage structures. Other contentious arenas appear too, where well positioned and resourceful organizations can be partially transformed into a basis for protest with challenging frames of reference. Apart from repression, their own resources, economic and social roles, and their integration in the regime frame and limit the kind of political commitment they can lead. Ambivalence arises between challenging and integrated positions. Professional associations hesitate to jeopardize their elite role while the Muslim Brotherhood may be content with its social hegemony. Both cases underline the versatility of political arenas, their connections and relational characteristics. When one arena is too controlled, political forces invent new ones, while there is a perpetual back and forth between contentious arena and regime. Under authoritarian regimes, radicalization processes, both in repertory of action and ideology, appear at the turn, when alternative arenas become so integrated in the regime that they lose their contentious role. These political arenas are the places where alternative worldviews and ideologies are produced and shared. At that level, the Muslim Brotherhood has a very specific position as a hegemonic ideological producer with no hegemonic power and position. The case thus undermines the analysis of ideologies as mere reflection of positions in power relationship and supports an analytical separation between political power and ideology.
References


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Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Radical Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia

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Indonesia provides a fruitful case study of differences between radicalization processes in liberal and authoritarian regimes. Political Science hereby tends to emphasize regime type as the determinant of Islamist political strategy (radical, militant or moderate) and therefore as the main explanatory factor for radicalization processes. Although this is true of the role of Islamists in various Middle Eastern countries, where electoral participation has moderated political programs and strategies, it is of little relevance to Indonesia. The democratic opening in 1998 provided Islamists with new opportunities to participate in electoral politics, and even become co-opted by formally “secular” forces, but at the same time opened up spaces for militant, radical Islamist groups. Whereas radical Islam faced severe state repression under Suharto’s New Order, we now find a highly ambiguous relationship between the state and radical Islamists, expressed in operational terms as a parallelism of repression and cooptation. This article tries to make sense of the relationship between the post-authoritarian state and radical Islam in Indonesia by transcending the institution-centered understanding of the role of Islam through an examination of the configurations of social forces that have determined the shape, scope, and practices of radical Islam within Indonesia’s new experiment with democracy.

More than 85 percent of Indonesia’s population of more than 230 million are Muslim, making it the largest Muslim-majority nation in the world. Hence there are nearly as many people of Islamic faith living in Indonesia as there are in the entire Arab world. Since the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia has made significant strides toward democracy. Its democratization featured a general overhaul and liberalization of the political system, including the establishment of a multiparty system, freedom of the press, and the first free and fair elections since 1956. Indonesia’s democratization furthermore encompassed the decentralization of a highly centralized political system in which political power was to a large degree concentrated in the hands of Suharto and channeled through his vast patronage network. The transition to democracy also saw attempts to reform the powerful military that had backed Suharto’s New Order and had been the main instrument to repress any form of opposition movement in the country, as well as attempts to reform the economic system once dubbed “Suharto’s crony capitalism.”

The latter included, amongst other issues, the fight against endemic corruption and tackling the disastrous effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on the national economy. Most reviews of Indonesia’s transition to democracy have so far been very positive. It is widely acknowledged that, for the time being, Indonesia does not seem to be in danger of falling back into authoritarian structures. Many researchers (Rieffel 2004, Qodari 2005, Mujani and Liddle 2010), as well as international institutions such as the World Bank or the UN, describe the free, fair, and peaceful elections of 1999, 2004, and 2009 as historic landmarks for the country. The country has seen several changes of government, and legislatures and courts have gained formal independence from central government. Indonesians also enjoy extensive political freedoms, while countless civil society organizations and other pressure groups try to exercise some sort of a “watchdog function” over elected governments on the national and local level (Nyman 2006). Along these lines, Indonesia possesses many attributes of a consolidated democratic political system and has remained largely stable during the post-Suharto era. Such observations first of all
contradict culturalist theories of Muslim exceptionalism, although a Muslim-majority country, Indonesia did not descend into theocracy after the fall of Suharto. Despite being the country with the largest Muslim population, Islamist parties never gained sufficient voter support to challenge the secular state. Neither the 2004 nor the 2009 national elections featured any significant increase in votes for parties with Islamist agendas. The most important issue for voters throughout the 2009 election was the economy, and there has been little evidence that factors such as religion or ethnicity had any significant influence on voting behavior (Mujani and Liddle 2010, 37).

Indonesia therefore makes an interesting case study, as culturalist theories on the relationship between Islam and democracy claim that the two are incompatible because the former does not provide for a separation of church and state and does not allow secular law to be translated into divine law. This is not to say that Indonesians see no place for religion in politics. In 2010, 89 percent of respondents to a PEW Global Attitudes survey said that Islam played a large role in politics in Indonesia, and that Islam’s influence in politics is positive (91 percent). However, in the same survey a 65 percent majority of Indonesians believed that democracy was preferable to any other kind of government, whilst only 12 percent said that in some circumstances a non-democratic government can be preferable. Therefore it seems safe to state that the majority of the population, as well as the country’s political elite, regard the idea of an Islamic state as counterproductive (Fealy 2004). The country has remained on course toward democracy, and many (mostly foreign) observers reiterate the importance of a democratic Indonesia as a potential role model for the whole Muslim world, demonstrating the compatibility of Islam and democracy (Kingsbury 2010; Hughes 2004). That is not to say that the country has not experienced a radicalization amongst certain Islamic actors or the development of a militant fringe committed to wage jihad on what it perceives to be opponents of the establishment of an Islamic state. The emergence of radical Islamist groups has consequently sparked concerns amongst foreign observers and Indonesians alike. Asked about Islamic extremism in Indonesia, 42 percent of respondents said they were either very concerned or somewhat concerned, while 42 percent said they saw a struggle between modernizers and Islamic fundamentalists. Of the 42 percent who saw a struggle, 54 percent identified with modernizing forces and 33 percent with fundamentalists. However, these figures are not to be equated with support for Islamist militancy. In fact support for Islamist militancy has decreased. While in 2003 59 percent of all respondents expressed support for Osama bin Laden, the figure dropped to 26 percent in 2011. Similarly, in 2009 65 percent stated that suicide bombings can never be justified.

The existing theoretical literature finds two divergent explanations for the small role radical Islam has played in Indonesia’s recent history (Hamayotsu 2010). One basically turns the aforementioned general culturalist argument against itself and attributes the success of Indonesia’s democratization process despite a Muslim-majority population to the specific characteristics of Indonesian Islam. According to this argument, the different ways in which Islam was blended with earlier, largely animist, religious beliefs and traditions weakened the rigidity of Middle Eastern interpretations of Islam. This in turn led to the establish-

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1 The theory of “Muslim exceptionalism” is backed by the rather general claims of authors such as Huntington (1997, 1991), Lipset (1994), or Gellner (1994), who see Islam as responsible for the absence of democracy or, where democracy has been introduced to a Muslim state, as responsible at least for the aforementioned challenges of democratic consolidation. What underlies this belief is the idea of a “unique relationship between religion and politics in Islam that precludes the separation of the religious and political spheres” (Ayoob 2006, 2). In other words, political thought and action in the Muslim world are mainly driven by religious goals, or at least by religious convictions.


ment of moderate, liberal traditions of Islam in Indonesia since its arrival in the thirteenth century. Hence the peculiarly moderate form of Islam developed over the centuries all over the Indonesian archipelago leaves little room for fundamentalist interpretations and is thus compatible with democratic, liberal forms of government (Geertz 1960).

The other argument emphasizes the existence of democratic institutions since the fall of Suharto. In this interpretation, the establishment of free and fair elections, freedom of the press, and a multiparty system has helped to marginalize radicalism by giving radicals an opportunity for political participation. Here, the regime type seems to determine the strategies and politics of the Islamists. If we consider the experiences of various Middle Eastern countries with radical Islamist movements, this hypothesis seems to make sense as political liberalization allowed the participation of radical Islamists. Given the opportunity to participate, however, Islamists were ready to adjust former radical positions and in the end became increasingly moderate (Nasr 2005). In a very simplified form, the main argument would be that inclusion through participation leads to moderation, exclusion through repression leads to radicalization (Hafez 2003).

How far does this argument carry us with regard to the case of Indonesia? In Indonesia, democratic, or at least reform-oriented Islamists did – amongst other groups – in fact play a vital part in ousting Suharto. They took part in the re-formasi movement demanding free and fair elections and press freedom, and founded democratic parties and civil society organizations. But as well as opening up a space for moderate Islamists to participate in electoral politics, the transition to democracy also made room for a more radical fringe of political Islam. Taking these processes into account it seems that political liberalization has been a double-edged sword: on the one hand it fostered the emergence of moderate Islamic civil society organizations and Islamic parties; yet on the other hand violent Islamist groups emerged after the fall of Suharto. The ambiguous role Islamists have played in post-Suharto Indonesia thus calls into question the assumption that political liberalization fosters a moderation of Islamist actors. Post-authoritarian Indonesia not only witnessed moderate Islamists playing a reform-oriented role within electoral politics, but also saw Islamist militants conduct an armed struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state. Thus, the assumed correlation between democracy and a moderation of radical Islamists seems to be highly ambiguous: the existence of democratic institutions alone obviously cannot be directly equated with a moderation of Islamist forces. As we have observed, both processes – radicalization/militancy and moderation – followed Indonesia’s transition to democracy.

I therefore argue that the “liberalization = moderation” hypothesis does not adequately describe the realities in post-Suharto Indonesia. While political Islam in Suharto’s New Order stood in stark opposition to the state, and consequently even moderate Islamists faced intense state repression, we now find a highly ambiguous relationship between state and political Islam, which expresses itself in operational terms through a parallelism of policies of repression and co-optation.

In order to make sense of the ambiguous relationship between the post-authoritarian state and political Islam in Indonesia, we need to go beyond an institution-centered understanding of democratization processes and look at the configurations of social forces that have determined the shape, scope, and practices of Indonesia’s transition to democracy. For this we need to link the resurgence of political Islam in Indonesia with a critical examination of the power politics behind the democratic institutions that evolved after 1998. I will begin by providing some insights into the historical relationship between Islam and politics in Indonesia, before moving on to explore the resurgence of political Islam after the ousting of Suharto, and examine the specific and limitations of Indonesia’s transition to democracy. I will conclude with an outlook on the prospects and perils of Islamism in Indonesia more than ten years after the reformasi.

1. Indonesian Islam and Politics in Historical Perspective
Taking into account Marx’s observation that religion serves as the "sigh of the oppressed creature," it is no surprise that Islam as a political ideology came to Indonesia during the colonial era. During (and beyond) Indonesia’s struggle for independence from the colonial rule of the Dutch,
Islam competed for mass support with two other ideologi-
cal currents: nationalism and communism. Unlike to the
history of nationalism, the history of political Islam in In-
donesia is one “crowded with failure” (Fealy 2005, 161).
Fealy identifies three main periods. The first, from 1949
until 1959, was shaped by independence and the country’s
first experiments with democracy, which were char-
acterized by relatively free political competition between
parties and the first free and fair elections. The second
period, from 1959 until 1998, was in turn shaped by a fal-
tering of the flirtation with democracy. This period con-
isted of decades of authoritarianism, first under Sukarno’s
“guided democracy” (1959–1965) and then under Suhar-
to’s “New Order” (ordre baru). After the initial experiment
with democracy in the 1950s, both regimes that followed
placed tight restrictions on political Islam. The third peri-
od, which began following Suharto’s ousting in 1998 and
continues through the present, is also shaped by the past
(Fealy 2005, Hadiz 2011).

After Indonesia became independent from Dutch colonial
rule in 1949, the main line of political conflict between Is-
lamist and more secular forces concerned the question of
whether Indonesia should become an Islamic state. The Is-
lamists favored the inclusion of the sharia in the Indonesian
constitution and the establishment of a Negara Islam In-
donesia (Islamic State of Indonesia). More secular forces,
amongst them Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, feared
that an Islamic constitution could lead to secessionist as-
pirations among the then mainly Christian eastern prov-
inces of the archipelago and ultimately cause the break-up
of the young nation. These fears tipped the scales in favor of
a constitution that excluded notions of an Islamic state. The
majority of Islamic actors, although deeply disappointed by
Indonesia’s “secular” constitution, took comfort in the pros-
pect that the Islamic parties would, if united, certainly win
Indonesia’s first elections and would then change the con-
sitution. A minority of Islamists even began local uprisings
with the goal of establishing an Islamic state (Negara Islam)
through military force. The so-called Darul Islamb movement
(House of Islam) eventually managed to establish Islamic
rule in parts of Sumatra, Java, and Sulawesi, but these were
eventually crushed by the central government after a deca-
defeated (Dahm 2007, 203).

The first free elections in 1956 brought bitter defeat for the Is-
lamist parties. While the dream of a politically unified Islam
had been dashed by various political splits between 1949 and
1956, hopes of electoral victory were disappointed too when
the Islamic parties gained only 43.1 percent of the votes.
While from 1956 Islamic parties participated in coalition gov-
ernments under Sukarno, their political influence was often
overshadowed by the secular nationalism of Sukarno and the
PKI (Partai Kommunis Indonesia, the Communist Party of In-
donesia). When Suharto came to power after a military coup
in 1965, his first move was directed against the powerful PKI.
With the help of Islamic militias and the military, an esti-
mated half a million PKI members were killed. Despite the
close involvement of many Islamists with the military during
the transition from Sukarno’s “guided democracy” to Suhar-
to’s New Order, the demise of Sukarno and the PKI did not
mean greater influence over state power for political Islam.
On the contrary political Islam, as the only potential source of
opposition to Suharto, was quickly marginalized (Hadiz 2011,
18). This marginalization included requiring Islamic groups
to conform to the state philosophy, restricting the use of Is-
lamic symbols and language, and limiting the number of Is-
lamic parties. In 1973, all Islamic parties were forced to merge
and form the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United
Development Party). The very name of the party demon-
strates the nearly complete marginalization of political Islam
under the first decades of the New Order, as it no longer bore
any direct reference to Islam. Under the New Order no inde-
pendent power centers existed outside the state apparatus,
which is why Benedict Anderson describes the ordre baru as
the victory of the state vis-à-vis society (1990).

Intensifying state repression forced many of the more rad-
ical Islamist activists into exile; amongst them most notably
many of those who were later involved in the creation of Je-
maah Islamiyah. As a result of the heavy state repression
political Islam had very little political influence for decades
in Indonesia (Baswedan 2004, 671). The Suharto regime
legitimized the authoritarian politics of the New Order
through state-led developmental strategies. New Order de-
livering continued high economic growth rates and rising
living standards, for which, in the mindset of the architects
of the New Order, political stability was a precondition.
The latter was achieved through the backing of the state se-
What followed was a whole bundle of policies that led to a facing state repression like any other opposition group.6 Authoritarian and corrupt regime of the New Order, was Political Islam, still largely defined in opposition to the increase in personal piety among the citizens of Indonesia. Knowledge that this turn mainly comprised a drive for an within the regime (Singh 2004) – although one must ac-
tent intertwined with the Islamization policies im-
plemented by the Suharto regime itself. This is what Ruf (2002, 51) calls an “irony” of the aforementioned macro-
political developments: that “secular” regimes in the Muslim world, such as the Suharto regime in Indonesia, became promoters of the Islamization process by pushing for the implementation of a wide variety of Islamic policies in an attempt to regain or strengthen their own legitimacy and control rising political support for Islam (see also: Hasan 2007a, 88). It is against this background that the often ambiguous relationship between Islam and politics in post-Suharto Indonesia must be analyzed.

The Islamization of the late New Order, which still in-
fluences the trajectories of Indonesian Islam to this day, must be understood against a variety of interconnected fac-
tors. Perhaps most importantly, tensions between the re-
gime and the military, which had been one of the main pillars of regime stability, drove Suharto to look for other supporters and sources of legitimacy. In addition, mounting divisions within the regime were accompanied by the rapid growth of the traditionally very pious middle classes, caused by the economic boom of the 1970s and 1980s. The middle classes embraced Suharto’s gradual renunciation of the military insofar as “they welcomed the opportunity to gain access to senior government positions” (Fealy 2005, 164).

Hence, on the one hand, the Islamization of Indonesia owes, much to a rising middle class seeking moral orient-
ation and identity in a rapidly changing sociopolitical and economic environment. For many, Islam became a reference point, a reliable and consistent element of identification within an ever-changing, modernizing order (Hefner 2005). On the other hand, the rise of Islam is to some extent intertwined with the Islamization policies im-
plemented by the Suharto regime itself. This is what Ruf (2002, 51) calls an “irony” of the aforementioned macro-
political developments: that “secular” regimes in the Mus-
lim world, such as the Suharto regime in Indonesia, became promoters of the Islamization process by pushing for the implementation of a wide variety of Islamic policies in an attempt to regain or strengthen their own legitimacy and control rising political support for Islam (see also: Hasan 2007a, 88). It is against this background that the often ambiguous relationship between Islam and politics in post-Suharto Indonesia must be analyzed.

While one cannot fail to notice the growing influence of conservative (Wahabi) interpretations of Islam through charitable foundations and other Islamic organizations...
based in the Arab world from the 1970s onward (Bubalo and Fealy 2005), various forms of Islamic militancy and the struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state can be traced back to the pre-independence era (Sidel 2006; Hadiz 2011). Above all else, the range of historical events described here questions the prominent image of Indonesian Islam as being inherently tolerant and moderate. However biased such an image has been, it most certainly reflects the fact that Islam as a political force was for decades marginalized or even repressed under Suharto’s New Order. With the ousting of Suharto this was to change drastically.

2. The Resurgence of Political Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia

The end of the New Order led to the opening of the political sphere for a great variety of new political actors. Moderate Muslim intellectuals were active in the pro-democratic reform movements that took to the streets in 1997 and early 1998 and demanded Suharto’s resignation. While playing a vital role in the immediate events leading to the downfall of Suharto, the “movement for a democratic Muslim politics in Indonesia” (Hefner 2005, 274) was soon effectively marginalized by a rising conservative (and often militant) spectrum of Islamist actors, ranging from transnational terrorist networks like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Islamist militias to legal Islamist political parties and civil society groups. The radical fringe of political Islam has displayed a heterogeneous array of organizational structures, goals, applied strategies, and relationships with the state.

The opening of the political system was closely followed by an outbreak of inter-communal violence between Muslims and Christians, the establishment of Islamist militia groups, and attacks by the Jemaah Islamiyah terror network on Christian churches (2000), nightclubs in Bali (2002 and 2005), the Australian embassy (2004), and the Marriott Hotel (2003, 2009) (Mapes 2005). Shortly after the ousting of Suharto, nominally Christian paramilitaries sprang up, attacking what happened to be nominally Muslim communities in Poso (Sulawesi), Central Kalimantan, and the Moluccas. While the roots of these conflicts – all of which had been effectively suppressed by the iron rule of Suharto – were to be found in competition over political and economic power, local leaders effectively mobilized support amongst “their” constituencies by portraying the conflicts in religious rather than in political/economic terms (van Klinken 2007). Sectarian violence between Christians and Muslims in the three aforementioned provinces has cost more than twelve thousand lives since the fall of Suharto. The outbreak of sectarian violence in 1998–1999, paralleled by the intensification of long-running separatist conflicts in the provinces of Aceh, West Papua, and East Timor, led many analysts to conclude that a break-up of Indonesia (often termed “Balkanization”) could very well be underway (Wanandi 2002; Mally 2003).

Even more worryingly, the escalation of violence in Ambon (Moluccas) owed a great deal to the establishment and deployment of Islamist militia groups such as the currently disbanded Laskar Jihad (Jihad militia), which was reportedly heavily involved in the deadly conflict between Muslims and Christians on the Moluccas. Besides the Laskar Jihad, the Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Defenders of Islam Front), another Islamist militia, made headlines by patrolling the streets of Jakarta and other cities in order to prevent what their members perceived as “vice” (e.g., massage parlors, nightclubs, the selling of “pornographic” literature, etc.). Furthermore, the FPI conducted raids during Ramadan, targeting businesses and individuals who were deemed disrespectful to the holy month. In April of 2006 the organization attacked the newly founded office of the Indonesian edition of Playboy, as well as organized gatherings and demonstrations in 2007 against the newly established left-wing Papernas party, which it accused of spreading communist ideals (Sabarini 2007b). In 2010 and 2011 the number of religiously instigated assaults by Islamic militias such as the FPI increased significantly. For example, in September 2010 alone more than thirty attacks on Christian churches took place, twelve more than during the whole of 2009. As Kimura notes, the government response was “lukewarm, if not provocative” (2010, 190). On the day before the FPI launched an attack on one Christian church, its representatives met with Jakarta’s governor and police chief to discuss cooperation between FPI and the police to better ensure “law enforcement support” during Ramadan.

What is more, the activities of various militia groups were often backed by state officials. Laskar Jihad, for example,
was reportedly armed and trained by members of the Indonesian military (Hasan 2006). According to cables from the U.S. embassy in Jakarta published by Wikileaks, sources within the Indonesian security forces had such close ties to the FPI that they were able to warn the U.S. embassy of an FPI attack hours before it actually took place. One cable states that a member of Indonesia’s BIN intelligence agency managed to provide the U.S. embassy with “advance notice of FPI’s hostile intent hours prior to the February 19 vandalism of the Embassy.” The cable also states that “National Police Chief Sutanto had provided some funds to FPI” prior to the attack, but cut off funding after the attack. The FPI is described as an “attack dog,” and thus as a “useful tool” for the police, “that could spare the security forces from criticism for human rights violations.”8 The Indonesian police described the claims made in the cable as false and untrue.9

Islamist militias were also involved in a number of attacks on Ahmadiyah, an unorthodox Muslim sect. These attacks made international headlines in February 2011, when some 1,500 people attacked a small group of members of Ahmadiyah and killed three of them. Whilst these attacks were publicly condemned by many politicians, intellectuals, and religious authorities, who all made public statements in favour of religious tolerance, the state apparatus has usually responded by limiting Ahmadiyah’s public activities to safeguard public order (Olle 2009, 114). For example, when members of the Front Pembela Islam, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and other radical groups attacked a demonstration organized by the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Faith for its support of Ahmadiyah, the Department of Home Affairs and the Department of Religion issued a joint decree consisting mainly of warnings to followers of Ahmadiyah not to promote deviant teachings, while at the same time prohibiting vigilantism. The inaction of the government, the law enforcement agencies, and the judiciary in condemning the violence, preventing attacks, and bringing perpetrators to justice has been accompanied by a growing number of provincial and local regulations that limit, or at times even de facto ban, the activities of Ahmadiyah (Crouch 2011). Government reaction to the violent attacks of February 2011 on Ahmadiyah members and supporters was also lukewarm. While some of the perpetrators were actually tried and convicted, the sentences of a few months in prison were nowhere near the maximum of twelve years.10 What is more, a ministerial decree issued in 2008, which banned Ahmadiyah followers from expressing their religious beliefs publicly, actually provided the legal background for nationwide discrimination and violent attacks (Heiduk 2008).

The resurgence of Islamist militias has, however, by and large been overshadowed by the existence of the Jemaah Islamiyah terror network. While until 2009 their attacks were aimed mainly at Western nightclubs, embassies, and luxury hotels, Indonesian officials and government institutions have increasingly become targets. This was most spectacularly exemplified by a failed plot to assassinate President Yudhoyono in 2009, but also by various attacks on police officers in 2011.11 Threatened by attacks against state officials and institutions, the Indonesian government has in turn made significant efforts to crack down on terrorist networks operating in the country. In 2010 for example, a jihadist training camp in Aceh became the target of a police crackdown that left eight rebels dead, amongst them the alleged mastermind of the Bali bombings. Following the crackdown in Aceh, President Yudhoyono decreed the establishment of a National Anti-Terrorism Agency to coordinate the efforts of different government agencies involved in anti-terrorism. Overall, the increased counter-terrorism efforts vis-a-vis jihadist networks since 2005 have resulted in the arrest of over two hundred militants associated with Jemaah Islamiyah as well as the police killings ofJI splinter group leaders Mohammad Noordin Top and Dulmatin in 2009 and 2010 respectively.

8 Cable 06JAKARTA5851, Wikileaks.com, August 30, 2011, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06JAKARTA5851.html#.
Apart from the state’s ambiguous relationship with “uncivil society” (Hefner), another striking feature of the resurgence of political Islam in Indonesia is the remarkable rise since 1998 of the PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera – Prosperous Justice Party) inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood. After gaining less than 2 percent of the votes in Indonesia’s first free and fair elections in 1999, the PKS managed to win more than 7 percent in 2004 and 2009. As a result, it became Indonesia’s seventh-strongest political party and joined the ruling coalition of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The PKS even saw its leader, Hidiyat Nur Wahid, chosen as speaker of the Indonesian parliament. Analysis of the 2004 elections shows that PKS won many votes through its somewhat secular agenda (demanding reform of the welfare system and pushing for stronger anti-corruption policies). It differed from other Islamist groups by not openly demanding the establishment of sharia law and mainly concentrating on governance issues. Furthermore, the cadre-based organizational structures of the PKS, which were modeled on Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhoood, and the party’s internal disciplinary system not only ensured that the majority of its members abide by the party’s programme and refrain from activities that could be detrimental to the PKS’s image, such as conducting or supporting violent actions, but have at the same time served as a “preventive radicalisation mechanism.” Noor argues that it is “this internal mechanism that PKS hopes to use in order to maintain the cohesion of its membership and to distance itself from the more radical and violent Islamist groups in Indonesia today” (2011, 26).

It seems obvious that Indonesia’s democratization has opened up space for a great variety of Islamist actors, which have in turn further enhanced the general political importance of Islam. Democratization encompassed the establishment of a multiparty system, the lifting of restrictions on the freedom of press, and an enormous decentralization process that has allowed Islamists to spread their ideas legally through extensive communication networks. It also enabled the Islamist parties to return to the political arena. The lifting of repression of oppositional groups permitted the establishment of various Islamic civil society organizations, including moderate, liberal organizations, but also the “uncivil society.” While post-Suharto Indonesia certainly disproves the hypothesis that democratic institutions automatically lead to Islamist moderation, the developments also challenge the assumption that there is a clear dividing line between Islamists and the state’s authorities. While the latter appears to be true with regard to jihadist networks such as Jemaah Islamiyah and its splinter groups, which faced strong state repression, other militant Islamists such as Front Pembela Islam or Laskar Jihad have often operated in a gray zone between repression and cooptation. The varying relationship between the state and militant Islamist actors – ranging from (at least temporary) cooptation to repression – seems to emphasize how even parts of political Islam’s militant fringe can be instrumentalized by elites to serve their specific sociopolitical interests.

This picture is further complicated by the International Crisis Group investigation into the killings of police officers in West Java in 2011, which found that the perpetrators of the bombings were not members of terrorist groups but had been radicalised in the context of the street politics of Islamist militias. “The 2011 suicide bombings of a police mosque in Cirebon, West Java and an evangelical church in Solo, Central Java were carried out by men who moved from using sticks and stones in the name of upholding morality and curbing ‘deviance’ to using bombs and guns” (ICG 2012, 1). Similarly, a study on religious radicalism in Java by the Sentara Institute published before the 2011 attacks found that radical Islamist groups in the area had served as “incubators” for the two suicide bombers involved in the attacks but that neither of the two had any links to known terrorist groups. Neither the Islamist actors nor the Indonesian state can be considered to be a “monolithic bloc”; rather, it is a stark characteristic of post-Suharto Indonesia that the relationship between the state and Islamist actors has lost its cohesion. The ambivalent relationship between political elites and the “uncivil society”, as well as the rise of the PKS in the 2004 elections, again must be understood within the wider context of Indonesia’s transition to what Hadiz terms “illiberal democracy” (2003).

3. Contextualizing Political Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia: The Oligarchic Continuum
The aforementioned positive reviews of the democratization process that brought about Indonesia’s transition to
democracy and the end of the New Order focus mainly on factors such as elite choices, leadership, and the importance of political institutions to the course and outcome of the democratization process (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Accordingly, the crafting of democratic rules and institutions, combined with democratic forms of governance and the existence of an enlightened, pro-democratic civil society serving as a “watchdog” to the government, is equated with the consolidation of democracy (Rieffel 2004). While such new institutional arrangements may be pivotal for the establishment of a democratic political system, they largely exclude the constellations of social forces (or classes) that “determine the parameters of possible outcomes in any given situation. … The direction of political change following the end of authoritarian rule is primarily the product of contests between these competing social forces” (Hadiz 2003, 592). Bellin points out that social forces are therefore by and large “contingent, not consistent, democrats” (2000) – that is, support for democracy or the authoritarian state depends on whether these specific social forces see their political and economic interests served by the respective form of rule. When political and economic conditions change, interests may change, too. Thus social forces might see the need to redefine their position toward the respective regime (Bellin 2000).

The change in political and economic conditions in Indonesia was brought about by the Asian financial crisis in 1997. With the New Order descending into deep economic crisis, more than one third of the population slid under the poverty line, living standards of large parts of the population declined, and economic growth rates fell to less than zero. Once legitimated by high economic growth rates and rising living standards, the New Order regime, personalized by Suharto, who was often referred to as Pak Pembangunan (father of development), saw itself confronted with political and economic crisis. As Suharto proved incapable of solving the crisis and hundreds of thousands demanded reforms, supporters withdrew their loyalty and forced him to step down (Smith 2003).

The fall of Suharto and the institutional reforms that followed are not to be equated with the establishment of democracy and a “free” market economy. Yet they did change the “balance of power” and the “terms of conflict” (Robinson 2001, 120), as the formerly dominant political/business oligarchs and bureaucrats lost the powerful centralized state apparatus that had guaranteed their privileged positions and secured their interests. A new and more open political system came into being, one in which politics was no longer channeled exclusively vertically through the state apparatus and Suharto’s cronies, but increasingly through parties and the parliament. The “diffusion of politics” after the fall of Suharto made it necessary for the old power-holders to adapt to the politics of reform and consequently to engage in wider and more horizontal alliances in order to protect their own resources of political and economic power (Slater 2006, 208). A coalition of moderate reformers and old elites under the leadership of Suharto’s deputy Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie took power and initiated moderate democratic political reforms – effectively marginalizing those social forces that had demanded more radical reforms. At the same time, the system of collusion, corruption, and nepotism amongst officials and politico-business oligarchs did not cease to exist. The de facto elimination of any mass-based opposition during the New Order era meant that there were no simply social forces strong enough to break up the old power structures.

Therefore, while political institutions were widely reformed, the socioeconomic power structures of the New Order (the vast, informal patronage networks of the elites) remained largely unaffected throughout this “quasi-evolutionary” elite-driven transition process. The result was what Slater calls the construction of a “political cartel” (2004). Although elections are formally competitive, the cartel of political elites protects those in power from outside competition. Slater argues that the political cartel has made Indonesia’s oligarchy “practically irremovable through the electoral process, even though elections themselves have been commendably free and fair” (2006, 208).

The “money politics” is fueled by a party system in which political parties have not emerged out of “broad-based social interests” with the backing of different, often competing social forces (which was precluded by the elite-controlled transition process) but exist instead mainly as “patronage machines” of elite factions. This has also been described as a
“trend toward personality-based political parties in recent years.”

Striking examples for this type of political party are the Democrat Party led by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerinda, led by ex-General Prabowo Subianto) and the People’s Conscience Party (Partai Hanura, led by ex-General Wiranto). The “commodification of politics” (Ufen 2010, 30) has various dimensions. First, the mobilization of voters, which often begins months ahead of the actual campaigning periods, involves spiraling costs for the candidates in terms of advertisements and marketing. These costs are often at least partially shouldered by business elites backing one or sometimes even all candidates to ensure their interests are met by office-holders after the elections. Second, on the local level candidates need to bribe party bosses to secure slots on their party’s lists. So, money politics also affect the internal process by which a political party designates its candidates. In order to ensure that candidates have at least some support, they officially have to be put forward by parties. In reality candidates start campaigning before they have the support of a political party, and later seek support from any party, regardless of ideals or platforms. “Parties were a ‘vehicle’ minus ideology” (Simandjuntak 2009, 93).

One example is the backing of former deputy governor Fauzi Bowo by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) during the 2007 local elections in Jakarta. This decision, which was made only weeks before the elections, came as a surprise to the PDI-P party chapters and the public, as Bowo had previously been registered with former Suharto party Golkar. Despite his lack of roots within his new party, and although other candidates had already been selected, Bowo was immediately given a chance to register as an independent candidate for PDI-P. Disappointed party members as well as political analysts described this as a “political ploy played by the elite,” which holds the tickets to enter the race for lucrative and sought-after posts within the local and national government. These tickets are usually sold to the highest bidder, which effectively marginalizes democratic decision-making processes within the parties (Sabarini 2007a). In line with this, Buehler and Tan show that the relationship between party and candidate is formed at a later stage, on an ad-hoc basis shortly before the elections, and often based on personal bonds not political bonds (2007). Virtually all local candidates had no roots in any party and originated from outside the parties. “The parties expected to be paid by candidates for their services in the elections” (Buehler and Tan 2007, 65). Thirdly, trying to ensure a good ticket for posts after the elections also involves the “mobilization of delegates as voters at party congresses through campaigning and different forms of vote-buying” (Ufen 2010, 30).

In a country where, according to the World Bank definition of less than $2 per day, more than 50 percent of the population continues to live below the poverty line, the practice of money politics severely restricts political decision-making to competing wealthy elite factions (Hillman 2006, 27).

Vote-buying is common in all districts of Indonesia, with more than seven thousand election violations, including multiple vote-buying incidents, reported during the 2004 parliamentary elections. During the 2004 presidential elections the NGOs Indonesian Corruption Watch and Transparency International Indonesia suspected nearly all presidential candidates of vote-buying. Australian journalist Michael Backmann was left wondering whether corruption runs so rampant as to completely undermine democracy (2004):

Democracy is a good thing. But what is the point of it when the state apparatus is so corrupt that most laws are subverted to the point of irrelevancy? Who cares whether this or that leader is elected when corruption will mean that their policy platforms are unlikely to be implemented, and certainly not in the way that they would intend?

Indonesia is today still among the thirty most corrupt nations according to Transparency International’s annual Corruption Index. A survey conducted by Gallup right before the 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections showed that nine out of ten Indonesians perceive corruption...
to be endemic throughout government surveyed. Moreover, 52 percent believe that corruption actually became worse between 2004 and 2009 (Gallup 2008). Corruption is so endemic, that 85 percent of judges and 60 percent of police officers are estimated to be corrupt (Webber 2006, 408) and companies working in Indonesia are reckoned to use about 10 percent of their overall budgets to “smoothen” business operations (Henderson and Kuncoro 2004).

While collusion and nepotism under the New Order were largely channeled through Suharto’s patronage networks, today the democratic political parties serve as patronage vehicles for Indonesia’s “new” elites. Thus Robinson and Hadiz describe Indonesia’s transition process as the “oligarchization” of democracy (2004). Within the democratic oligarchy, as opposed to the authoritarian New Order of Suharto, the once extremely centralized state apparatus has lost its cohesion. It must therefore be understood not as a monolithic bloc, but rather as a focal point of competing social forces. The deployment of Islamist militias serving as instruments in the hands of competing elite factions and the success of the Islamist PKS must be understood against this background. Against what many Indonesians perceive as the “old,” ineffective, and corrupt political establishment, the PKS presented itself as an “anti-establishment” party with a political agenda focusing mainly on anti-corruption policies and socioeconomic reforms. The success of its “clean and caring” message during the 2004 and 2009 elections was a product of the many shortcomings of the “new” democratic order.

4. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Radical Islam Ten Years after Reformasi

The foregoing analysis of the substance of democracy and the realities of “democratic” practices in post-Suharto Indonesia identifies a widening gap between the formal aspects of democracy (such as free elections, democratic institutions) and the democratic rhetoric of elected elites on the one hand, and the realities on the ground. The growing political importance of radical Islam in Indonesia must be interpreted as a response to this gap. The oligarchic continuum has triggered different responses from different strands of radical Islam, which have in turn resulted in different policies adopted by the Indonesian state towards the respective groups. Transnational jihadist networks like Jemaah Islamiyah and their followers have quickly come to regard the new Indonesia as more of the same secularism that they despise as sinful (though formally more democratic). Terrorist acts carried out to establish an Islamic state have been met with increasingly successful counter-terrorism measures by the Indonesian state. Whilst Islamist militants waging jihad as part of a struggle for an Islamic state in Indonesia have faced increasing repression by the Indonesian state and as a result have been weakened over the years, local Islamist militias like Front Pembela Islam and their “anti-vice” politics have been tolerated or in various incidents even actively supported by and used as a tool for political elites. Islamist vigilante groups have carried out with impunity a variety of militant actions against what they perceive as a “Christianization” of Indonesia and for the application of the sharia in public life. This is first of all because these militias, unlike Jemaah Islamiyah, accept the Indonesian government as legitimate in principle, and do not actively strive to establish an Islamic state in its place. In addition, nearly all political parties (as well as other private actors) employ “their” respective private militias for protection and to intimidate opponents. Hence political support in Jakarta for imposing a ban on militias is low. With new studies highlighting the blurring divisions between Islamist militias and terrorists, a wider question emerges: Is it possible to differentiate between radical Islamist militias and jihadi terrorism? One preliminary conclusion, based on present research on the attacks in West Java, could be that jihadi ideologies and tactics have merged with the agendas of vigilante groups, thus establishing “individual jihadists” or “self-made terrorists” with no connections to larger terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah as a new variant in Indonesia’s spectrum of radical Islamists.

And then there is the moderate strand of radical Islam. Islamist parties, especially the PKS, have employed a “clean and caring” message in response to what especially the urban middle class perceives to be but the continuation in a democratic institutional framework of the old patterns of collusion, nepotism, and corruption that dominated Indonesian politics for decades. Within this context, the PKS managed to mobilize the votes of many disappointed members of the middle class through its commitment to
clean government and social reforms. Because of its success in the 2004 national elections the PKS even became part of the coalition led by President Yudhoyono. But realpolitik has caused the PKS some serious setbacks over the last few years. By being a part of the Yudhoyono government, the party had to carry some of the responsibility for “tough” policies such as the cuts on fuel subsidies. More damage to the party’s “clean and caring” image was done through corruption charges against PKS members serving in regional governments. Ironically, the PKS was unable to successfully transform the “clean and caring” campaign that gained it many votes during the 2004 elections into realpolitik under the Yudhoyono government, and thus currently finds itself in a state of decline. Thus while Islamist parties like the PKS managed to gain electoral success with an agenda focused on governance issues, it has been difficult for them to deliver on those promises. Accordingly, the party failed to gain more than 7.9 percent of the votes in the 2009 national elections. Opinion polls seem to provide further evidence for this development, recently showing flagging support for Islamist parties in general. Moreover, in a society that has been in a process of Islamization for nearly two decades, attempts to gain political legitimacy through moral, faith-based politics are not the sole domain of the PKS. Local sharia laws for example are increasingly supported by “normal” Muslim and even “secular” parties such as Golkar in order to boost their political legitimacy amongst their constituents (Buehler 2011). Therefore Tanuwidjaja argues that the decline of Islamist parties in post-Suharto Indonesia is not to be equated with a crisis of political Islam (2010). Instead, he argues, Islam has penetrated all political parties to an extent that makes it hard for Islamic parties to monopolize Islamic aspirations of their constituents. The fact that all major political parties have accommodated Islamic aspirations can be interpreted as a victory of radical Islamists in a formerly “secular” political environment.

Hence, it would be wrong to conclude that the recent weakening of political Islam in Indonesia is irreversible. The continuum of predatory interests, graft-ridden political institutions, rampant poverty, and unemployment still – despite high economic growth rates – makes political Islam seem a credible alternative to many. While these findings certainly do not link up directly with the individual motivations of radical Islamists to engage in violence, interviews with jailed militants show that perceived inequality and perceived corruption often served as a justification for Islamist violence. Especially endemic corruption has contributed to “the negative impression that the government is immoral and thogut (evil)” (Ungerer 2011, 11). The oligarchic character of Indonesia’s democracy has to a large extent minimized the positive effects of moderate Islamist parties. The real challenge for Indonesia’s democracy is therefore not political Islam per se, but rather the appropriation of the democratization process by the power politics of predatory elites. This, combined with an ongoing Islamization of society in general, has further complicated the aforementioned ambiguous relationship between the state and radical Islam. However, the (selective) instrumentalization of radical Islam by the state has also, much to the distaste of those in favor of the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia, discredited it in the eyes of many Indonesians looking for a credible opposition force to what Webber terms Indonesia’s “patrimonial democracy” (2006).
References


ELECTING NOT TO FIGHT: ELECTIONS AS A MECHANISM OF DERADICALISATION AFTER THE IRISH CIVIL WAR 1922–1938

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Electing Not to Fight: Elections as a Mechanism of Deradicalisation after the Irish Civil War 1922–1938

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Much research into the relationship between democratisation and conflict argues that holding elections soon after civil war, when nationalist issues still resonate, is likely to see voters elect to fight. This paper explores a case where elections had the opposite effect. Examination of the relationship between election results and political developments, as well as geographical voting patterns, demonstrates that elections were the primary mechanism for the deradicalisation of Irish politics after the civil war of 1922–23. Elections served as a mechanism for arbitration, selection, and coordination between more and less radical elites and their bases of support. Once the new state had shown its strength it had to accommodate gradual change, while electoral losers had to show they could reconcile change with stability. Elections helped establish credibility in both respects without altering the state-society relationship, suggesting that deradicalisation was dependent on state performance, and thus on some shared conception of the state. This combination of credibility, electoral legitimacy, and state performance, enabled a revolutionary elite, schooled in both constitutional and revolutionary politics, to deradicalise Irish nationalism after independence.

The idea that the early stages of democratic transition can be hijacked by nationalist elites and result in people “electing to fight” is a useful corrective to the view that democratisation always brings peace. Transitional elections may enable elites to entrench their positions, and nationalism is the ideology which enables them do so (Snyder 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2005). Although institutions such as a free press may constrain elites, early elections are likely to see people elect to fight by choosing leaders who advocate radical policies. Post-conflict elections particularly can re-ignite civil war passions, give a platform to extremists, and allow one side to confirm its victory, obstructing general reconciliation (Reilly 2008). Early elections can be especially damaging if power becomes distributed along lines over which the war was fought, rather than leading to the integration necessary for state-building (Sisk 2009, 198). Accordingly, Paris suggests that elections be postponed until moderates prevail, and electoral systems designed to marginalise radicals (Paris 2004, 188–91).

In Ireland, however, elections brought the War of Independence (1919–1921) to a close, and enabled a state to deradicalise after its birth in civil war in 1922. Although these elections did confirm victories, expressed civil war tensions, and kept nationalist elites in power, politics substantially deradicalised nonetheless. Many democratic theorists understand democratic institutions principally in terms of functions and outputs, not ideals. Irish elections proved to be a “mechanism” of deradicalisation in two ways: while at first seen as a way of achieving civil war ends, repeated exposure to this mechanism led to consensus on its value as a means of resolving conflict. It worked not because the two sides agreed to resolve their differences peacefully, but because it accelerated a process of deradicalisation that led to the marginalisation of violent actors and consensus on democratic politics.

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1. Electing Not to Fight

If electing to fight is important, so should its converse be. If elections result in radicalisation when elites exploit us-versus-them sentiments, represent their opponents as traitors, and harness electoral support in defence of privileges (Snyder 2000, 45–88), a nationalist movement which possessed these combustible elements, but still deradicalised, suggests other possibilities. The Irish Free State was created by the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, after partition in 1920, and only became a republic in 1949. If the hardest struggles are those against the “birth defects” of a political community (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 3), the deradicalisation of a state whose very existence constituted a violation of the founders’ principles shows that voting can also lead to non-violence.

Sinn Féin rose to prominence in 1918 when radicalisation seemed the best way of achieving independence. The movement abstained from the United Kingdom’s Westminster parliament, founded its own underground parliament, Dáil Éireann, in January 1919, and committed itself to the Irish Republic proclaimed during the 1916 Rising. The War of Independence lasted until July 1921, and the Rising remained a symbol of what could be achieved by physical force. The Irish Republican Army (IRA hereafter) spearheaded the independence movement. However, once the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty had been accepted by the second Dáil, on January 7, 1922, elections became the crucial mechanism making the nationalist elite accountable to a public which had become war-weary. The Rising had seen “specialists in violence” increasingly take the initiative away from the politicians. The treaty, however, split the IRA, and began a long process in which elected governments re-asserted their authority. Just as Sinn Féin invoked the principle of majority rule in 1918 to back its call for independence, electoral victories were followed by the forceful assertion of this principle in 1923, 1927, 1933, and 1939. While 1918 radicalised politics, elections had the opposite effect after the treaty.

Deradicalisation had four dimensions. The commitment to the Republic was de-intensified, and the state stabilised in the 1930s, without achieving either the Republic or an end to partition. The treaty required these goals to be pursued incrementally, and the “all or nothing” Republican approach to “the national question” was sidelined. Secondly, conflicts were increasingly resolved in the formal representative arena. Differences over the Treaty split the second Dáil, and two rival parliaments continued to exist in parallel. The decision of Fianna Fáil to enter the new state’s “third Dáil” in 1927 made it the only chamber which mattered. The all-Ireland second Dáil stopped meeting in 1938. Thirdly, the blurred boundary between constitutional and violent politics was reasserted, and elections became the only basis of legitimate authority in nationalist politics by 1933. Paramilitarism then declined. Finally, politics were deradicalised in the sense that a revolutionary elite became dependent on the support of an electorate less radical in its outlook. This meant that purely ideological parties did not flourish, and economic issues increasingly dominated electoral campaigns.

Democratisation had resulted in a combination of independence war, civil war, and sectarian war after 1918 (Kissane 2004). Yet the British imposition of the Treaty, and the fact that attacks on Northern Ireland would result in further violence against Catholics there, meant that the War of Independence could only be extended to Northern Ireland at a price. In this combustible environment “southern Irish” voters elected not to fight. The June 1922 election saw radical nationalists lose majority support, which meant that the costs of further conflict could not be easily be imposed on the voters. The link between elections and deradicalisation, thus established, would endure.
Mansfield and Snyder also suggest that radical elites can be held in check by strong institutions of accountability (2003, 23). Irish voters’ decision not to fight in 1922 has been explained in three ways: (1) The sequence was one of institutionalisation before liberalisation. The British left the “building blocks” of normal politics: a central administration, legal system, and free press. The breakdown of constitutionalism in 1916 was an aberration, 1922–23 a reassertion of the Irish norm. (2) Institutions such as the Catholic Church, the labour movement, and the press were sufficiently developed for the movement’s radicals to be reined in by the organised expression of public opinion (Garvin 1996; Laffan 1999); an accountability argument. (3) A combination of British military pressure, the Catholic Church, and the stance of the banks distorted the marketplace of ideas in 1922. (The first anti-treaty newspaper, *The Irish Press*, was not founded until 1931). Only the holding of successive elections, without threats of reoccupation, sanctions, and red scares, allowed the real views of the people to be ascertained. Sovereignty was a pre-requisite for the electorate expressing itself freely (a state-building argument). All three perspectives suggest that transitions do not necessarily create conditions especially favourable for radical nationalist causes (Snyder 2000, 54).

2. “Civil War Politics”

“Civil war politics” – the term for the heated electoral campaigns after 1922 – retained all the combustible elements of “electing to fight”. Yet elections continued to deradicalise. The civil war was fought within Sinn Féin and the IRA. The pro-treaty government prevailed and formed Cumann na nGaedheal in December 1922. The losers continued to be represented by Sinn Féin, from which Fianna Fáil split in 1926. Cumann na nGaedheal ruled until 1932, after which Fianna Fáil remained in power for sixteen years. Civil war politics continued in two ways. No coalition was formed before 1948, which meant that the non-civil war parties played no role in government. Secondly, civil war issues were revisited at each election. Up to 1932 the government wanted elections to confirm its victory, while the opposition used elections to stake its claim as guardian of the incomplete national revolution. Both sides thus struggled for legitimacy in the name of the nation.

The civil war divide became more, not less, important. The “directional model” of voting behaviour (Dunleavy 1995, 150–52) suggests that once a basic line of division is established in a political system, voters tend to vote in terms of what side of the divide they are on, not in terms of how closely their opinions match those of the parties themselves. In this respect voting is not rational but directional, and the parties that situate themselves most clearly on either side of the middle ground tend to attract most votes. Despite strong support for “neutral” candidates in June 1922, once the two large parties representing the civil war sides emerged, voting became directional. As a result, the non-civil war parties’ share of the vote dropped from over 40 percent in June 1922 to less than 15 percent in 1938. This decline is shown in red in Table 1. The September 1927 election was the obvious turning-point.

Radicalisation may thrive when nationalist elites rule in the name of the people, but are insufficiently accountable to them (Snyder 2000, 45). Yet the civil war parties *did* impose their conception of politics on voters. They usually fell short of a majority during elections, but to avoid coalitions with “sectional interests” they took advantage of an ambiguity in the 1922 constitution which did not outline the
conditions under which a Dáil could be dissolved, except to say that “Dáil Éireann may not at any time be dissolved except on the advice of the Executive Council”. The first dissolution occurred in 1927, when the attorney general advised the minority government, which had done badly in the June election, that the Constitution did not prevent the Executive Council from dissolving the Dáil without its consent (O’Leary 1979, 24). The Dáil was dissolved and the September 1927 “snap election” returned Cumann na nGaedheal to power. In 1933 and 1938 Fianna Fáil governments also called “snap elections” in order to convert their initial plurality of seats in the Dáil into a majority. They then formed a single-party government and avoided a coalition. Figure 2 shows the effects of these “snap elections” on parliamentary strengths.

Deradicalisation thus occurred more because the civil war blocs changed internally, rather than because moderate actors became more pivotal. Institutions, such as a free press or a multi-party system, were not strong enough to persuade voters that vertical divisions (between elites and masses) were more important than those between nations (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 2). The combined electoral strength of the civil war parties was initially greatest in western areas where civil war violence was worst. Figure 3 shows their combined first preference vote by region between 1922 and 1938. Before September 1927, their share of the vote in the “heartland” of Ireland and in the capital Dublin was actually less than 60 percent. Remarkably, in the heartland, where most constituencies were located, their share of the vote had dropped to only 43 percent by June 1927. This area had seen less fighting in 1922–23. After Fianna Fail’s entry into the Dáil in 1927 a national pattern of representation emerged, with the civil war parties’ combined vote share reaching 80 percent or more in all regions in 1938. Their territorial expansion was an aspect of “the invasion of the centre by the periphery” between 1922 and 1938 (Garvin 1974). The third parties lost out in this invasion.

Figure 2: Party strengths and snap elections 1922–38

Source: Gallagher 1993.

Much has been written about what kinds of institutional design encourage deradicalisation. Power-sharing is often recommended. Irish politics deradicalised under a Westminster “winner take all” system where power was exclusively in the hands of one or other of the civil war parties. Local government was placed under strong central control after 1923. The term “Civil war politics” itself suggests the instrumental use to which civil war memories were put. The scars were real: seventy-seven IRA men were officially executed by the state during the civil war, most as reprisals. Yet “joint institutional manipulation”, whereby both sides used the rules of the game to structure competition around themselves, took place (Dunleavy 1991). By 1936 forty-eight of the eighty-three articles of the 1922 constitution had been amended, further concentrating power in the hands of the civil war parties (Farrell 1988).
Hence deradicalisation cannot be explained in terms of the weakening of the original cleavage: rather the cleavage was reinforced as the polity deradicalised. Deradicalisation was not the result of the familiar steps: the abandonment of nationalist goals, the replacement of radical actors with moderate ones, or changes in the external environment which made nationalist issues less relevant. The Irish marketplace of ideas was actually severely distorted by the alliance between priest and patriot: exactly the conditions under which elections allegedly lead to radicalisation (Snyder 2000, 56–59). Elites were accountable electorally, but not in other ways. Nonetheless, elections proved a sufficient mechanism for deradicalisation. They did so because they performed three essential functions.

3. Functions of Elections: Arbitration, Coordination, Selection

3.1 Elections as an Arbitration Mechanism

Elections can strengthen public support for democracy in new democracies if a process of “habituation” can lead to the internalisation of democratic rules. They can also strengthen the power of “norm entrepreneurs” who advocate democratic methods within political movements divided between radicals and moderates. Irish involvement in mass elections long predated 1921 and its long democratic “apprenticeship” is usually cited as a reason for its stability (Chubb 1992). When the single transferable vote proportional representation system was introduced in 1921, there was little difficulty adapting to it. On the other hand, others stress that belief in elections was reinforced by a dramatic alternation in power (Munger 1979). The 1932 changeover demonstrated that democratic rules applied to both sides.

Neither approach explains the relationship between elections and deradicalisation. In the absence of a negotiated peace and power-sharing, why should either side accept election results? The winners held an election to rubber-stamp their victory in 1923, but why accept defeat in 1932? The role of “norm entrepreneurs” in persuading the losers to accept election results and the strengthening of state legitimacy in 1932 were important factors. But why were the norm entrepreneurs persuasive among the anti-treatyites, and why did a “winner take all” changeover not disrupt the process? Post-civil war democracies must combine respect for political pluralism with the provision of public order. If elections perpetuated the winner-take-all logic of civil war, how did they allow for the restoration of order?

One explanation is that both sides eventually accepted that the treaty issues should be arbitrated by the voting public. The question was not whether such issues should be dominant, but whether they would be arbitrated democratically. Post-civil war democracy can be “an arbitration mechanism” in which the public are given the right to choose between warring factions in elections (Wanthchekon 2004). The treaty had required that a general election take place.

Figure 3: Civil war parties’ share of first preference vote by region 1922–38

Note 1: To account for boundary revisions in 1923 and 1935, the following classifications were used. In 1922 Centre includes Dublin Mid, Dublin North West, Dublin South, Dublin County; Heartland includes Carlow-Kilkenny, Cork Borough, Cork East and North East, Cork Mid, North, South, South East, and West, Kildare-Wicklow, Laois-Offaly, Louth-Meath, Tipperary North, South, and Mid, Waterford-Tipperary East, Wexford; Border Periphery includes Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim-Roscommon North, Longford-Westmeath, Monaghan, Sligo-Mayo East; Western Periphery includes Clare, Galway, Limerick City and East, Mayo South-Roscommon South, Mayo North and West. In 1923–33 Centre includes Dublin North, Dublin South, Dublin Co.; Heartland includes Carlow-Kilkenny, Cork Borough, Cork East, Cork North, Cork West, Kildare, Laois-Offaly, Meath, Tipperary, Waterford, Wexford, Wicklow; Border Periphery includes Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim-Sligo, Longford-Westmeath, Louth, Monaghan, and Roscommon; Western Periphery includes Clare, Galway, Limerick, Mayo North, and Mayo South. For 1937-38 Centre includes Dublin North East, Dublin North West, Dublin South, Dublin Townships, Dublin County; Heartland includes Carlow-Kildare, Cork Borough, Cork North, Cork South East, Cork West, Kilkenny Laois Offaly, Meath-Westmeath, Tipperary, Waterford, Wexford, and Wicklow; Border Periphery includes Athlone-Longford, Cavan, Donegal East, Donegal West, Leitrim, Louth, Monaghan, Roscommon, Sligo; Western Periphery includes Clare, Galway East, Galway West, Mayo North, Limerick, Mayo North, and Mayo South.

Note 2: In 1922 Limerick City and East, Donegal, Leitrim-Roscommon North, Clare, Kerry-Limerick-West, and Mayo North and West were uncontested.

Note 3: Figures for University constituencies are not included.
within six months. The Provisional Government, under pressure from the British, saw this election as a means of finding out if the people would give them a mandate for the course they were taking. The anti-treatyites feared it would signify the disestablishment of the Republic and an acceptance of partition (Kissane 2002). An election was held only on June 16 after both sides agreed to put forward a joint panel of candidates and form a Sinn Féin coalition government afterwards. This agreement became known as “the Collins-de Valera electoral pact”. In the June election pro-treaty panel candidates won 58 seats out of 128, while anti-treatyites from this panel got 36, a loss of 22 seats.

The assumption of the electoral pact, that a straight vote on the treaty be avoided, was now rejected in favour of the arbitration device. The Provisional Government thought the results gave them a clear mandate to implement the treaty. Republicans thought the mandate was for a coalition. To the case for the Treaty settlement, only narrowly accepted by the Dáil in January 1922, was added the principle that the majority must rule. A switch to peacetime legitimacy was underway, and the alleged threat to individual liberty and private property posed by the “irregular” IRA was now stressed in government propaganda (Kissane 2005, 155–58). The Provisional Government, under British pressure, attacked the IRA positions in central Dublin on June 28. Civil war then spread to the countryside. The fighting was ultimately one-sided, the public proved war-weary, and the anti-treatyites laid down their arms and returned home without a surrender in May 1923 (Hopkinson 1988). Military victory was secured.

The logic of an arbitration device was that the electoral victors would determine the direction of the polity, and government policy reflect public opinion. The government claimed that the August 1923 election retrospectively vindicated its civil war policy. Yet Michael Collins, the pro-treaty leader, also said that the treaty would stand, unless “in the whirl of politics” those opposed to it got a majority in the country (Kissane 2002, 207). The arbitration mechanism thus pointed to two means of conflict resolution. The victors tried to use their strength to compel the losers to accept the settlement. In contrast, Fianna Fáil wanted to reconcile the losers to the new state by replacing the agreement.

Implicit in the arbitration device is the principle of majority rule. When the anti-treatyites offered to negotiate peace in April 1923, the government replied that in future, “all political issues … shall be decided by the majority vote of the elected representatives of the people” (Valiulis 1992, 189). At the Sinn Féin Árd Fheis (general convention) in 1926, when a large minority left to form Fianna Fáil, Sinn Féin’s president de Valera declared that “the majority of the people were going to shape the future” (Fanning 1989, 10). The pro-treaty government stood down after the 1932 elections, from which Fianna Fáil emerged as the largest party. After gaining a majority of seats in 1933, de Valera gradually revised the treaty on the basis of his parliamentary majority. His enactment of a Republican constitution in 1937 “completed the reconciliation of majority rule with popular sovereignty” (Farrell 1988, 117–19).

By 1938, (besides partition) most civil war issues had been substantially resolved by the arbitration device. This encouraged deradicalisation in two ways. Responsibility for deciding the direction of the polity was devolved, which meant that the moves away from the treaty were in step with a public opinion less radical than the elite. Secondly, those parties that accepted the arbitration device found themselves at odds with radical actors. The anti-treatyites were seen to have rejected democracy in 1922, and Fianna Fáil had to resolve its “commitment problem” by signalling its moderate intentions after 1926. The assassination of the Minister of Home Affairs, Kevin O’Higgins on 10 July, 1927, saw them end their abstentionist policy and enter the Dáil. Before the 1932 election, rather than declaring that once in power they would dissolve all existing relationships with the United Kingdom, Fianna Fáil limited their ambitions to the removal of the oath (required of parliamentarians by the 1922 constitution), combined with the non-payment of land annuities to the British government. (Land annuities were paid by Irish farmers as compensation for land they gained from various land reform acts before independence.) These commitments ensured Fianna Fáil Labour’s support in power. Nonetheless, the IRA informally worked for Fianna Fáil in elections in 1932 and 1933., Only Fianna Fáil’s electoral victory in 1933 saw them finally resolve their commitment problem by employing military tribunals against the IRA. These tribunals
had been established by Cumann na nGaedheal in 1931. After this extra-legal opposition to the Fianna Fáil government subsided.

3.2. Elections as a Coordinating Mechanism

If civil war ends in stalemate and an agreement to share power, both sides may deradicalise concurrently. Yet in Ireland there was a direct connection between the imbalance of power created by the civil war and the loser’s decision to deradicalise. An effective coordination device establishes clear expectations about actors’ compliance with its provisions, forcing them to re-assess their attitudes to it or become marginalised (Hardin 1999, 140). In Ireland the prospect of political oblivion quickly led to deradicalisation. The civil war victors insisted on elections as the only route to power. The anti-treatyites could reorganise knowing that their opponents would respect the integrity of this procedure. Expectations converged around parliament as the only place for opposition.

The government had won the war “hands down”. The losers abstained from the Dáil, and hoped for an election victory which would enable Sinn Féin’s parliament and government to become the institutions of the state. Yet local government appointments were centrally controlled, the losers were excluded from public employment, and many emigrated. Financial problems and electoral failures forced Sinn Fein to reconsider tactics (Pyne 1969–70). The danger of a genuine multi-party system was very obvious to de Valera, who remarked in 1923 that if the “third parties” (such as Labour) succeeded in organising themselves to any considerable extent it would be nearly impossible to unite them again “for a purely national purpose”. It was vital, therefore, that the reorganisation of Sinn Féin as the national organisation should be pushed forward with all speed (Laffan 1999, 429).

In January 1926 de Valera announced his willingness to enter the Dáil if the oath of allegiance were removed. The issue was debated by Sinn Féin on 9 March, 1926. Having lost the debate, de Valera’s minority became Fianna Fáil: the Republican Party, further splintering Sinn Féin with another split. The public rewarded their step towards deradicalisation. In June 1927 Fianna Fáil gained forty-four as opposed to Cumann na nGaedheal’s forty-seven seats, but its elected members were prevented from taking their seats so as long as they refused to take the oath. The assassination of Kevin O’Higgins then led the government to introduce a bill requiring electoral candidates to promise in advance to comply with the oath. The basis of the abstentionist policy was destroyed. Fianna Fáil took the oath – albeit as “an empty political formula” – and became the largest opposition party. When the “Republican Dáil” met on December 11, 1927, only half of those who had attended the previous year were invited, as the other half had joined the de facto parliament (Kissane 2002, 173–80).

Post-conflict democracies can be sustained by uncertainty: actors can accept electoral defeat for now, confident of future chances (Prezoworski 1988). In Ireland, certainty about their future irrelevance if they continued their policy of abstentionism encouraged the losers’ participation in official institutions. An imbalance of power had similar consequences in 1933, when the newly-formed Fine Gael (a continuation of Cumann na nGaedheal) chose an unelected fascist with a civil war past as its president, and a campaign of political disruption by his “Blueshirts” began. “Red-scare” tactics against Fianna Fáil marked the 1933 election and paramilitary violence returned to the countryside. The Blueshirts were led by fascists, but the Fine Gael parliamentary elite abandoned them when the situation polarised. The government repressed them with the cooperation of the Garda Síochána (police). The poor showing of Blueshirt candidates in the 1934 local elections suggested their movement, and the crisis it provoked, would be “the nemesis of civil war”. If Fianna Fáil had not won an electoral majority in 1933, Fine Gael (and the British government, with whom Fianna Fáil fought a trade war), may have tried harder to undermine its government. De Valera had called the snap election believing that the British government would not negotiate with a parliament they expected to fall (Fanning 1983). The pro-treaty elite confined themselves to conventional opposition from then on. An imbalance of power again saw expectations converging on parliament as the arena of political opposition.

Stable democracy has, as a core element, political consensus on the desirability of existing institutions and the
rules of the game. Historically, such elite consensus has come about either through elite settlements, or through processes of electoral competition in which the main parties eventually converge on an equilibrium point (Higley and Burton 1998). Although the civil war destroyed the basis for consensus for some time, the parties converged on some issues in the late 1930s, culminating in an agreed policy of neutrality in World War Two. Elections encouraged this convergence at two critical turning-points. Fianna Fáil became a responsible opposition in 1927 as the world depression was deepening. Fine Gael accepted the legitimacy of Fianna Fáil rule in 1934, when the European polarisation between democrats and fascists was extending to Ireland. Both crises saw expectations coordinate on parliamentary forms of opposition.

3.3. Elections as a Selection Mechanism.

In the absence of strong mechanisms of accountability elections can be hijacked by an elite threatened by the return to normal politics. Yet Irish elections did not provide “a safe landing” for nationalist elites (Mansfield and Snyder 2005 8): after all mechanisms of accountability had been sufficiently strong to make radical arguments unpersuasive in 1922 (Garvin 1996). Elections also remained competitive, giving the edge to those who could adapt their skill sets and rationalise their commitment to them after the civil war. Elections institute a double process of “Darwinian selectivity” in favour of such actors: one among parties in general elections, and one among politicians vying for leadership within these parties (Rustow 1970, 359). The danger was that hardliners would regroup and use civil war networks to continue the conflict by other means. Yet in Ireland early elections had the opposite effect, forcing splits within Sinn Féin in 1922 and 1926. The losses of anti-treaty Sinn Féin in the “pact election” of 1922, and the public’s rejection of key anti-treaty leaders, led to the pro-treaty leader, William Cosgrave, refusing negotiations during the civil war with people whose “period of usefulness” had been eclipsed (Kissane 2005). Into the 1930s elections continued to give actors more suited to peaceful politics the upper hand within the anti-treaty opposition.

The impact of this double selectivity on the party system has been noted. It resulted in the marginalisation of Sinn Féin after 1926 and of the Blueshirts after 1933. Anti-treaty losses in 1922, strong support for third parties up to 1927, and the fear that they would realign the system around non-nationalist issues, all encouraged deradicalisation. Republicanism had to become electorally competitive to achieve its goals. Moreover, the victors’ “red-scare” propaganda continually stressed the responsibility of the anti-treatyites for the economic cost of the civil war. This had two consequences: first, Fianna Fáil had to focus on economic issues in elections; then, in order to show coalition potential, the party deradicalised its behaviour in the Dáil. The prospect of it coming to power after its five years as a constructive opposition was less threatening. Labour, which supported the government during the civil war, supported the minority Fianna Fáil government between 1932 and 1933.

This selectivity was also at work in the struggle for hegemony within Sinn Féin. While the struggle between revolutionary and conservative nationalists among the victors continued within the army, on the losing side those who were successful in elections became “norm entrepreneurs” for democratic methods. This struggle went through three phases: the initial response to defeat, the 1926 split, and Fianna Fáil’s period in power. In 1923 de Valera reflected that the absence of popular support was his side’s chief weakness during the civil war. He saw in the government’s formation of Cumann na nGaedheal an opportunity to relaunch Sinn Féin as a broad-based national movement. Attempts to have the party rename itself the Irish Republican Political Organisation were resisted by de Valera, who insisted that “we wish to organise not merely Republican opinion strictly so-called, but what might be called ‘Nationalist’ or ‘Independence’ opinion in general”. De Valera, who had explicitly rejected the arbitration device in 1922, became “a norm entrepreneur” for democratic methods (Kissane 2002, 168–73).

Yet stalemate first prevailed. In 1925 the IRA decided it would withdraw its allegiance to the Republican government founded by de Valera in 1922. This contributed to the formation of Fianna Fáil, and after its entry into the Dáil the balance of power shifted. Sinn Féin was only able to put forward fifteen candidates for the June 1927 election, as
opposed to Fianna Fáil’s eighty-seven, and only five were elected. Sinn Féin was unable to put forward any candidates at all for the election in September 1927. In contrast, Fianna Fáil increased its seats from forty-four to fifty-seven. The number of affiliated Sinn Féin branches (Cu-mainn) was 87 in 1927 compared to a figure of 232 for 1926 (Kissane 2002, 175). Many Sinn Féin members and supporters who initially remained loyal, later joined Fianna Fáil, “attracted by its dynamism and the political acumen of its leaders” (Pyne 1969, 47).

A third phase began in 1933. Even though many IRA members worked for Fianna Fáil in the 1932 and 1933 elections, Fianna Fáil’s government did not suspend Article 2A, which allowed for military tribunals, although their operations were halted. The hated Criminal Intelligence Department, responsible for counter-insurgency, remained in existence. Moreover, a former Cumann na nGaedheal was chosen as Minister of Justice. Open confrontation with the IRA followed a radical change in IRA policy in March 1933, when the IRA rescinded its resolution, carried in 1932, to adopt a supportive attitude towards the government. It would now “pursue its policy irrespective of its reactions on the policy of the Free State Government and other political parties” (Kissane 2002, 184).

Fianna Fáil wanted not to marginalise Republicanism, but to show those bitter in defeat that politics could achieve their objectives. The Constitution (Removal of Oath) Act in 1933 went some way towards fulfilling the government’s ambition of establishing a government based on democratic principles, “and the complete absence of political barriers or tests of conscience of any kind” (Kissane 2002, 187). Government pensions were introduced for members of the anti-treaty IRA, and IRA men were recruited into the Gardaí. The 1937 constitution made it difficult to claim that the state was not legitimate. The changed attitude of one IRA leader, Sean MacBride, is illustrative. In the early thirties he predicted that if Fianna Fáil succeeded in removing the oath and the office of Governor General, the IRA would be in a difficult position (ibid., 192). By 1937 he had become convinced that the IRA had no real role to play in Southern politics, and ceased to be active in the organisation soon thereafter.

Since the decision of the more pragmatic Sinn Féiners to accept the treaty involved a commitment to deradicalise, the selection mechanism mattered most for those with the longest journey to travel. It worked so effectively that Fianna Fáil developed the most efficient electoral machine in the state, remaining dominant until 2011. Its electoral journey began in defeat, and its organisational culture was already apparent from de Valera’s attempted reorganisation of Sinn Féin in 1923; ideological pragmatism combined with Republican rhetoric; a concentration on socio-economic issues; and electoral efficiency – an internal memo stated that there should be no “duds” in this regard, but appointment by ability (Kissane 2002, 193). Before 1932 such norm entrepreneurs required electoral successes to be persuasive. In power they vindicated their civil war cause with constitutional changes, and at the same time pushed aside the IRA. “Constitutional Republicanism” may be an oxymoron, and only success at the polls allowed Republicanism, south of the border, to become constitutional.

4. Elections and State-Building

A tension can exist between elections and state-building, and for this reason Paris recommends “institutionalisation before liberalisation” (2004, 179–211). Early elections can freeze allegiances in ways that are incompatible with state-building, which requires integration among the population (Sisk 2009, 198–203). Yet the Irish sequence was simultaneous institutionalisation and liberalisation. By 1922 the country was in chaos, with no official security force. Only civil war resolved the problems of dual authority structures, private armies, rival sovereignty claims, and disputed boundaries. Central institutions were then rapidly reconstructed between 1923 and 1927, years in which four general elections took place.

Early elections rubber-stamped this process of reconstruction. The Provisional Government’s claim that it received a mandate in 1922 would have been hard to sustain had they not won the conventional phase of the civil war by September. The August 1923 election was held before the civil war had officially ended, and enabled the government to claim public endorsement for its military campaign. Later elections (in 1927, 1933, and 1938), were also followed by emergency legislation. The public rewarded the
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Elites with a mandate for the course (deradicalisation) they were taking. Indeed all but one of the eight elections held between 1922 and 1938 were won by incumbents. If the public was receptive to deradicalisation in the interests of democracy, it consistently showed a preference for strong central authority. There was no trade-off between liberalisation and institutionalisation.

Elections also confirmed that the state had not been captured by the winners. An electoral reform that did not disadvantage the losers was carried out in 1923. The retention of proportional representation (STV) allowed them to rapidly regain electoral ground. Garvin suggests that the pro-treaty elite saw politics “essentially as administration”, and reacted to the disturbance of revolution by committing themselves to a state autonomous from a “corrupting” native culture (Garvin 1981). After 1932 Fianna Fáil sought no revenge, and made the state more autonomous. While previous reconstruction schemes offered employment to National Army veterans, Fianna Fáil offered it to all.

The state itself was a source of deradicalisation. Early elections signalled that this process was underway, and state strength kept these signals strong. Had elections been postponed, the state would have lacked legitimacy, and the losers would have been deprived of a reason to regroup. Eight general elections took place between 1922 and 1938: one every few years. Since power was usually returned to incumbents, public support for deradicalisation was obviously connected to state performance. Elections furthered institutionalisation because they reinforced traditional conceptions of state performance. By 1922 an idea of the state existed: the government’s civil war propaganda stressed the state’s role in the protection of individual liberty and private property (Kissane 2005, 151). Fianna Fáil incorporated aspects of Cumann na nGaedheal’s appeal into its own strategy, as demonstrated in its manifesto for the 1933 general election.

Fianna Fáil 1933 General Election Manifesto

Today!
Choose your own Government
Choose a Strong Government
Choose an Irish Government!

We pledge ourselves to promote unity, to rule justly and impartially, to hold all citizens equal before the law, and to protect each in his person and in his property with all the resources at our command. We promise that the confidence placed in us by the people will not be abused. We promise to serve Ireland with all our abilities and to advance in every way the true interests of her people.

(Signed President de Valera).

Vote Fianna Fáil

Security was the bedrock of the state-society relationship (Sisk 2009), and the issue most likely to lead voters to support the government after civil war, regardless of social cleavages (Wantchekon 2005). The emphasis of the British state had also been on security. Mulhall notes that expenditure on the secret service was vastly higher after independence than it had been under the British in 1921–22. Expenditure on the police, for example, rose from £425,000 in 1922–23 to £1,031,000 in 1923 (Mulhall 1993). The government’s “red-scare” tactics, effective in the civil war, continued into the 1930s. This forced Fianna Fáil to address the public’s need for security too. As de Valera recalled:

The people supported Fianna Fáil because its policy was a practical one. It kept the ultimate objective of a free, united Irish nation clearly in view, but it concentrated successively on the nearer local objectives along the way, striving at each point to put upon the people only the strains which the people could bear.

(quoted in Kissane 2002, 191)

Civil war issues were revisited at election time, and in the atmosphere of insecurity this created, those who could provide strong government benefited. The result was that competition, while intense at the elite level, was deradicalising at the societal level. The dominance of such a conservative elite was reassuring to those among the public who were also socially conservative. The stress on security implied acceptance of the social order at a time when European politics were becoming polarised. Its bases, land reform, Catholic morality, and the common law system, had also been promoted by the British state, and reconstruction ef-
forts worked through institutions, like the Land Commission, which predated independence. The state-society relations were reassuring in the sense of being traditional.

Snyder suggests a zero-sum relationship between the interests of nationalist elites and democratic accountability (2000, 52). However, as with the emphasis on security, the majority rule principle was mutually reassuring to elite and public. In 1936 de Valera published a pamphlet *National Discipline and Majority Rule*, which distanced his party from the civil war and suggested that the IRA had only been legitimate when supported by the majority of the people. He was now claiming the mandate he had enjoyed in 1918. Majority rule meant that the civil war elite remained dominant, in return for which the elite provided the public with the sense of security that had been disrupted since 1914. Elections were crucial to this balancing act. When governments with weak parliamentary bases held snap elections at two critical junctures (September 1927 and 1933), crises of authority were resolved with the public’s support. Such elections forced the public to choose between one or other of the civil war sides who favoured an arbitration device that privileged their own conception of politics. Deradicalisation was thus a joint exercise, not one where either elite or public prevailed. Irish elites were able to shape governing alternatives, while becoming more responsive to public preferences.

The horizontal aspect to the state-society relations was important too. As issues became resolved by the arbitration device, the two civil war parties converged on common ground. The Offences Against the State Act, passed against the IRA in 1939, gained their joint support, as did the state’s policy of neutrality in World War Two. Consensus on economic protectionism and on the defence of Catholic morality had also been established. Both civil war sides had originated in Sinn Féin, and unlike unionists, shared a belief in full independence and Irish unity. Some personal friendships were revived as work in the Dáil acted as “an emotional solvent” for the bitterness of civil war. The elite had come to prominence in a national revolution, which disadvantaged those with no “national records”, such as Labour. The outcome was mutually reassuring to those whose nationalist politics prevailed, and to the public which saw the social conflicts of the civil war left behind.

Unfortunately, the price was the muffling of the pluralism Snyder associates with deradicalised politics. The Irish revolution had had a social dimension: over one hundred Soviets were formed between 1917 and 1923 (Kostick 2009). Labour did exceptionally well in 1922, but after the civil war its vote fell sharply. Its weakness in rural regions far from Dublin gave the advantage to Fianna Fáil, which took many of its manifesto commitments from Labour in 1927. Fianna Fáil continued the nineteenth-century pattern of standing up to Britain, but rapidly spread its support base beyond those peripheral areas where anti-state feeling had been strongest in 1923 (Garvin 1981). “Civil war politics”, involving competing visions of the nation’s future and the muffling of pluralism, could have delayed reconciliation. Yet Fianna Fáil’s expansion was compatible with state-building, as such parties came to represent an encompassing, not exclusive, national interest. Neither Fianna Fáil or Fine Gael were established during the civil war.

The paradox of deradicalisation taking place alongside the institutionalisation of a deep cleavage has been explored regarding Northern Ireland, an ethnically-divided society (Evans, Mitchell, and O’Leary 2009). Party competition can, however, further national integration: (a) by establishing a national network of cross-local communication channels in a way that strengthens national identity; and (b) by helping to set the national system of government above any particular set of office holders, encouraging voters to target their discontent at the governing party and not the political system as a whole (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 4). The 1932 changeover allowed voters’ discontent to be targeted at Cumann na nGaedheal, not the state. Moreover, both civil war parties continued the nineteenth-century tradition of establishing mass centralised organisations which cut across class and territorial cleavages (Garvin 1981, 216). Neither were a party of periphery or centre: both emphasised social cohesion. Nation-building through party competition was one consequence of civil war politics. As with older nationalist movements, these parties also provided institutions within which the rivalry between constitutional and violent nationalism could be bridged (ibid., 180).
5. Conclusion

The Irish nationalist elite was only relatively autonomous: they remained electorally dominant, but the steps they took on the treaty were in line with public opinion. The Mansfield/Snyder perspective reflects the pre-1914 liberal view of the public as “a molten mass” that elites can easily put their stamp on (Müller 2011, 7). Yet Irish elections combined two things Snyder does not allow for. They de-radicalised politics and kept a nationalist elite, schooled in constitutional and revolutionary politics, in power. Since the formation of a cohesive elite is required for societies to move out of transition, elections mattered not in making this elite accountable, but giving it the ability to rule. Civil war politics perpetuated the struggle for legitimacy, but keeping that struggle sharp favoured not moderates, but those who combined constitutional politics with a revolutionary pedigree.

Irish elections only became part of an effective system of checks and balances after the passing of the 1937 constitution. They mattered most as conduits of public opinion in a society with a long tradition of local political organisation. Most Irish politicians had “dual mandates” (i.e., held local government and parliamentary seats) and local elections were held in 1925, 1928, and 1934. Anti-treatyites never abstained from these bodies, many of which passed peace resolutions during the civil war, but were not generally responsible for national issues. That local support was required for national power provided a key mechanism of deradicalisation, and points to the need to investigate voters’ preferences at the local level before assuming that elections held in transitional circumstances will radicalise politics. Such an investigation would direct attention to that combination of war weariness, government repression, economic interests, mass emigration, religious authority, and cultural traditions that made these constituencies elect not to fight. Their articulation through the STV proportional representation system was also constant before and after the civil war.

For Mansfield and Snyder elections could have deradicalised because they were held after central institutions had developed (the sequence argument), were complimented by strong checks and balances (the accountability argument), or because the time that elapsed before 1937 was sufficient for behaviour to change incrementally (the state-building argument). None of these perspectives explains the outcome in Ireland, where institutionalisation and liberalisation were mutually reinforcing, despite the frequency of elections in this period. The complementary relationship between elections and state-building was crucial to the resolution of the civil war divide. Once the Free State had shown its strength, the question was how it could accommodate change by making credible the “stepping-stone” approach to the Treaty. The losers had to show they could reconcile changes to the Treaty with stability. Elections helped establish credibility in both respects. That they did so without altering the state-society relationship suggests that deradicalisation was dependent on state performance, and thus on some shared conception of the state. In explaining why the currency of revolutionary politics could be converted into a state-building project through elections – the gold standard of deradicalisation in Ireland – the idea of the state was as important as its institutional design.
References


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State Violence and Oppositional Protest in High-Capacity Authoritarian Regimes

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State Violence and Oppositional Protest in High-Capacity Authoritarian Regimes

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This examination of the mobilization-repression nexus in high-capacity authoritarian regimes draws on examples from China, Russia, Iran, and several Middle Eastern states to develop a framework for analyzing state violence and how political oppositions are organized. The study examines middle and low levels of state violence, the provincial and municipal organization of party and regime, and the police, private militias, and thugs as low-level enforcers, and focuses on: (1) the complexity of the state’s apparatus of repression and control and how different levels exercise different forms of violence against activists; (2) the creativity of the opposition’s actions to voice its demands and avoid repression and surveillance; and (3) the recursive relationship between the two, a dark dance between state and opposition with high stakes for both. Hierarchical analysis at national, provincial, and local levels, and lateral analysis across these levels, where elite interests frequently diverge, show that intersections and gaps on both axes can create lapses in social control and openings the opposition. These free spaces of speech and innovative action give rise to novel ways to keep oppositional sentiments in the public forum. The article offers several propositions for analyzing repression and state violence at various levels, and, similarly, the various ways that these free spaces occur.

In the late 1980s, Chechen nationalism was moderate, focusing on democratic reforms, cultural traditions, and bringing to light the history of Soviet repression. But in the early 1990s, sectors of the movement proposed a separatist agenda (Bohlen 1991). In the late summer of 1991, just a few months after the attempted coup d’etat by communist hardliners in the Moscow, a newly elected Chechen government began to take steps towards independence. The Russian state responded by invading the region with great brutality in winter 1994–95. Russian planes bombed the capital of Grozny, and towns and villages suspected of being rebel strongholds were razed. Households with young males who might support the insurgency were terrorized (Gall and de Wall 1998; Dunlop 1998). This first war was fought to a stalemate, but in October 1999 Russia again invaded with overwhelming military power. What remained of Grozny had been turned into a wasteland by December (Hughes 2007, 113; see also Tishkof 2004; German 2003). The indiscriminate and widespread use of force against the civilian population has been called genocidal, especially “indiscriminate bombardment and well-documented cases of massacres” (Hughes 2007: 161). Putin’s promise to “waste them to the shithouse” was fulfilled, and offers an earthy description of one way that state violence can occur – military action decided by high-level state elites.

Contemporary Russia gives us another example of state violence, but this time occurring at a lower analytical level. Mikhail Beketov, editor of a local newspaper in Khimki, a suburb of Moscow, had written often about the corruption of local officials, and had been warned to stop. In spring, 2008 he called for the resignation of the city’s leadership, and a few days later a bomb destroyed his car (Levy 2010). Shortly thereafter, he was attacked leaving his home. The beating was so savage that his leg and several fingers had to be amputated. Brain injuries were so severe that he can barely utter simple sentences to this day. Although police promised a thorough investigation, the case remains unsolved. According to one observer:

These types of attacks or other means of intimidation, including aggressive efforts by prosecutors to shut down news media out-
lets or nonprofit groups, serve as unnerving deterrents. And in a few cases, in recent years the violence in the country has escalated into contract killings. Corruption is widespread in Russia, and government often functions poorly. But most journalists and nonprofit groups shy away from delving deeply into these problems. (Levy 2010, A4)

They shy away because violence by state agents is a palpable reality. Other reporters and editors have been beaten and/or arrested on inflated charges. In the extreme, they have been murdered by contract killers. Anna Politkovskaya’s assassination in 2006 is widely known, but there have been numerous others. One plausible estimate holds that over one hundred newspaper reporters and editors have been murdered since 2000 (Levy 2010).

This article develops a rubric for analyzing state violence at various levels, and, similarly, the various dimensions by which political opposition is organized. It offers preliminary ruminations on the richness and diversity of political oppositions that builds on a small literature on “micromobilization” and “dissident networks” (Opp and Roehl 1990; Opp and Gern 1993; Johnston 2005) and, similarly, on a literature on the states’ multileveled efforts at social control (Ferree 2005; White and White 1995; Carley 1997). It offers, in part, a contrast to approaches that see the protest mobilization-repression nexus as more or less straightforward reflections of costs, benefits, opportunities and thresholds for action. Approaching this goal from a broad comparative perspective of several different authoritarian states, I focus on three dimensions relevant to levels and forms of state violence: (1) the complexity of state’s apparatus of repression and control and how different levels exercise variable forms of violence against activists, either to shut down protests or to prevent them from materializing through fear and intimidation; (2) the creativity of the opposition’s actions to voice its demands and avoid repression and surveillance; and (3) the recursive and iterative relationship between the two, a dark dance between state and opposition with high stakes for both.

First, regarding the state, I argue that its repressive violence is best conceptualized according to a hierarchy of repressive administration. This includes, not just national-level military or security-force repression, as in Chechen case, or in Syria throughout 2011 and 2012, but also personal-level thuggery against reporters, dissidents, and vocal citizens, as in the Russian example, or as commonly reported by Egyptian activists before Mubarak’s fall, or today, by Chinese activists regularly. Additionally, I will specify a middle-range of state violence at the provincial level by party officials and administrators, by police and private militias, and by various other security organs. A further factor in the administration of social control is that at each of these levels, there are competing elite interests, which can create openings and even hidden allies for the opposition. While theorists of the modern bureaucratic state will find these observations about administrative levels noncontroversial, this article makes an original contribution by applying it to questions of social control and mobilization. State repression, is not a monolithic affair captured wholly by aggregate measures of police budgets, size of security apparatus, or protester deaths and injuries, but rather can be fruitfully analyzed both hierarchically at different levels and laterally, across these levels, where elite interests frequently diverge. Intersections and gaps on both axes can create lapses in social control and openings for the opposition.

The second dimension focuses on the opposition and how it takes advantage of these complexities of repressive administration. I will discuss the practicalities of social control in a particular kind of repressive state, high-capacity authoritarian regimes (or HCAs), and how it can never be complete precisely because of the scope and complexity of state administration. This creates free spaces for the political opposition that similarly occur at national, regional, and local levels. These free spaces are forums of speech and innovative action that give rise to novel ways to keep oppositional sentiments in the public forum. Rather than visions of crushing totalitarian fear and preference falsification (Kuran 1992), I will discuss the wellsprings of freedom and creativity that sometimes exist in modern authoritarian states. These “weapons of the weak” were chronicled by James Scott (1985, 1990), in his groundbreaking research on peasant societies. This article makes an original contribution by identifying several forms they take in modern HCAs (high-capacity authoritarianisms) to circumvent repression and keep oppositional sentiments alive.
The third focus combines the first two, following Tilly’s call (2003) to understand collective violence in dynamic terms. I highlight how state violence occurs in an ongoing and recursive relationship with the opposition at the different levels of its organization. I conclude by suggesting that mid- and microlevels of social organization both of the opposition and the state – often overlooked by quantitative studies of the mobilization-repression nexus – play key roles in state-oppositional dynamics. I have in mind (1) how the diversity of social control apparatus means that the opposition sometimes finds occasional allies within it; and (2) how the widespread official corruption that characterizes these regimes at all levels is especially relevant at the local level. In general, I suggest that the gap between official ideology and the corruption that permeates HCAs animates the opposition through resentment and anger at hundreds of daily insults in the arena of daily life. As news, not only of daily injustices but also acts of protest and resistance, diffuse by word of mouth preference falsification and fear are mitigated, keeping alive oppositional sentiments in public opinion. The complexity of HCAs means that citizens are not completely quiescent, but rather they are very careful who they talk to.

This article takes a first step in thinking systematically about how this multileveled complexity affects the relationship between state repression and oppositional mobilization. It offers a framework for a more fine-grained analysis of state violence and its causes. Mark Lichbach once lamented, “Why have scholars theorized and reported that all possible curves fit the impact of repression on dissent?” (1987, 293). This article will show that part of the answer lies, on the one hand, in missing the complexity of repressive apparatus and, on the other, a failure to apprehend the creativity of the opposition. The article offers several propositions to serve as benchmarks for analysts of a more midlevel orientation to state violence, and concludes by suggesting how recognition of these gaps in theory might affect how researchers model the mobilization-repression relationship in the future.

1. State Violence and Mobilization
Research on state violence and protest mobilization has failed to produce a general model that consistently fits the variety of trajectories and outcomes. Early research suggested a point in the application of state violence beyond which citizen frustration and aggression erupts, an implicit point of proportionality where repression begins to incite protest rather than quell it (Davies 1969; Feierabend and Feierabend 1962; Gurr 1970). Before that point, increasing repression tends to have a negative effect on protest levels because it raises the costs of participation. After that point, backlash occurs against the brutality of the regime’s response. This is a model that is more applicable to authoritarian states and non-democracies because it presumes the state’s willingness to escalate violence as needed, without concern for legality or human rights. For a repressive regime, knowing where this point lies is important because it informs “the dictator’s dilemma” (Francisco 2005), the question of how much repression is necessary to quell dissent without provoking reactive backlash – a dilemma faced by the al-Assad regime in Syria 2012.

Subsequent research provided evidence for a completely opposite relationship, namely, that low levels of state violence are linked with political opportunities that mitigate protest mobilization. This is a model more appropriate to relatively open and democratic regimes. In this view, low repression corresponds with the availability of institutional channels for claim-making, which alleviate the need for extramidlevel protest. As repression increases, institutional opportunities close and protest increases, but here too, only up to a threshold, which marks the point at which costs become too high. A line of deterrence is crossed, after which state violence increasingly inhibits protest mobilization. Several studies support the operation of a line of deterrence, not only in open political regimes but also where state violence was increasing: in France and England (Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975), Northern Ireland (White and White 1995), South Africa (Olivier 1991), and Germany (Opp and Roehl 1990).

One reason for these inconsistent findings is that studies often combine different types of state regime, which is why this article focuses on HCAs only. Another reason is that aggregate measures of state violence are more reflective of system characteristics such as police expenditures or size of the armed forces than of the various forms of state violence.
(Koopmans 1997, 152–53), which is why this article explores middle-range and microlevel data to make comparisons among state actions. Several scholars argue that it is not only the intensity but also the form of repression that affects mobilization, and it is plausible that the same goes for the form of oppositional actions. Opp and Roehl (1990) differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate protest, with the defining criteria resting on tactics and legality. White and White (1995) point out that, even in Western democracies, it is incorrect to assume that all repression occurs within legal parameters. They trace “informal” repression in Northern Ireland that is typically carried out by rogue individuals or circles within the police. In the United States, Carley (1995) draws upon government records about the American Indian Movement to trace covert repression.

But also, there is the view that the repression-protest relationship embraces too many variables, too much dynamic monitoring of opponents, and too complex temporal and spatial variations to be captured by a single model. Rasler (1996) and Kurzman (1996) both point out that the mere perception of an opportunity – one that may not objectively exist – can spur action, demand sacrifices, encourage small victories, and thereby create new openings. Groups can be dispersed spatially (Rasler 1996) and they can cluster by risk-taking orientation (Karklins and Peterson 1993). Similarly, the opposition has a repertoire of protest actions, between violence and nonviolence (Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998), between direct and indirect action, between overt protest and unobtrusive actions.

Because a great deal of research about the repression-mobilization relationship relies on modeling of aggregate data, it misses much of the “cultural work” of resistance and opposition (Scott 1985, 1990; Melucci 1985, 1989). Research in the field of social movements has long recognized the importance of behind-the-scenes activities in movement development: Morris identifies “movement halfway houses” in the U.S. civil rights movement (1982), Mueller refers to “cultural laboratories” in the women’s movement (1994), and Fantasia and Hirsch discuss “spatial preserves” in Islamist movements (1995). The more widely used concept in this literature is free spaces, which describes gathering places outside direct surveillance of the state where new ideas can be voiced and put into practice (Polletta 1999). These are safe havens that mitigate the costs of participation and offer subtle and satisfying selective incentives to participants. As I will suggest, it is in the cracks of civil life created by the complex organization of HCAs where free spaces can flourish.

2. State Capacity and Violence

Regarding variations in state regimes, scholars have classified repressive states on various dimensions, the most important being the extent of state capacity, size of repressive apparatus, and legitimacy – or lack thereof. At the pole of extreme repressiveness, totalitarian states (such as North Korea, Belarus, and Tajikistan) are characterized by ongoing monitoring and social control through a highly developed police apparatus, strong ideological socialization, and continual ideological propagandizing. These are tasks that require an extensive mobilization capacity and continual internal monitoring of both state institutions and daily social life. Such resource-intensive tasks are characteristic of high levels of state capacity. More common are extremely repressive states that have lower capacity, sometimes labeled sultanistic regimes, a term introduced by Max Weber (1968), and elaborated by Linz and Stepan (1996; see also Linz and Cheabi 1998). These regimes rest on the autocratic rule of a supreme leader. They are dictatorships based on plunder and personalism, which are common in less developed states. State administration is concentrated in a small circle dependent on the supreme leader’s beneficence. The forces of social control are his instruments of rule and enrichment, as was the case in Nicaragua under Somoza, Iran under the Shah Pahlavi, Romania under Ceausescu, or Uganda under Amin.

Authoritarian states tend to navigate a course between these two extremes. They offer more areas of freedom to their citizens and tend to be quite stable because they enjoy greater legitimacy. In contrast to Linz’s early characterization of authoritarian states as having limited capacity and an underdeveloped state ideology (1964), it is fair to say that a more common contemporary pattern is extensive state development and greater degrees of legitimacy, for example, in one-party authoritarian states such as Mexico.
before 1996, Argentina in the 1960s, or Venezuela today. There may actually be a modicum of political pluralism either in the form of permitted dissent (within bounds) among ruling party members or the existence of window-dressing parties with a handful of seats in rubber-stamp legislatures. One-party authoritarianisms use local party and union leaders who deliver the vote by distributing favors to the grassroots – especially employment – in return for support. These kinds of authoritarian states tend to be more stable than military authoritarianisms (Geddes 1999). Pluralism may be reflected in differences of opinion within bureaucratic agencies, for example when leaders rely on economic experts to guide modernization policies (O’Donnell 1973). Pluralism may also play a limited role in institutional development outside the state, such as the Catholic Church in communist Poland or in Francoist Spain. In these cases, the authoritarian state was unable to completely co-opt the church because of strong public opinion, and thus local churches became free spaces, mostly outside state control.

In this article I focus on high-capacity authoritarian regimes (HCAs), such as China, Russia, Iran, Mexico before democratization, and Egypt before the fall of Mubarak. Among the states that I will discuss, the degree of state capacity will vary, but only slightly, and will be noted when its effects are significant. The state capacity of China and Russia is very great, but it is lower in Syria, for example, where elements of state administration reflect more sultanistic and/or personalistic patterns based on family, tribal, and communal ties.

Many aspects of HCAs are well known. Those that are most relevant to my analysis can be summarized as follows:

1. One-party rule. Meaningful political participation is limited to one party. If present, opposition parties are more a symbolic gesture to a façade of democracy than any substantive reflection of competing interests. In Egypt, for example, support for “opposition parties” paled in contrast to the ruling National Democratic Party, which gained 88 percent of the vote in November 2010. Façade parties, such as the Wafd Party, the Leftist Unionist Party, and the Arab-Nasserite Party, among others, divided the remaining seats between them. The largest opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood, was illegal and outside the electoral process, although its candidates ran as independents. There is a sense that members of these opposition parties are complicit in authoritarian rule, yet when the opposition mobilizes, they often play key roles.

2. Centralization of governance. One dimension of this second characteristic flows from the first, namely, that party structure is often blurred or overlaps with state administrative functions. A second dimension is that legislative and judicial functions are subordinated to the executive institutions of the one-party state. The ongoing erosion of the independent judiciary in Venezuela by placing members of Chavez’s Bolivarian Party in regional and local judgingships is an example. Regarding the military, its degree of independence varies according to different historical and regional contexts. In some states there may be a strong overlap with party membership, as has occurred in Venezuela too, as a result of conscious policy by Chavez to ensure the loyalty of commanders. In Egypt, the military maintained a degree of independence through geopolitical ties with the U.S. and through its involvement in profit-making enterprises. Recent regime changes in Egypt and Tunisia demonstrate how destabilizing military independence from state and party can be.

3. Media control. HCAs seek to limit and control those institutions that govern the flow of information to citizens. Ministries of information and propaganda manage the complex task of censoring news and commentary, but, as I will discuss, the effectiveness of their efforts is often a casualty of state administrative complexity because newspapers and broadcast media are often local or regional, and therefore harder to control.

4. Highly developed social control apparatus. Numerous levels of police organization are common: a national, state, and local police, state security forces, secret police, networks of spies, special militias, and party enforcers. These forces are distinct from the military as loci of the means of violence in the authoritarian state, but the military too is often divided into special units, elite divisions, and republican guards chosen for loyalty to the president. Finally, bands of thugs – often policemen and
party members known for their brutality, physical intimidation, and violent efficiency – work as agents of enforcement and fear, especially during states of emergency. It may be that they are organized more formally into militias or vigilante groups to do the bidding of economic and political elites *ex jure*.

5. **Absence of citizen protections.** The logical extension of a highly developed police apparatus is the arbitrary use of police powers. Surveillance, extrajudicial detentions, capriciousness of enforcement, shakedowns, bribes, and protection rackets are all common. Detentions, beatings, harassment, incommunicado periods, torture, and, in the extreme, disappearances, create fear among family and loved ones that ripples through society. They also drive the accumulation of collective grievances and limit public forms of collective action – but encourage unobtrusive forms among certain sectors of the public, as I will discuss.

6. **Political venality.** More so than in democracies, there are huge benefits at the upper echelons of authoritarian states for economic and political elites who cooperate with the state and ruling party. For those who are willing to play the game within the rules of one-party control and forfeit principles of liberal democratic governance, self-interest is a powerful stabilizing factor at society’s upper levels of status and wealth, which mitigates division among elites. At the lower levels of region, province, town, and municipality, the same logic is at work on a smaller scale, creating opportunities for sweetheart contracts, bribery, theft, real estate deals, and shakedowns that impart a strong interest in the status quo among local elites, and strong resentments among the public, for whom the injustices of such schemes do not go unnoticed.

7. **Clientalism.** The distribution of jobs, contracts, favors for family members, and the social capital of connections and status also become powerful tools for mitigating political opposition. At the lower levels of state authority, many citizens find employment in the state-controlled sectors of the economy (state-owned industries), administration (the various functions of the high-capacity state, such as health, education, welfare), and social control apparatus (police and army). This creates a large pool of citizens whose interests either lie with the status quo or are complicated by various pulls and pressures in different directions regarding political opposition.

### 3. Elite Divisions: Spaces for Corruption and Resistance

Research has long recognized that division among ruling elites is a key factor in regime instability. To counter these forces, HCAs offer strong economic incentives of self-enrichment and enrichment of family members, both immediate and extended. In the absence of threats to the status quo, HCAs manage elite conflicts with the carrot of economic benefits and the stick of party discipline. For especially egregious behaviors there is the threat of expulsion and arrest. That such divisions occur frequently is noncontroversial among analysts, and is revealed especially in times of regime instability and change, such as in Tunisia in early 2011.

In January, 2011, Tunisian state and party leaders scrambled to distance themselves from the authoritarian rule of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in order to secure positions in the new regime after huge popular protests forced him to flee. Mohamed Ghannouchi was Ben Ali’s right-hand man under the old regime. Despite challenges, Ghannouchi was able to portray himself as a competent administrator and technocrat and form a transitional cabinet. Other old-regime insiders were not so successful, and were quickly expelled from the transitional government in response to popular protests. Mouldi Jendoubi, the second-in-command of the Tunisian Trade Union, was at the forefront of calls for further expulsions, even though he and other union leaders both acquiesced to and benefited from their relationships with the Ben Ali government. Their call for a general strike to expunge party insiders from the new cabinet helped establish their credentials of oppositional militancy. These kinds of elite divisions are well-documented mechanisms of opening opportunities for mobilization of political oppositions (see McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Polarization of elites is a fundamental criterion for the development of revolutionary situations (Goodwin 2002). While sometimes studied regarding the implementation and outcomes of protest (Amenta and Zyman 1991; Amenta and Young 1999), elite divisions at regional and local levels should also be considered in the repression-mobilization nexus.
As among national elites, competition and disagreement occur frequently among regional and local administrators too, both laterally and vertically. These divisions, both real and potential, are important for two reasons when analyzing state violence. First they create maneuvering room for elites at various levels to enhance their power and pursue self-enrichment, corruption, intimidation, and thuggery. Second, they also provide room for free spaces in which the developing opposition can take advantages of lapses in social control and enforcement, and play upon conflicting elite interests to recruit allies. Although elite analysis at the national level often takes precedence in the political and social sciences – and remains crucial in analyzing political instability and regime change – lapses of enforcement and shifting alliances at less exalted levels also can have far-reaching consequences, both for the developing opposition and for the “prevailing strategies” of social control (Koopmans and Kriesi 1995).

A key focus in this article is that the local level is where thousands of functionaries draw upon state and/or party authority to augment their meager salaries. Just as the upper echelons of power enrich themselves through land deals, state contracts, and joint ventures, so too do local inspectors, municipal employees, policemen, party leaders, union officials, and low-level bureaucrats, among others, take petty bribes, shakedown street vendors and local businessmen, and pursue their own interests. The protests that brought down the regime in Tunisia were precipitated precisely at this level, when a municipal inspector tried to confiscate the fruit from Mohamed Bouazizi’s street-vending cart in the city of Sidi Bouzid. Itinerant vendors were commonly harassed by police and inspectors, with the understanding that they either pay a bribe of ten dinars (five euros, or several days’ wages), or run away and lose their cart and stock (Fahim 2011). On December 17, 2010, Bouazizi stood firm and was beaten by inspectors. His self-immolation in protest precipitated the mass mobilizations that toppled the Ben Ali regime.

It is typical of HCAs that claims and grievances about state corruption accumulate nationally, regionally, and – perhaps most importantly – locally. Most citizens, for most of the time, experience the state at this level. And because of this, the enrichissez-vous machinations of party elites in the capital, although far removed from quotidian experience, are often talked about and are well known as examples of illegitimate and unjust governance. As a normal and expected part of daily existence, authoritarian corruption rides on the complex division of labor of HCAs. When examining the varieties of state violence, these small injustices must be considered along with mobilization of the military or deployment of the riot police. Yet, just as the decentralization of social control in HCAs permits these small acts of violence, so too does it create interstices where the opposition can take shape and grow in the form of free spaces, again, especially at the local level.

These observations lead to three basic propositions about HCAs, which will guide the discussion that follows:

Proposition 1. Oppositional ubiquity. HCAs contain intrinsic spaces where opposition can develop, derived from the complexity of the social control task.

Proposition 2. Oppositional creativity. The creativity of certain activists in HCAs can produce intrinsic spaces for the opposition that reduce the associated risks.

Proposition 3. Oppositional motivation. The political venality of HCAs fuels oppositional sentiments and drives the creativity and ubiquity of actions embodied in the first two propositions. Corruption at the local level is especially important for fueling regime illegitimacy in the long term.

4. Opposition in HCAs: Unobtrusive and Ubiquitous

A large body of research about political and social movements has firmly established that large mobilizations do not emerge full-grown from the head of Zeus, but rather come from preexisting mobilizing structures that serve as the basis of organization (McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam 1982, 1999; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996; Tarrow 1998). Most of these studies examine democratic regimes, but cracks and lapses in the repressive apparatus of HCAs suggest similar preorganization of grievance articulation. For example, during the summer of 2011 as Syrians confronted the al-Assad regime, their actions were guided by local coordinating committees in all the major
cities. Where did these groups spontaneously come from if everyone had been living in quiescence among their neighbors (Arsu and Stack 2011)? It is more likely that they grew out of hidden networks of opposition, often with ties with émigré activists, but primarily organized and maintained within the small free spaces of the repressive state.

My own field research in authoritarian states found that in the Soviet Union, in Poland, in Mexico, and in Francoist Spain, subterranean organizations of opposition, politicized in varying degrees, commonly existed—indeed, were permitted to exist—in the interstices of state administrative complexity (Johnston 2005, 2006, 2011; Johnston and Mueller 2001; Johnston and Taverna 2012). This principle strongly parallels Scott’s classic analyses of repressive social relations in traditional societies (1985, 1990). The existence of informal, sometimes duplicitous oppositional groups and organizations offers an alternative explanation for the rapid mobilizations of “popular fronts” against the communist Eastern Europe regimes. Rather than years of pent-up frustration and preference falsification being unleashed by external events, mass mobilizations grew out of pre-existing networks among discontented citizens, who regularly discussed—albeit carefully—how they were fed up with the contradictions of “mature socialism,” with the deficits of citizen freedom, with the small injustices of everyday life, and the inequities of communist party dominance.

In truth, HCAs never completely stamp out the opposition (the key point of proposition one above). Nor are HCA states single-actor monoliths with their agents marching in lock-step to enforce social control. I base these observations on several projects (Johnston 2005, 2006, 2011), whose findings can be summarized by the following observations: (1) Varieties of oppositional talk persist and are indeed quite common among particular networks of people—a finding that strongly contrasts the observation that “preference falsification” leads to political quiescence in repressive regimes (Kuran 1992). (2) Talk is frequently organized in groups and organizations that often function duplicitously, being public and often officially recognized, but surreptitiously maintaining an oppositional ambiance among members. Creative actors carve out free spaces where they can take advantage of lapses in state surveillance, call upon new allies within the state, and innovate new tactics of opposition. (3) These networks of oppositionists—who vary in the risks they are willing to take—include outspoken dissidents and the members of their circles, especially among writers and artists, as well as ordinary citizens who resist the lack of freedom and react with repugnance against official corruption. (4) These groups and networks put pressure on the regime to democratize and are also springboards of yet more forceful and open oppositional activities once the regime takes steps to reform. (5) It is common for the free spaces these groups carve out to exist in part through the complicity of state agents who look the other way, or police who warn a suspect rather than detaining him or her, or party officials who choose not to report oppositional activities among friends. In some cases, these state agents may privately harbor oppositional sentiments.

We can see the ubiquity of oppositional talk even in states like North Korea, probably the closest example of a totalitarian state we have today. Despite intense cradle-to-grave political indoctrination, media manipulation and misinformation, widespread fear, xenophobic nationalism, Orwellian public discourse, and staged personality-cult rituals, many North Koreans can still sift through the lies to interpret self-interest. In late 2009 protests erupted when the North Korean state announced a shock currency devaluation that wiped out the life savings of many citizens (McNeil 2009; Demick 2010). People protested in the streets of the capital, Pyongyang, and in rural towns and villages (Li-Sun 2009), some setting fire to piles of now-worthless old currency. Moreover, such protests are not new. There were reports of protests by women against age prohibitions for participation in local markets four years ago. I have been told of jokes about Kim Il-Sung’s hairdo. When Soviet archives were opened to researchers, it became clear that the Stalinist terror was not monolithic (Priestland 2007). Orders from Moscow were sometimes ignored in the distant republics. Aspects of Stalin’s personality cult were not accepted, and sometimes even mocked. Some cases of low-level political dissent were identified (Viola 2003).
Recognizing that cracks in the repressive apparatus allow oppositional talk to occur and groups to exist is a finding with important implications for the mobilization-repression nexus. Just as there are undercurrents of conflict among political elites at different levels of administration, so too are there undercurrents of opposition, but here mostly at the local, quotidian level of life. Moreover, not only do cracks and hiatuses in the repressive apparatus allow activists to seize and construct free spaces, but covert oppositional attitudes among elites may create opportunities. As one former Soviet censor reported to me, when his bosses were on vacation he could let things pass. Sometimes it was friendship that made censors look the other way – when they could get away with it. Other times, free spaces existed because of the ineptitude or laziness of the security forces. Activists reported leniency by the police because the opposition’s existence, to some extent, defined the police role and gave them something to do. As such, the game was afoot. More generally, this perspective suggests that the prevailing strategy of an authoritarian state is at least partly defined by its recognition of these free spaces.

**Proposition 4.** Free-space oppositions sometimes have low-level allies within HCA regimes, either intentionally through the actions of covert supporters, or unintentionally through laziness or ineptitude of regime personnel. Although not numerous, the impact of these “inside connections” is disproportionate to their number because they help oppositional sentiments to remain in public consciousness during periods of apparent quiescence.

**5. The Scope and Form of Free Spaces**

Many of the groups and organizations that constitute opposition movements in HCAs are informally organized, less overtly political in focus, and their actions often unobtrusive. However, other groups may be less surreptitious and more formally organized, such as façade parties, which are recognized and permitted to exist within limits to convey the impression of political pluralism. One example located towards the organized pole is the Muslim Brotherhood, which by a decision as the national level operated under a modus vivendi with the Mubarak regime. The Brotherhood officially eschewed oppositional politics and cultivated its free spaces in grassroots organization of a social, charitable, and religious character. As long as it operated within these constraints it was able to avoid direct suppression, although it was technically an illegal organization. The Brotherhood had to practice careful political restraint in arenas of civic discourse as a precondition of the free spaces it enjoyed. For the regime, the risks of such a strategy are that its security forces appear weak to the public because of the persistent and apparent contradiction between what it says (the Brotherhood is an illegal, radical Islamist organization) and what it does (turn the other way in the interests of placating the 20 percent of the population that support the organization). Another risk is that the organization becomes a springboard for mobilization against the regime should the context of opportunities and constraints change. It is interesting that thirty years ago a similar strategy was exercised by the communist regime in Poland regarding the Catholic Church, which was at the forefront of early Solidarity mobilization. Unlike the Church, the Brotherhood was slow to participate in the gathering opposition in early 2011, and stayed away from street protests, a position that it could not sustain as momentum grew.

Variability in state repression is also evident in China if we compare the violent campaign against Falun Gong several years ago with the blind-eye tolerance of house-church Christianity (Vala and O’Brien 2007). Somewhere between Beijing’s halls of power and enforcement by local party cadres, one religious movement (Falun Gong, which seems to be supremely apolitical) is more heavily repressed, while the other, evangelical Christianity, encounters semi-tolerance in some locales (Vala and O’Brien 2007). Although both are prohibited by the letter of the law, it seems that many provincial officials see unofficial Christianity as less threatening than the vague spiritualism of Falun Gong. The apparent contradiction of one being labeled a superstitious throwback to pre-communist China and the other not demonstrates the variability of enforcement at national and local levels. Where national direction is less clear, enforcement risks mitigation by different perceptions of potential threat and local interests, in this case, by lower-level bureaucrats in the state and party apparatus. Not only does the complexity of the state often lead to variable application of repression, but complexity of perception and interests, say, if a person’s parents are secret Christians,
compounds it. Finally, there is also the issue of the how a particular policy sphere, in this case state control of religious practice, is related to political opposition. Permitting house-church worship by several dozen citizens is much less threatening than, say, the organization of ethnic political organizations in the Tibetan, Uyghur, and Mongolian regions that challenge the territorial integrity of the state.

Prior to 2011, when protest tolerance decreased significantly in the wake of the Arab Spring, this kind of selective repression characterized China’s prevailing strategy. After the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan Province, which caused many deaths among young children because of shoddy school construction, a diverse and diffuse movement among parents mobilized to demand compensation and accountability of local officials. In addition to the participants’ tragedy of personal loss, many local party officials had profited from building contracts where shortcuts and substandard materials were used, deepening perceptions of injustice and lack of accountability. Provincial officials allowed many of these protests to proceed, reflecting in part the need to appear responsive to citizens’ demands (and the “Olympics thaw”) – as long as they remain isolated, specific, local, and did not challenge dominant political alignments of state and party. Activists that passed these thresholds were often beaten and arrested.

Proposition 5. Because perceived threat determines repressive levels, there will be variability according to policy areas and claims of protests. Repression can also vary by administrative level of enforcement, creating temporary free spaces for movements.

Proposition five also applies to media control and limitations on press freedoms, which in China are both heavy and pervasive, but not hermetically sealed. On the one hand, news of political turmoil is routinely repressed. Riots in Lhasa or Urumqi find no space in Chinese dailies. The Ministry of Propaganda sends out weekly lists of stories that cannot be covered in print and broadcast media. During the 2011 popular mobilizations in Egypt, newspapers, broadcast media, and internet in China were mute on the subject (Wong and Barbosa 2011). On the other hand, the complexity of social control means that censorship sometimes fails simply because of ineptitude. To take one example, a classified advertisement appearing in the Chengdu Evening News paid homage to the mothers who lost children in the Tiananmen Square massacre. The meaning of the ad slipped by the staff: “Saluting the strong mothers of victims of 64” was its cryptic text. Six-four is common shorthand for the repression on June 4 (6-4), 1989, when hundreds – perhaps thousands of students were killed by the People’s Liberation Army. The advertisement referred to those few mothers who, despite an absolute ban on speaking of the massacre, have continued to call for an investigation. It seems that the young woman who accepted the ad was unaware of the significance of the “64” reference, and was told it was the date of a mining disaster when she asked the person placing the ad. News of the defiant ad went viral on the internet before censors were able to intervene. The Ministry of Propaganda had the final word, however, because three editors at the newspaper were fired in retaliation.

As in other aspects of society, members of the media may sometimes intentionally push the limits of tolerance. There are always a few reporters and editors who are willing to see how far they can go in pursuit of journalistic freedom. In June 2010, Nanfang Dushi Bao (Southern Metropolis Daily), a paper in the Pearl River Delta region known for its provocative editorials and investigative journalism, published a cartoon that also made veiled references the Tiananmen Square massacre. In one of several cartoons commemorating International Children’s Day on June 1, a blackboard image drawn by a child depicts a lone figure standing in front of a line of tanks. The drawing echoes the famous news video from 1989, in which a sole student protestor attempts to block the advance of tanks towards the square (see Figure 1). The cartoon was removed after the image began to circulate online with comments about the Tiananmen Square events. The torch in the upper left of the chalkboard replicates the one held by the iconic Goddess of Democracy at the Tiananmen demonstrations (the other notations also are indirect references to the student movement, see Earp 2010). The point is that, like the news blackout of anti-Mubarak protests, the regime attempted to strictly enforce silence about the events surrounding the Tiananmen Square protests, but cracks in the system occur for numerous reasons. It is not plausible that editors could
have carelessly missed these references; rather they seemed to be testing the limits of what could pass.

Figure 1: “Commemorating Children’s Day” at Tiananmen Square

These examples provide good characterizations of the relationship between state and opposition at local levels of the authoritarian state. We perhaps see it reported more frequently in relation to press freedoms because Western reporters in China, Iran, Russia, and elsewhere, are especially attuned to these. But the general conclusions are that small openings and cracks occur (1) because of the heroism of particular actors, such as reporter Shi Tao, who was sentenced to a ten-year prison term for e-mailing to the West the Ministry of Propaganda’s directives about Tiananmen Square coverage. (2) Free spaces occur because of mistakes, ineptitude, complexity, and the sheer extent of the task of implementing total control. (3) They also are carved out through the complicity of certain agents who, as minor acts of rebellion against quiescence and pervasive control, let prohibited material pass. (4) They occur because of the inherent creativity of activists who find ways to evade restrictions that the authorities never contemplated (for example, the fascinating case of Chinese internet phenomenon of the “grass mud horse” which recently went viral there (see Wines 2009). In all these cases, the effect is not so much giant strides in political opposition, but rather keeping the hope of political opposition alive among a populace that is frequently outraged at the small injustices encountered every day. Rather than preference falsification, the analyst might speak of the “hope confirmation” that these microlevel acts accomplish for segments of the population.

Proposition 6. The effect of free-space acts of opposition is two-fold: creating a base for the social organization of oppositional movement, and breaking the social-psychological constraints of silence and preference falsification. This second effect broadens awareness of others who share oppositional sentiments, and creates a potential pool of actors poised to participate once mobilization efforts begin.

6. The Heterogeneity of State Violence
Max Weber observed that the state maintains a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of violence. Mao Tse-tung advised his cadres that all power flows from the barrel of a gun. It should come as no surprise as we consider the exercise of state power that the state uses violence against its citizenry much more frequently than the other way around. The sheer firepower and destructive reach of the modern state are overwhelming compared to what citizens have at their disposal. Yet HCAs are also typified by a complex division of labor in the business of violence among the military, security forces, special units known for their fierceness and/or loyalty, secret police, local police, vigilantes and militias, and, finally, thugs and enforcers who do the bidding of local elites and strongmen. Activists in Syria report that there are no less than sixteen distinct branches of security apparatus operating in major cities. Thus, the complex division of labor in HCAs extends to agents of state violence, and carries with it significant consequences regarding state violence and free spaces. My goals in this final section are to show (1) how these various levels are analytically discrete in the application of violence; and (2) how, even here, the recursive relationship between the state and opposition exerts its influence in the course of events, especially at microlevels, to create spaces for opposition.

6.1 The Military and Ethnic-Communal Heterogeneity
The highest, most institutionally established, and geographically most extensive level of analysis is the national
military. Military elites are often highly integrated and influential in HCAs, as in China, Russia, Venezuela, Mexico, Egypt, and Tunisia. Cleavages between political and military elites pose basic threats to regime stability, but it is typical that high-capacity states quell conflict through strong economic incentives for both political and military elites. When the interests of generals diverge from those of political leaders, however, history tells us that regime change often follows. Diverging interests at the elite level was a major element in recent events in Egypt, where pressure from the generals drove Mubarak and his National Democratic Party from power. The most plausible explanation is that military leaders threw in their lot with the protesters as a means to preserve their extensive involvement in private sector enterprises and ensure continuity of huge military budgets and massive foreign assistance, primarily from the United States. Here, divergent interests worked in favor of regime change and tentative steps toward liberalization. In contrast, the willingness of Chinese military leaders to unleash violent repression against students’ democratic protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989 suggest there was strong correspondence between the interests of the military and political elites. Paradoxically, this correspondence rested in part on similar reasons, heavy military involvement in state and joint-venture enterprises, with the difference being the smaller scope of popular protest in China, which was confined to student mobilizations in Beijing and several other Chinese universities.

Proposition 7. The size and scope of popular unrest, the independence of the military, and the interaction between the two in relation to threats to military interests are the key factors determining the military’s response to popular unrest.

Complicating the relationship between military and political elites are communal divisions within state territories, which function as another major variable in levels of state violence. Communal identities – not only ethnic but also religious and tribal – divide many states, and, more often than not, can unite the national military command against separatist pressures that threaten territorial integrity of the state. In ethnically diverse states it is common for the dominance of the majority group to be maintained in the upper ranks of the military. When it is not, the consequences can be far-reaching. In the former Soviet Union, for example, ethnic divisions in the military undermined orders to fire on separatist protesters in various ethnic republics. In the Estonian SSR, Air Force General Djokar Dudaev, a Chechen, refused orders to fire on protesters calling for independence at a critical juncture in the Soviet Union’s dissolution. Dudaev was schooled in nationalist separatism when he was assigned to the air force base in Tartu, Estonia, and went on to lead the separatist Chechen republic to independence in 1991, and into war with Russia in 1994.

In contrast, nationalist protests and anti-Han ethnic riots in the Tibetan and Xinjiang Autonomous Regions, where separatist movements have mobilized, have been violently repressed by the Han-dominated military units. Ethnic homogeneity minimized the risk of division within the ranks. Because the defense of national territory is so basic to the military’s function, the state’s armed forces are frequently players in the violent suppression of separatist ethnic-national protests. In some cases, no doubt because communal identifications are strong and activate social-psychological responses of violence and retribution, the most extreme form of state violence – ethnic genocide – is typically perpetrated by ethnically unified army units. This was clearly seen in the opening narrative about the Russia-Chechen war and the extensive violence that Russian air force and army, motivated partially by ethnic stereotypes, perpetrated on Chechen civilians.

Proposition 8. State military violence is aggravated when ethnic and communal divisions overlap with oppositional protest mobilization. An ethnically homogeneous military command has less hesitation using violence against minority ethnic movements because attributions of difference mitigate empathy and identification.

In Syria, sectarian rather than ethnic divisions operate in military organization. The regime of Bashir al-Assad is dominated by Alawite Muslims, a minority Shiite sect, and Alawites tend to prevail among the leadership of the army and security forces. Alawite-led units slaughtered ten thousand people to put down protests in the Sunni city of Hama in 1982. Today, threatened by mounting opposition
led by the majority Sunnis and the social-psychological effects of communal identity, the Syrian army had at the time of writing killed over nine thousand protesters. Moreover, sectarian divisions in the lower ranks have undermined the effectiveness of military violence – more on this below.

6.2 Militias and Praetorian Guards

Militias mobilized at the regime’s behest are to be distinguished from the national army, navy, and air force. While militias may be heavily armed, a common pattern is that they are under the command of the ruling party or a small inner circle of political elites associated with the head of state. Special military units that are segregated from the national armed forces can also be grouped here too. I have in mind Presidential Guards, Republican Guards, and similar praetorian units that are directly answerable to the leader as insurance against military coups d’estat, as in the case of Moammar Kadafi’s Revolutionary Brigade. During the turmoil that swept through Libya in 2011, this sizeable force had units assigned to protect Kadafi against units that might prove less loyal. In Syria, Bashar al-Assad’s brother Maher, heads the Revolutionary Guard and the notorious Fourth Division, both based in Damascus. In general, elite forces are distinguished from regular troops by special pay, benefits, and equipment to ensure their loyalty.

Regarding the Libyan uprising, Kadafi’s regime had lower capacity compared to Egypt or China, and tended toward the sultanistic pole of repressive regimes. Importantly, this was reflected in the fragmentation of the central military command and widespread defections among military commanders when protests broke out and repression began. Apart from the regular Libyan army, which had about forty-five thousand troops prior to the rebellion, the Revolutionary Guards had about four thousand and the People’s Militia reserves about four thousand. Characteristically for sultanism, Kadafi’s policy was to make sure that commanders were continually rotated to prevent bonds of loyalty from building between officers and men. He also kept some units loyal to him by appointing sons or family members to command them, and supplying them better than other units, both in the quantity and quality of armaments. The Khamis Brigade, commanded by one of Kadafi’s sons, is reported to have received newer equipment, such as the latest tanks and rocket launchers, while other units made do with aging and low-tech Soviet armaments (Zucchino 2011). These policies led to the rapid split in the country when the uprising began, as normal units, many of which were based in the east, defected to the opposition and better-armed, praetorian units concentrated in Tripoli to protect the regime.

Proposition 9. Reliance by political elites on special military units is characteristic of lower capacity authoritarian regimes tending toward the sultanistic model. This heterogeneity in the control of violent resources disposes such regimes to civil war rather than political transitions sustained by mass protests.

The division between the military and these special units and militias or elite security units also gives rise to spaces of opportunity for the opposition, and, as such is fundamental to the application of state violence. This was evident in Egypt when the army refused to fire on protesters, but security forces and hired thugs waded into protests on Friday, January 29, 2011. During the following two days, it was the army that stood between protesters and armed supporters of the regime. These events are examples of how elites commonly rely on special units to ensure repressive capacity. In Iran, the Basij Militia and Revolutionary Guards, not the military, played a key role in the suppression of the democratic movement in 2009 and recently in February 2011, (Worth and Fahti 2009). Various observers have reported to me that the regime of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad chooses not to rely on the military for political enforcement because their loyalty in repressing Iranian citizens cannot be counted on.

One possible reason for this derives from the same communal identifications that I mentioned earlier as factors in military violence against ethnic minorities. It is plausible that Egyptian and Tunisian military officers were hesitant to fire on protesting citizens in January and February 2011 because of an affinity they felt for them. This is not necessarily a reflection of support for protesters’ grievances, but rather of shared identity as sons and daughters of the nation (if there are no communal divisions). This recognition means that officers think twice before ordering con-
scripts to fire on protesting youth with whom they can identify strongly, and risking a breakdown in the chain of command.

This is exactly what occurred in northern Syria town of Jisr al-Shoughour in 2011. Lower-level desertions had been reported for weeks as the regime mobilized national army units against protesters, but a large military operation against this Sunni stronghold meant that many Sunni conscripts were ordered to fire on townspeople. Scores refused, and some officers defected to aid the townspeople’s resistance (Zoeph and Shadid 2011). While authoritarian states will vary in the degree of control and professionalization of the armed forces, in high-capacity regimes firing on citizens is not what conscripts are trained for, nor do middle-level officers see maneuvers against civilians as their professional calling. Observers from within Syria have documented that the Free Syrian Army, which by early 2012 was challenging Assad’s forces in several towns, draws its recruits mostly from conscripts and low-level officers who refuse such orders (Bilefsky 2012).

As defections mount and the tide of protest rises, the militias and special army units mentioned earlier are mobilized. Their availability reflects how autocrats often recognize the gaps in repressive capability that derive from the consequences of low pay and community integration of police, or, perhaps, ethnic and/or regional divisions in the military and police. In the Syrian defections, low pay, lack of morale, poor conditions, and shortages of food among conscripts, plus the Alawite-Sunni sectarian divide between officers and their men, were factors in the breakdown of discipline.

Another repressive strategy in these circumstances is the use of mercenaries as a way to buy assurance of repressive capability. The rationale is that because foreigners have no ties to the community, and because they are often ethnically, racially, and linguistically different from the citizenry, they are more reliable perpetrators of violence – and perhaps more brutal. In the Bahraini protests of February 2011, where the initial response of King Hamad ibn Isa Khalifa was to order the police to invade the occupation of the Pearl Roundabout and fire on protesters, he was able to count on the obedience of his security forces partly because many were foreigners from neighboring countries and from Southeast Asia (Parker and Murphy 2011). Later, he invited in Saudi Arabian troops to quell protests. As popular uprisings spread through the Arab world, Kaddafi in Libya was reported to have brought in as many as four thousand mercenary fighters from Niger, Mali, and Sudan’s Darfur region (Daragahi and Therolf 2011; Gentleman 2011). Earlier he had also recruited Touareg from Mali and Niger into the Libyan Army. Their presence, plus that of the other the sub-Saharan mercenaries, buttressed Kaddafi’s control of Tripoli as other parts of the country joined the rebellion and units of the regular military defected (MacFarquhar 2011). Mercenaries joined special militia units wearing red berets – as opposed to regular green army berets – to assault rebellious districts in Tripoli. For the analyst sorting out the array of repressive forces deployed during times of protest intensification, foreign mercenaries enter the mix of special militias, elite units, praetorian guards, and loyal security forces known for their brutality.

Proposition 10. Also characteristic of lower capacity authoritarian regimes tending toward the sultanistic model, is the use of foreign mercenaries, whose presence raises questions of control and risks escalating violence against civilians

Yet for mid-level party loyalists and local cadres threatened by protesting citizens, these kinds of repressive resources are typically not under their control. At these levels, it is more typical for local police and thugs to be called to do their bidding, which brings us to the next level of how violence is organized.

6.3 Thuggery and Vigilantes

Thuggery and vigilantes in their most radical and virulent forms tend to be organized informally and temporarily outside official sanction. Here I have in mind goons, enforcers, and knee-cappers who are often given free reign to beat protesters, intimidate oppositional activists, and/or instill fear among the populace. While being a thug or a bully is an individual behavior, it is common that HCAs employ such people (who will, of course, vary in their predispositions to violence, lawlessness, and self interest) in times of growing oppositional mobilization and/or times of crisis, as in the case of Libya, when Kaddaf
porters in Tripoli to intimidate citizens from protesting (Therolf 2011). While such violent episodes are not easily amenable to systematic research, it is plausible that the prospect of guns and official cartes blanche to use them attracts party members and friends who are prone to embrace opportunities for plunder, violence, and rape, rather than answering a “higher calling” to restore public safety.

Thuggery is also commonly employed by local agents of the state, not to quell protests or ensure state security in the broad sense, but to protect their own venal interests. In one example of extreme local-level thuggery in China, a 53-year-old man named Qian Yunhui, who had relentlessly campaigned for six years against illegal land seizures in his village, was reported to have been murdered by local men. According to his wife, he received a phone call asking him to go outside his house one morning, and simply disappeared. An hour later, his body was found crushed beneath the tire of a truck, victim of an apparent accident, but villagers earlier had witnessed several men holding him down in the road (Yang and Wong 2010). We know about this because pictures of his gory death were widely posted on the Chinese internet. Public interest was great because land disputes are common occurrences in rural China (Yang and Wong 2010). Similar seizures of land by local officials and the death of an outspoken citizen spurred an unprecedented rebellion of the inhabitants of Wukan village, in Guangdong Province in December 2011. Provincial party officials promised elections and investigation of corrupt real estate deals to diffuse the rebellion (Jacobs 2012).

In another example, two Chinese journalists were severely beaten by Badong County police in May 2009 as they attempted to report on a case involving the rape of a young waitress by three party officials there. This case too drew significant public attention on the internet because it was a compelling narrative of official venality and passion – the waitress stabbed one of the officials in retaliation. The local party cadres compounded their offense by ordering the beatings by three party officials there. This case too drew significant public attention on the internet because it was a compelling narrative of official venality and passion – the waitress stabbed one of the officials in retaliation. The local party cadres compounded their offense by ordering the beatings by three party officials there. This case too drew significant public attention on the internet because it was a compelling narrative of official venality and passion – the waitress stabbed one of the officials in retaliation. The local party cadres compounded their offense by ordering the beatings.

6.4 Police and Corruption
Similar tales of police brutality were reported as the veil of fear was lifted in Egypt and Tunisia in early 2011. In Russia, a recent poll found that one quarter of respondents had personal knowledge of incidents where the police beat or tortured people. A Russian member of parliament reports: “Our law-enforcement organs are seriously littered with scum and losers of all kinds” (Loiko 2011, A4). The reason is that in repressive regimes the police serve those in power as much as (and perhaps more than) they do some abstract sense of the regime’s social order. Because the police are often enforcers of elite scams and shakedowns at national, regional, and local levels, the same bureaucrats and party officials are willing to turn their back on police abuses involved in similar corrupt activities – or even encourage them. Compounding the this synergy, lower-echelon police in authoritarian states are usually paid poorly, making bribes, shakedown, and illegal enterprises common sources of income, and when this occurs, the dirty money frequently flows upward to elites higher up in the feeding chain. When a lieutenant general in the Russian Police was recently arrested for corruption, the investigation revealed that he had lived in a mansion filled with jewelry, guns, antiques, and fine art. He also owned five different Moscow apartments and property in Cyprus and London (Loiko 2011, A4). This lifestyle was paid for by his cut of deals and scams conducted by those under his authority. Moreover, it is common that many regime elites know of these practices and turn a blind eye.

Although most of these observations will not surprise analysts of authoritarian states, I suggest that the use of police for political repression and state security – a fundamental principle of HCAs – has a ripple effect in local corruption and brutality that is perhaps less widely recognized. The relationship can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 12. Because police are the local enforcers for corrupt administrators and party functionaries, the carte blanche they receive for low-level violence spawns lawlessness that permeates society and feeds free-space-based illegitimacy.

As one measure of this relationship, last February’s texting and twitter calls for mobilization in China (the preempted Jasmine revolution) were for an end to authoritarian rule, inflation, and widespread corruption (Jacobs and Ansfield 2011). Another measure is that two foci of early Syrian protests against the al-Assad regime were the corrupt and unaccountable security forces (especially regarding deaths of detained youths) and the corrupt inner circle of Assad’s friends. Bashir Assad’s first cousin, Rami Maklouf, is one of the country’s wealthiest businessmen (Shadid 2011). Maklouf is known in Syria as Mr. Five Percent, reflecting his standard cut in deals from state contracts. His most public business, Syriatel, had its offices attacked during protests in May 2011, in an indication of public awareness of these inner machinations of the ruling elite. It is likely that this relationship between corruption and security forces was the force behind the widely reported frustration and anger that drove the recent revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, and Yemen. The empassioned narrative of the incommunicado detention of Wael Ghonim thrust him into the spotlight during the Egyptian protests precisely because so many citizens were able to identify with it. Moreover, it is likely that state elites know how their subjects resent the pervasiveness of official corruption. In Syria, as an early measure to insure quiescence in Aleppo, the country’s second largest city, the Assad regime specifically reined in corrupt activities, bribe-taking, and shakedowns there. According to one report, “For some people, these are really wonderful times” (Abdulrahim 2011, 4).

At lower levels, the majority of the police and security forces are made up of common workers, who, in the weak and uneven economies of these authoritarian regimes, are happy to have a regular job. For many, it is their institutional role that leads them to brutish behavior, but when their shifts are over, they go home to family, friends, and neighbors, many of whom understand that the bribes are systemic income supplements, a regular part of doing business, and a way to feed the family, however distasteful. For the unemployed men in the neighborhood, it is plausible that most would not turn down an opportunity to put on the uniform to earn a living the same way. In Mexico under PRI authoritarianism, la mordida was resented because of its arbitrariness and its economic “bite” on families, but also normative and widely expected. This “normalization” complicates moments of political mobilization at the microlevel of analysis, because the police and security forces are torn between their own self interest and orders from superiors, on the one hand, and social pressure from friends and family not to follow orders to repress protests on the other. A critical moment in the Tunisian mobilizations was when the police and security officers refused to attack fellow citizens, and in turn were embraced by protesters. In general, such defections mark crucial junctures in opposition movements. As division appears within the ranks of the police and security forces, on-the-ground tactical assessments of advantage often appear to favor the protesters by virtue of their sheer numbers. When this occurs, regime change is not far behind.

7. Conclusions
Authoritarian states are not monoliths of social control and administration. Understanding their complexity is fundamental to understanding how the mobilization-repression nexus unfolds in them, and especially the forms and frequency of state violence. It is axiomatic that HCAs do not liberalize on their own. Even China, which since the 2008 Olympics (and prior to 2011) had been responsive to citizen mobilization in some spheres – anticorruption campaigns, for example – tightened social control in other spheres to deftly manage citizen discontent. In both expansion and contraction of responsiveness, it is popular pressure that often forces elite action. This is the reciprocal relationship between regime and opposition in HCAs. The focus of this article has been to trace out the contours of how it occurs at various levels of state organization, with insights from a comparative focus on mid- and lower levels.

The organization of the forces of violence, which varies by states according to the threats that the opposition poses to political elites, is especially important. I have traced several tactics that political elites may employ, on the one hand, to weaken threats from the military, especially division of
labor and resource allocation, and, on the other, to ensure repressive capacity when necessary. The organization of the military and militias ranges from centralization in the capital to barracks in distant peripheries of the state, which are often less reliable because of ethnic and/or communal divisions.

Parallel to the forces of violence are the forces of political control, surveillance, and fear management. These too are organized hierarchically and spatially, which, as for armies and militias, offers spaces for divisions and cracks in social control. At the local level there is often an overlap between party officials and the means of violence, as they employ thugs and vigilantes to enforce their interests. This is violence of the state at the micolevel, and is where the majority of citizens encounter an unjust and arbitrary state. But I also argue that the reciprocal dance between regime and opposition also is performed at this level too, and that creativity, bravery, and even crosscutting ties of family and friendship can undermine more formally organized police functions, which may necessitate the use of thugs and enforcers. These relationships raise the question of whether there are inherent contradictions in high-capacity authoritarian states. Although they may appear quite stable in the short and medium term, it is an interesting proposition that these underlying forces may foster the gathering of oppositional sentiments and actions in the long term, and contribute to a spiral of violence, retribution, opposition, mobilization, and elite division. I close, then, with a provocative proposition that necessarily leaves many questions unanswered, but consistent with the intent of this article, namely to guide research on state violence, repression, and opposition in new directions, is derived from its mid- and lower-level focus on repression and opposition.

Proposition 13. The complexity of HCAs gives rise to basic contradictions that emanate from (1) the lack of accountability of political elites at various levels and the ensuing corruption that permeates society, and (2) how hiatuses in the social control administration create free spaces where illegitimacy and opposition thrive because of point number one. These two patterns suggest the inherent instability of HCAs in the long run.

The research task, then, is to specify why some HCAs persist as long as they do, say seventy years in the Soviet Union, or fifty in apartheid South Africa, or fifteen years in Pinochet’s Chile. To answer such questions, a dialogue between the broad system-level comparisons characteristic of so much repression-mobilization research and the mid- and lower-level variables specified in this report, will likely be necessary.
References


The States Must Be Crazy: Dissent and the Puzzle of Repressive Persistence

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According to forty years worth of research, dissent always increases repression whereas state coercive behavior has a range of different influences on dissident activity. If the outcome of government action is uncertain, why do authorities continue to apply repression? We explore this “puzzle of repressive persistence” using official records of U.S. government activities against the Republic of New Africa, a Black Nationalist organization active in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In particular, we investigate three proposed answers to the puzzle: repression is effective but in a way not currently considered; repression functions by mechanisms not hitherto considered by quantitative researchers; or those who use repression are not actually interested in eliminating dissent. We find that persistence in this case can be attributed to: 1) a long-term plan to eliminate challengers deemed threatening to the U.S. political-economy and 2) the influence of particular agents of repression engaged in a crusade against Black radicals. Both factors increased the likelihood of continued coercion despite short-term failure; indeed such an outcome actually called for additional repressive action. These insights open up a new area of research for conflict scholars interested in occurrence, persistence and escalation.

For approximately forty years, quantitative researchers have tried to understand the relationship between political dissent and state repression, commonly referred to as the “dissent/conflict-repression nexus” (e.g., Lichbach 1987). Understanding the interaction between dissident behavior and state repression is important because, at its core, it represents one of the most crucial elements of modern life – the former (dissent) identifying an effort to bring about political, economic, and/or social change by raising the costs of governance and the latter (repression) identifying an effort to create as well as protect the status quo by raising the costs of collective action. Essentially, two conclusions can be drawn from this body of work. On the one hand, dissent always increases repressive behavior (Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Davenport 1995, 1996, 1999; Davenport 2005; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Franklin 1997; Gartner and Regan 1996; Hibbs 1973; King 1998; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Regan and Henderson 2002). On the other hand, repression has a variety of different influences on dissent. For example, it has been found to increase it (Gurr and Duvall 1973), decrease it (White 1993), alternatively decrease or increase it depending upon context (Boswell and Dixon 1990; Bwy 1968; Gupta and Venniers 1981; Weede 1987), decrease it over time (Rasler 1996), lead to substitution where one form is decreased while another is increased (Moore 1998; Shellman 2007), and have no impact whatsoever (Gurr and Moore 1997).

These results are puzzling and different researchers have attempted to explain the varied outcomes in diverse ways (e.g., using new data or a new method, or developing new theory) but the focus of the current paper follows from these puzzles: we seek to understand why, when the impact of repressive action on dissent is believed to be variable (i.e., the
outcome of repression is not generally known), authorities would continue to use coercion? Are states “crazy,” repeatedly using a policy that does not always work or is their some method to the madness? Although current research does not explicitly address this question, when one consults the literature relevant to the topic numerous answers emerge, none of which have been examined explicitly.

Within this article, we explore three explanations for repressive persistence: 1) repression may work as a “regulatory” activity but not in the way currently examined; 2) repression may work differently than expected; and 3) government objectives may be different than currently theorized. To do this, we deviate from existing work and use a unique database on the interaction between the United States government and a Black nationalist organization called the Republic of New Africa (RNA) between 1968 and 1973. These data were compiled from records of fifteen different local, state, and federal policing organizations as well as a wide variety of other archival material, by the street address (spatial unit) – hour (temporal unit), for all events between 1968 (the founding of the organization) and 1973 (considered to be a low point for the organization, if not its end). Such a design is necessary to examine the competing arguments discussed above – something that is extremely difficult to accomplish within the traditional large-N framework. This design clearly complements other research, providing some insight into a puzzle that has lain unaddressed within conflict studies for quite a while as well as providing some directions for further investigation.

We find that in the case of the RNA it is best to view repressive persistence as part of a broader government policy to: 1) eliminate a behavioral threat (i.e., secession) which, if successful, could upset the political system and 2) sustain a particular ethic within the repressive apparatus that was largely anti-black as well as anti-radical. The existing research here assists us in understanding why repression is applied despite varied behavioral outcomes, returning us to some of the earliest theories where government coercion was prominently featured. In the conclusion, we outline how such insights can be integrated into the large-N, quantitative investigations that currently predominate.

1. Understanding the Conflict-Repression Nexus
For most researchers in political science and sociology the interaction between governments and dissidents is one of dueling combatants (e.g., Dahl 1966; Hobbes [1651] 1950; Lichbach 1995; Machiavelli [1513] 1980; Pierskalla 2010). In this scenario, each actor attempts to influence the other by using diverse coercive strategies (respectively protest/dissent for challengers and protest policing/repression for governments), attempting to alter the opponents’ willingness to continue their current path of action. It is suggested within this work that if neither actor engaged in provocative behavior, then there would be no need for coercion. If nobody moved (i.e., challenged the other), then it is expected that nobody would get hurt, so to speak. If one side moved, however, then a counter-move is expected and some form of dissent/coercion would be applied. This would continue until one side quit or was defeated.1

Consequently, challengers use certain tactics to raise the costs of political order, compelling authorities to withdraw from or engage in specific policies and/or practices. Here, sit-ins, petitions, strikes, demonstrations, terrorist acts, and insurgent attacks are expected to diminish the perceived legitimacy of authorities (through increased disruption within society) and political leaders are prompted to reassess the relative gains derived from giving in to challengers or persisting in their current activities. Given the objectives of challengers and the way in which challenging tactics are used, it is understandable that authorities engage in state repression when confronted with challenges. Such behavior is intended to protect established institutions, practices, and individuals or clear the way for new ones by raising the costs of challenging activity. Arrests, detention, verbal harassment, beatings, targeted assassinations, and mass killings alter the decision calculus of those in opposition. Consequently, movement participants are prompted to reassess

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1 There are other alternatives (e.g., exit/flight or accommodation) but these are not generally considered in the work discussed here.
the relative gains of giving in to authorities or persisting in their struggle.

Adopting the view described above, the research design employed to investigate the conflict-repression nexus is relatively straightforward. Generally, the influence of repressive and dissident behavior at time t is inferred from examining values of dissident and repressive behavior, respectively, at time t + 1 compared to those at time t – 1. If dissent increases after repression has taken place, then repressive behavior is deemed “unsuccessful” because government coercive action did not diminish the challenger’s activity. If repression increases after dissent has taken place, then dissident activity is deemed “unsuccessful” because challenging behavior did not diminish government coercion. There are some variants on this basic theme. For example, most researchers consider contemporaneous impacts. In this context, the effect of relevant behavior is anticipated within a single unit of time. Such a perspective lies implicit within the work referenced; while none of this is discussed openly and in detail, it nevertheless follows logically.

Exploring a wide variety of places, periods, and operationalizations (for both behavioral challenges and repression), it is clear that conflict theorists have been partially correct in their characterization of what takes place. On the one hand, behavioral challenges consistently increase state repressive action (Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Davenport 1995, 2005, 2007a, b; Franklin 1997; Gartner and Regan 1996; Hibbs 1973; King 1998; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Leith 1999; Regan and Henderson 2002). Certain types of challenges have a greater impact than others (e.g., violent behavior relative to non-violent activity, which further supports the threat hypothesis), but the basic finding is robust across examinations. On the other hand, findings are mixed with regard to the influence of repression on behavioral challenges – especially dissent, which is the focus of this article and the area that has received the most empirical attention. To date, researchers have found almost every relationship. For example, as Davenport states (2005, vii):

Confronted with state repression, dissidents have been found to run away (e.g., White 1993), fight harder (e.g., Eckstein 1965; Feirabend and Feirabend 1972; Gurr and Duvall 1973; Koran 1990; Khawaja 1993; Francisco 1996), and alternatively run away or fight (e.g., Bwy 1968; Gurr 1969; Gupta and Venieris 1981; Lichbach and Gurr 1981; Weede 1987; Rasler 1996; Moore 1998)– varying according to political-economic context. Additionally, work has been found where there is no response whatsoever.2

2. The Puzzle of Repressive Persistence

To date, research investigating the dissent-repression nexus has been dedicated to understanding how the two forms of conflict influence one another. Building off this work, however, we take the conclusions of forty years worth of empirical research, accept its validity and attempt to understand one puzzle that emerges when all of this is viewed together: given the mixed effectiveness of state coercion in diminishing political dissent, why would governments continue to apply repressive behavior? This we refer to as the “Puzzle of Repressive Persistence.” Within research focused on the relationship between conflict and repression no explicit attention has been given to this issue. Reading this body of work creatively and drawing upon other areas of research, however, allows several arguments to be developed. To initiate this discussion, we present the most closely related argument emerging from the work of Ted Gurr (1988), which proves to be useful, but ultimately limited. Three extensions of this basic argument are then provided, the plausibility of which is explored in the RNA case.

2.1. Gurr’s Coercive State Thesis

Our investigation of Repressive Persistence begins with what appears to be among the oldest and most straightforward of explanations. In 1988, Ted Gurr sought to theoretically understand the circumstances that led to the creation and continuation of some of the most powerful organizations in human history and to generate testable propositions. One of these organizations, and the one most relevant to the current discussion, concerns state security forces. These are important because they engage in state repression.

According to Gurr’s argument, repressive behavior is enacted for two distinct reasons. In his first proposition, he argues that:

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2 This work is not as robust as the one mentioned where dissent uniformly increases repression, as findings are not as stable when different variables, methods, and contexts are applied.
States involved in recurring episodes of violent conflict tend (a) to develop and maintain institutions specialized in the exercise of coercion; and (b) to develop elite political cultures that sanction the use of coercion in response to challenges and perceived threats. (Gurr 1988, 50)

Following this logic, one could make the case that repression would be used by political authorities despite variation in behavioral outcomes (i.e., its influence on dissent, terrorism and insurgency) after these tactics have been employed because this is simply what institutions that specialize in “the exercise of coercion” do. From this perspective, repressive action sometimes works to reduce behavioral challenges and sometimes it does not, but repression would be applied regardless because this is what the actors and institutions engage in.

While moving in the right direction, we find this is a somewhat unsatisfactory answer to the puzzle identified above for two reasons. On the one hand, there is some variation in government repression against internal challengers that have been involved in “recurring episodes of violent conflict.” The US government, for instance, which clearly fits under the category of a recurring episode of violent conflict during the mid to late 1960s, wielded repressive action against communists and the Black Panther party quite differently from how it responded to laborers (especially after the Wagner Act of 1935) and the Ku Klux Klan. On the other hand, the consequence of ignoring information about behavioral challenges likely varies across distinct actors. For example, for much of the Cold War anti-radical persecution was acceptable in the West but this was much less the case toward the end or immediately afterward. The result: just having a specialized institution that uses coercion does not seem to address the point about varying outcomes, leading to another proposition.

In the second circumstance favorable to repressive action, Gurr argues:

To the extent that coercive strategies lead to conflict outcomes favorable for the political elite, their preference for those strategies in future conflict situations is reinforced. To the extent that coercive strategies have unfavorable outcomes, political elites will prefer noncoercive strategies in future conflicts (Gurr 1988, 50).

Here, governments repress in situations where they believe it will work for them (i.e., it is successful). What is “success”? Well, Gurr argues that “successful use of coercion enhances leaders’ assessment of its future utility” (1988, 49). What makes a political leader think that their future benefits would be great? While not exactly clear, it seems to be the case that this involves the containment and/or elimination of politically important rivals. As Gurr argues (1988: 47):

… all durable states of the modern world established and consolidated rule over their national territories by the successful use of force: by revolution; by suppressing rebellions and secessions; by forcibly subordinating and integrating, in diverse combinations and sequences, neighboring peoples, reluctant aborigines, ethnic minorities, lords and merchants, peasants and laborers, kulaks and capitalists.

Containment and/or elimination thus seem to be crucial for establishing and consolidating rule, and ultimately maximizing government utility, which appears to be the objective of governance and the principal conclusion of Gurr’s piece.

Gurr’s second proposition is a step in the right direction toward addressing the problem of Repressive Persistence, but it ultimately fails as an explanation because of a series of unresolved issues that remain.

First, it is unclear what constitutes “containment” and “elimination.” The latter seems clear: the entity making the claim against authorities is vanquished and disappears. The former seems less so. In the case of containment, the entity making the claim against authorities is limited somehow, tamed. Although Gurr does not argue this, it seems reasonable to argue that containment would be revealed if the challenger’s challenge was diminished in some way: i.e., reduced in frequency and/or degree of radicalization (the displacement of existing leaders from office as well as the magnitude of overall change desired).

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3 This judgment is made based upon the country’s experience with the War of Independence, wars against various Indian nations, the Civil War, the labor wars, the struggle for civil rights and the black power movement, as well as diverse episodes of urban unrest.
Second, it is unclear what the relevant unit of analysis is within Gurr’s discussion of successful repression. He appears to suggest that some kind of running evaluation is conducted, where contentious interactions at the nation-year unit of analysis are evaluated for relative success or failure and government actions are taken accordingly (i.e., repress or not). Where repressive action has been successful in the past (i.e., challengers were contained or eliminated), it will be employed in the future; where repressive action has failed in the past, it will not be employed. This is problematic in the sense that it is unclear how political authorities evaluate contentious politics. For example, how far back do governments look in their evaluations? Do governments consider all challengers together at the nation and year or simply those that are confronted at some local unit and some lower level of temporal aggregation? By what metric do governments evaluate their activities (in hours, days, weeks, months, quarters, years, or by campaign)? These issues need to be addressed and units of analysis should be clearly specified.

Third, there is a serious tension between the two propositions built into Gurr’s argument. In the first, governments are completely irrational and ignore new information. In the second, governments are completely rational and follow new information perfectly. We believe that a reasonable response to Repressive Persistence should be clear on exactly what drives the explanation.

Fourth, it is not clear exactly what challenges Gurr deems worthy of attention. He appears to suggest that only challenges that could result in the complete disruption of the government would be worthy of consideration, but there is no reason to maintain this position. It is not apparent that governments know which challenges could result in their removal and/or significant modification. As a result, it is possible that they would keep their eyes on a wide variety of challengers.

The questions raised by Gurr’s propositions are useful because the answers frame the various answers to the puzzle that we put forward below. Following from Gurr’s argument we offer three possible explanations for repressive persistence.

2.2. Repression Works – But Differently than How It Is Typically Examined
The first answer to the persistence puzzle is that repression is effective but in a different way than currently considered. Most closely connected with the examinations of the dissent-repression nexus discussed above, there are three variants of this argument. In one, discussed by Rasler (1996), the impact of repression is not contemporaneous but lagged (i.e., repressive behavior at time t does not influence dissent at time t but much later [time t + n]). Alternatively, Lichbach (1987) and Moore (1998) suggest that the impact of repression on dissent is not simply revealed where prior repressive action decreases subsequent dissident behavior as the literature generally maintains. Rather, it is argued that “substitution” exists where repression decreases certain forms of dissent (generally violent behavior) while increasing other forms (non-violent behavior). A third variant of this argument highlights a different kind of substitution effect. Similar to dissidents engaging in different types of behavior, authorities may also use distinct methods of influence depending upon the threat faced. For example, governments may attempt to accommodate certain dissident interests – in some way incorporating challengers into the system or paying them off (Gamson 1975; Krain 2000). This is crucial to address because if one actor were exclusively focused on repressive behavior but ignored accommodative efforts, then it might mischaracterize the state’s influence. In short, dissent might just as well be influenced by accommodation as repression.

2.3. Repression Works – But Differently than Theorized
The second answer to the persistence puzzle maintains that state coercion is effective but functions in a way that is not considered by quantitative researchers. This argument draws upon qualitative and historical literature on social movements and covert repressive activity (e.g., physical and electronic surveillance, informants and agents provocateurs [Marx 1988; Cunningham 2004; Davenport 2005]). In this work, the objective of state repression is not the reduction of overt dissident behavior but rather the “pacification” of dissident claims-making and/or the reduction of the various activities that dissidents engage in prior to contentious dissident behavior (e.g., meetings, the development and articulation of movement objectives, training, recruitment, and so forth). Here, authorities at-
tempt to substantively alter the degree of threat presented by challenges through reducing the degree of radicalism of group objectives (e.g., from revolution to reform) and/or preemting overt challenges.

This approach to the topic represents an important shift in how we understand the persistence puzzle, for it suggests that it is irrelevant whether actual dissident activity is modified by repression (e.g., the number of protest events observed and coded during a particular temporal unit). What is more important is what precedes and underlies these efforts at social change (e.g., what dissidents talk about wanting to do, how many dissidents show up, whether or not dissidents meet, and for how long).

To date, no systematic work has been done on this argument. While much research attempts to understand social movement trajectories (highlighting the use of the repressive tactics discussed above) and many attempts have been made to understand how and why covert repression is applied, no-one has rigorously tracked exactly how and in what manner covert repressive action influences claim-making or pre- and post-mobilization, thus addressing the punishment puzzle explicitly.

2.4. Who Cares if Repression Works? A Different and Older Take on Persistence

The third and final answer to the persistence puzzle suggests that those who use repression are not interested in eliminating dissent; in other words, there are other ends to which repressive action is put that outweigh the concerns of behavioral control. For example, drawing upon Durkheim’s work on punishment (1933), it could be argued that repression is less about deterring or controlling dissidents than it is about unifying societal opinion (Walter 1969).

Here, repressive action against deviance informs those not directly targeted about what is and is not deemed acceptable within the relevant community. In a sense, it is the (behavior and attitudes of the) general population that becomes the target of repressive control, not the behavior of specific challengers.

A diverse array of theorists most prominently represented by Marx and Pushakanis (Garland 1990), but including others as well (Chomsky and Herman 1979; Donner 1990; Petras 1987; Pion-Berlin 1989; Stanley 1996) suggest that techniques of punishment like repression are less about behavioral regulation than about protecting specific political-economic relations (i.e., protection rackets). In this case, repressive behavior serves as a mechanism by which those who benefit from particular exploitative relationships are allowed to continue in their exploitation.

A different variant of the argument returns to Gurr but extends his proposition. In Gurr’s first proposition repression would be continued because this is what specialists in coercion do. One could also view the occurrence of persistence despite varying behavioral outcomes as a form of bureaucratic extension (Foucault 1977; Gurr 1986). Within the work just identified above, authorities are less attuned to the vicissitudes of dissident behavior than they are to the internal dynamics of repressive and governing organizations themselves. For example, it is expected that once repressive organizations have been created and become active, employees will have a vested interest in perpetuating the use of coercive action. As a consequence of this, one would likely see increased attempts to institutionalize and extend the application of repression to greater numbers of problems (e.g., Lustick 2006). This is less tied to how institutions initially came into being than what any self-interested institution will do to maintain its access to resources. With little to no disaggregated data on the subject, there has been no consideration of this explanation (but see Cunningham 2004 for an important exception).

3. (Re)Configuring the Analysis of State Repression

In order to rigorously investigate all of the arguments made in the last section, a new approach to repressive behavior is required. For example, according to the first explanation offered above (repression works – but differently than it is typically examined), repression would be most likely at the beginning of a dissident campaign or in direct response to the number of dissident activities initiated, trailing off over time. If repressive behavior is repeatedly applied without dissident behavior, however, or if repression precedes dissident activity, then this suggests that authorities are not waiting for lagged effects. Alternatively, repressive behavior would be most likely applied when the most threatening forms of dissent appear and prior to any switch in dissident
tactics. After the tactical shift has taken place or in situations when the most threatening behavior has diminished, repression is expected to be withdrawn. Finally, in a different variant of this argument, repression would be most likely applied when accommodative policies are non-existent. When such activities are undertaken, then repressive behavior is more likely to be reduced. This suggests the need for an alternative empirical specification which accounts for these possible variations in repressive activity.

Examination of the second explanation for the persistence puzzle (repression works – but differently than theorized) requires other considerations. In this case, one must identify and examine pre-mobilization challenging activity and look for changes – both contemporaneously as well over time. Repression is expected when pre-mobilization is increasing or at a high point. State coercive behavior is withdrawn when pre-mobilization is pacified (i.e., made less radical) and/or significantly diminished in efficiency (i.e., when fewer people attend, when greater numbers of fearful expressions are made and when fewer individuals participate).

Finally, the third explanation for the puzzle of repressive persistence (those who use repression are not interested in eliminating dissent) compels researchers to consider factors other than contentious politics. For example, in one variant of this argument one must focus on the influence of repression on public opinion. In another, individuals must focus on the structure of the political economy, exploring the degree to which repressive action protects/extends these arrangements. In the third variant, researchers must focus on the influence of repression on the repressive apparatus itself (e.g., its morale, its access to resources and the impact on the interaction with political-economic elites).

4. The Republic of New Africa vs. the US Government

From the discussion, it is clear that the standard investigation of the dissent-repression nexus is ill equipped to address the insights provided by the diverse arguments highlighted in the last section. Toward this end, we outline the state-dissident interaction of interest to this study, addressing the challenger, the government’s response to them and then the data collection effort that facilitated the analysis.

4.1. We Shall Overthrow: Black Power and Freeing the Land

The social movement whose behavioral challenge we concentrate on was named the Republic of New Africa or RNA. Disgruntled with the ineffectiveness of the civil rights approach to modifying American attitudes and conditions, observing a continuation of white violence despite the adoption of certain laws, and influenced by the political theorization and strategies of Malcolm X, a small band of Detroit-area activists joined with Black Nationalists from around the United States (e.g., the Revolutionary Action Movement and the Deacons for Defense and Justice) and founded the RNA on March 31, 1968 (Obadele 1995).

The primary objective of the Republic of New Africa was to establish African-American independence from the United States government; specifically, it sought: 1) land for the establishment of an independent country in the deep South: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina (the so-called “Black Belt”); 2) a plebiscite among Blacks in order to determine the “national status” of the “New Afrikan population in North America”; and 3) reparations for the treatment of Blacks as slaves (Republic of New Africa 1968). The strategy was clearly articulated. For example, the RNA would take advantage of a numerical concentration of African Americans to secure the election of diverse public officials who were supportive of the Republic. Once in power, these individuals would appoint sympathizers to the cause as well as members of the Black Legion (the military unit) in order to protect and serve the African American nation – effectively deputizing an army and initiating a technique of electoral secessionism. Following domino theory, the RNA would start with one locale and then progressively move through the other states. If, at any time along this path, the US government attempted to block any of these efforts, then the organization threatened to employ guerilla warfare in inner cities throughout the country until they were granted what they desired. Differing from most secessionist groups, the RNA did not try to hide their strategy. The objectives and plans were communicated via RNA press release, speeches, and publications as well as through interviews on radio and television and in popular magazines like *Esquire.*
To accomplish these objectives, the organization engaged in many legal forms of protest: rallies, petitions, political education courses, food drives, lectures, conferences, and the publication of “independent” newsletters/papers, as well as other activities long-established in Black communities (e.g., armed “self-defense” programs [deacons]). The group also engaged in efforts to legally separate parts of the United States: it began purchasing land in Mississippi for the capital of the new nation, elected a government, and attempted to develop a security force/army – the Black Legion (an admittedly small unit with limited military capability). To signify the independence they sought, members adorned themselves with African cloth and many changed their “slave” names to alternatives befitting liberated individuals. Members of the Republic also engaged in diverse illegal and violent activities: robberies, shootouts with police, shooting practice, plots to bomb state and federal buildings, and even a plane hijacking.

4.2. Repressing the “Negro Threat”

Unsurprisingly, the United States government (in and out of Detroit) did not sit idly by in the face of the RNA – regardless of how improbable the group’s objectives might seem now or might have seemed at the time. The authorities were well aware of what was at stake and took the group seriously. An FBI memo from Detroit to Chicago published in 1973 (File #157-907, section 55), identified the RNA as being “engaged in activities which could involve a violation of Title 13, United States Code (USC) Section 2383 (Rebellion or Insurrection), 2385 (Advocating Overthrow of the Government), Title 22, USC, Section 401 and 1934 (Neutrality Matters) and Title 18, USC, Chapter 12, Section 231 (Anti-riot laws)”.

As such, the RNA threatened the core aspects of the US government and civil society. Set against the backdrop of summer riots that resulted in millions of dollars worth of damage, dozens of deaths, and increased racial tension throughout most cities in the United States – especially in the North – the potential threat was immense.

The US government applied a wide variety of techniques against the RNA in order to identify, counter, and/or eliminate their behavioral challenge; overt techniques such as arrests, raids and grand juries were employed by the police and courts (Earl 2003; Goldstein 1978; Wolfe 1978). Such an approach followed a general pattern established across most cities during the time – commonly referred to as the “escalatory force” model (McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy 1998). Covert activities by police and intelligence organizations, including wiretaps, physical surveillance, informants, and agents provocateurs, were also employed (Marx 1988; Cunningham 2004; Davenport 2005). These strategies were employed to identify who was involved in social movements, as well as how they were recruited (so that these processes could be disrupted), what activities challenging organizations were involved in (frequently ahead of time so that authorities could pre-empt them), and to identify as well as counter any behavior deemed worthy of attention.

The question most relevant to the conflict-repression nexus is, how did this repression influence the RNA? According to most research, repressive behavior was generally effective in eliminating this social movement. For example, Pinkney, highlighting overt repressive behavior, notes (1976, 125–26):

> Since its inception the Republic of New Africa has encountered friction wherever it has attempted to operate. … In August [of 1971] the headquarters [which moved from Detroit to the South] was raided by Mississippi policemen and agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. During the raid two policemen were wounded by gunfire … The incident in Mississippi has … signaled the demise of the Republic of New Africa.

Brisbane offers a similar account (1974, 184–85). Highlighting covert repressive activity, Tyson notes that “the COINTELPRO operation, the FBI’s effort to disrupt and divide the Black movement, often by illegal means,” took a toll (1999, 303–4).

While insightful, it is problematic that these accounts are not based on any detailed investigation of the topic. Although they demonstrate generally that repression was effective at decreasing RNA dissident activity, it is not exactly clear how well individual instances of repression succeeded in influencing relevant behavior, which is the core unit of analysis for empirical research on the topic. To understand the influence of repressive behavior on social movements, therefore, one has to rigorously investigate the subject.
5. Researching the Republic of New Africa

Our primary source for our investigation of how repression influenced the RNA comes from what is commonly referred to as a “Red Squad” file. These records are compiled from diverse organizations principally city-based but extending up to state and federal levels and across diverse aspects of governments: police departments, judicial institutions (e.g., the Justice Department and district courts), intelligence organizations (e.g., FBI, CIA, State Department, and the Army), and the Internal Revenue Service. The objective of the Red Squad was twofold: 1) to monitor behavior that was deemed radical in its intent, violent, or relevant to “national security” (Donner 1990, 3) and 2) to eliminate targeted organizations.

The RNA records housed at the [self identifying reference] include files from Detroit Police Department (Special Investigations, Demonstration Detail, Intelligence Division, Inspectional Service Bureau, Security Unit, Detective Division, Criminal Division, Public Complaints Division, and Tactical Reconnaissance), the Michigan State Police (Special Investigation Bureau, Special Investigation Unit), the Internal Revenue Service, the US Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. From these files, repression of the RNA was coded to identify the type of activity undertaken by state authorities (e.g., instances of physical and electronic surveillance, wire-tapping, and the forging of letters by authorities), the identity of the organization involved in the action, the number of agents involved, location, date, and time. Event type is subdivided into two areas: overt repressive action (e.g., arrests, raids, and harassment) and covert repressive action (e.g., physical and electronic surveillance).

Coded characteristics of dissident behavior include the type of activity undertaken by RNA members (e.g., business meetings, fundraising, shooting practice, riots, demonstrations, political education courses, petitions, speeches), the identity of individuals in attendance and their participation in the organization’s activities, number of people in attendance, location, date, and time. This is relevant for the current research, because it allows us to gauge the influence of arrests and instances on dissident behavior where informants are suspected, if meetings are held, how many people were present within them, how many people spoke at these events, what did they speak about as well as what did the relevant personnel do (e.g., talking, training, lecturing, leafleting, protesting, taking target practice, and so forth). Equally as important, we can do this by the week, as well as explore lagged values from the relevant date. This is important for we use the week as the principal unit by which government considers its effectiveness (a concern raised by our discussion of Gurr). Such an approach seems reasonable for the police appeared to employ this unit in their compilations.

In addition to the event-based information we rely upon other materials as well to contextualize what we observe. For example, the archive contains police and civilian reports about the period, an extensive compilation of local and national newspaper articles about the RNA and police activity against them, some public opinion surveys conducted around the period of interest, as well as Republic of New Africa records such as internal memos, personal letters, flyers, posters, and a biography of one of its leaders. Over the last few years there has also been a respectable amount of scholarship generated about the black nationalist movement. We utilize the information contained within these records as well to engage in something of a plausibility probe of the various propositions identified above. This is done because given the complex nature of the arguments put forward it would be very difficult to apply the type of analysis most commonly used when examining the conflict-repression nexus, with a standard statistical model and cross-national database. In the conclusion, we return to how the present study might speak to more conventional analyses.

6. Probing the Persistence Puzzle

Viewing the data, it is clear that neither individual acts of overt or covert repression led to a decline in dissident behavior as expected by the conventional view (i.e., there is no straightforward indication of “success”). For example, as one can see in Figure 1, the arrests and raids that took place place on July 3, 4, 18, 21, and 25, as well as August 8 and 16, 1968, did not prevent dissident behavior on August 27 and again on September 10 and 15. The basic argument is also undermined by the fact that the raid and mass arrest at New
Bethel (on March 31, 1969) – by far the largest and most severe repressive act of the period – prompted the most extensive dissident response, continuing from April 1 to November 9, 1969. By the time of the raid and arrests in Mississippi during August 1971, the basic story was quite different. Now there was no growth in dissent after repression. Indeed, barring a few later protests, RNA collective action was almost finished by that point. This is perhaps the only place where repression worked as most scholars suggest (decreasing dissent after repression was used).

Having identified the varied outcomes of repression, the question remains: Why would coercive behavior be applied consistently despite its ineffectiveness in behavioral regulation?

6.1. The Unconventional View: Delayed and Tactical

The first explanation for the persistence puzzle was that repressive behavior continues despite dissent because: 1) the objective of authorities is long-term and not short-term in nature; 2) the objective of authority is a tactical shift away from radicalism not a reduction in all dissident behavior; and 3) authorities perceive no other alternatives.

6.1.1. Effectiveness Deferred

The delayed impact thesis would lead us to expect some form of overt repression as the initial response to overt dissident behavior and for there to be a state response with either breaks between episodes of coercive action (so as to allow the repression to take its effect) or for repressive behavior to be clustered temporally with dissent gradually
diminishing over time. In the case of the relationship between RNA dissent and US authorities, Figure 1 shows that while dissident behavior decreases over time, it is difficult to attribute such a result to the delayed effect of state behavior.

For one, repressive behavior does not respond to RNA activity, challenging the state-responsivity argument. One can see that after the founding convention, the Black Nationalist organization engages in dissident behavior in roughly six distinct periods within which at least one event takes place every two weeks: 1) March 29–30, 1968; 2) June 8–November 21, 1968; 3) February 8–August 31, 1969; 4) October 18, 1969–January 24, 1970; 5) April 1–June 4, 1970; and 6) sporadic events from August 5, 1970, through April 15, 1973, after which activity wanes. In their attempt to counter the RNA, the authorities are approximately two months too late: the first arrests are in May of 1968. The delayed response of the authorities to dissident behavior appears to be a pattern. Thus, it is only at New Bethel (the first anniversary of the RNA) that the police respond immediately to increasing activity.

After New Bethel (which involved a massive raid and mass arrests following a shooting that left two officers dead), arrests continue for quite some time, responding to the increased collective action of the RNA. Again, arrests decrease but this takes place amidst another increase of RNA activity in April (on the 12th, 17th, 18th and 23rd). As the dissident challenge continues into May (4th and 11th), this prompts another wave of police activity on the 13th, 25th and 26th of the same month. Challenging the delayed response thesis in a different way, another wave of repressive behavior in Detroit around the time of a Mississippi raid in August of 1971 represents sporadic arrests completely unrelated to dissident behavior, which was also taking place infrequently both before and after the arrests.

6.1.2. Substitution and Shifting Tactics
Investigation of this case supplies little support for the substitution argument either. If the RNA were influenced as advocates of this position suggest (following overt repressive behavior conceived as either events [Lichbach] or episodes [Moore]), then one would see a decrease in one tactic (e.g., violent or non-violent behavior) and an increase in another (respectively, non-violent or violent activity). This appears to ignore information about what the objectives of the different activities were however.

For example, the RNA was initially committed to focusing its efforts on establishing its “nation” within the deep South. All discussion and preparation (e.g., speeches, military training, conferences, workshops, and community meetings) concerned this activity and location. By 1971, however, the RNA had given up this rather large-scale, ambitious plan and focused on merely purchasing land in Mississippi for the establishment of a city-state as well as conducting a preliminary plebiscite; this would serve as the platform from which they could move back to the broader plan (Obadele 1995). This tactical shift is important for it supports specific aspects of existing research while significantly challenging others.

Indeed, one could argue that Detroit-based repression of the RNA was successful because it compelled the Black radicals to move their base from Detroit to New Orleans (in May 1970). The organization still maintained a chapter in Detroit, but it moved its leadership and headquarters to the new location. While reducing the cost of collective action, in line with the conventional conception of repression, the geographic change was also undertaken to facilitate the move to the South (directly related to the organization’s ultimate objective and clearly most radical goal). From the new home base, with support as well as participation from the Detroit chapter, the RNA purchased land in Mississippi and began to educate and train members throughout the organization for the next stage in state-building. At the same time, the RNA also began to reach out to the residents of Mississippi. Repression thus pushed the RNA not away from but toward radical behavior in an outcome that is inconsistent with the expectations of existing research.

6.1.3. Sticks as well as Carrots.
Regarding the third variant of the unexpected influence argument, it is clear that political authorities did not apply any other tactic against the RNA. By the time the Republic of New Africa emerged, the federal government was em-
phasizing a “law and order” approach to poverty and civil unrest. This involved significant resources being given to police organizations, training in counter-dissident activity, and the granting of extensive leeway with regard to the use of coercive practices. In many respects, the context facilitating repressive behavior was most prevalent during this period (Goldstein 2000).

6.2. The Unexpected View: Pre-mobilization and Objective Management
The second explanation for the persistence puzzle is that repressive behavior continues because its actual targets are those engaged in challenging behavior (i.e., challengers) not the challenges themselves (i.e., the challenging behavior). Here, state behavior is expected to limit RNA efforts at establishing and sustaining collective action, and diminish the radicalism of their objectives.

6.2.1. Patterns in Pre-mobilization
Observing diverse aspects of RNA behavior such as meetings and number of event attendees (Figure 2), one can see that despite consistent mention of infiltration (covert repression) and several arrests (overt repression) — shown above in Figure 1, the organization initially increased the number of meetings and the number of attendees per meeting. Indeed, as Robert F. Williams (the first president of the RNA) noted: “Sometimes it was hard to tell the infiltrators from the idiots” (Tyson 1999, 204). However, this did not dampen the mobilization efforts. But around November 24, 1968, one can also see that prior to the New Bethel incident the values diminish across both characteristics. This suggests that the lagged influence of repression was effective at weakening the RNA organizationally but not in any easily observable way.
Figure 2: RNA Pre-mobilization activity
As seen in the figure, the New Bethel incident in late March 1969 represents an interesting period. Members came to Detroit from all over the United States for the first anniversary of the RNA. In the context of the declining characteristics mentioned above, it appears that the meeting could not have occurred at a better time to reinvigorate the organization. New Bethel also represented a prime opportunity for the authorities to confront the African American dissident organization. With organizational characteristics declining (i.e., the number of people attending), one large raid with mass arrests and extensive interrogation could potentially produce tremendous amounts of information about the organization. Additionally, living through such an experience could intimidate the victims and, through media coverage of the events, potential recruits. Not only was the RNA’s largest meeting to date completely disrupted (a disaster for the organization), but the shooting of the police officers and the magnitude of police sanctions that followed was expected to turn public opinion against the RNA. From the record, the actual aftereffect of New Bethel was mixed, thus complicating the assessment of government repression. On the one hand, the raid and arrests galvanized the members – slowly increasing the number of meetings held and the sheer breadth of participation by organizational members, supporters, and the curious (i.e., greater numbers of those attending spoke and/or engaged in whatever activity was being undertaken, such as leafletting). On the other hand, the events set in motion a gradual decline in the number of attendees at organizational functions. In line with the “Radical Flank Effect” (Della Porta 1995), mobilization increased but the actual number of individuals involved in these activities decreased.

By March 29, 1970, amidst a wave of police action, the number of meetings and number of people actively speaking at events had begun to decrease again. Again, the effect of the police activity appears mixed. After this time, there were essentially no RNA meetings open to the public, just some special sessions of the governing council and miscellaneous get-togethers. Toward the end of the time series, after the last few arrests, there is a brief increase in number of meetings and number of attendees as the organization attempted to withstand this effort at disruption. These were short-lived however. Very soon there were no activities reported at all.

### 6.2.2. Killing Claims

A second variant of the unexpected view maintains that authorities persist in their repressive efforts despite varying successes at behavioral regulation because the actual objective is to control dissident claims not behavior. In this theory, authorities are concerned with eliminating the most radical dissident goals. Evaluating the historical record, this does not appear to be the case. In line with the earlier discussion of tactical shifts, repression did not alter the RNA’s objectives. They were always interested in setting up a Black nation, signified by their consistent use of the phrase “seize the land” at all meetings and in most publications. In fact, repression actually seemed to accelerate the RNA’s plans, prompting them to attempt to try to get Ocean–Hill Brownsville to secede in mid to late 1968 and their decision to move to Mississippi in 1971, much earlier than anticipated (i.e., the timetable was advanced).

In this context, one might expect political authorities to persist in their use of repression against the RNA despite varying behavioral outcomes, because the black radicals were advancing their political agenda. We tend to disagree with this, however, because there is simply no evidence that RNA claims were a topic of discussion within police documents and thus there is no support in these sources for the claim-kill argument, at least not on a day-to-day basis. We do, however, see indications that the US government was utilizing laws concerning the RNA’s attempt to overthrow a sovereign government as a pretext for engaging in repressive action. This does suggest that at a broader, more aggregate level the content of the RNA’s challenge was relevant to government action.

### 6.3. The Unconcerned View: Protecting and Serving, not Countering and Eliminating

In different ways, the previous two explanations for repressive persistence are largely connected to behavioral regulation: the first through an impact on overt collective action and one aspect of the second through an impact on pre-mobilization. Both presume that an evaluation of dissident behavior (its frequency and trajectory) is taking
place over some unit of time and space. Exploring different influences, we find that the arguments identified above are not well supported. In an attempt to discover what is really taking place, we extend the kill claim argument further and consider an alternative explanation.

On almost every dimension, it is clear that the RNA represented a serious threat to the United States political and social system, thereby meriting persistent repressive effort. It did not, however, threaten all aspects of the system equally, and this variation is important.

6.3.1. For the People
The symbolic order argument revolves around teaching lessons to specific subjects about proper behavior and likely responses to deviance. When threatened by political dissent, authorities engage in repression not to counter and/or eliminate challengers but to communicate to non-participants that this form of political activity is illegitimate and that they will be sanctioned for engaging in such behavior. We find evidence that this was the lesson intended for African Americans. Specifically, political leaders at the local, state, and federal levels realized that the mobilization potential for organizations like the RNA was significant and that repressive action might prevent them growing in their appeal. We are aided in this investigation by a number of public opinion surveys conducted in Detroit during the period under investigation.

Concerned with the causes and aftereffects of the July 1967 riot, the Detroit Free Press (1968) conducted a random probability sample survey of African American attitudes in August of the same year. A follow-up repeat study was conducted in October of 1968. As the RNA was created on March 31, 1968, it comes into existence right between the two surveys. Given that it was engaging in diverse activities at the time without any high-profile repressive activities, if the proposition outlined above were correct we would expect to find a growth in sentiments favorable to the RNA: Black separatism, Black ownership, ethnic pride, distance from whites in particular and the United States in general.

Examining the surveys, we find some support for the general argument regarding a favorable context for the RNA and the need for continued repressive behavior despite varying behavioral outcomes revealed within the government’s data. The DFP survey shows that from August 1967 to October 1968, Blacks generally felt that they had more to lose by engaging in violent action (from 53 to 63 percent) and that if war broke out the United States was worth fighting for (from 67 to 77 percent). However, there is also a clear finding that a specific subset of African Americans expressed interest in organizations like the Republic of New Africa. The research discloses that among rioters in 1967 (10–12 percent of all respondents), non-religious individuals and the young were more likely to support Black nationalism, measured as accepting a “militant” position, avoiding whites socially, fighting with other African Americans for rights, and building a separate Black society apart from whites in the United States or Africa.

While there are no explicit measures of repression in the survey, the authors do note a precipitous increase from 57 to 71 percent in the number of respondents who identify police brutality as a problem that could lead to another riot. These results present an interesting paradox: repressive action may be necessary to close the window for additional radicalism by eliminating the challengers but the use of this behavior could be associated with open the window further by provoking the disengaged.

Of course, the surveys discussed here represent only two slices of a much more complex and dynamic pie. Implicit within this type of examination is the argument that the logic behind persistence associated with lessons is changed slowly, whenever modifications are provided in popular opinion. What carries the explanatory weight in between these alterations, however? For this, more and perhaps different information is needed. We return to this below.

6.3.2. For the Cash
The essence of the economic argument concerning repressive persistence is that government applies coercion consistently despite short-term failure to regulate behavior because it is attempting to protect economic relationships over the long term. The relevance of this explanation seems limited given the objectives of the RNA and its small degree of success in realizing those objectives.
In theory, the RNA threatened the US economy in different ways. Basically, the organization was interested in providing the six essentials of decent human life for its black constituents: food, housing, clothing, health services, education, and defense. Hostile to the basic principles and practices of capitalism, the key to the RNA’s plans was a collective, full-employment strategy like in a socialist system. Here, every individual would work at their chosen profession not for profit but for the greater good of the collective. Clearly this economic strategy was a longer-term objective, but its essence fundamentally threatened the legitimacy of the US economy. In addition, potentially removing the African American from the marketplace would have significantly damaged the American economic system, especially given the sheer size and spending patterns of this community.

One could argue that although the US economy was not substantively directly threatened by the actions and/or rhetoric of the Republic of New Africa, the symbolic challenge was significant. The RNA represented a socialistic, all-Black movement whose success might prove to be a challenge for a government and economy that had major problems meeting the needs of African Americans. While this may be true, the available historical evidence appears to focus on explicitly political factors: nationhood, weapons, military training, and the potential for violence. The government records on the RNA discussed their economic plan in principle, but, again, the day-to-day records discussing what the Republic was doing paid very little attention to their economic activities. This makes sense as the primary focus of the organization concerned government infiltration, avoiding arrest, and paying the rent. Similarly, political factors were essential components of the RNA program. Equally important, however, a group of government institutions throughout the United States were specifically prepared to identify, monitor, and respond to the behavioral threat presented by the RNA. This is discussed below.

6.3.3. For the Troops

Instead of teaching lessons to the general population or protecting economic relations, the third argument attributes repressive persistence to coercive agents themselves, as initially introduced by Gurr (see above) but modifiedextended. Here it was argued that state coercion continues despite failure to regulate behavior because of the habitual patterns built into repressive institutions carrying out relevant activity and permissiveness for such activities within governing elites. When applied to the Detroit case, it is clear that while coercive institutions were extremely important for understanding the persistence of repressive action, in an interesting twist, it is also revealed that the agents of repression were able to continually apply coercive action in spite of regulatory failures because of the failures themselves and because of the ability of the relevant government organizations to manipulate the situation for their own purposes. In a sense, repressive persistence is attributed to a crusade of government agents to “fight the good fight” where every failure became yet another reason and opportunity for them to prove themselves. Such an argument is a departure from Gurr, who he maintained that coercive institutions would simply ignore inconsistent information or that prior successes would guide subsequent behavior.

In order to understand the role of coercive institutions in repressive persistence within our extension of Gurr’s argument, we must begin by noting that the authority’s response to the RNA emerged during a special period in American and Detroit history. At the time, the general level of threat presented by black unrest was significant throughout the United States. During this period, the United States was struck by one of the largest rises in violent crime in its history. The sheer severity of civil unrest added another, more politicized dimension to this threat. In Detroit, the riot of 1967 represented nothing less than a watershed in local-level challenges to public order and repressive action. The damage caused by the event and the authority’s response was extensive by any measure. During the riot, forty-three individuals were killed, hundreds wounded, and there were millions of dollars of property damage. In reaction, approximately 7,200 individuals were arrested, the city was essentially occupied, and numerous curfews and other restrictions on civil liberties were imposed for weeks after the event.

While the magnitude of the police response was significant, in many ways it was “too little, too late.” Prior to 1967, three separate reports by the community-police commis-
sion highlighted the racial tensions in the city and the potential for violence (Jacobs 1977, 145). In addition, there was a pervasive belief among patrolmen that the “riots” were not disorganized; rather, it was argued that they reflected a coordinated strategy of Black radicals such as the RNA to disrupt urban America. The event was important precisely because it (re)emphasized the perception that Blacks were a threat and that white people’s fears were legitimate. This provided the motivation for repressive action (of almost any type and level of lethality) as well as permissiveness for such behavior – despite failures.

As a direct result of the riot, two important dynamics emerged. First, “(r)acial conflict [moved to] the heart of all Detroit-based politics” (Farley et al. 2000, 46). Second, whites largely moved out of Metro Detroit to the suburbs, leaving the urban environment to the Blacks and the predominantly white and southern police department. This movement was particularly problematic because the historically insulated policing institutions of Detroit were already engaged in a rather heated battle with its geographically isolated Black residents. As Donner notes (1990, 291):

A number of cities, of which Detroit is a prime example, reflected in their police structures and target priorities a similar “urban pathology”: a decaying Black ghetto, ... the emergence of potentially violent Black and white groups, and the development among white policemen of a “siege mentality” against the Black community. ... after the ghetto riots of the late sixties, self-help and violence inevitably came to be regarded in both camps – police and ghetto – as a vital means of survival. “Law and order” became a coded battle cry as the police were transformed into an army defending white power and the status quo.

Exacerbating this, the diverse units that confronted the RNA were the ones most removed from ordinary police duties; the various sections of the “Red Squad” had very little contact with other parts of the department and had essentially no oversight. Such a pattern continued after the riots, as increasingly aggressive special units emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s: e.g., the “Big Four” and “Stop Robberies, Enjoy Safe Streets” (STRESS). These programs resulted in a large number of hostile Black-police interactions, several deaths of African Americans, and significant inquiries by citizen as well as government committees.

In addition, in the lead-up to the riot, Detroit police department was engaged in a bitter fight with the Mayor of Detroit, which it won. After an at times extremely contentious dispute (involving ticketing slow-downs and “sick-ins” where officers would call in sick en masse and city lawsuits to prevent any disruption of law enforcement), the Mayor’s office settled with the police right before the riot, on terms as diverse as “seniority, grievance procedures, management rights, vacations, leaves [and union recognition]” (Bopp 1971, 172). Bargaining amidst a hostile interaction with the Mayor and confrontation on the streets significantly enhanced the collective identity of the police. It is in this context that a need to prove its worth and a lack of political accountability allowed repressive persistence to occur. Indeed, seemingly under siege and fighting the “good fight” to preserve an essentially white order over the black threat, governing authorities were exempted from having to justify any short-term lack of success of repressive activities. Here, the “show” of force was sufficient to appease both the agents of repression, the principals who unleashed as well as stood over these agents, and the white constituency to which both were loosely accountable.

7. Conclusion
For the last forty years, researchers investigating the relationship between dissent and repression have produced the same contradictory findings. On the one hand, individual acts of dissent always increase acts of repression but, on the other hand, individual acts of repression consistently have different influences on dissident behavior. While many scholars analyzed one of the two components of the relationship (either the influence of repressive behavior on dissent or vice versa), no-one has yet attempted to explain the question that emerges when both results are considered simultaneously: when the outcome of repressive efforts is largely uncertain, why would authorities continue to use coercion (presumably in an effort to decrease dissent) – what we refer to as the puzzle of repressive persistence? Are states crazy or is there some method to the madness? This article sought to explore this issue by identifying diverse explanations and examining one of the most thoroughly documented state-dissident dyads available – the interaction between US authorities and the Republic of New Africa between 1968 and 1973.
Specifically, considering an event catalog as well as diverse historical documents covering the state-dissident interaction, we investigated three different answers to the puzzle. One suggests that repression works but that it has been examined inappropriately (through lags, substitution effects, and the fact that governments use other techniques). A second explanation posits that repressive behavior may work in a way different from that examined. Here, it is expected that repression influences pre-mobilization (meetings, recruitment, and objective formation). A third explanation suggests that individual acts of repression are not applied to influence dissent; rather, they are applied to sustain the identity of the agents.

Considering the US-RNA case, we find the most support for the third explanation. While individual acts of repression do not immediately decrease dissent, the magnitude of the threat posed by a radical Black Nationalist organization was significant, as was the insulated and combative identity of Detroit-area policing organizations. Indeed, these factors reveal not only why the repressive campaign against the RNA was initiated but also why it continued despite the varying effectiveness of state coercion.

From the work provided here, a new set of hypotheses emerge, which require further investigation beyond the case explored here. For example, if the argument above is correct, then we should expect to see varying acceptance for repressive failures across contexts. Citizens as well as leaders within authoritarian systems should be more accepting of failures compared to democracies, as the former are not subject to citizen scrutiny, evaluation, and punishment at the ballot box. At the same time, even within democracies, we would also expect that when a behavioral challenge is significantly threatening, authorities may be able to persist despite repressive failures – at least for a time, as long as they can show some effort toward, if not evidence of progress. The exact nature of the threat, the duration of time that states can fail without repercussions, and the meaning of non-events (success or no evidence at all) are all issues that require consideration.

In many respects these are not new issues for social scientists; rather, they are new for the current generation of conflict researchers as the present way of investigating relevant behavior has become largely divorced from the theories explored here. Indeed, questions of state responsiveness to citizen electoral threats are mainstays within the literature. What the research in this article reveals, however, is some of the tensions in this work. For example, if governments are to respond to behavioral challenges directed against them and if citizens are expected to evaluate their leaders regarding the appropriate/effective use of repression, then it is crucial to understand precisely how these two interact. If citizens believe that challenges are severe enough, then they may be willing to tolerate significant amounts of repression, but if information concerning behavioral threats and the repressive action directed against them are both provided by authorities, then this may not represent much of a check on their activity. If the media is censored in some manner and/or information is withheld from citizens, then this further undermines political accountability. How long can information about dissent, repression and behavioral effectiveness be withheld from citizens without electoral and/or attitudinal aftereffects? If authorities manipulate information about dissent and behavioral regulation, what are the repercussions? These questions reveal that the puzzle of persistence sits not only at the core of conflict studies, but at the core of more broadly defined political science.

In addition to challenging the topics that are explored in existing research of state repression, the current work also prompts researchers to alter what they collect information on. At present, scholars are focused on vague nationally-aggregated structural characteristics. Our work suggests that researchers should attempt to understand the objectives and interests of both principals (e.g., politicians) and their agents (e.g., police, military, intelligence service, and militias). As a community, we have been more focused on the former than the latter but there are still limitations. With the former, we are not very good at understanding what is perceived by the relevant actors or how they understand/explain what is done. With the latter, we know very little about those that pull the trigger, beat the protestor, and/or torture the victim. Newer work is pushing in this direction (e.g., Cunningham 2004; Butler et al. 2007) but clearly more effort needs to be extended toward understanding why governments agents do what they do. This involves not
just looking at these actors functionally as to how they relate to the state but also viewing them organizationally, psychologically, as well as sociologically. With these ad-
ditions, our investigations into repression, its withdrawal, its escalation, and its persistence would be immensely im-
proved.

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Intra-Party Dynamics and the Political Transformation of Non-State Armed Groups

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Open Section
Intra-Party Dynamics and the Political Transformation of Non-State Armed Groups

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Although non-state armed groups are primary stakeholders in contemporary political conflicts, there has been little research into their members’ perspectives on internal factors shaping radicalisation and de-radicalisation. State and international actors often assume that bringing rebel leaders to the negotiating table or “converting” them to peaceful politicians means weakening, splitting, or dismantling militant structures. This paper re-evaluates those assumptions in the light of rebel leaders’ own accounts of internal organisational dynamics before, during, and after political conflicts and peace settlements. Participatory action research with “insider experts” from armed movements in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Nepal, Aceh, El Salvador, Colombia, and South Africa reveals insiders’ analysis of leadership and organisational dynamics during armed conflict and political talks and highlights the rational decision-making process whereby proactive leaders constantly (re)assess and adjust their tactics (from unarmed to armed and vice versa) as the strategic environment evolves. Horizontal and vertical communication between members is critical for enabling collective ownership of transformation processes from violent insurgency to peaceful transition and preventing internal splits and disaffection during peace negotiations. The claim that rebel organisations should be dismantled as quickly as possible during peace processes is found to be dubious, highlighting instead the importance of retaining cohesive coordination and communication structures during volatile post-war transitions.
institutionalisation. In each country, a team comprised of local researchers and former group members was asked to reflect on the main factors which have shaped such transitions. This paper presents some of the outcomes of this research process, offering an insiders’ perspective on the shifts and relations in the ends and means of insurgency during (de-)radicalisation (section 1), the intra-party factors (decision-making and organisational dynamics) which influence their readiness to negotiate their transformation into peaceful political actors (section 2), and the impact of such transitions on their organisations (section 3).

1. Shifting Ends and Means: Political Vision and Strategies
The purpose of this first section is to clarify the terminology used in this paper, defining the major features of the actors under scrutiny according to their self-ascribed goals and strategies (1.1.), and describing the applied understanding of (de)radicalisation, with a primary focus on shifts between violent and non-violent politics during extended peace processes (1.2.).

1.1. Resistance/Liberation Movements and Armed Struggle as Last Resort
Non-state armed groups are classically defined, in Weberian fashion, as “violent challengers to the state’s monopoly of legitimate coercive force” (Policzer 2005, 8). Among the vast universe of such groups, the scope of enquiry of this paper is reduced to a sub-set of actors who pursue primarily political (as opposed to economic or private) agendas; understand the use of force (often seen as a last resort) to be a legitimate and pragmatic tool of resistance against clearly defined opponents (i.e. as opposed to indiscriminate terror); are formally organised and have hierarchical, accountable structures (and often distinct military and political organs); and exercise some degree of territorial control (where they develop their own parallel governance structure). For the sake of clarity, one could also use the label “rebel opposition groups” (Holmqvist 2005, 45), conventionally defined as being “engaged in a political struggle … to redefine the political and legal basis of the society through the use of violence” (Bruderlein 2000, 8). Policzer’s aforementioned definition presents some serious shortcomings as it fails to capture the specific nature of these actors; by focusing solely on their temporary and adaptable means of action it overlooks their goals and ideology, as well as the unarmed components of their movements. In fact, such movements tend to see disrupting the state monopoly over the use of force as a temporary strategy, while their ultimate goal is precisely to restore monopoly to a legitimised (i.e. transformed or breakaway) state.

The term “non-state armed groups” is strongly rejected by the authors of a series of case studies written by, or in close collaboration with, members from seven former rebel movements (García Durán et al. 2008, Maharaj 2008, Ogura 2008, Aguswandi and Zunzer 2008, De Brún 2008, Bekaj 2010, Álvarez 2010). On the one hand, they argue that the label “non-state” neglects these movements’ aspiration to statehood (through state capture, power-sharing, or self-determination) as well as, at times, their quasi-governmental features as a state within a state. The label “armed groups”, for its part, fails to account for a complex set of means of political action, armed and unarmed, which are evolving constantly according to circumstances and strategic calculations. In our research and capacity-building engagement with these actors, we thus decided to name them according to their own labels, which tend to reflect their primary objectives, and opted for the inclusive (and admittedly subjective) terminology of “resistance/liberation movements”.

These actors do indeed primarily identify their struggles as political endeavours, rooted in a combination of identity-based and/or class-based revolutionary ideology, representing the interests and grievances of an oppressed minority or a disempowered majority, and aiming to replace incumbent governments or gain local self-determination. A direct
or hinted reference to their political goals and/or ideological agenda can be found in the names they choose: the Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M) and its People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM), “We Ourselves” (Sinn Féin) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, FMLN), 19th of April Movement (M19), and the African National Congress (ANC).

These movements describe and justify the recourse to violent political activism as a legitimate form of self-defence in the face of acute human rights abuses and denial of democracy. They appeal to international norms such as the right to self-determination or the right to fundamental freedoms to support their “right to revolt” (Maharaj 2008, 12). For instance, official Sinn Féin declarations (e.g. the 1994 Peace Proposal) define armed struggle as “a legitimate part of a people’s resistance to foreign oppression” (De Brün 2008, 25). Some movements deliberately emphasised the self-limited nature of their armed activities against “legitimate targets” to garner support both internally and internationally. The ANC even committed itself in 1980 to observe the Geneva Protocol relating to irregular warfare, while the KLA issued an internal directive instructing its members to “commit liberation acts with a just character, and not attack socio-cultural monuments, civilian population and subjects of importance for the life of the people” (cited in Bekaj 2010, 16). Internally, these movements also claim that their armed activities were supported by large segments of society (i.e. within their ethnic or social constituency), who consider them to be legitimate defenders of their interests and grievances. Most case study authors highlight the repression-mobilisation cycle whereby state counter-insurgency operations, by cracking down on armed civil society activists, led to an increased level of popular support for the armed insurgency.

Armed struggle is described as a means of last resort, employed after all other forms of political action have been met with severe state repression. In South Africa, the ANC initially used solely nonviolent means of struggle, only establishing its armed wing Umkonto we Siswe (MK) in 1961 following the 1960 Sharpeville massacre and the enforcement of a ban that prevented it from operating peacefully. Maharaj (2008, 12) recalls Mandela’s justification of armed struggle as a “legitimate form of self-defence against a morally repugnant system of government which will not allow even peaceful forms of protest”. He goes on to argue that “violence would begin whether we initiated it or not. If we did not take the lead now, we would soon be latecomers and followers in a movement we did not control” (Maharaj 2008, 10). Likewise, the CPN-M in Nepal first entered parliamentary politics, only preparing for a “protracted people’s war” in 1995 after encountering police repression, “fake trials”, and mass arrests (Ogura 2008). The study on the M19 draws a similar picture of the movement’s emergence in the aftermath of rigged elections, and also notes its members’ conviction that their struggle would only be respected by the oligarchy if backed by the power of arms. In Aceh, the decision by the founders of the GAM to resort to “reactive rebellion” is described as “the only language that Jakarta understood”, and as a defensive posture “to counterbalance the language of the enemy” (Aguswandi and Zunzer 2008, 6) after the government retaliated violently and brutally to their declaration of independence. In Northern Ireland, the violent repression of the civil rights movement in the 1960s and the introduction of internment without trial in 1971 convinced Sinn Féin members that only armed struggle could accomplish the end of British rule in Ireland. In El Salvador, “a great part of … so-

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3 The M19 was named after the date of a rigged general election on 19 April 1970 which created part of the impetus for establishing the movement—thereby offering a clear indication of its pro-democracy agenda.

4 “All peoples have the right to self-determination.” United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Part 1, Article 1.1. According to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol 1, Part 1 Article 1.4), such a right applies to cases of colonial domination, alien military occupation, and where a distinct racial group is denied equal access to government (so-called “racist regimes”).

5 “It is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law…. Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble.
ciety viewed armed struggle as the only possible way to face structural violence”, amidst the “lack of institutional channels that would resolve the political, economic and social crisis” prevailing in the 1970s (Álvarez 2010, 8). Finally, in Kosovo, the KLA emerged after several years of mass-based nonviolent struggle against Serb domination over the Albanian majority, which was crushed by the regime and largely ignored by the international community. The sidelining of the Kosovo delegation at the 1992 London Peace Conference on Yugoslavia and during the Dayton negotiations merely reinforced the belief among the Albanian population that only warfare could attract international attention to their plight (Bekaj 2010, 22).

1.2. Transitions Between Violent and Non-Violent Politics

Although the shift from conventional political action or peaceful resistance to armed insurgency is described by resistance or liberation movements as an option of last resort, these actors strongly object to the typical depiction in the policy world and scholarly literature of linear and unidirectional transitions “from rebellion to politics” (Söderberg Kovacs 2007). They contend instead that armed rebellion represents one form of political action – rather than its opposite. One study notes that “there was … political armed struggle and there was political non-armed struggle” (De Brún 2008, 6), while another quotes von Clausewitz’s definition of war as “a continuation of politics [by other means]” (Maharaj 2008, 11).

As we have seen, the groups profiled in this paper had clearly articulated political visions right from their inception, leading at various times to different political strategies being employed consecutively or simultaneously. In Ireland, the Republican movement has passed through various phases of political struggle over the course of more than eight hundred years, which have included “passive resistance, agrarian unrest, armed uprising, mass movements and political agitation, language and cultural struggles, constitutional and parliamentary engagement” (De Brún 2008, 6). Armed activity came to the fore whenever political engagement broke down. Moreover, once militants started resorting to armed activities, it did not mean that they ceased their engagement on the other fronts. For example, from 1961 to 1990 the ANC defined armed activities as one of four “pillars of struggle”, alongside nonviolent mass mobilisation, the political underground movement, and the international campaign to isolate the apartheid regime. “The development and combination of these four pillars were seen as the basis for realising the aims of the struggle” (Maharaj 2008, 13). In El Salvador, the FMLN also “emphasised the combination of armed struggle with the political struggle of the masses” throughout the 1980s, and increasingly pursued a strategy of negotiations and conventional political action alongside its military campaigns (Álvarez 2010, 20). “Diplomatic warfare” was also part of its agenda, and one of its six fronts was specifically dedicated to international advocacy. In the Aceh separatist struggle, the exiled political leadership was in charge of conducting peaceful international advocacy to complement their field troops’ guerrilla warfare. During armed campaigns by the IRA in Northern Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s, activists also pursued nonviolent resistance (e.g. hunger strikes or “blanket” protests in prison to demand recognition of their status as political prisoners) and electoral activities (i.e. the “armalite and ballot box” strategy). This dual strategy was aimed at “winning the hearts and minds” of the wider nationalist community while putting pressure on the British government to open up negotiations (De Brún 2008).

This paper homes in on the shifts from mixed armed/unarmed political strategies during periods of active conflict and peace process, to the progressive demobilisation of their military structures and the adoption of exclusively unarmed means of political engagement. Although intra-state armed conflicts end in various different manners, the majority of conflicts since the end of the Cold War have been settled through a negotiated transition,6 and armed groups have thus become central stakeholders in peace processes and post-war peacebuilding. In asymmetric con-
flicts between state and non-state parties, peace and stabil-
ity are closely intertwined with demands for justice, human
rights, or democracy, which are not produced auto-
matically by the signing of an inter-party agreement. In
fact, statistical surveys reveal that more than one third of
conflicts settled through peace agreements since 1989 have
seen a return to violence within five years (Human Security
Center 2008). Therefore, one should envisage conflict
transformation as an extended process stretching far
beyond the restricted timeline of peace negotiations as
such: it encompasses early de-escalation measures (e.g.
talks about talks and pre-negotiations), peace processes
(official and unofficial inter-party talks, humanitarian ac-
cords, and more comprehensive peace agreements), and
the implementation of the parties’ respective commitments
through post-war demobilisation and disarmament, peace-
building, and democratic consolidation. The remainder of
this paper focuses on the dynamics at play during these ex-
tended phases of behavioural de-radicalisation, collective
demobilisation, and peaceful transformation.

2. Organisational Structure and Dynamics
We now turn to the factors influencing non-state armed
groups’ shifts from violent insurgency to the negotiating
table, with a particular focus on the intra-party level of
analysis. The existing literature on the deradicalisation of
armed groups through peace processes and inter-party ne-
gotiations can be classified into two main categories. A first
type of study concentrates on (national or international)
environmental factors which condition the behaviour of
rebel groups, such as the “political opportunity structure”
analysed by social movement theory (e.g. Tarrow 1998),
state counter-terrorism policies emphasised by security ex-
erts (e.g. Jones and Libicki 2008), or transnational geo-
political dynamics (such as the loss of external “patrons”
after the end of the Cold War) favoured by international
relations specialists. For their part, conflict resolution
scholars highlight inter-party (relational) factors through
the concepts of “ripeness” and “mutually-hurting stale-
mates” (Zartman 1996), which focus on the subjective and
objective balance of power between the state and its armed
challengers. Although these approaches offer valid el-
ments of explanation for de-radicalisation processes, they
fail to account for internal (individual or organisational)
factors of transition. The few analyses that specifically deal
with intra-party dynamics tend to focus primarily on idio-
syncratic factors of individual disengagement, such as age,
maturity, and/or changes in life course, discovery of al-
ternative belief systems, deconstruction of enemy images,
etc. (Bjorgo and Horgan 2009). By contrast, we now turn to
organisational factors accounting for collective shifts to-
wards negotiations by the movement as a whole, such as
decision-making structure and leadership styles (2.1), and
horizontal/vertical relations and communication channels
between members (2.2).

2.1. Leadership and Decision-making
Many insurgency movements are organised around distinct
dual structures which simultaneously allow armed and un-
armed forms of struggle. In some instances, political move-
ments predate the formation of a military branch, and
both are kept largely autonomous in order to allow the
political front to conduct non-violent campaigns, pursue
electoral politics, or conduct negotiations. This was the
case with the ANC and its armed wing MK in South Africa,
the GAM government in exile and AGAM field com-
manders in Aceh, Sinn Féin and the IRA in Northern Ire-
land, and to some extent the CPN-M and the PLA in
Nepal. For their part, Latin American guerrillas such as the
M19 and FMLN defined themselves as “political-military
organisations” with a combined command structure. Here,
peaceful political action was subordinated to military
priorities (Álvarez 2010, 20), and in fact, it was the military
leadership that took all political decisions and led the ne-
gotiation teams. In Kosovo as well, the KLA was initially es-
tablished as a military organisation, which in turn created a
political directorate (led by Hashim Thaci who is now
prime minister) that was in charge of representing the
movement during negotiations, but which was subordinate
to the military leadership.

Although these organisational variations have important
implications for the pace and effectiveness of a movement’s
turn to mainstream political action after peace agreements
(as will be seen in section 3), their influence on strategic
shifts from insurgency to dialogue with state agents is more
uncertain, as the case studies show that the decision to ne-
gotiate a peaceful transition might be made by political as
well as military leaders. The role of the movement’s leadership is stressed in all studies, emphasising their proactive sense of initiative and their ability to assess shifting power relationships and react swiftly to arising windows of opportunity, sometimes without any prior consultation within the movement. This was the case, for instance, when imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela took the unilateral decision in 1989 to write a letter to President Botha, in which he set out the principle of majority rule while addressing the fears and concerns of the white minority. Although this bold step was met with heavy scepticism inside his own party, it played a key pre-emptive role for future negotiations by securing a central role for the ANC in the peace process. The M19 study also highlights the quasi-religious nature of hierarchical structures – “the commander is never wrong” (García Durán et al. 2008, 27) – and the decisive role played by the movement’s successive leaders. For instance, Commander Pizarro showed his ability to convert from a military to a political leader when he initiated a peace process with the Colombian government in 1989. His audacious offer of disarmament was made without any prior consultation within his own movement or with other guerillas, but was later internally approved by a democratic vote in favour of ending the armed rebellion.

Political scientists identify three broad categories of leaders: ideologues have a predetermined agenda which conditions all their decisions and their relations with their constituencies; strategists also have a set goal but adapt the means of pursuing it according to the context (political timing) and what constituents will support; pragmatists adapt their goals and agenda to the expectations of constituents and the situation (Hermann and Gerard 2009). Although rebel leaders are often perceived as stubborn and intransigent ideologues, all “insider experts” consulted for this research stressed the rationality of the decision-making process, in which strategic or pragmatic leaders constantly reassess the means and ends of insurgency in the light of an evolving environment.

In line with the strategic style of leadership described above, the studies reveal the adoption of violent means to be an instrumental rather than an ideological choice, and describe the decision to enter a peace process as proceeding from a rational calculation of the possibilities and limitations inherent in non-violent politics as opposed to continuing the armed conflict. In Colombia, the M19 leadership realised during the 1980s that war had become an obstacle to change, as the oligarchy was seeking to exploit violence for the perpetuation of the status quo. In search of alternatives, they reformulated their strategy of “weapons at the service of politics” to “peace at the service of politics”, and from “change for peace” to “peace for change”. In other words, they appropriated the notion of peace as a transformative strategy of action in itself, rather than a distant absolute end (García Durán et al. 2008). In South Africa, the ANC also took a proactive decision around 1990 to embrace negotiations as “a new terrain of struggle” and “primary site of contestation” (Maharaj 2008, 23), and unilaterally suspended its armed struggle in order to force the regime into formal peace talks. The CPN-M study also presents the movement’s shift from armed activities to peaceful street protest and negotiations in 2006 as an illustration of the motto “firm with principles and flexible with tactics” (Ogura 2008, 45).

The pragmatist style of leadership described above is also consistent with the readiness of some rebel leaders to reassess the original objectives and discursive frame of their struggle. In Colombia, El Salvador, and Nepal, a redefinition of the insurgents’ primary goals was a clear precondition for their strategic shift from armed rebellion to negotiation. Around 1979, the M19 leaders shifted their main political objective from socialism to democracy. The FMLN underwent a similar reorientation when it gave up its revolutionary aspirations to advocate for reform within the framework of representative democracy and market economy; from then on, its agenda primarily focused on transparent elections, an independent judiciary, and demilitarisation. In Nepal, the Maoists also underwent a major ideological shift around 2001 from seeking a communist one-party system to embracing competitive multi-party democracy, and reoriented their programme towards introducing a new constitution, electing a constituent assembly, and establishing a republic. This move enabled them to join forces with their former enemies, the legal opposition parties, against the autocratic regime of King
Gyanendra. When it comes to secessionist movements, the elements of flexibility mainly revolve around the definition and content of self-determination. For instance, GAM’s decision, voiced in the 2002 Stavanger Declaration, to give up its claim to an independent Islamic state of Aceh and settle for self-government in a decentralised democratic system, resulted from a pragmatic decision that the meaning of independence was more important than the term itself.

2.2. Horizontal and Vertical Communication Channels

Effective social or political movements require decisive and visionary leaders, but also strong and cohesive organisations. Internal consultation and power dynamics within rebel movements, either horizontally (e.g. between “moderates” and “radicals”) or vertically (across the hierarchy), play important roles in influencing the move from militancy to negotiated politics. There are claims in the literature on counter-insurgency and negotiation that armed groups are most effectively brought to the negotiation table by weakening them through provoking defection, implosion, and infighting between members (e.g. Alterman 1999; Cronin 2010). By contrast, other studies highlight the importance of intra-group cohesion to ensure a successful peace process and post-war political viability of these movements (Söderberg Kovacs 2007; Al-Ashimi and Goerzig 2010; Dudouet 2010).

The case studies examined here, unsurprisingly, strongly support the latter argument. Internal consultation and debate preceding, accompanying, or following back-channel and formal negotiations are cited as critical factors that ensure a high degree of accountability and unity among members and supporters, thus enabling collective ownership of transformation processes from violent insurgency to peaceful transition, and in turn guaranteeing sustainable conflict settlements. The Maoists in Nepal, for instance, convened several thousand members in inclusive conferences at critical moments in the conflict and the peace process, in order to ensure that decisions would be taken on behalf of the whole movement. In several studies, jails are also described as a space for encounter and debate, where political options are weighed and discussed at length, away from the constant preoccupations and danger which might distract underground leaders at large from engaging in strategic assessments of the situation (e.g. García Durán et al. 2008).

Maintaining internal cohesion is particularly crucial during volatile war-to-peace transitions, as peace processes are held to be particularly vulnerable to “spoiler violence” by splinter groups seeking to derail or prevent peace agreements (e.g. Darby and McGinty 2000). This was particularly the case in Northern Ireland and South Africa, where peace negotiations took place amidst an upsurge in violence generated by former allies or components of the insurgency movement who were opposed to a peace deal or protesting against their alleged marginalisation. In this context, the leadership stood out for their ability to sustain their group’s commitment to the negotiation process, and keep the majority of their movement united behind a common position.

Intra-group power struggles are very sensitive issues for insurgency movements, and since most of the case studies were written by, or together with, (former) members, they hardly mention internal disagreements and dispute resolution mechanisms – with the exception of two studies written by outside analysts on the basis of extensive interviews with (former) leaders. The study on the FMLN addresses the numerous disagreements which arose between its five guerrilla fronts over the goals of the revolution and the best strategy for reaching them (i.e. armed struggle until victory or parallel armed struggle and negotiation). The main conflict was ultimately “resolved” after the suicide of the leader from the most radical guerrilla group. The case study on the Nepali Maoists also mentions the occurrence of intra-party confrontation in 2004 over questions of internal democracy and the definition of the movement’s primary target enemy (i.e. India or the monarchy). Internal unity was restored after the king’s coup d’état in early 2005 helped to resolve the dispute over strategic priorities.

Vertical communication through the movement’s hierarchy is also important in order to gather support for new strategies and prepare members or supporters for the changes ahead. In the case of the CPN-M, the lines of communi-
cation were primarily top-down, in the form of political training for Maoist cadres to explain the strategic shifts made during the peace process. The fact that since the signing of the 2006 peace accord most Maoist combatants have remained stationed in cantonments, patiently waiting for a political compromise on their army integration and/or socio-economic rehabilitation, can largely be explained by the high level of discipline and ideology within the movement, as well as the intensive “coaching” carried out down the chain of command by cadres and commanders (Ogura 2008). In Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin also engaged in intense negotiation with the Republican activist base which was “kept abreast of developments as they unfolded and as much as possible knew about developments before they heard about them in the media” (De Brún 2008, 15).

In South Africa, observers describe the peace negotiations as a “pact” between ANC elites and the elites of the outgoing order, which had the effect of alienating other armed formations (such as the Inkatha Freedom Party) that were excluded from it. However, this theory ignores the substantive role played by the ANC’s campaign of rolling mass action and the fact that the ANC regularly reported back to its constituency in mass rallies (Maharaj 2008).

3. Post-War Adaptation

Having shown that strong leadership and cohesive organisations are crucial factors enabling armed groups to come to the negotiation table with the state, we now turn to examine the impact of peaceful transitions on their organisational structures. Focusing on the timing and challenges of transforming armed groups into conventional political entities in the aftermath of negotiated peace agreements, we question the usefulness of early demobilisation and disarmament (3.1.), spell out transitional mechanisms to preserve internal discipline and cohesion during fragile post-war transitions (3.2.), and highlight some factors facilitating an effective transformation of militant structures into democratic political parties (3.3.).

3.1. Challenges of Early Demobilisation

The clearest indication of armed groups’ political will to undergo post-war transitions from armed to conventional political activities consists in their participation in so-called demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programmes, which are usually set up with international assistance immediately after a peace accord. Such schemes build on the assumption that rebel structures should be dismantled, and their members disarmed, as quickly as possible after the cessation of hostilities. Indeed, international DDR programmes (such as the UN DDR Standards) typically recommend “breaking down the command and control structures operating over rebel fighters … thus making it more difficult for them to return to organized rebellion” (Spear 2002, 141), thus reflecting a perception of former combatants as spoilers and a “security threat”.

However, according to armed group veterans and analysts alike, such a view is highly problematic. Firstly, it fails to take into account the “security dilemma” encountered by (former) combatants, who regard the possession and use of arms as an indispensable prerequisite for the security of the people they represent. As a result, they will hesitate to abandon their militarised status before they are convinced that their political status and legitimacy is fully recognised by the government, that their wartime grievances will be addressed through comprehensive reforms, and that a backlash of force against them or the people for whom they stand can be ruled out (Dudouet et al. 2012). In fact, in most cases under scrutiny, decommissioning only took place at the end of a long post-war transition, following – or in parallel with – the implementation of structural reforms to address the root causes of violence through democratisation (South Africa, Colombia), demilitarisation and security sector reform (Northern Ireland, El Salvador, Nepal, Kosovo), or power devolution (Aceh).

Moreover, abrupt demobilisation entails the risk of creating a security vacuum, as it can lead to disorder and disorientation among former combatants, trigger a return to violence by disaffected splinter groups, and make the reintegration process more difficult – for instance by hindering the dissemination of information on reintegration options. Finally, DDR mechanisms tend to rely on a distorted understanding of armed groups as purely military organisations, thereby overlooking the fact that many movements have a long history of non-military political struggle and structures, as reviewed above.
By contrast, the case studies highlight the importance of retaining coordination and communication channels throughout post-war transitions, which can be described as a two-stage process: short-term maintenance of command structures in order to supervise an orderly (re-)conversion process; and long-term institutionalisation of civilian entities that pursue the struggle through conventional political means.

3.2. Transitional Maintenance of Command Structures

The concept of “interim stabilisation measures” has recently appeared in the DDR literature to encompass temporary schemes designed to prevent the occurrence of security vacuums in the early stages of post-war transition, keep combatant cohesiveness intact within a military or civilian structure, and improve real and perceived security during the negotiation or planning of long-term conventional security promotion activities (Colletta and Muggah 2009). They offer not only combatants an opportunity to use their wartime skills and experience for peacekeeping purposes during volatile war-to-peace transitions, but are also useful confidence-building and social cohesion exercises that help prepare members for the socio-psychological transformation of switching their identity from combatant to civilian.

In Northern Ireland, IRA command structures (i.e. the Army Council) have remained more or less intact since the 1994 ceasefire, even after the leadership declared a formal end to its armed campaign in 2005. Even their political opponents accepted the pragmatic logic that maintaining a leadership structure was necessary to oversee the transition and demobilisation of the organisation and prevent frustrated individuals from joining dissenting factions (McEvoy 2012). In Aceh, in the wake of the 2005 peace accord, GAM’s military wing was transformed into a civilian Transitional Committee (KPA) to supervise the demobilisation of its combatants and maintain a cohesive structure until a political party could be formed. Establishing the KPA created strong suspicions among the government representatives, who saw this structure as a continuation of the military wing of GAM under a new name and identity. From GAM’s perspective, however, the existence of a transitional body is perceived as a crucial means for the movement to assist the transition process internally (Aguswandi and Zunzer 2008). Such structures also play a symbolic role by providing elements of continuity of struggle in the eyes of the movement’s constituency. In Kosovo, where a quick post-war dismantling of the victorious liberation movement was bound to stir up opposition and alienate the local population, the KLA chief of staff insisted on the removal of the word “dissolution” from the negotiation agenda; instead, the guerrilla force was transformed into a civilian security entity, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). Aside from providing security (which was mainly taken over by international peacekeepers), it also played a crucial symbolic role. Indeed, establishing the KPC met the aspirations of former combatants to “keep their uniforms on”, albeit within an unarmed civil organisation with specific emergency response and civil protection duties, while the political leadership was negotiating the establishment of a new security apparatus for post-independence Kosovo. Once the new Kosovo Security Force was set up in 2008, the KPC was dismantled in an orderly fashion (Bekaj 2010).

3.3. Challenges of Political Institutionalisation

While interim stabilisation measures are essential to provide security in volatile environments and facilitate post-war re-skilling for combatants, the formation of cohesive and effective post-war political structures represents a major challenge for armed opposition movements which aspire to participate in post-war statebuilding and democratic transitions, especially after decades of illegal existence, exile, or underground operations (Soderberg Kovacs 2007).

Most of the movements under scrutiny have achieved remarkable long-term or recent success in their post-war conversion “from bullets to ballots”, from the outstanding performance of the ANC in South Africa, which gained 63 percent of the votes in 1994 and has been confirmed in power in all subsequent elections, to the election of the FMLN presidential candidate in 2009 in El Salvador. In fact, with the exception of the M19 in Colombia, all nine movements examined in this paper are presently either in control of the national or autonomous (regional) legislative or executive powers, or are participating in power-sharing governments.
The growing body of literature on the post-war political development of insurgency movements identifies a number of factors which might explain the success or failure of their transitions from the battleground to the electoral arena. It is argued for instance that movements which had a pre-war history as a political party or retained a civilian command structure and a political branch throughout the conflict can more easily build on this experience in the post-war environment (De Zeeuw 2008, 13).

In fact, the only movements found in the case studies to possess a combined political-military command structure faced difficulties in establishing a cohesive party in the wake of the peace process. Despite its successful transition into a major opposition party which went on to win the presidential election in 2009, the FMLN was affected by multiple individual defections and collective splits throughout the 1990s (e.g. by two of its five former constituent guerrilla groups). The KLA did not form its own party, and instead its members went on to establish their own formations, competing for power in the newly-independent state of Kosovo; one of these parties is currently in power. The demobilisation of the M19 guerrilla forces was accompanied by the formation of a coalition party with other leftist activists, Democratic Alliance-M19. But despite this new party’s early achievements in the immediate post-agreement phase (constituent assembly, national and local elections in 1990–91), it steadily lost its initial electoral support and has remained a minor political force ever since. This failure can be partly explained by the loss of internal cohesion and political dispersion entailed by the demobilisation process, the new party’s inability to consolidate its social base, and its lack of experience in the electoral process and institutional arena (García Durán et al. 2008). At other levels, however, this political force has played an important role in running social projects, departmental and municipal bureaus, women’s groups, and work with victims.

Even movements with a long history of political engagement and cohesive civilian structures are not immune to intra-party tensions or rivalries over leadership or programme issues in the aftermath of peace agreements. In Nepal, internal dissension over ideological and strategic decisions on the path and pace of peace implementation processes particularly increased after the formation of a Maoist-led government in 2008, as those confronted with the realities of power (in particular Prime Minister Prachanda) emphasised a pragmatic stance and discourse while the party ideologues and radicals remain focused on safeguarding their Maoist values and struggle for socialist democracy. In Northern Ireland as well, Sinn Féin’s adoption of a strategy of dialogue, and later its decision to join a power-sharing government with former political opponents, led to the formation of dissident Republican groups who have attempted to derail the course of the peacebuilding process. But De Brún argues that although they still exist, “they have no support, no political organisation, and have articulated no alternative to the strategy to which the overwhelming majority of Republican activists and former prisoners subscribe” (2008, 16).

Another factor of internal tension is the return of exiled or imprisoned leadership, creating possible misunderstandings or rivalries with internal underground leaders. This was most obviously the case in Aceh, where the exiled government’s return home after the 2005 peace agreement led to a temporary split of the GAM movement into two camps (the Swedish group versus the KPA and field commanders), who presented separate candidates for the provincial elections. In South Africa too, political tensions between the ANC’s former internal, external, and prison forces (the “Robben Islanders”) still have repercussions today, and the challenges of consolidating a cohesive post-war movement were demonstrated for instance by the 2008 leadership crisis and formation of a breakaway party.

Beyond the challenges of maintaining internal cohesion, the transition from armed resistance to conventional politics also requires adopting a new political culture, formulating a new programme, installing party organisational structures, recruiting party cadres, and building their capacity to govern. The Nepali study mentions the CPN-M’s organisational shift ahead of the April 2008 constituent assembly elections “from a war-time to a peace-time system” (Ogura 2008, 41), restructuring its civilian apparatus to conform with the state administrative divisions and training cadres for political action and “peaceful revolutionary
change”. In Aceh, GAM was able to expand and strengthen its political wing during the peace process, and also established parallel state structures at all levels of administration. Its biggest challenge, having won the 2006 provincial elections as well as many district-level elections, is to prove that it can run Aceh province better than the Jakarta government did (Aguswandi and Zunzer 2008).

Success in the electoral arena is also conditioned by the ability of the new political formations to broaden their support base beyond their initial constituency, and to recruit new party cadres who were not involved in the armed struggle. For instance, the ANC has been quite successful in pursuing a very inclusive programme which cuts across racial and ideological party lines. For its part, Sinn Féin has now become the largest party representing the nationalist community in Northern Ireland (a position previously held by the moderate Social Democratic and Labour Party), but it remains a community-based party focused on the demands of one side of the electorate, and does not really seek to rally support across the sectarian divide. In El Salvador, the FMLN has managed to integrate new civilian members (including the incumbent President Funes), but the vast majority of party leaders are former guerrilla commanders. This points to the importance of adapting wartime leadership structures to new priorities and agendas, seeking a healthy balance between continuity or stability and transformation in order to avoid the phenomenon of “fossilisation” where entrenched party leaders continue to lead the movement in quasi-authoritarian style (see section 1).

These challenges to post-war institutionalisation thus highlight the need for locally-tailored external capacity-building support in democratic party politics by international agencies (such as political foundations or NGOs with electoral expertise), through technical or financial assistance in organisational development, (legal) financing, parliamentary tasks, election campaigning, administrative skills, or good governance.

4. Conclusion

Our examination of the influence of the discourse and self-analysis of (former) members of armed opposition movements on the internal factors shaping the adoption and adaptation of goals and strategies during the processes of conflict escalation and de-escalation highlights the rational decision-making process whereby strategic and pragmatist military/political leaders constantly (re-)assess and adjust their methods of action (from unarmed to armed tactics and vice versa) according to the evolving strategic environment. The vertical and horizontal relations and communication between members (as well as their constituencies) are found to be critical factors enabling collective ownership of conflict transformation processes and preventing the occurrence of intra-party splits and disaffection during peace negotiations. Finally, the claim that rebel organisations should be broken down as quickly as possible during peace processes is found to be dubious; the findings highlight instead the importance of (at least temporarily) retaining coordination and communication channels through cohesive structures, in parallel with the development and/or consolidation of civilian entities that pursue the “struggle” non-violently through democratic politics.

All of these issues would merit further analysis though complementary methodologies offering a more independent perspective on intra-group dynamics. In particular, the “subjective” findings gathered here call for more in-depth research on the boundaries between different forms of political action (within a wide spectrum from conventional party politics to nonviolent struggle, self-limited armed insurgency, and indiscriminate terror); on the internal dynamics and decision-making involved in shifting goals and strategies; and on their various implications for the processes of radicalisation and de-radicalisation. There also needs to be more interdisciplinary investigation on the linkages between internal cohesion, negotiations, political transitions, and post-war institutionalisation.

Finally, such analysis might offer useful lessons for constructive international engagement to support the conversion of state challengers into active state- and peace-builders, as long as these actors are politically-motivated movements which enjoy strong social legitimacy and aspire to take part in democratic politics. Indeed, our findings call for a rethinking of conventional intervention in intra-state political conflicts, promoting the cohesion...
rather than dissolution of combatant structures during negoti- 
ation; engaging with the real leaders who have the power to implement a deal or bring their constituency with them (rather than “moderates” or “proxies”); and offering technical assistance to support political transitions into or- 
ganisations that possess a future role within a peaceful en- 
vironment, in contrast to criminalisation strategies (e.g. 
through anti-terrorist measures such as proscription and 
counter-insurgency) which prevent these groups from ex-
panding their political capacities.


Neo-liberal Governing of “Radicals”: Danish Radicalization Prevention Policies and Potential Iatrogenic Effects

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The Danish government’s counter-radicalization Action Plan of 2009 had intended and unintended effects. Primarily targeting Danish Muslims, it employs neo-liberal governmentality approaches of governance through individual support and response, information and knowledge, empowerment, surveillance and intervention, and anti-discrimination. It aims to prevent radicalization by transforming, shaping, and disciplining illiberal and violence-prone “radicals” into active, liberal citizens. Prolonged fieldwork and in-depth interviews with seventeen Muslims from a targeted milieu reveal skepticism about the effectiveness of the measures. Implementation of the action plan in practice may yield iatrogenic effects.

The concept of radicalization has become a central part of the political and academic vocabulary, especially in recent articulation and analysis of the threat from Islamist terrorism. The concept has, in particular, been linked to the question of “home-grown terrorism” in the West. Radicalization has become the main frame for understanding, explaining, and preventing young Muslims from engaging in radical activities. Although the concept is contested, the discourse of radicalization and theories of radicalization processes are gaining momentum in most European countries (Sedgwick 2010).

The popularity of the radicalization discourse is largely a product of the reconsideration of existing counter-terrorism policies aimed at stopping terrorist attacks, especially following the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 and 2005. These attacks refocused attention among policymakers, security agencies, and academics from “external security” to “internal security” (Bigo and Tsoukala 2008), launching the concept of radicalization as the framework for understanding “home-grown terrorism”. In this new perspective, concern is increasingly directed toward issues of integration, parallel communities, and illiberal attitudes of Muslim minorities in particular, as their lack of integration, social cohesion, and experience of marginalization are posited to provide a breeding ground for radicalization.

It is against this backdrop that radicalization prevention has developed as a new policy area in many European countries over the past five or six years. It is characteristic of the radicalization discourse, and of the new policy regimes, that they mix a security agenda with an integration agenda, where security concerns and risk assessment become closely intertwined with questions of integration, anti-discrimination, and social cohesion.

The discourse on radicalization has roots in security concerns, but also concerns the wider debate on how Western liberal democracies should relate to, and integrate, especially Muslim minorities. Christian Joppke identifies a development towards “repressive liberalism” within the fields of integration and immigration policy (2007), where Western European states are increasingly concerned with forming and letting in the right kind of liberal-democratic oriented people, creating as he puts it “liberal states for liberal people only” (Joppke 2007, 271). Joppke sees this trend as exemplifying the flourishing of a Foucauldian disciplining form of neo-liberalism. He connects his thesis about the advance of repressive liberalism with the Foucauldian concept of gov-
ernmentality, which constitutes a form of regulation that aims at “shaping behavior in congruence with particular sets of norms and with a certain goal” (Dean 1999, 15). Governmentality as a mode of regulation is characterized by the ambition to govern through individuals’ exercise of free choice, rather than direct control or prohibitions.

In the following I refer to the Danish government’s action plan of January 2009 for radicalization prevention – A Common and Safe Future – as an exemplary case of the formation of radicalization prevention as a new policy field and practice regime (Regeringen 2009). The purpose of the investigation is twofold. First, the article provides an overview of the content, intended effects, goals, and logics inherent to the action plan, via the analytical framework of governmentality developed by Mitchell Dean and Nikolas Rose (Dean 1999; Rose 1999). The purpose is to show how the prevention of radicalization in Denmark can be read partly as an extension of the repressive liberalism trend identified by Joppke. At the same time the perspective of governmentality provides a useful mold for debating the potential problems of targeting radicalization through a logic of governmentality and a commingling of security and integration concerns. Thus, the second part of the article examines whether the implementation of the action plan in practice may also yield iatrogenic effects. More precisely, the question investigated is if the neo-liberal intention of preventing radicalization by shaping and creating liberal-democratic citizens may be counter-productive, and in the worst-case scenario contribute to the creation of oppositional, illiberal identities? Here the article argues, building on extensive interview- and fieldwork-based research among young Muslims in Denmark, that at least three sets of unintended consequences may occur.

Providing a definitive answer to the question of outcomes of radicalization prevention policies of the kind being implemented in Denmark is beyond the scope of this article. Providing such an answer would mean conducting a policy-effect study, measuring the level or scope of radicalization among target groups before and after the implementation of policies, which would pose serious methodological challenges. Instead, this article takes a more indirect route of highlighting, first, the rationales behind the intended outcomes of Danish radicalization prevention policies and, second, theoretically and empirically possible mechanisms through which intended outcomes may be perverted in practice.


In January 2008 the Danish government set up a working group of ministry officials tasked with developing an action plan to prevent extremism and radicalization among young people. In January 2009, after a process of public consultation and dialogue on a draft version, the government’s A Common and Safe Future action plan was launched, to provide a multifaceted approach to radicalization prevention, pinpointing seven main areas of intervention with twenty-two concrete policy initiatives. The seven areas of intervention are: 1) direct contact with young people; 2) inclusion based on rights and obligations; 3) dialogue and information; 4) democratic cohesion; 5) efforts in vulnerable residential areas; 6) special initiatives in prisons; and 7) knowledge, cooperation, and partnerships.

In the following analysis the policy document is treated as the central plank of a developing “practice regime of radicalization prevention,” defined as the “more or less organized and routinized way in which we at a given time think, perform, and reform activities such as education, care, punishment, correction etc.” (Dean 1999, 30). The action plan constitutes the programmatic formulation of this new

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1 “Iatrogenic effects” is a term from medicine referring to unintentional adverse effects or complications caused by or resulting from medical treatment or advice, but has also been used to refer to adverse effects of, for example, youth crime prevention programs (see e.g. Dishion, McCord, and Poulin 1999).

2 The study formed part of a large comparative study of radicalization processes among young Muslims in Europe. In total thirty-nine interviews were carried out with young Muslims frequenting a particular Muslim milieu in the city of Aarhus in Denmark, religious authorities in the milieu, and social workers close to the young people in the milieu. The particular milieu was chosen because it in many ways constitutes the kind of neo-orthodox and salafi-inspired environment that many authorities, and academics, worry about, rightfully or wrongly, in terms of radicalization. For a detailed description of the study and its results see Kühle and Lindekilde 2010 and Kühle and Lindekilde forthcoming.
practice regime, while the practice regime of radicalization prevention itself is made up of the concrete programs, policy measures, actors, and institutions that are involved in implementing the action plan.

Dean argues that the analysis of a practice regime can be divided into four analytical dimensions. First, an important aspect of any practice regime is the framing of the problem to be tackled, and the solutions that follow from this. The second analytical dimension concerns the way governance of behavior is thought to function, the more or less implicit logics connecting orchestrated impulses, and their effects, and the different rationales of regulation behind various concrete policy measures. The third dimension relates to the technical aspect of a practice regime, and deals with the programs, technologies, tactics, instruments, institutions, and procedures that are designed to implement the concrete policy measures of a practice regime. Finally, the goal of governmentality as a form of regulation, which is engraved in the operation of neo-liberal practice regimes, is the fertilization of certain favorable identities or subject positions. This analytical dimension examines the identity formation the practice regime seeks to foster and the capacities, behavior, and attitudes that are supposed to accompany this transformation. The analysis of the Danish government’s action plan to prevent radicalization follows the four-dimensional analytical grid outlined above.

1.1. Radicalization Scenarios: Problem Definition and Solutions

The overall goal of the Danish government’s action plan is formulated in the preface as a wish to:

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\text{maintain and further develop Denmark as a democratic society with freedom, responsibility, equality and opportunities for all. Primarily, because it holds an independent value for society as well as for the individual, but also in order to weaken the growth basis for radicalization of young people and to strengthen society’s resilience to extremism. (Regeringen 2009, 11)}
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It follows from this formulation that the problem of radicalization and extremism is perceived as negatively correlated with individual experiences of freedom, responsibility, equal worth, and equal opportunities, so that the absence of such positive experience provides a potential breeding ground for radicalization among young people. More precisely, the problem of radicalization and extremism is defined as follows:

Extremism is characterized by totalitarian and anti-democratic ideologies, intolerance to the views of others, hostile imagery and a division into ‘them’ and ‘us’. Extremist ideas may be expressed in different ways, and ultimately they may bring individuals or groups to use violent or undemocratic methods as a tool to reaching a specific political objective, or they may seek to undermine the democratic social order or make threats or carry out demeaning harassment against groups of people based on e.g. their skin colour, sexuality or beliefs.

Radicalization is the process in which a person gradually accepts the ideas and methods of extremism and, possibly, joins its organised groups. Personal circumstances, group dynamics as well as political, financial and cultural factors may all contribute to radicalization processes. (Regeringen, 2009, 8)

This two-fold definition of radicalization casts a certain light on the problem. First, it is worth noting that “extremism” is defined quite inclusively, making not only anti-democratic or violent actions, but also undemocratic and intolerant ideas and attitudes defining elements of an “extremist” profile. This tendency to define extremism, and subsequent radicalization, as both a cognitive/ideological and a physical phenomenon is common in academic literature and government reports on radicalization across Europe (for discussion hereof see Kühle and Lindekilde 2010, 24; Leuprect et al. 2010; Lambert 2011).

Secondly, radicalization is defined as the process of progressing internalization of extremist ideas. In this perspective radicalization becomes a more or less linear move away from a “normal” state of mind and action repertoire towards a “radical” outlook. In the academic literature on radicalization this processual perspective is dominant, often theorizing radicalization as following distinct phases (Silber and Bhatt 2007; Wiktorowicz 2005). Whether or not this processual understanding of radicalization is accurate is an empirical question. A growing literature suggests that it is not (Kühle and Lindekilde 2010; Olsen 2009; Staun 2009). However, what is important here is that this understanding of radicalization stipulates and replicates certain “radicalization scenarios” rather than others (Schiffauer 2008). In this perspective radicalization becomes likely when individuals are caught off balance, which can put them on a slippery slope from, for example, “moderate”
Islam to “radical” Islam. Much academic literature and press coverage on radicalization among young Muslims in the West subscribes to such a radicalization scenario, where individuals’ involvement in “Islamist” or “Salafist” milieus is seen as an early phase of radicalization, which serves as a “conveyor belt” into violent jihadism (Hemmingsen and Andreasen 2007). It is held that radical entrepreneurs within such neo-orthodox Muslim milieus are free to recruit for violence. It is obvious that subscribing to such a radicalization scenario leaves little room for seeing neo-orthodox, but non-violent, Muslim milieus as part of the solution rather than part of the problem.

Finally, as already indicated, the Danish government’s action plan defines radicalization as an individual phenomenon. It is individuals, not groups that radicalize. This means that responsibility for radicalization falls upon the individual. He or she has a responsibility to avoid radical milieus and to become a well-functioning, liberal member of society.

In terms of solutions it is clear that the above-mentioned understanding of the problem of radicalization as cognitive and behavioral, processual and individual, points in certain directions. First of all, the conceptualization of radicalization as a linear process or slippery slope calls for early preventive measures to stop such processes from gaining momentum. The particular understanding of radicalization advanced in the government action plan makes preventive measures a natural solution. The action plan justifies the preventive focus in the following manner:

Through a direct, preventive effort it must be ensured that we as a society are prepared to identify and address specific problems related to extremism in a timely manner. Extremist propaganda should be met with factual information and alternative offers for the young people. An early, multi-stringed and coordinated preventive effort should counter the processes and influences that make certain young people turn their backs on society or be recruited into radical and extremist groups. (Regeringen 2009, 11)

The logical response to radicalization processes is early intervention and prevention. Furthermore, it follows from the understanding of the problem of radicalization as an individual, and both cognitive and behavioral phenomenon, that prevention strategies should be targeted at individuals, and should include a concern for both individuals’ behavior and their attitudes and opinions.

My argument is that this problem definition and solution orientation makes the state-sponsored fight against radicalization and extremism very similar to the handling of other threats to individuals’ well-being, such as the fight against smoking and obesity. The approach to radicalization is also to attempt to reverse a negative development, to change behavior by influencing opinions and attitudes and offering alternative information and possibilities. Thus, the mode of regulation is one of neo-liberal governmentality, where the individuals’ free choice is made the locus of change and regulation. Put differently, I argue that one of the main reasons for the popularity of the radicalization discourse today is the ease with which it can be fused with the logic of the dominant mode of neo-liberal government in Western societies. Looking at the concrete policy measures of the action plan, this logic of prevention through influencing and correcting extremist attitudes, and the provision of more progressive alternatives to radical milieus, is highly visible (see next section). This is also underlined by the absence of prohibitions in the action plan; radicalization is to be fought through influencing and shaping individuals who make the “right” liberal-democratic choices on their own, rather than, for example, prohibiting extremist and radical groups. Security is advanced in society by facilitating integration and the development of liberal citizens, and not so much by the control, surveillance, and repression of the older anti-terrorism practice regime.

1.2. Concrete Measures and Logics of Change

The many concrete policy measures in the Danish action plan can be categorized into groups based on which rationale of governance and logic of change they adhere to. What all the categories of governance share is that they try to govern through the individuals’ management of freedom; where they differ is in terms of how directly they try to affect individual choices. Some build on direct involvement with adolescents, others try to obtain desired outcomes through indirect effects, for example by imposing new roles and responsibilities on street-level bureaucrats.
such as school teachers and social workers. I identity five rationales of governance in the action plan.³

1.2.1. Governance through Individual Support and Response

The first group of initiatives builds on the idea that radicalization can be prevented if adolescents who show signs of “worrying behavior” are supported and challenged by other young people or adults who they respect and who hold more liberal-democratic values and identify more with mainstream society. The basic idea is that adolescents in the earliest phases of radicalization can be persuaded to change attitudes and behaviors in a more positive direction by interacting with others who hold different perspectives.

Two central policy measures in the Danish government action plan can be subsumed under this heading. First, we find the proposal of “Mentoring schemes focusing on young people and identity issues.” The mentoring schemes are currently under implementation in two model municipalities – Copenhagen and Aarhus – where corps of young mentors have been established and trained to make contact with adolescents in the target group, and understand radicalization processes and the meaning of identity building in such processes. The mentor-mentee relationship is voluntary, and no sanctions are applied if a potential mentee refuses to enter the program or leaves the program before completion. The mentors are thought of as a kind of task force, which can be called upon by street level bureaucrats who are in close contact with the young people (e.g., school teachers, youth workers, etc.), and who for various reasons are concerned about a particular individual. However, the actors behind the mentoring schemes (Ministry of Integration, local police, and municipality offices of integration) are still struggling to find out how to match mentors and mentees in a meaningful way, and how to make adolescents who are beginning to define themselves in opposition to mainstream society engage in a relationship with mentors who to some extent represent the society and system they are opposing.

The second, and similar, example of a policy measure that builds on a rationale of governance through individual support and response is the attempt to implement radicalization as a “new parameter of concern” within the existing context of “School – Social services – Police” (SSP) collaboration. This institutionalized collaboration has traditionally been concerned with crime prevention and alcohol/drug abuse. The concrete initiative is designed to train school teachers to identify signs of radicalization, understand radicalization processes, and initiate early intervention either by holding a meeting with the specific student and his/her teachers and family, or by contacting the authorities, for example through the mentoring program. However, the initiative has met some initial resistance among some school teachers who did not believe it to be their task to “spot potential terrorists” (Kühle and Lindekilde 2010). Likewise, they believe that there are important differences between worrying about youth delinquency and radicalization, with the latter treated as a problem with more political undertones.

1.2.2. Governance through Information and Knowledge

A different set of initiatives aims at providing adolescents with information and knowledge about radicalization, democracy, and citizenship. The rationale is that information about possibilities of democratic inclusion and active citizenship will prepare adolescents to make the “right” choices regarding identity formation and channeling of frustrations. The assumption seems to be that if the supply of information targeting young people is optimized and made “factual,” attitudes and behaviors can be changed. A range of initiatives fall in this category, including the creation of an “internet forum for young people on democracy and radicalization”; “inspirational material on democracy and civic education in Danish public schools”; “lessons in democracy and civic citizenship in the independent primary schools”; “increased dialogue and information on the Danish foreign policy”; “strengthened training in democracy and civic citizenship in the Danish Language Education for adult foreigners” (Regeringen 2009). It is obvious that several of these initiatives are de-
signed to target information flows involving, particularly, young Muslims in Danish society. It is also clear from the descriptions of the initiatives that the information flow will mostly be one-way—from authorities to radicalization-threatened adolescents. Thus, rather than a two-way exchange of views, most initiatives in this category build on monological attempts to persuade and change perceptions in the target group.

One particular initiative in this category has fostered intense public debate, namely the initiative to carry out extra inspection visits to twenty-five selected independent primary schools to ensure that they live up to their responsibility to prepare the students for living in a society with freedom and democracy. The controversy concerns both the selection of schools and the actual visits. So far ten inspection visits have been carried out. It has been pointed out, especially by the Association of Danish Independent Schools, that the formulated selection criteria seem quite arbitrary. Of the ten schools selected so far half had predominantly Muslim students and were based in residential areas with a high percentage of foreigners and citizens with a Muslim background. Considering that Muslim independent schools make up only about 5 percent of all Danish independent schools, the Association of Danish Independent Schools and others argue that the inspections were designed from the outset to check Muslim independent schools, and that this is highly discriminatory. A headmaster from a Catholic school that was also selected for investigation argued against this background that his school served as an “alibi” in the authorities’ crackdown on Muslim schools (Kjærgaard and Larsen 2010).

1.2.3. Governance through Empowerment
A third set of initiatives in the action plan aims to empower target groups to solve their own problems by enhancing competences and abilities. A central concern is to boost “democratic competences” as a way to make adolescents abstain from choosing radical identities and milieus. The basic idea seems to be that by helping target groups become aware of possibilities of citizenship and democratic engagement, the breeding ground of radicalization will be reduced and target groups better equipped to solve problems of radicalization.

Concretely, the action plan seeks to enhance “democratic competences” by funding special “associational mentors” who can further the creation of cultural, sports, and leisure associations building on democratic principles among adolescents with multicultural backgrounds. Another example is funding and creation of “citizenship centers” aiming to “strengthen young people’s development of identity, sense of belonging, responsibility, civic citizenship and democratic competencies” (Regeringen 2009, 19–20) by providing information and guidance on “active citizenship”. A final example concerns the initiative to create a “democratic platform for young people,” especially those with a multicultural background. The idea is that adolescents from immigrant communities who are engaged in associations or networks that take part in democracy and intercultural activities can help empower young people with multicultural backgrounds who feel excluded from the democratic community.

1.2.4. Governance through Surveillance and Intervention
Despite the dominance of neo-liberal logics of governance in the Danish action plan to prevent radicalization, a few initiatives seem to be based on more conventional modes of regulation through control, surveillance, and intervention.

This is the case for some of the initiatives targeting “vulnerable residential areas” (Regeringen 2009, 22) and the prison system. In vulnerable residential areas, for example, the government action plan intervenes in local housing associations’ letting practices by pushing for more mixed letting in these areas, giving priority to “resourceful tenants” over “long-term recipients of cash benefits, start-up assistance or introduction benefits” (Regeringen 2009, 23). In the prison system the action plan to prevent radicalization forces prisons to adopt a new approval scheme for prison chaplains, designed to ensure that approved chaplains are fully aware of their responsibility to help prevent radicalization.

However, the most significant initiative under this heading is the increased use of “preventive talks” conducted by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service with adolescents who have shown signs of early radicalization or are affiliated with extremist milieus. The use of preventive talks
builds on a logic of internalization of surveillance by making people aware that they are being watched. The Danish Security and Intelligence Service is currently designing a concept for these preventive talks and methods to screen out individuals in the early stages of radicalization.

1.2.5. Governance through Anti-Discrimination
Of the twenty-two initiatives in the action plan, twenty-one are covered by the above-mentioned four rationales of governance. The last strategy, of governance through anti-discrimination, comprises only one initiative and is rather an outlier in the action plan. The initiative is rather undeveloped and stipulates only a need to provide better information on how to achieve justice after suffering discrimination, strengthened activities against discrimination in nightlife, and anti-discrimination measures addressing the unfair allocation of vocational traineeships. Given that experiences of discrimination are cited as a potential cause of radicalization in the Danish government action plan, this shows that discrimination is targeted in order to indirectly prevent radicalization. Thus, anti-discrimination is not only pursued as a good in its own right.

As already indicated, the practice regime of radicalization prevention can be seen as situated between a practice regime of security and one of integration, tolerance, and citizenship. The influence of and connection with the practice regime of integration, tolerance, and citizenship are particularly clear in connection with the initiatives on anti-discrimination. The particular initiative of anti-discrimination clearly originates there. Following Joppke we can say that this particular initiative draws on a more Rawlsian notion of liberalism, which is more accepting and accommodating of cultural difference than the disciplining and correcting notion of Foucauldian liberalism, which is dominant in the Danish action plan.

1.3. Implementation – Theory and Practice
The Danish action plan to prevent radicalization is currently being implemented. A state-sponsored status report on the progress of implementation concludes (in October 2010) that “most initiatives have been launched, and a few already finalized” (Cowi 2010, 4). However, several initiatives are still only words on paper, including a number designed to advance feelings of inclusion in the democratic community among ethnic minorities. The largest progress has been made with the initiatives targeting specific individuals in the earliest stages of a radicalization process.

If we turn to the concrete instruments, techniques, procedures, and institutions that are to implement the government action plan in practice, two observations are worth mentioning. The first point to note is the variety of instruments and techniques brought into play, spanning informational campaigning, education of street-level bureaucrats, production of handbooks, support of associative activities, mentoring programs, role models, school inspections, etc. The actors involved in the implementation process include school teachers, local police, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service, parents, municipalities, young people with a multicultural background, social workers, youth club employees, etc. It is clear that this very broad coalition-building calls for intense collaboration, division of labor, and adjustment of criteria of success (Lindekilde and Fahmi 2011). It is far from obvious that all these different actors share the understanding of the problem and solutions envisioned in the government action plan – a point which is further developed below.

Second, implementation of many of the initiatives in the action plan is connected to existing instruments and institutions known and used in other practice regimes. For example, the aforementioned extra inspection visits to selected independent schools are linked to the inspection and control obligations that the Ministry of Education already has vis-à-vis Danish independent schools according to the Independent Schools Act. Likewise, within the existing School/Social services/Police framework radicalization is implemented as a new “parameter of concern” alongside existing ones of alcohol/drug abuse, criminality, suicidal tendencies, eating disorders, etc. This importing or re-embedding of existing technologies of governance is also clearly present in the mentor corps and role model schemes, which have been widely used in other Danish practice regimes, not least in the field of integration.

This “reinvention” of instruments and techniques builds on a logic of cost minimization and regulation efficiency.
maximization. As many of the techniques and institutional frameworks have proven effective in other areas of governance, the basic assumption is that they will be easy to reuse and effective in the field of radicalization. However, from a governmentality perspective one would also assume that the particular area of governance – and its understanding of problem and solution – will affect the efficiency of techniques. Thus, one can ask what happens to existing instruments when they are either imported to a new practice regime or loaded with new objectives. For example, how can a role model scheme be meaningfully imported into the field of radicalization prevention? Or what happens to the understanding of intentions when standard anti-discrimination measures are presented in the context of radicalization prevention? These questions are addressed in section two below.

1.4. Identities and Subject Positions
The last dimension of the policy analysis takes a closer look at how the action plan creates certain favorable identities and how identity formation is directed. We can say that where the three first dimensions of the analysis are concerned primarily with the means of governance in the area of radicalization prevention, this last dimension is concerned with the end goal of governance: forming the “right” kind of people.

A particular concept of the “ideal citizen” permeates the action plan. This identity can be summarized as the responsible, liberal citizen, who is perceived as the natural starting point for identity formation in liberal societies. Radicalization is, from this perspective, the move away from this natural starting point towards alternative (negative) identities. The ideal citizen of the action plan is first and foremost pro-democratic and non-violent, and non-supportive/non-sympathetic vis-à-vis violent or undemocratic groups. In addition, the ideal citizen is responsible and active. In several parts of the action plan active citizenship, in terms of participation in associational life and democratic procedures, is praised as an important aspect of citizenship. Becoming such an active citizen who contributes to the common good is framed in the action plan as an individual responsibility. Thus, ideal citizens not only oppose violent and undemocratic methods, they also play an active and responsible part in society. Finally, the action plan stipulates workforce integration as essential to the identity of a responsible, liberal citizen. This ideal identity created in the action plan has much in common with the kind of liberal citizens that Joppke identifies as the end goal of civic integration policies in Europe.

In opposition to this ideal citizen, the action plan situates “the radical,” “the extremist,” or the adolescent “threatened by radicalization.” This individual has undergone, or is undergoing, a process which destroys the normal, natural and liberal starting point of identity formation. In this perspective the move away from the liberal ideal identity is due to the individual’s lack of necessary resources, abilities, and competences to seize the opportunities offered by liberal-democratic society. The empowerment logic described above underlines this understanding of identity formation. In many ways the “radical” is characterized by the negation of traits of the responsible, liberal citizen, for example by being violent, undemocratic, and inactive. The action plan makes several links between living in “parallel societies,” isolation from mainstream society, and this negative identity.

The action plan to prevent radicalization is, in short, all about formation of responsible, liberal citizens at the expense of “radical” identities, and the two fundamental subject positions are understood in terms of either-or. Either you take on the liberal identity, or you take on a radical identity and become the target of corrective policies of intervention. This perception leaves little room for, for example, verbally supporting violent groups like Hamas or al-Shabaab and at the same time being a responsible, liberal citizen.

2. Potential Iatrogenic Effects of Radicalization Prevention Policies?
After highlighting the intended consequences and the underlying rationale and logics of change within the developing practice regime of radicalization prevention in Denmark, we now turn to a theoretical and empirical discussion of potential perversion of intentions and consequences when moving from policy formulations to policy delivery vis-à-vis target groups (Boudon 1982). It is a fair assumption, based on the vast literature of policy studies
(for example Hogwood and Lewis 1993), that the con-
sequences of radicalization prevention in practice will de-
pend partly on its implementation – the way policies are
put to work and presented to citizens by “street level
bureaucrats” (Lipsky 1980). Likewise, the efficiency of any
policy depends partly on the target group’s perception of
the policy’s legitimacy/illegitimacy (Winter and Lehman
Nielsen 2008). This section addresses Muslims’ perceptions
and evaluations of radicalization prevention policies: How
are the problem definition and solution strategy suggested
by the practice regime of radicalization prevention evalu-
ated by target group members? How is the neo-liberal
strategy of disciplining into liberal-democratic citizens per-
ceived in practice? How are policy intentions behind spe-
cific initiatives of radicalization prevention understood
and decoded? The question whether there is any theoretical
and empirical evidence that radicalization prevention policies
might have iatrogenic effects in practice is of specific inter-

The aforementioned empirical research among young neo-
orthodox Muslims in the city of Aarhus, Denmark, forms
the basis of the discussion. The study at large empirically
investigated the usefulness of the terminology of radical-
ization in identifying and combating potential risks. The
study applied the definition provided by the Danish gov-
ernment in its action plan to prevent and radicalization,
and compared it with the political and religious beliefs,
perceptions, and distinctions articulated in the concrete
Muslim milieu. The study sought, by comparing the ma-
jority “etic” categories of the radicalization discourse (rep-
resenting the cultural understandings of the professional
policymaking and academic outsiders) with the “emic”
categories (representing the cultural understandings of the
target groups), to clarify the boundaries of radicalization
and define the term more precisely. In addition, the study
examined how young Muslims in the target group of the
radicalization prevention policies evaluated the new action
plan. Such evaluations were discussed in depth in seven-
teen interviews with Muslims in the study. This part of the
study soon showed that the vast majority of our inter-
viewees were surprisingly well informed about the policy
initiatives and quite critical of their design and potential
effects (negative evaluations were expressed in fifteen of
the seventeen interviews). To be fair, a few interviewees
were broadly positive towards the government action plan,
and thought it was a necessary move. In particular, the
ideas of improving anti-discrimination efforts were ap-
plauded. Another group of interviewees approved of the
radicalization prevention plans, but believed they would
have minimal effect, if any at all. One said “this is fine, but
it is like curing cancer with Aspirins” (Muhammad, Soma-
li, age 19). In the following, interview statements that sug-
gested more negative perceptions and effects of the policies
are analyzed and linked with relevant theoretical perspec-
tives. I choose to focus on these negative evaluations as
they were by far the most frequent in our interviews and
because they are the most worrisome from a societal or
policy-making perspective. The nine different Muslim in-
terviewees quoted in the following are all men from immi-
grant backgrounds (although eight Muslim women were
interviewed for the larger study), with ages ranging from
nineteen to thirty-eight, and different educational back-
grounds. Most were students of some kind, but the sample
also included private and public sector employees and un-
employed individuals.

2.1. Policy-learning, Labeling and Suspect Communities
The first theoretical perspective I will apply to the em-
pirical material is a tradition in policy studies that is con-
cerned with the self-image that specific target groups
“learn” from the framing of certain problems and the labe-
ing of groups in policy texts and implementation practices
(Soss 1999; Schneider and Ingram 1993). Framing and
labeling – in this case the label “radical Muslim” – con-
structs a particular understanding of the problem that
legitimizes policy initiatives (see above). Studies in this
tradition show how affected target groups can react to im-
posed labels that are perceived as stigmatizing, either by
opposing them or by gradually subscribing to them (Mon-
crieffe 2007). The effect in terms of behavior is that policies
do not have the intended consequences.

One particular way that policy framing and labels can lead
to stigmatization and iatrogenic effects is by obscuring the
diversity of interpretations and divisions that may be criti-
cal for addressing the very problem or cases that the label
highlights (Balch in 2007). In our interviews this was a
common criticism of the way the term “radical Muslim” is defined and addressed in the Danish government’s action plan. Two quotes exemplify this reasoning and the potential effects:

The effect is that you become tired. When you generalize things many who are unaffected become affected. It is a very degrading feeling. The result is that some begin to isolate themselves more – to go against this. (Jamaal, Palestinian, age 28)

The problem lies in the foundation of society, in the basic structures, in the lack of understanding of Muslim culture. There is a need for much more widespread understanding of the fact that there is no necessary link between being a practicing Muslim, even an orthodox Muslim, and radicalization. It is just not that simple. We need much more nuances. But when you see the other as an enemy there is no room for nuances. One can come up with as many initiatives to combat radicalization as one likes, but as long as this basic fact is not understood their effect will be minimal. And this will take time” (Taamir, imam, age 32)

The two quotes touch upon how the label “radical Muslim,” as defined in government policy, is believed to be too broad and inclusive, and incapable of drawing necessary distinctions. More precisely, the widespread perception was that by making support of “terrorist organization” like Hamas and al-Shabaab, and undemocratic opinions or practices (such as unwillingness to participate in democratic elections) part of the definition of “radicalization,” the Danish government is de facto labeling large parts of the Danish Muslim population as “radicals.” Further, it was argued that such support and opinions represented the exercise of constitutionally protected free speech and freedom of religion, and did not pose any danger to Danish society in terms of violence.

The effect of the perceived gross generalization implied by the label “radical Muslim” is that it casts suspicion on all Muslims:

If I was somebody who did not often meet Muslims I might see these initiatives as a sign that we need to keep an eye on all Muslims … We are creating a disproportionate surveillance society. It will create distance and then we have a problem. I don’t think any parallel societies exist today in Denmark, but this would mean that they would develop. I would not trust anybody from the authorities. If my seven year-old daughter starts wearing the headscarf, am I then a potential radical who needs to be kept under surveillance? (Naadir, Pakistani, age 24)

If the general Danish population does not calm down concerning coexistence with ethnic groups, with Muslims, and stop focusing on them as a potential threat and constantly being on guard with suspicion and exaggerations, then the radicalization prevention plan will fail. The action plan itself talks about the importance of demystification and communication, acceptance and inclusion, but where are we to find the ingredients, if not among ordinary Danes. (Taamir, imam, age 32)

In line with recent studies on the effects of “hard” counter-terrorism efforts in Western Europe (Schiffauer 2008, Mythen, Walklate and Khan 2009; Pantazis and Pemberton 2009), the data from our study suggests that the labeling and framing of “soft” radicalization prevention policies are creating feelings among Muslims of being treated as a “suspect community.” The quotes demonstrate how such generalized suspicion from the surrounding society may lead Muslims to react with isolation and suspicion of majority authorities. On the level of everyday life Gabe Mythen and his collaborators show how the creation of Muslims as a “suspect community” has very real effects, making young British Muslims “perform safety” in public places for example by not carrying back-packs in the London underground (Mythen, Walklate and Khan 2009, 747).

The power of labeling seems real in many ways. Another common effect of policy framing and labeling is that it directs the focus toward particular problems and solutions, to the exclusion of others that may be equally salient. Thus, the entire practice regime of radicalization prevention, along with the intense public debate about radical Islam, works to connect the Muslim community to the phenomenon of radicalization. As shown in the policy analysis in the previous section, this focus means that other problems of lacking integration, socio-economic ghettoization, and discrimination are subsumed under the heading of radicalization prevention. Two quotes illustrate the problematic nature of this simultaneous highlighting and overshadowing of issues:

I think this extreme focus on radicalization will fail and at some point the authorities will do their own evaluations and see that these initiatives had very little effect, if any. They will realize that they are still left with a lot of other and more pressing issues and problems that have not been solved because of the focus on radicalization. (Umar, Somali, age 28)
All these soft measures in the government action plan are fine, if only they had not appeared in an action plan to combat radicalization. There is a need for more focus on democratic values, a need for more dialogue and knowledge. But when it comes in this context I think it is problematic. (Naadir, Pakistani, age 24)

The last quote points to an interesting dilemma that surfaced again and again in our interviews: Muslims in the target group generally accept the liberal ambition of pushing certain democratic values, active citizenship, dialogue, anti-discrimination, socio-economic integration, etc., but resist the idea of pushing these issues under the heading of preventing radicalization. The general perception was that these issues deserved attention in their own right and not merely as components of the radicalization problem. Our interviewees found that the good intentions behind the move to address these issues were clouded by way the issues were framed and addressed only as causal factors of radicalization.

2.2. Misrecognition and Muslim Identity Strategies

It has already been hinted that the framing and labeling inherent in the Danish radicalization prevention policy are perceived as degrading, discriminatory, and stigmatizing by the young Muslims in our study. These findings can be explored further by linking them to theories of recognition. Stigmatization is a form of misrecognition, which theories of recognition, as formulated by Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth (Taylor 1994; Honneth 2006), would predict had consequences in terms of identity building. The starting point for these theoretical perspectives is that recognition in modern societies is something that is created and negotiated socially, and no longer something that flows automatically from one’s position in social hierarchies. Thus, recognition of identity as individually and collectively valuable can be denied by the surrounding society. This can be problematic as recognition is perceived to be a necessary condition for being oneself, for personal integrity, and for possibilities of achieving the good life. According to Taylor, recognition is “not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need” (1994, 26). Axel Honneth argues that recognition is negotiated in three different spheres – the private sphere of relations to family and friends; the legal sphere that concerns the individual’s juridical rights and duties; and the sphere of solidarity, which pertains to the collectives the individual belongs to (e.g. political, ethnic, or religious) (2006, 93). Recognition in the sphere of solidarity, which is the most relevant here, is conditional on an evaluation of particular groups or identities as contributing to the common good of society. Thus, to realize one’s full potential and become a valued citizen in a pluralistic society it is not enough to gain respect within one’s own group or minority; it takes recognition from society at large (Anderson 2005: xvii). Taylor describes the consequences of misrecognition of identities by society:

Our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being. (1994, 25)

Experiences of misrecognition in the sphere of solidarity, for example communicated through stigmatizing labeling in public policies, can lead individuals into identity crisis. Honneth underlines how the loss of dignity and self-respect can only be rectified through action, for example through protest, continuing the fight for recognition, or searching for recognition in alternative collectives (2006, 181). Honneth, thus, implies that there is a connection between political resistance/protest, including radical political opposition, and experiences of misrecognition.

Such a link between perceived misrecognition in the general framing and labeling of Muslims in the Danish action plan and different identity strategies was often indicated in our interviews. One interviewee said:

The young become tired of this generalized depiction of them – in policies and in the media. Through my work I experience first hand how many choose to go abroad to look for work because they cannot stand hearing it anymore. This has gone on for years now, and the debate about radicalization is just adding another layer. . . . The focus is always on the very few that have a problem with democracy, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. The focus is entirely on all negative. And the broader group of Muslims pays the price. All those young people with a Muslim background who are involved in the education system are good and sensible young people. What does radicalization have to do with them? They become very tired of it all. (Majid, consultant, age 38)
Here the reaction to misrecognizing generalizations is one of exit from majority society, and simply looking abroad for better life chances and recognition. Faced with misrecognition from Danish society, young Muslims of immigrant descent are giving up “Danish Muslim” identities and looking to find respect, for example, in Muslim majority countries abroad.

Another response strategy would be to downplay the elements of identity that are being misrecognized, here Islam, for example by avoiding visual markers of religion, and assimilating into “Western culture” and norms of privatizing religion. This strategy can be found among segments of the Danish Muslim population who identify as “cultural Muslims.” However, to our interviewees, who were very orthodox, Salafi-inspired Muslims, this option seemed untenable. On the contrary, several interviewees suggested that experiences of misrecognition lead young Muslims to strengthen their Muslim identity:

What happens when young Muslims are confronted with this is that they are confirmed in the feeling that they are a problem – that they are under suspicion. This confrontation means that they become even more aware of their Muslim identity, as they feel stepped upon. This can be the seed for a negative reaction among some, a rollback of understanding. (Taamir, imam, age 32)

Rather than leading to exit or assimilation, in this context misrecognition is held to produce demonstrative voicing and display of difference. The idea expressed in the quote, that misrecognition and assimilation pressure may have unintended consequences among young Muslims in the West struggling to balance between two (or more) cultures, has been identified in other studies as well (for example Mythen, Walklate and Khan 2009; Schiffauer 2007; Roy 2007). In fact, it has been suggested that such experiences of misrecognition have fed into the re-Islamification of young Muslims across Europe over the last decade.

A final reactionary strategy implies not just a demonstrative display of difference, but the creation of actual oppositional identities, where young Muslims come together to define themselves in opposition to majority society. They construct an identity around the very misrecognition of the society that misrecognizes them. This identity strategy is obviously the most worrying from a perspective of radicalization prevention, as the theory suggests that this kind of oppositional identity building on a division of the world into “us” and “them” forms part of the breeding ground for radicalization. Commenting upon the initiative in the Danish action plan to make school teachers and social workers more aware of the signs of radicalization, one interviewee states:

Imagine a social worker who has no knowledge of a person’s background, and very little knowledge about what it is to be a Muslim, who is then told to evaluate whether a person or a family shows signs of radicalization. I cannot in my wildest dreams imagine how a few courses will enable such a person to make this evaluation. I cannot see how such a situation where they are told to evaluate people’s thoughts, opinions, dress, and reactions can lead to anything good. The effect will be negative, there will be a counter-reaction. Already a lot of Muslims believe that the authorities operate on the basis of stereotypes and prejudice. Trust is already low. (Jamaal, Palestinian, age 28)

The quote implies that implementation of this initiative could have iatrogenic effects by further reducing Muslim trust in authorities and in the worst case scenario lead young Muslims to isolate from majority society and actively discredit authorities.

If we look at our interviewees’ evaluations of the different types of neo-liberal governance in the Danish radicalization action plan an interesting pattern appears. As already indicated, most interviewees are positive towards “governance through anti-discrimination,” although several would prefer the government to have addressed the problem outside of the practice regime of radicalization prevention. Likewise, most interviewees are mildly positive or indifferent towards “governance through empowerment,” as they welcome efforts to foster and strengthen cultural/religious dialogue and organization-building. Interestingly, several interviewees explicitly expressed positive evaluations of “governance through surveillance and interference,” specifically the increased use of “preventive talks” by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service. As long as such preventive talks are conducted in the light of a concrete suspicion of terrorist activities, the interviewees welcomed it as a necessary instrument. One said:
I have met several young people where I think such a talk would have had a positive effect. However, the effect depends on who is doing the talk – it should not be the frightened social worker, but the police. And it is essential that this does not become a slippery slope where everybody who takes their shoes off to go into the mosque needs a preventive talk. For this to work we have to be very careful with the techniques that are used and the kind of presumptions that we bring to such talks. (Kareem, age 22)

However, the vast majority of young Muslims in our study protested against the “governance through individual support and response” initiatives, in particular the role model/mentoring schemes and the idea of making radicalization a new parameter of concern in the existing preventive School/Social services/Police collaboration. Commenting on the role model campaigns, one interviewee said:

I am so tired of role model campaigns. It has become a religion, you see. And some people have made a fortune from these role models. What this obsession with role model campaigns says is: “There are few role models among Muslims in Denmark, but large criminal networks.” That is not true – this is not what the real picture looks like. It is very discriminatory. (Racheed, age 27)

The implicit message of role model campaigns is seen as discriminatory against the target groups, as it suggests that these groups (i.e. young Muslims) are in particular need of role models. It is thus perceived as communicating misrecognition. Another interviewee argues:

The idea behind the mentor campaigns and role models is that if we make some immigrants have contact to some Danes, the immigrants cannot help but become a little bit more Danish, that is, a little bit better. I am not sure that this is the way to solve our problems. (Umar, Somali, age 28)

This quote can be read as a critique of the subtle form of neo-liberal governmentality – the disciplining and shaping of attitudes and behaviors – which quite obviously forms the rationale behind this initiative. The interviewee problematizes the underlying assumption that if young people from the target group interact with others who are more in contact with mainstream society and liberal-democratic values, the radicalization-prone adolescents will alter their exercise of freedom in a more productive direction. Likewise, the logic behind “governance through information and knowledge” is criticized for being “propagandistic,” and a one-sided attempt to persuade and change perceptions in the target group. One interviewee argues that these initiatives are designed to “stuff liberal values down our throats” (Muhammad, age 25). The general point here is that the good intentions behind these preventive measures are perceived as misrecognition, which may have iatrogenic effects on Muslim identity-building.

2.3. The Fear of the Label “Radical” – Participating as a Muslim in Public Debates and Preventive Collaborations

In January 2011 the Danish branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir held a much-debated public meeting in Copenhagen. In a press interview the spokesman of the largest Muslim umbrella organization in Denmark, Zubair Butt Hussain, said that he would like to go to the meeting just to hear what these “loonies” had to say, but that he dared not go as he feared the argumentative strategy of “guilt by association” that is so common in public debates about Islam in Denmark. Put differently, Zubair But Hussain feared that he would be labeled “radical” just for showing up at the meeting and would, as he put it, “spend the rest of his life trying to distance himself from stoning and violent jihad” (Omar, February 28, 2011).

This example illustrates the final iatrogenic mechanism of the radicalization prevention policies and the radicalization discourse in general, and shows that the label “radical” is a powerful tool for excommunicating actors in public debates. Assigning the label to Muslims active in public discourse discredits them and puts them on the defensive, forcing them to answer all kinds of questions about their beliefs and values. In fact, it can be argued that Muslim actors who want to be part of public debate are increasingly expected to proactively endorse certain liberal democratic values (such as rule of law, freedom of speech, gender equality, etc.) and reject others (such as sharia, support of violent groups, jihad, etc.) before ever saying anything in public. That is, the entry barriers for Muslims in public debate seem to be growing. As one interviewee said:

It has become more difficult to engage in the public debate on integration, and now radicalization. One has to sound perfectly in tune in order to be accepted. You need to have the right views. Many just don’t dare to speak up anymore as they are scared of the label “radical.” . . . I never had hesitated to speak up in the media, but now I consider it a million times . . ..
day is that all the progressive voices are silent in the public debate. They have left the floor to voices such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. (Naadir, Pakistani, age 24)

One consequence of the requirement to endorse and reject certain values in order to be a legitimate Muslim voice in public debate, and not be excommunicated as “radical,” is that it leaves the floor to those who are in fact radicals and therefore have nothing to lose by being identified as such. The problem with this development is that radical views are left unquestioned as alternative voices withdraw from public debates:

No one dares to speak their mind. They don’t have the resources to confront the wave of criticism that follows. And maybe they give up and isolate themselves. This is very crucial. It worries me that these voices become silent because it leaves more room for radical views, which are not questioned. (Majid, consultant, age 38)

The alternative voices alluded to here are those who try to balance religious orthodoxy and skepticism of Western culture and institutions with a clear opposition to violence and confrontation. Many interviewees believe these actors would constitute an effective alternative to radical groups:

People need to understand that Muslim representatives in public debates have to balance on a knife-edge. Danish Muslims have many more realities and concerns than the ordinary Dane. They care about foreign politics, problems in their home countries. Many are critical towards the U.S. As a representative you cannot just ignore this. You lose legitimacy. If Muslim representatives are to play a role in the fight against radicalization they cannot do so on premises laid out by the government or the press. It is a balance, and these people need room to argue their case in their own language without being called radicals. (Taamir, imam, age 32)

The last part of this quote addresses an important point. The radicalization discourse has spread the fear of the label “radical,” leading Muslim actors who could prove important allies in the battle against radicalization to withdraw from public debates. These actors may pose a challenge in terms of integration, as they do not fit the mold of the liberal democratic citizen, but not in terms of security. Such Muslim actors, be they local imams, community leaders, or influential sheiks, may very well be the best suited to reach young Muslims flirting with violent jihadism. But, as indicated by the quote above, they would lose their legitimacy if they first had to comply with the premises of the radicalization discourse by confirming democratic ideals and dismissing principles of sharia. So if the authorities were to make use of such actors in the battle against radicalization it would mean overlooking intolerant and non-integrationist perspectives for the sake of addressing security concerns. So far the Danish authorities have been very reluctant to do this.

To sum up, the practice regime of radicalization prevention and the radicalization discourse in general are narrowing the room for non-integrationist, but non-confrontational, orthodox Muslims to participate in public debates or cooperate with the authorities. And this may have iatrogenic effects in terms of refuting jihadist rhetoric and reaching to those few adolescents who are flirting with violent means. Insisting on dialogue only with those who share “our” fundamental values and goals could turn out to be counterproductive.

3. Conclusions
The first part of this paper provided a governmentality analysis of the Danish action plan to prevent radicalization. It investigated the framing of the problem of radicalization, the modes of governance suggested as the solutions to the problem, the techniques and institutions of implementation as well as the positive/negative subject positions and labels inherent in policies. It was argued that the developing practice regime of radicalization prevention revolves around logics of “repressive liberalism,” which holds that radical identities can be prevented by shaping and disciplining adolescents with illiberal and undemocratic beliefs into liberal democratic citizens. The basic mode of governance here is one of influencing individuals’ exercise of free will, not through control and prohibitions but through incentives, information, empowerment, and challenging interventions. The analysis showed how the problem of radicalization is framed as an individual, gradual, and both behavioral and cognitive process, which justifies a diverse and multifaceted approach to radicalization prevention, aiming at early, individual intervention and changing behavior by altering illiberal attitudes, beliefs, and values.

The second part of the paper discussed how this policy framing, labeling, and mode of governance was received
and evaluated by Muslims in the target group. The main question addressed here was whether the neo-liberal intentions of radicalization prevention in the government action plan are perverted in the process of practical implementation. This question was addressed by analyzing data from a large interview-based study of young, orthodox Muslims in Denmark, in combination with insights from relevant theoretical perspectives. The analysis showed, first, how the label “radical Muslim” in the preventive policies was perceived as glossing over important lines of division within the Muslim target group, thus grouping together Muslims who support groups such as Hamas and al-Shabaab because they believe they are fighting a legitimate battle in war-like situations, with the very few who would support al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism in the West. Likewise, the label was perceived as wrongly grouping Muslims who would not vote in democratic elections for religious reasons with the very few Muslims in the West who actively work to undermine democracy. These generalizations inherent in the definition of the label “radical Muslim” were found to contribute to the experience that Muslims in general are made into part of a “suspect community.” Secondly, the analysis showed how the general framing and labeling of the practice regime of radicalization prevention together with concrete initiatives in the action plan were evaluated as communicating misrecognition of Muslims and Islam. The data suggests here that experiences of misrecognition may negatively affect Muslim identity strategies, ultimately by fostering oppositional Muslim identities. Finally, analysis of the empirical data suggested that the spread of the radicalization discourse in Denmark has created a fear among Muslim actors of the label “radical,” which is used in public debates to effectively excommunicate Muslim actors who are not perfectly in tune with the majority’s liberal democratic ideas. It was shown how this mechanism has shrunk the latitude in public debate and the scope of institutionalized cooperation with the authorities for non-integrationist but non-confrontational orthodox Muslim actors.

Although the analysis of iatrogenic effects of radicalization prevention policies described in this paper is indicative rather than strictly causal, I find the evidence worrying. Although the evidence does not suggest that young Muslims addressed by a radicalization mentor or critical questions from teachers will automatically radicalize further as a consequence of negative labels and experiences of misrecognition, it does suggest that this risk is real, and that confrontation with the radicalization discourse could have unintended negative effects through more indirect channels. The data presented here indicates that the risks of iatrogenic effects of radicalization prevention are greatest in initiatives that are heavily influenced by the logic of “repressive liberalism.” The existence of these risks does not mean that we should give up trying to prevent radicalization, but it most certainly should make us think very carefully about how to frame, formulate, present, and practically implement radicalization prevention policies.
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References


Internal and External Collective Memories of Conflicts: Israel and the 1948 Palestinian Exodus

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Internal and External Collective Memories of Conflicts: Israel and the 1948 Palestinian Exodus

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The new millennium has begun with conflicts raging in various parts of the globe. Of special importance are the seemingly intractable conflicts: those that are violent, long-standing, and perceived as irresolvable and of zero sum nature. These conflicts significantly damage the lives and the countries of the involved parties and also occasionally other countries in the region (Coleman 2006). They concern concrete issues that have to be addressed, such as territories, natural resources, and self-determination. They also involve wide-scale socio-psychological dynamics which develop among the involved parties and play an important role in the outbreak continuation and resolution of conflicts. These dynamics include mainly the ethos,\(^1\) the collective emotional orientation,\(^2\) political attitudes (e.g., right-left), aspects of social identity (Liu and Hilton 2005), and the collective memory (all these dynamics pertain to the conflict).

Collective memory is an important phenomenon which significantly influences countries and societies. It touches upon nationalism, leadership, and culture, and is a major factor in intractable conflicts. Collective memory research has experienced significant growth in the recent period, mostly regarding conflicts. This is mainly due to the prevalence of conflicts worldwide and the realization that collective memory of conflicts plays a big part in shaping all the other socio-psychological dynamics regarding conflicts (emotions, etc.) (Booth 2001; Devine-Wright 2003; Olick 2007; Shelter 2010; and Winter 2010). The literature about collective memory of conflicts (as well as of other topics), addresses collective memory as a unified phenomenon (for example, Devine-Wright 2003; Hagopian 2009; Zheng 2008; see also section 1., “Background”). This article challenges that unified approach, hypothesizing that collective

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1 Ethos of conflict is defined as the configuration of central societal beliefs that provide particular dominant orientation to a society experiencing an intractable conflict. These beliefs involve, for example, the importance of security, patriotism to the country, unity of the society, and peace as the ultimate desire (Bar-Tal 2007a).

2 Collective emotional orientation refers to the characterizing tendency of a society to express particular emotions in conflict situations, for example fear, anger, or hatred (Bar-Tal Halperin and De Rivera 2007).
memory of conflicts comprises two types of sub-memory, internal and external (what people think and what they express in public). The hypothesis is tested using empirical material on the Israeli collective memory about the causes for the 1948 Palestinian exodus. The exodus is the major historical event in the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict, highly violent for most of its time (Lustick 2006). This division between internal and external sub-memories has broad theoretical implications for memory studies (of conflicts, and of other topics).

1. Background: Memory, Israel, War
1.1. Collective Memory
Collective memory is generally defined as representations of the past assembled in collectively adopted narratives (Kansteiner 2002). It is a general category which includes several main kinds of memories. To name the most significant, the first is popular memory, defined as representations of the past held by the society’s members, best manifested directly by public opinion surveys. It significantly influences the socio-psychological dynamics mentioned above and the behavioral reactions of those holding it, and is therefore accorded great importance (Liu and Hilton 2005; Midelton and Edwards 1997; Schuman and Rodgers 2004; Shelter 2010). The second kind is the official memory: the representations of the past adopted by the institutions of the state. This memory is manifested, for instance, in publications of state ministries and the army, national museums, and textbooks approved for use in the educational system (Connerton 2009; Wertsch 2002; Zheng 2008). Third is the autobiographical memory, namely that of the people who experienced the discussed events firsthand, which is typically manifested in memoirs and storytelling. This is a primary historical source (alongside documents) and therefore usually accorded importance (Hackett and Rolston 2009; Jenning and Zhang 2005; Schumann, Akiyama, and Knaupper 1998). Fourth and final is historical memory, the way the research community – mostly academics, but also independent scholars – views the events of the past (Winter and Sivan 1999).

The prime significance of the latter three kinds of memories is their influence on popular memory, the importance of which was explained above (Nets-Zehngut 2012a; Wemheuer 2009; Wertsch 2002). Official memory has its own separate importance: it represents countries in the international arena and thereby influences their interactions with other countries (Lustick 2006; MacDonald 2010; Malksoo 2009).

Focusing on collective memory of conflicts, this consists of the narrative held by a party to a conflict that describes the origin and course of the conflict. Rather than setting out to provide an objective history, it typically relates it in a manner that is functional to the society’s present existence and future aspirations (Booth 2001; Lawsin and Tannaka 2011; Olick 2007; Zheng 2008). This memory is usually selective, biased, and distorted and thus provides a simplistic and black-white outlook. As such, it plays an important role in the course of conflict by shaping the psychological reactions of each party towards the rival (negatively) and towards the in-group (positively). Studying this memory is therefore essential in promoting peace (Bar-Tal 2007a; Conway 2008; Devine-Wright 2003; Paez and Liu 2011).

Use of the memory of conflict tends to be instrumentalized during the climax of intractable conflict since it provides each party with the socio-psychological basis needed to meet the enormous challenges of such a conflict. Significantly, this memory also inhibits de-escalation, peaceful resolution, and reconciliation. Thus, the more significantly a party’s memory can be transformed to being less biased and distorted – when there is factual basis for such a transformation, and usually there is – the more the party’s psychological reactions will accommodate the rival and view it in a more legitimized, humanized, and differentiated manner. This will increase the likelihood of achieving peace and reconciliation between rival parties (Booth 2009; Lawsin and Tannaka 2010; Lustick 2006; Nets-Zehngut 2012b; Volkan 2001).

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3 The term “exodus” is used here in the sense of a neutral designation for the combination of expulsion and flight.
4 Ian Assmann also developed two concepts: cultural memory (manifested in rituals, images, monuments, and buildings, dealing with long periods, and characterized by stability) and communicative memory (daily discussion about the past, dealing with short periods, and characterized by instability) (1995).
In summation, all of the above literature about collective memory, and other relevant studies not described above, discuss it as a unified phenomenon. The current article hypothesizes that each kind of has two types, internal and external (e.g., internal official sub-memory and external official sub-memory). Internal sub-memory is how the holders of a memory actually view the history of the conflict. External sub-memory, in contrast, is what these holders express publicly as their views of that history. The analysis described below tests this hypothesis for three kinds of memories (official, autobiographical, and historical). Space constraints prevent further discussion of popular memory. Since the suggested distinction will be discussed in relation to the Israeli collective memory of the 1948 exodus, some historical background is required.5

1.2. Israel and Its Memory of the Conflict

The roots of the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict (hereafter “the conflict”) lie in the late nineteenth century, when Jewish Zionist pioneers from Europe settled in a part of the Ottoman Empire designated Palestine by the Palestinians and Eretz Israel by the Jews (in Hebrew: “the Land of Israel”). Beginning in the early twentieth century, under British rule, the Palestinian and Zionist national movements began to realize that they were competing for the same territory. This led to violent clashes between the Zionist pioneers and the Palestinians, escalating over the years. In 1947, the United Nations voted for the establishment of neighboring Palestinian and Jewish states, after which the 1948 War broke out. Israel won the war, in which some 650,000 Palestinians became refugees (the 1948 exodus) and were displaced, for the most part, to various Arab countries. Over the years, several further wars were fought between Israel and Arab countries, in 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, and 2006. The 1967 Six Days’ War led to Israel’s seizure and occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, whose Palestinian residents rose up in mass protests (Intifadas) in 1987 and 2000. Numerous peace initiatives were initiated, leading to two peace agreements (in 1979 with Egypt and in 1994 with Jordan), and in the mid-1990s interim agreements with the Palestinians (Bickerton and Klausner 2009).

Especially since the 1948 War, the conflict has become the major issue in the existence, ideology, and identity of the Israeli Jews (hereafter “the Israelis”). Since the foundation of Israel, its institutions have exclusively disseminated among the Israelis the Zionist narrative of all the major events of the conflict (“inclusive” narrative).6 Generally, this inclusive narrative portrayed the Arabs/Palestinians and the Jews/Israelis as narratives of conflicts typically do. It was selective, biased, and distorted, presenting a simplistic black-and-white description of events. The Arabs/ Palestinians were blamed for the outbreak and continuation of the conflict, delegitimizing them, while the Jews/Israelis were portrayed positively as peace-loving and moral, merely victims of the conflict (Bar-Tal 2007b; Caplan 2010; Podeh 2002).

The central historical event of the conflict in this narrative is the Palestinian exodus during the 1948 War. This event created the Palestinian refugee problem, and has great political, psychological, and social importance for both parties. Since 1949, the refugees have been the subject of a major Arab/Palestinian diplomatic campaign demanding their return, backed by a United Nations resolution; and since the 1990s this has been a major obstacle in the peace negotiations between the parties – the Palestinians demand the return of their refugees and Israel refuses. The Zionist narrative took no responsibility for this exodus, placing exclusive blame on the Arabs/Palestinians. The exodus, it argued, was caused mainly by blanket appeals by Palestinian and Arab leaders to leave their homes, and due to fear of the Jews. Acts of expulsion by Jewish and later Israeli military forces were ignored and even denied. The Palestinians, in contrast, largely argue that the exodus was caused by forced expulsion, for example in history textbooks and studies (Abdel Jawad 2006; Firer and Adwan 2004; Nets-Zehngut 2011a).

5 This background is provided with no distinction between internal and external sub-memories, since this is the way the literature usually treats it.

6 There are various Zionist narratives. The article focuses on the political Zionist narrative which was dominant in the first period after the establishment of Israel.
The Israeli state disseminated the Zionist narrative, for example regarding the 1948 exodus, through the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), the Publications Agency at the National Information Center, and the education system. Until the late 1970s, the state was extensively supported in its dissemination effort by various Israeli societal institutions. For example, research community’s studies (Nets-Zehngut 2011b) and Jewish 1948 war veterans’ memoirs (Nets-Zehngut unpublished-a) largely presented the Zionist narrative regarding the exodus (see also in general: Caplan 2010; Ghazi-Bouillon 2009; Zand 2004).

The dominance of the inclusive Zionist narrative began to be challenged by Israeli societal institutions in the late 1970s. Members of these institutions started writing critical publications confronting various topics relating to this narrative. For example, many scholarly studies and some 1948 Jewish war veterans’ memoirs (respectively, Nets-Zehngut 2011b, unpublished-a) presented a critical narrative regarding the exodus (sometimes called a “post-Zionist” narrative). According to this narrative, some Palestinians left voluntarily (e.g., due to fear, societal collapse, or calls by Arab leaders to leave some localities), while others were expelled by the Jewish/Israeli fighting forces. The expulsions sharply contradicted the Zionist narrative.

This societal change intensified in the late 1980s with the commencement of a historical revisionist period commonly called the “New Historians” era (Caplan 2010; Ghazi-Bouillon 2009). New historical studies criticized additional aspects of the Zionist narrative not criticized earlier, or supported criticism raised earlier. The historian Benny Morris was a major figure among these critics. His most discussed findings focus on the 1948 exodus, published in a wide-ranging book in 1987. He objected to Palestinian claims about a Jewish master plan to expel the Palestinians, while supporting the critical narrative regarding the causes for the exodus. Moreover, since the late 1980s more critical studies of the exodus (Nets-Zehngut 2011b) and critical 1948 war veterans’ memoirs (Nets-Zehngut unpublished-a) have been published, providing a solidly basis to conclude that the critical narrative is more accurate than the Zionist narrative (Bar-On 2004; Caplan 2011; Ghazi-Bouillon 2009; Zand 2004).

As for the state institutions, the IDF (Nets-Zehngut unpublished-b) and the Publications Agency (Nets-Zehngut 2008 and forthcoming) continued at least until 2004 to present largely the Zionist narrative. The situation in the Ministry of Education, though, was partly different (Nets-Zehngut unpublished-c). While until 1999 its approved history and civics textbooks for the most part presented the Zionist narrative, from 2000 they presented the critical narrative (at least until 2004). Let us now turn to describe the research upon which the theoretical arguments of this article are based.

2. Methodology

The described research examines the way in which the causes of the 1948 exodus were presented in all the publications of five Israeli institutions over fifty-six years – between 1949 (right after the end of the 1948 War) and the end of 2004 (when the research began). Three state institutions represent the official memory: (1) The Information Branch in the IDF Education Corps, which the main unit for disseminating information among soldiers; (2) The Publications Agency in the National Information Center, the main institution in Israel for disseminating information among its citizens; (3) The Ministry of Education, which approves history and civics textbooks for use in middle and high schools in the national secular educational system (the biggest in Israel). The two societal institutions examined are: (1) Memoirs by Jewish war veterans who participated in the 1948 War (autobiographical memory); (2) Studies of the research community (historical memory). Thus this contribution examines
three kinds of memories: official, autobiographical, and historical (hereafter “the exodus research”).

All of the analyzed publications from these five institutions were written by Jews in Hebrew. The texts were analyzed to identify the narratives they presented regarding the exodus, for example, the Zionist narrative or the critical one. Other characteristics of the publications were also analyzed, for instance, the scope of discussion of the exodus (Glassner and Moreno 1989). Interviews were also conducted with key people who worked in the institutions during the research period: for example, directors of the Publications Agency, national history supervisors in the Ministry of Education, renowned scholars (e.g., Benny Morris), and 1948 war veterans. The interviews were conducted using semi-structured questionnaires, allowing the interviewees to comment on various issues on their own initiative (Mac-Craken 1988).

The research is based on 1,076 bibliographical items and 96 interviews (with 60 subjects, some of whom were interviewed more than once). Publication analysis provided most of the descriptive findings (e.g., what were the characteristics of the various memories?), while the interviews largely provided the explanatory aspect. The interviews clarified the reasons for the diagnosed characteristics of the memories, for instance, why a particular state institution presented the Zionist narrative and not the critical one. They also explored the extent of actual knowledge in these institutions regarding the causes of the 1948 exodus. In this regard, this research is different from many other memory studies whose explanatory aspect is often not based on actual evidence such as the current interviews.

3. Findings

It is widely accepted that people or institutions may internally hold one narrative, and externally present the same narrative or a different one (i.e., that two sub-memories exist, internal and external). Here, we are dealing with a situation in which each of the two sub-memories contains a different narrative (and this will be applied to the three kinds of memories).

Starting with the internal official sub-memory, the staff at the three state institutions were highly informed about topics related to their work, including the 1948 exodus. Accordingly, they were aware of the critical narrative about the exodus, and regarded it (and not the Zionist narrative) as accurate. This was even true also in the early period (up until the late 1970s), when the critical narrative had minimal public presence in Israeli societal institutions. Institutions’ staff learned about this narrative via sources such as personal experience in the 1948 War, stories told to them about it, critical studies published by scholars living outside of Israel, or articles in the Israeli maverick weekly Haolam Haze. They had many more chances to learn about the critical narrative after the late 1970s, when it became publicly very present in these societal institutions, where it has been dominant since the late 1980s (Publications Agency: Nets-Zehngut 2008, forthcoming; IDF: Nets-Zehngut unpublished-b; Ministry of Education: Nets-Zehngut unpublished-c).

Specifically, starting with the Education Corps: Yesha'yahu Tadmor, a senior figure from 1959 until 1971, who attained the rank of Deputy Chief Officer of the Corps, said about the approach at the Corps at that time regarding the causes for the exodus: “I knew that a big part [of the Palestinians in 1948] were expelled … it was clear that there was an expulsion … of course we knew” (interview with Yeshahayau Tadmor, Tel Aviv, June 2007, 7 and 10). Likewise, Avner Shalev, a major figure in the Corps from 1969 until 1980, who became Chief Officer, said: “There were events that led to the War of Independence … [the 1948 War] part of it was the Haifa case of [the Jews asking the Palestinians to] ’remain,’ and they ran away, villages that they ran away from since they were afraid of the approaching IDF, and incidents when they were expelled …

10 For similar support, see, for example: Mordechai Bar-On, Deputy Chief Officer and Chief Officer of the Corps from 1961 until 1968 (interview with Mordechai Bar-On, Jerusalem, June 2006), and Mati Greenberg, who served in senior positions in the Publicity Branch and in the History Department — which supervised the IDF’s publications — from 1969 until 1988, as well as later as a reservist (interview with Mati Greenberg, Tel Aviv, December 2006). Other officers who served later in the Education Corps held the same approach to the exodus. For example: Yoav Spiegel (interview with Yoav Spiegel, Tsrifin, June 2007) and Orna Kotler (interview with Orna Kotler, Tel Aviv, June 2007).
We knew, mainly in the south, that they were expelled” (interview with Avner Shalev, Ramat Hasharon, June 2007, 6). Similarly, in the Information Center: Shlomo Rosner, who worked in various senior positions in the Publications Agency and other departments from 1963 until 1999, asserts: “Twenty years after 1948 there were many people here [in Israel], thousands of people, who knew that there had been expulsions [in 1948]. So what, did we [in the Information Center] live in a bubble? … The fact that we were working for the Information Center did not isolate us [meaning, we knew about the expulsions]” (interview with Shlomo Rosner, Jerusalem, January 2009, 3 and 4). The situation was the same in the Ministry of Education, for example, regarding Yehoshua Mathias, Ada Moshcovits, and Shifra Kulat who wrote textbooks and worked in the Ministry roughly from 1970 until the mid-1990s, and regarding Ya’acov Landau, who co-authored a history textbook for the Ministry in 1964 (interviews with Yehoshua Mathias, Jerusalem, September 2007, and Tel Aviv, May 2009; with Ada Moshcovits, Jerusalem, September 2007; with Shifra Kulat, Jerusalem, September 2007; phone interview with Ya’acov Landau, June 2009). The staff at these three state institutions also communicated among themselves, within their institutions, the critical narrative.

In summation, the internal official sub-memory of the three state institutions was critical, at least until 2004. By contrast, as we saw in the “background” part of this article, where the Israeli official memory of the exodus was described, the external official sub-memory of the three state institutions was largely Zionist (except for the Ministry of Education, which became critical after 2000) (IDF: Nets-Zehngut unpublished-b; Publications Agency: Nets-Zehngut 2008, forthcoming; education system, through textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education: Nets-Zehngut unpublished-c).

Moving to autobiographical memory, the analysis covered sixty-eight memoirs addressing the 1948 exodus that were published from 1949 to 2004. Some of the memoirs are personal (about the experiences of their individual authors), while others are collective (e.g., of battalions and brigades, usually written by veterans’ committees). Many of these veterans were already dead by the time the exodus research was conducted. Thus, while these memoirs provide the external autobiographical sub-memory of the exodus, it is in most cases impossible to determine the corresponding internal autobiographical sub-memory. However, it is possible to diagnose the existence of internal and external autobiographical sub-memories in certain cases where war veterans externally presented the Zionist narrative, while internally holding the critical narrative. It is thus reasonable to assume that if this phenomenon occurred with these specific war veterans, as demonstrated below, it probably also occurred with more veterans.

Specifically, several 1948 war veterans presented the Zionist narrative in earlier memoirs, but later shifted to the critical one (Nets-Zehngut unpublished-a). For instance, Moshe Carmel, commander of the Northern Front in 1948, provided the Zionist narrative in his 1949 memoir, but in a 1978 newspaper article and a 1989 memoir followed the critical narrative (Carmel 1949, 1978, 1989). There can be no doubt that in 1949 he was already aware of the critical narrative from personal experience (as he wrote later, and also because in 1948 he gave written orders to expel Palestinians, which were traced in the 1980s), but did not present it publicly (Morris 2001). The same applies to Shmuel (Mula) Cohen, commander of the Iftach Brigade in 1948 (the 1970 and 1978 Brigade memoirs in contrast to the 1989 and 2000 memoirs) (Respectively: Even-Nur 1970, Hashavya 1978, Cohen 1989, Cohen 2000); and Nahum Golan, commander of the Golany Brigade in 1948 (the 1950 and 1980 Brigade memoirs in contrast to the 1989
memoir) (Respectively: Etsyony 1950, Batelhaim 1980, Golan 1989). Likewise, Ben Dunkelman, commander of the 7th Brigade in 1948, included in the draft of his memoir a paragraph saying that he was given an order to expel the residents of the Palestinian city of Nazareth (which he refused to carry out), but ultimately omitted it from his 1977 memoir (Dunkelman 1977; Kidron 2001). Similarly, in 1978 there was controversy in Israel over the memoir of Yitzhak Rabin, previously Israel’s Premier but in 1948 a mid-level officer. In the draft of his memoir Rabin included a section describing the 1948 expulsion of the residents of the Palestinian towns Lydda and Ramle. The section was censored by a special ministerial committee in the published memoir, but leaked to the public sphere. Yigal Allon, a senior officer in 1948, disputed in the media the content of the section, saying that these residents were not expelled. However, not only were documents found that prove the expulsion, but Allon’s biographer Anita Shapira argues that he knew about it (Allon 1978; Kidron 2001; Shapira 2004). Many additional studies describe similar cases of censorship or self-censorship by 1948 veterans regarding the exodus (e.g., Bar-On 2004; Ben-Ze’ev 2010; Morris 1996; Nave and Yoge 2002; Shapira 2000).

Thus, keeping in mind the description of the Israeli external autobiographical memory in the “Background” section above, we can talk about two general periods of autobiographical memory: until the 1970s, and from then until at least 2004. In the first period, the internal sub-memory was at least partly critical, while the external one was exclusively Zionist. In the second period, though, the situation changed: while the internal sub-memory may have remained unchanged, the external one became fairly significantly critical. This was due to various macro-level changes in Israel (feeling more secure in its existence in the context of the conflict, economic development, becoming less collectivist and conformist) and a decrease in the Arab/Palestinian diplomatic campaign against Israel, as well as micro changes among the veterans (they grew old and retired, and felt they needed to tell the truth in their memoirs before they pass away) (Nets-Zehngut unpublished-a).

Lastly the historical memory was researched similarly to the autobiographical memory (i.e., by analyzing all relevant publications). Given that these two kinds of memories are also similar in their characteristics (and different than the official memory), the historical memory will be discussed following the same pattern as for autobiographical memory. For example, Natanel Lorech, a leading historian of 1948, published at least four books between 1958 and 1978 that dealt in part with the 1948 exodus, all presenting the Zionist narrative (Lorech 1958, 1961, 1976, 1978). However, as Mordechai Bar-On demonstrates (2001, 2004), Lorech was aware of the critical narrative and actually presented it in his 1997 memoir, as well as admitting he had self-censored his writings (Lorech 1997). Similarly, while Elhanan Oren completed a PhD dissertation presenting the critical narrative in 1972, his book (based on the dissertation) published in 1976 contains a more moderate, largely Zionist, narrative of the exodus. At a conference in 1989 he explained that he was more conservative in the book due to external censorship (Oren 1972, 1976, 1989). Likewise, Meir Pail, in general a critical scholar, was at times less critical in his writings in order to avoid damaging Israel’s international image (interview with Meir Pail, Tel Aviv, January 2009). Many additional studies describe similar phenomena of academic self-censorship regarding the conflict and the 1948 exodus; this was in part due to the peer review process (regarding self-censorship and external censorship see section 4.5., “Discussion”) (e.g., Bar-On 2004; Ghazi-Bouillon 2009; Morris 1996; Nave and Yoge 2002; Pappe 1993; Shapira 2000; and Zand 2004).

Thus, here too, we can talk about two periods of memory: until the late 1970s, and from then until at least 2004. In the first period, the internal historical sub-memory was at least partly critical, while the external one was exclusively Zionist. In the second period, though, the situation changed: while the internal sub-memory maybe remained

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13 That is, both Rabin’s and Allon’s external sub-memories presented the Zionist narrative, while their internal sub-memories held the critical one.

14 For a general discussion of the relevant findings about historical memory see: Nets-Zehngut 2011b.
as before, the external one became mostly critical (and since the late 1980s almost exclusively so). The causes for this change were largely the macro-level ones discussed above regarding the autobiographical memory (e.g., the conflict’s situation, economic development and less collectivism; Nets-Zehngut unpublished-a).

In summary, evidence was found for the existence of internal and external sub-memories in each of the three kinds of memory investigated. Thus, the research hypothesis was confirmed.

4. Discussion

We now turn to the various theoretical contributions that flow from realizing the existence of internal and external sub-memories. These contributions are discussed in relation to the common circumstances in which two main narratives are present in the public sphere, dominant and alternative. Nonetheless, the discussion is also relevant to the rarer situations in which more than two narratives are involved. The two main narratives are: the dominant as a typical narrative of conflict portraying the given country positively, while the alternative is more critical towards the country, portraying it less positively (e.g., respectively, the Zionist and critical narratives). The discussion distinguishes, where necessary, between the three kinds of memories.

4.1. The Type of Memories the Literature Discusses

When the literature discusses collective memory (and its official, autobiographical, and historical kinds), it is actually typically discussing the external sub-memory. Examples include: textbooks regarding the official memory, memoirs regarding official memory, and studies regarding historical memory. This shows the need to place more emphasis on the upcoming discussion on the internal sub-memory of the three memories.

4.2. The Importance of the Internal Sub-Memory

One of the topics that the literature typically discusses regarding the external sub-memory is its importance. It influences the popular memory of citizens and a country’s relations with the international community. These are indeed two important aspects of the external sub-memory, since due to its external manifestation it allows for these impacts.

However, internal sub-memory is also important, for two main reasons. First, the way we view the past may lead to us to express these views externally. In other words, the internal sub-memory in each case influences the external sub-memory. Therefore, the internal sub-memory has indirect connections to the abovementioned importance of the external sub-memory. For example, critical internal autobiographical and historical sub-memories promoted the change in their external counterparts to become critical since the 1970s (see related discussion in section 4.7. “The Narratives That the Two Sub-Memories Hold” regarding the second situation). Second, the internal sub-memory is what actually directly influences the behavior of the entities which hold that sub-memory. For example, the behavior of war veterans or scholars towards Arabs/Palestinians (e.g., collaborating in projects, voting on peace agreements, or in daily life) is influenced by their internal (and not external) sub-memory. It is influenced by what they actually think about the past. This is similar in institutions, for instance, regarding the official memory. For example, the Israeli internal official sub-memory (of the diplomatic service) largely adopted the critical narrative regarding the exodus in the late 1990s. This contributed to their willingness at the 2001 Taba conference with the Palestinians to discuss aspects of the Palestinian refugee problem that had not been discussed before (e.g., the possibility of some kind of statement acknowledging the Palestinian 1948 tragedy and implicitly and indirectly Israel’s partial responsibility) (Ben-Josef Hirsch 2007; Lustick 2006).

The above discussion related to the general importance of the internal sub-memory. Specifically, the importance of each internal sub-memory is also determined by the importance of the kind of memory it is part of. For example, official memory is important since it influences, for instance, students in their formative years (through the textbooks of the Ministry of Education) or soldiers (via IDF publications). Autobiographical memory is important as a primary source about the past (via memoirs and testimonies), while the historical memory is important because it uses autobiographical memory and documents in formulating an authoritative description of the past in the studies that scholars write.
4.3. Mutual Influence of Internal-External Sub-Memories

The previous point related to the impact of the internal sub-memory on its counterpart external sub-memory, for instance, the impact of internal historical sub-memory on external historical sub-memory. However, there is also influence in the opposite direction: external sub-memory influences its parallel internal sub-memory. For example, critical studies (external historical sub-memory) may lead some scholars to internally adopt the critical narrative, in other words to change their internal sub-memory. A partial exception to such a direction of influence is autobiographical memory, where people with direct experience are less likely to change their internal sub-memory about an event because of reading a memoir with a contradicting description. They know what happened since they were there. Thus, we can talk about significant reciprocal influences of both types of memories.

This leads us to the conclusion that what the literature describes as “transformation of the collective memory in order to promote peace” (see literature review above) is actually transformation of the internal sub-memory. This memory is the one that directly influences psychological and behavioral reactions. However, this internal sub-memory is influenced by the external sub-memories of various memories. Through their external manifestations of the past they influence the internal sub-memories and lead to this transformation.

4.4. General Characteristics of the Two Sub-Memories

The characteristics of the internal sub-memory are largely similar to those of the external sub-memory, except for the following main differences. First, with regard to the extent of homogeneity: both sub-memories might not be homogeneous, in the sense that they can hold more than one narrative at the same time. For example, relating to the internal sub-memory – state officials, people with direct experience and scholars, each group may hold the dominant and alternative narratives in different compositions (e.g., 60 percent of the scholars hold the dominant narrative and the remaining 40 percent the alternative one). Sometimes, however, memories can be very homogenous. As we saw, the external official, autobiographical, and historical sub-memories regarding the exodus were basically exclusively Zionist until the late 1970s (and in the case of the official memory also on until 1999). It can generally be said that the external sub-memory will tend to be more homogenous than the internal sub-memory (in relation the three kinds of memories discussed). This is due to self-censorship and external censorship (e.g., state censorship of publications or lack of media coverage of a critical book) that can make the external sub-memory conservative (see below).

Second, with regard to the extent of accuracy: as described above, the internal sub-memories of the three kinds of memory tend to hold a narrative which presents the exodus more accurately (critical), than the Zionist narrative which was held at earlier times by the three external sub-memories. For autobiographical and historical memories this was the case until the late 1970s, for the official memory at least until 2004 (except for the Ministry of Education, critical since 2000). However, the accuracy of the internal autobiographical sub-memory decreases as significant time passes, with the deterioration of the memory of the people with direct experience (Gelber 2007; Nets-Zehngut, 2012b). Thus, we can theoretically conclude for these three kinds of memory, that the internal sub-memories will tend to be more accurate than the external (aside from the autobiographical memory, which might deteriorate as significant time passes). Third, internal sub-memory is much less influenced by self-censorship and external censorship than external sub-memory, which is highly influenced by these two mechanisms (see 4.5.).

4.5. The Mechanisms Which Lead to the Differences Between the Two Sub-Memories

When people or institutions hold in their internal sub-memory a certain narrative of an event, some things might prevent them from also holding or presenting the same narrative in their external sub-memory. Two main mechanisms lead to this phenomenon: self-censorship and external censorship.

Self-censorship in the context of the current discussion relates to situations of abstention from full expression of what is thought about the history of a conflict, without explicit instructions to do so (Antilla 2010; Maksudyan 2009). The exodus research identified broad self-censorship of the
There are two main causes for this self-censorship (Nets-Zehngut 2008, 2011b, unpublished-a, unpublished-b, unpublished-c, forthcoming; for (1) also Bar-On 2004; Shapira 2000, 2004): (1) Support for Israel’s international image. In light of the Arab/Palestinian diplomatic campaign against Israel, adhering to the Zionist narrative regarding the exodus was perceived as supporting Israel’s positive international image. (2) Mobilizing the citizens. Portraying Israel positively to its citizens was aimed at fostering high identification with and patriotism towards Israel. This would allow them to better cope with the security and economic difficulties and boost their patriotism.

Six additional causes contributed to the use of self-censorship (Nets-Zehngut 2008, 2011b, unpublished-a, unpublished-b, unpublished-c, forthcoming; for (3), (4), (5), 8 also Bar-On 2004; Gelber 2007; Nave and Yoge 2002; Shapira 2000): (3) The impact of the Zionist ideology. Until the late 1970s, Israelis from across the political spectrum were highly influenced by the Zionist ideology that views Eretz Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people. Therefore, many of them were biased in their approach to the conflict, including the exodus, and inclined to see Israel as just and moral in its conduct. Unconsciously influenced by this ideology, they were blind to the critical narrative of the exodus, and saw only the Zionist narrative. (4) Psychological difficulties. Some of the war veterans who personally witnessed or took part in the expulsion of Palestinians in 1948 found it hard to write about the expulsions. These were difficult scenes, especially for those who had been raised on values of humanism and peace with the Palestinians, as many veterans were. (5) Concern among veterans who expelled Palestinians. Some of these veterans were concerned that their public status might be harmed if their actions were revealed. (6) It was obvious. Many members of the 1948 generation knew that some of the Palestinians left in 1948 voluntarily while others were expelled. It was obvious so they saw no need to discuss it. (7) Institutional norms. The staff at the Education Corps adopted the norm of “transmitting unequivocal messages.” Due to the IDF’s vital role in protecting Israel, no risks were to be taken, and the norm was therefore to present the soldiers with simple, clear, black-and-white messages. Messages that would not raise doubts during combat, as the critical narrative would, being complex and attributing responsibility to both parties. (8) Sanctions. People were aware of the possibility of external censorship should they write critically (see below). This inhibited critical writing among some of them.

Some of the eight empirical causes listed above, including the two main ones, support the “politics of memory” theme (see below): support for Israel’s international image, mobilizing the citizens, concern among veterans who expelled Palestinians, institutional norms, and sanctions. These eight causes can be conceptualized as the following seven theoretical causes: (1) Support for international image; (2) Mobilization of citizens; (3) Ideology; (4) Psychological difficulties; (5) Observability; (6) Institutional norms; (7) Sanctions (due to the exposure of participation in activities that might be perceived as improper, or due to presenting such activities that were done by others, and therefore being exposed to external censorship).

One of these causes influenced the external sub-memory in all three kinds of memory: international image support. As for the other causes, the official memory was also influenced by the theoretical causes 2, 3, 6, and 7 (mobilization of citizens, ideology, institutional norms, and sanctions due to the presentation of expulsions done by others). The autobiographical memory was also influenced by causes 3, 4, 5, and 7 (ideology, psychological difficulties, observability, and sanctions due to participation in expulsions). Lastly, the historical memory was also influenced by causes 3 and 7 (ideology and sanctions due to the presentation of expulsions) (Nets-Zehngut 2008, 2011b, unpublished-a, unpublished-b, unpublished-c, forthcoming). In the Israeli context, the official memory was the one most influenced by self-censorship. That is why it remained Zionist largely throughout the research period, in contrast to the autobiographical and historical memories, which were so only until the 1970s.

Moving to external censorship, this mechanism relates to various societal and state activities aimed at preventing the exposure or dissemination of an alternative critical narrative. It is a wide concept that includes many types of ac-
tivities, such as military censorship, publishers’ refusal to publish critical books, or reluctance of academic institutions to finance critical studies or to hire scholars who critically research sensitive topics. It also includes social criticism, newspapers’ failure to cover the publication of alternative critical books, withholding paper from critical publishers and newspapers, classification of archival documents, and workplace sanctions such as job termination or transfer to a less desired job. Israelis’ awareness of possible external censorship inhibited many from critical activity regarding the exodus (Nets-Zehngut 2008, 2011b, unpublished-a, unpublished-b, unpublished-c, forthcoming).15

In summation, self-censorship and external censorship significantly influence the external sub-memory, especially in the case of official memory.16 They reduce its accuracy in presenting the past, compared to the internal sub-memory. In contrast, the internal sub-memory is not influenced by external censorship and only partly by self-censorship (via ideology and psychological difficulties, only in the case of autobiographical memory). Thus, we can see that self-censorship and external censorship are the main mechanisms that lead to tension between internal and external sub-memories.

4.6. The Politics of Memory

The major theme in recent memory studies is the “politics of memory” (also referred to as “a usable past”), meaning that the past is portrayed in a certain way to promote the present interests of the holder of a certain memory. These interests can be establishing a patriotic and cohesive nation-state, preventing riots among minorities, or fighting the country’s rival. They are promoted by state and societal institutions, such as academia, media, and cultural channels (Radstone and Schwartz 2010; Olick 2007; Wertsch and Karumidze 2009; Winter 2006).

The distinction between the two sub-memories, however, suggests, that the politics theme relates mostly to the external sub-memory. This is the memory which is highly influenced by political interests. A scholar, for instance, does not have to change his internal sub-memory of a conflict because of a diplomatic campaign against his country or because he would like to mobilize his fellow-citizens. Such a campaign or war, though, might strongly influence his external sub-memory. The two main causes for self-censorship of the external sub-memory – international image support and mobilization – underlie this point.

4.7. The Narratives That the Two Sub-Memories Hold

As described, each of the two sub-memories might be homogenous to different degrees. In a highly homogenous situation, there are two most plausible situations regarding the relations between the narratives that the two sub-memories hold: (1) Both hold the same ones. In such a situation, the narrative that the two sub-memories hold will have strong grip on the whole memory (e.g., official or historical memories). Its grip will not be challenged by either of the two sub-memories. (2) The internal sub-memory holds an alternative narrative and the external the dominant narrative. In such a situation, there is tension between the two sub-memories. The alternative narrative at the internal sub-memory might challenge the hegemony of the dominant narrative at the external sub-memory, and at times even overcome it. Such a phenomenon might partly be caused by psychological unease of people presenting an external sub-memory which they know is not accurate. They feel that they are not presenting the truth about the history. In a period of historical reassessment this unease might increase, since these people might be concerned that their inaccurate descriptions will be exposed.17

The situation in Israel until the late 1970s regarding the autobiographical and historical memories of the exodus

15 Support for this tendency can also be found in the Spiral of Silence and Groupthink theories (respectively: Noelle-Neumann 1989; Janis 1982), as well as in Bar-On 2004, Mathias 2005, Pappe 1993, and Zand 2004 (describing this mechanism).

16 See, for example, the earlier discussion of Dunkelman’s memoir (self-censorship) and Rabin’s memoir (external censorship).

17 For example, in an article published in Tikkun in 1988, Benny Morris accused the Israeli “old” historians of falsifying the history of the conflict, including the exodus, by presenting the Zionist inaccurate narrative (Morris 1988). Shabtai Teveth, a leading “old” historian, was highly offended by this accusation and initiated a long historical controversy with Morris (Nets-Zehngut 2011b, in preparation). Natanel Lorch, another “old” leading historian, was also offended by these accusations (Lorch 1997). However, since that accusation, both Teveth and Lorch have presented – e.g., in newspaper articles and a book – the critical narrative regarding the exodus (even though they previously presented its Zionist narrative).
probably exemplifies such a situation. There is no evidence that these internal autobiographical and historical sub-memories were exclusively critical or alternative during that period. However, even if they were only partly critical, as they probably were, they led to challenges to the external autobiographical and historical sub-memories, which were Zionist. And indeed, after the 1970s these external sub-memories became more critical.18

4.8. Methods of Research
The discussion above points out the need to use different methods in researching the external and the internal sub-memories. The external sub-memory is researched by examining its external manifestations (e.g., textbooks, monuments, memoirs, and studies). In contrast, researching the internal sub-memory cannot use external manifestations since they might be influenced by self-censorship and external censorship. Therefore, it should be researched in more private and anonymous settings, such as interviews or anonymous questionnaires.

5. Conclusion
While the literature regarding collective memory typically discusses it as a unified phenomenon, this contribution suggests that each kind of memory includes internal and external components. The research proves the existence of these two sub-memories regarding the Israeli official autobiographical, and historical memories of the 1948 exodus. Based on these findings, various additional theoretical contributions were obtained: it was found that the literature usually addresses the external sub-memory of each of the three memories, and the different importance of each sub-memory were discussed. The external influencing the popular memory and the country’s relations with the international community, and the internal as influencing the external sub-memory and the behavior of the entities that hold the memory. Then, the reciprocal relations of the two sub-memories were discussed, as well as the general differences between them with regard to homogeneity, accuracy, and the impact of self-censorship and external censorship. Self-censorship and external censorship were identified as the two mechanisms that cause the difference between the two memories, and the “politics of memory” theme was diagnosed as influencing mostly the external sub-memory. Lastly, two situations and their consequences were addressed: when both sub-memories hold the same narrative, and when the internal holds an alternative narrative and the external a dominant narrative, and the different methods for researching both types of memories were described.

While the above analysis relates to collective memory of an intractable conflict, it is also relevant to the collective memory of tractable conflicts, as well as to that of other topics such as nationalism, leaders, and identity. Selective and biased narratives are also constructed regarding these topics. For instance, typical national narratives in the past two centuries describe nations heroically, as unique entities positively differentiated from “other” nations. This was done to mobilize the citizens to the national projects of building and nurturing their countries, and thus plays a major role in national politics (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Rosoux 2001). In terms of future research it is thus recommended that memory studies pay more nuanced attention to these two sub-memories, and explore their characteristics.

18 Theoretically there could be a third situation, the opposite to the second, where the internal memory holds a dominant narrative and the external the alternative narrative (e.g., internal = Zionist, and external = critical). In reality, though, this situation is not common.
Cool Minds in Heated Debates? Migration-related Attitudes in Germany Before and After a Natural Intervention

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Cool Minds in Heated Debates? Migration-related Attitudes in Germany Before and After a Natural Intervention

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Data from the Transatlantic Trends: Immigration survey was used to investigate whether the debate surrounding Thilo Sarrazin’s immigration-skeptical Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany abolishes itself) had any impact on migration-related attitudes in Germany. The book was published in August 2010 and fieldwork took place during the evolving debate, providing a unique opportunity to study the impact of a major media event on public attitudes. Descriptive findings on the aggregate level show no substantial change in migration-related attitudes in the months after publication. More detailed findings reveal a significant increase in skepticism only for respondents with low levels of education, whose assessment of Muslim migrants’ integration became more negative during the debate. There are two possible reasons for the lack of more substantial attitudinal change. Firstly, the debate was highly polarized and lacked the consonant national media coverage that is an important precondition for media effects on public opinion. Secondly, there were no additional “external shocks” prior to the book’s release, such as a high levels of immigration, that could have made the public more susceptible to criticism of the impact of migration.

In the late summer of 2010, the German debate on the topic of immigration suddenly gained great momentum when the book Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany abolishes itself) was published. Written by Thilo Sarrazin, then a board member of the German Bundesbank, the book was the number one bestseller for twenty-one weeks (www.buchreport.de) and according to media data the top-selling political book in post-war Germany (www.buchmarkt.de). Many political leaders including the Chancellor and the Federal President commented on the case, and for weeks it was almost impossible to switch on the TV or open a newspaper without hearing or reading about Sarrazin’s book. The public debate was not focused only on its substantive claims. It also discussed whether the author was “finally” telling the truth that the German public had not been allowed to hear out of political correctness – or whether he was hiding blatantly racist ideas under a blanket of distorted scientific facts. Some reviewers – though a minority – pictured the book as a “fearless” attempt to at last enlighten the public about the failed integration of Muslim migrants (Kelek 2010), while others applied Sarrazin’s picture of migrants to his book: “uneducated, rapidly proliferating, and way too fat” (Bernard 2010).

In this article, we examine whether and to what extent the debate had a short- or medium-term impact on migration-related attitudes. As already mentioned, the debate was very visible in the media (even though the book was probably bought by many but read by few). Given the importance of news reports in shaping public attitudes on this topic (Schlueter and Davidov 2011; Boomgarden and Vliegenthart 2009; Lubbers, Scheepers, and Vergeer 2000), it is an interesting question whether Germans became more skeptical in their assessment of the economic and cultural impact of immigration on Germany and of migrants’ integration, or if at-
Attitudes remained stable throughout the debate. We also consider whether education, political orientation, and exposure to the debate had a mediating effect on the influence of this event on migration-related attitudes.

We analyze data from the cross-sectional survey “Transatlantic Trends: Immigration (TTI)” that has been conducted annually since 2008 by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). While many surveys collect data on public attitudes toward migration-related issues, this one is unique in asking much more specific questions on topics such as the perceived success of Muslims’ integration; the economic and cultural impact of immigration; attitudes about high- and low-skilled migration; and satisfaction with government performance in this field. By chance, the fieldwork for the 2010 wave started just a few days before the publication of Sarrazin’s book. This coincidence of a heated public debate about the consequences of migration with the collection of public opinion data on the same topic turned TTI 2010 in Germany into a natural experiment.

We will begin by outlining Sarrazin’s position on immigration and integration, before presenting the relevant theoretical explanations for migration-related attitudes and the mechanisms through which the debate may have affected them. After describing the data, measurements, and methodology used in our analyses we will show if and how public attitudes changed over the course of the debate.

1. The “Sarrazin Debate”

Deutschland schafft sich ab was officially published on August 30, 2010, but excerpts began appearing in the mass-circulation Bild newspaper from August 23. The debate gained momentum in September when Sarrazin appeared in several talk shows, the Bundesbank prepared his removal from office (he resigned on September 9), and the Social Democratic Party looked into the possibility of expelling him. By September 13 the book was a number one bestseller, and remained so until February 5, 2011. By early October – only one month after publication – more than one million copies had been sold.

The book’s general strategy is to formulate emotive and provocative statements and to “prove” them with allegedly “hard” but – convoluted and distorted – data and facts. The main topics relevant for this paper are immigration; its impact on Germany’s culture, demography, public services, economy, and crime rates; and the supposed failure of integration of Muslim migrants. Sarrazin considers the immigration of Muslims to be a direct threat to German liberal culture and lifestyle (2010, 266) and claims that this cultural threat is even more problematic because this group does not make any meaningful contribution to the German economy. When it comes to explaining Muslim migrants’ allegedly failing integration, he discusses cultural and motivational aspects (260–65, 286–99). According to Sarrazin, discrimination is not a contributing factor in this group’s lagging integration (287). Instead, cultural backwardness and Islam itself are held responsible, in combination with a lack of interest in becoming independent and being successful: “A lack of integration is due to the attitudes of Muslim immigrants” (289, translated, italics in the original). Sarrazin expects this situation to worsen in the future because he considers second and third generation migrants to be even more likely to apply for social benefits instead of engaging in the labor market (264, 284). Moreover, Muslim migrants have higher fertility rates than native Germans, especially when compared to more educated German women (347). In essence, the allegedly adverse effects on Germany’s culture, economy, demography, and crime rates, as well as Muslim migrants’ supposedly failing integration even in the second and third generation are the focus of the migration-relevant chapters of the book. As we will show below, several items included in the TTI survey capture public attitudes on these very issues. Before describing the data in greater detail, we need to consider why one would expect these attitudes to be affected by the Sarrazin debate at all.

2. The Debate and Migration-Related Attitudes: Two Possible Mechanisms

2.1. The Impact of the Media on Perceptions of Economic and Cultural Threat

Theoretical approaches focusing on perceived or real competitive threat feature prominently when it comes to explaining migration-related attitudes. After all, they offer explanations for differences across contexts or changes over time in the strength of anti-immigrant sentiment. Theories of realistic group conflict emphasize the role of threat to real group interests, practices and resources; group-threat theory...
emphasizes more strongly “the perception of threat to dominant group prerogatives” (Quillian 1995, 588, italics added). Increased group competition enhances ingroup solidarity and susceptibility to outgroup devaluation (Sherif and Sherif 1979, 11). The latter is met with collectively shared feelings of superiority, social distance, and fear of status loss (Blumer 1958, 3–4). These dynamics have been shown regarding migrants in general (Schneider 2008, 62) as well as regarding Muslims specifically (Velasco González et al. 2008, 678). Competitive threat can take different forms, most importantly economic or cultural. Rising numbers of migrants and worsening economic conditions have been identified as important factors increasing (perceived) group threat (Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009; Quillian 1995).

Not all individuals are affected to the same degree by changes in these conditions; rather, the impact of macro-level changes on individual attitudes is mediated by individual characteristics. Perceptions of economic threat are influenced by socio-structural variables such as education or occupational status: “Individual-level characteristics indicate in part which individuals are most vulnerable to expressing prejudice when they perceive that their group is threatened” (Quilian 1995: 591). Cultural threat, i.e. perceived threats to collective identity and national homogeneity, is mostly mediated by individual-level variables such as political orientation or type of national identity (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006, 428).

Negative reports about immigrants in the media have also been shown to foster perceptions of economic or cultural threat and to increase anti-immigrant attitudes. Blumer already demonstrated in the 1950s that attitudes about a seemingly subordinate and distant group are not the result of personal experiences but formed in the “public arena”: “public figures of prominence … are likely to be the key figures in the formation of the sense of group position and in the characterization of the subordinate group” (1958, 6). Sarrazin, who already had acquired a certain reputation – and popularity – for talking “frankly” about societal problems during his time as Berlin’s Finance Minister, certainly was such a “public figure.” In a similar vein, the media debate sparked by the publication of his book could have affected how people thought about migration (rather than just the topic’s general salience), a phenomenon called second-level agenda setting (Balmas and Sheafer 2009). The “evaluative tone in the media” about a certain issues causes what Sheafer calls the “affective priming” of political issues (or candidates) (2007). At least some media outlets, most importantly the high-circulation German tabloid Bild, repeatedly framed Sarrazin’s statements as a brave attempt to address problems no one dares talk about, most importantly Muslim migrants’ supposedly failing integration.

Different effects of the media on migration-related attitudes have been identified: direct effects, through exposure to different types of newspapers that cover, for example, the topic of “ethnic crime” in various ways (Lubbers, Scheepers, and Verger 2000), and indirect effects concerning the relationship between changes in the general media coverage of migration issues and migration-related attitudes (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009). The idea behind indirect effects is that even those who do not follow news reports on migrants themselves are affected by media debates on the issue because they talk about this issue with friends and relatives. The empirical studies reviewed so far provide at least some empirical evidence that negative reports on the topic of migration in the media increase levels of perceived migration-related threat. A lag of one or two months is considered to be the most relevant time period for the impact of news reports on migration-related attitudes (Schlueter and Davidov 2011; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009). Even if the debate under consideration here is certainly a special type of media coverage, it seems quite plausible that Sarrazin’s book would have affected the attitudes under consideration. On the one hand, it could have increased perceptions that native Germans and migrants compete for scarce resources such as social benefits. On the other hand, Sarrazin’s statements about “culturally distant” Muslim migrants unwilling to integrate but rapidly becoming demographically ascendant may have strengthened fears that “Germanness in Germany is getting more and more diluted” (Sarrazin 2010, 393, translated).

2.2. Shifting Perceptions About the “Right” Answers to Migration-Related Survey Questions

There is, however, another mechanism by which the book could have affected not necessarily native Germans’ migration-related attitudes but their answers to survey ques-
tions about the issue. The latter can be biased by “social desirability”: If there are strong norms about seemingly appropriate answers to questions on a certain topic, some respondents are likely to skew their answers accordingly. As outlined above, Sarrazin’s supporters claimed that he had finally said out loud what no-one dared to say because it was “politically incorrect.” This element was, for example, very strong in the arguments put forward by supporters such as Necla Kelek (2010). The issue of “Denkverbote” ("political taboos") played an important role in the debate, so it is quite possible that the perception of social norms about “appropriate” answers to migration-related survey questions changed in the course of the debate. Theoretically, these norms might be seen as the standard against which respondents’ answers are evaluated before they are reported (Strack 1994). Consequently, a shift in perceptions of these norms may have led to more “honest” answers because the formerly perceived gap between the answers respondents want to give and the answers they perceive as being socially acceptable could have narrowed during the debate. This could have been the case especially for those who have always been skeptical of immigration but did not want to admit it because they felt that this violated the norm of positive attitudes on the issue. As research has shown, this feeling is shared by respondents with higher levels of education and political liberals in particular (Janus 2010; Stocké 2007).

The two mechanisms presented in this section lead to different conclusions about which subgroups of natives should have been affected by the debate: As already mentioned, perceived economic and cultural threat is usually stronger among individuals with low levels of education, conservative political ideologies, and an ethnic national identity. Changing perceptions of what it is socially desirable to think about migrants and immigration should, in turn, mainly affect the highly educated and liberals. We thus expect both groups to have been affected by the debate, even though the underlying mechanisms may differ. And finally, we expect attitudinal change to have been most pronounced among those who have had a high direct or indirect exposure to the debate, i.e. who followed migration-related topics closely in the news or discussed them frequently with friends. We will now turn to the analysis of changes in respondents’ answers to migration and integration-related questions over the course of the Sarrazin debate.

3. Data, Measurements, and Methodology
As already mentioned in the introduction, the following analyses are based on data from the survey “Transatlantic Trends: Immigration” (Gustin and Ziebarth 2010). The main aim of this cross-sectional survey is to collect data on public attitudes to migration and integration-related issues. It has been conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States every year since 2008 in six European countries as well as the United States and Canada (the number of countries included in the survey changes slightly between years). Computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) with one thousand randomly sampled adults per country were conducted by TNS Opinion.

Depending on the item under consideration, the analyses presented here are based on data collected in Germany between 2009 and 2011. Our main focus lies on data collected in 2010: the book was officially released on August 30, 2010, three days after the beginning of the fieldwork, and a heated public debate evolved during the two weeks in which the fieldwork continued. Furthermore, the survey was repeated two months later in November 2010 (with different respondents) when it became clear that this would offer an opportunity to study the medium-term impact of the Sarrazin debate on migration-related attitudes. Furthermore, many items asked in 2010 were also used in 2009 and 2011. Taken together, these data allow for a detailed analysis of the debate’s short- and medium-term impact on public perceptions of immigration and integration in Germany. Only respondents with at least one parent born in Germany are included in the analyses¹. This reduces the number to about nine hundred.
3.1. Dependent Variables: Attitudes on the Impact of Migration and on (Muslim) Migrants’ Integration

Since the choice of dependent variables follows the relevant content of the book, we analyze public attitudes on the impact of immigration and on (Muslim) migrants’ integration. Attitudes on the impact of immigration are frequently measured with item batteries that ask about respondents’ perceptions of the impact of migration on national culture, on the economy, and on public safety (Zick, Küpper, and Wolf 2010; Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; McLaren 2003; for Germany: Fertig and Schmidt 2011; Rippl 2008). Items on the impact of migration often focus on job competition between native Germans and migrants. However, since Sarrazin’s point is not that migrants take jobs away from native Germans but that they tend to abstain from work and live on benefits instead, we concentrate on the following aspects of perceived cultural and economic threat:

Impact of Migration:
(a) Culture: Some people think that immigration enriches German culture with new customs and ideas. Others think that these new customs and ideas negatively affect German culture (two-point-scale: immigration enriches German culture – immigration negatively affects German culture)
(b) Social benefits: Legal immigrants are a burden on social services like schools and hospitals (four-point scale: strongly agree – strongly disagree)

Items about integration measure respondents’ perceptions of how well migrants should or do adapt to their new context. Available data suggest that it is important to differentiate between specific groups of immigrants when it comes to public perceptions of integration. In Germany, perceived cultural and social distance is much greater towards Turks than towards other immigrant groups (Blohm and Wasmer 2008). This is most likely related to Turks’ mostly Muslim background. Survey research shows that a large majority of Germans thinks that Muslim migrants prefer to segregate (Leibold and Kühnel 2006, 144). Moreover, recent studies show that Muslims are perceived as a group that tends to be aggressive, egoistical, arrogant, and intolerant, as well as supporting terrorist activities and showing fundamentalist tendencies (Fischer et al. 2007, 379; Wike and Grim 2010, 18; Zick and Küpper 2009, 3). About one third of the German public holds Islam-critical attitudes (Leibold and Kummerer 2011, 321). This general skepticism about Muslims could have been fueled by Sarrazin’s book: As outlined above, Sarrazin makes a point of drawing a line between “good” migrants and “bad” Muslim migrants who are allegedly responsible for “70 to 80 percent of all problems in the fields of education, labor market, public transfers, and criminal behavior” (2010, 262, translated). In a second step, we will thus focus on items that capture native Germans’ assessment of (Muslim) migrants’ integration:

Evaluation of Integration:
(c) Generally speaking, how well do you think that (split sample: Muslim immigrants / immigrants in general) are integrating into German society? (four-point scale: very well – very poorly)

Half of respondents were asked about Muslim migrants’ integration and half about migrants’ integration in general. This enables us to analyze whether Sarrazin’s differentiation between “good” and “bad” migrants found increasing support during the course of the debate.

3.2. Independent Variables: Education, Political Orientation, Direct and Indirect Exposure to the Debate

As mentioned above, the differentiation between native Germans with high and low levels of education is crucial for our analyses. Native Germans with low levels of education can be expected to feel more threatened by migrants economically, while skilled native Germans are more likely to give socially desirable answers to migration-related survey questions, a tendency that may have decreased during the debate. Here we draw the line between those who have attained university entrance qualifications (Abitur), and those who have less school education. A closer look at this variable reveals that the sample is skewed towards the better-educated native Germans in both waves (see Table 1). This does not cause a severe problem for our analyses, though, since we are interested in change over time and not so much in the absolute level of migration-related skepticism.

Starting out from a cultural threat perspective, additional independent variables gain importance: Migration-related threat to ingroup integrity and status is higher for
those who see migrants as outgroup members per se. This is expected to be more strongly the case for individuals with an ethnic national identity than for those with a civic-cultural national identity (Diehl and Tucci 2010; Lewin-Epstein and Levanon 2005; Hjerm 1998). In TTI 2010, national identity is captured by asking respondents which preconditions they consider to be most important for migrants’ naturalization. Since this question on national identity yields a very skewed distribution, we take a closer look at respondents’ political orientation in our analyses instead (center/right versus left). This variable is not only closely related to national identity, it can also be expected to be an important predictor of perceived migration-related cultural threat (Semyonov, Rajzman, and Gorodzeisky 2006, 428).

In order to capture respondents’ exposure to the debate we include in our analyses the following two items that can serve as proxies for direct and indirect exposure, respectively:

How closely do you follow news about immigration and immigrant integration issues in Germany? When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss immigration matters frequently, occasionally, or never?

As control variables we include age, sex, and – since East and West Germans still differ in terms of migration-related attitudes (Diehl and Tucci 2010) – region in our analyses. With regard to age we compare young and middle-aged with elderly respondents since age is only included as a grouped variable in the data set.

In the empirical section we analyze whether and how the answers to the aforementioned items changed over the course of the Sarrazin debate – at the aggregate level and separately for native Germans with high versus low levels of education, for those with a center/right versus a left-wing political orientation, and for those who have had more or less exposure to the debate, either directly (following news) or indirectly (talking with friends). This will tell us whether attitudes that typically vary between these subgroups became more polarized in the course of the debate. In order to study change over time, we built a time-dependent variable grouping two to four days of interviewing, so that we ended up with eight time units spread over the first wave (before and directly after publication of the book) and the second wave (two months later) of data collection. Table 1 presents a descriptive overview of the dependent and independent variables.2
Table 1: Distribution of model variables by wave (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Wave 1</th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of native Germans thinking that immigration negatively affects German culture</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of native Germans “strongly” or “somewhat” agreeing that immigrants are a burden on social services like schools and hospitals</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of native Germans thinking that immigrants in general are integrating “very poorly” or “poorly” into German society</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of native Germans thinking that Muslim immigrants are integrating “very poorly” or “poorly” into German society</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (lower level of education)</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation (center-right)</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussing immigrant matters with friends (frequently)</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following news about immigration (very closely)</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (55–65+)</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (male)</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (eastern Germany)</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4. Findings

4.1. Was There Any Attitudinal Change on the Aggregate Level?

We will first take a closer look at the development of direct and indirect exposure to the Sarrazin debate. During the period under consideration, no other migration-related issue was very prominent in the media. We can thus safely assume that any change in intensity with which respondents followed the news on the issue or talked about it with friends must be related to the Sarrazin debate (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Share of native Germans following the topic in the news “very closely” and talking with friends “frequently” about migration issues by date of interview (percent)

* Answer categories: very closely, fairly closely, not very closely, not at all; ** Answer categories: frequently, occasionally, never
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration (TTI) 2010, own calculations
In fact, we can see that after the book launch in late August, Germans followed the news on this issue significantly more closely and discussed the topic with friends more often than before. By mid-November at the latest, levels had returned almost back to “normal” again: The topic seems to be less prominent in the media or was at least not followed very closely any longer, and the issue was no longer discussed significantly more often with friends than before the official book release.

If we now turn to the perceived cultural impact of migration we find that migration-related attitudes remained relatively stable throughout the course of the debate. Even though many respondents did obviously follow the debate, Sarrazin’s worries that his offspring will live in a country that has lost its “cultural and intellectual capacity” (2010, 392) were not shared by the German public, at least not more strongly than before the publication of the book (Figure 2).

The slight increase between late August and early November 2010 is statistically insignificant. This overall rather optimistic view about the impact of migration on German culture is also demonstrated by other studies (Semyonov, Rajman, and Gorodzeisky 2008, 12). As outlined above, the claim that many Muslim migrants show little inclination to work but prefer to live on social benefits features prominently throughout the book. The graph shows a (statistically significant) increase in worries about migrants being an economic burden between the beginning of wave 1 and the beginning of wave 2. It should also be noted, however, that overall approval of this item was lower in 2010 than in the year after the debate, which raises the question whether this increase can really be attributed to the “Sarrazin debate.” Furthermore, the comparatively high instability in attitudes might be caused by the examples of social services given in the question wording (“schools and hospitals”). These two issues are less prominent in the public debate in Germany than in many other countries surveyed by TTI, e.g. the United Kingdom or the United States. In the German context, this item may thus measure so-called “non-attitudes” that are usually unstable and thus hard to “explain” (Converse 1964).

The items presented so far refer to migrants in general. As outlined above, Sarrazin draws a sharp distinction between
“good” and “bad” (i.e. Muslim) migrants. We therefore analyze whether the German public follows Sarrazin’s differentiation – and whether it gained salience during the course of the debate. Fortunately, a closer look at the TTI data can settle this question, because in 2010 a new item was inserted into the questionnaire asking about the perception of migrants’ integration. Half of the sample was asked about migrants in general, half of the sample about Muslim migrants in particular. The distribution of answers to these questions is shown in Figure 3.

**Figure 3: Share of native Germans thinking that Muslim immigrants/immigrants in general are integrating into German society “very poorly” or “poorly” by date of interview (percent)**

![Figure 3: Share of native Germans thinking that Muslim immigrants/immigrants in general are integrating into German society “very poorly” or “poorly” by date of interview (percent)](image)

We can see, first of all, that Muslim migrants’ integration is regarded with substantially greater skepticism than the integration of migrants in general, a finding that has also been shown for other European countries such as Spain and the United Kingdom (Transatlantic Trends: 2010, 29). While the size of the gap between the attitudes toward migrants in general and toward Muslim migrants in particular widened in the course of the debate, this was mostly because attitudes towards immigrants in general became slightly more positive over time (p < .10).

**4.2. Did Subgroups of Native Germans React Differently to the Debate?**

We have already been able to show that overall assessments of the impact of migration and of migrants’ integration did not change substantially in the course of the debate. This may seem surprising given that we deliberately analyzed those items that refer to the specific issues raised by Sarrazin: Migrants as a threat to German culture, a burden on social services, and not willing or able to integrate. However, before we rush to the conclusion that the debate made no difference to migration-related attitudes, we need to take a more detailed look at how specific subgroups reacted. According to the theoretical arguments outlined above, it is quite possible that native Germans with low levels of education, conservative political orientations, and more exposure to the media debate were more susceptible to Sarrazin’s arguments than others who may even have started – in defiance of the book’s claims – to feel more positive about the issue. In order to look into this possibility, we ran several regression models on the variables analyzed so far (models including standard errors can be found in tables 2A–4A in the appendix). The first model contains the independent variables described above, while models 2 to 4 contain additional interaction terms between date of interview and education (model 2), political orientation (model 3), and exposure through debates with friends (model 4). Since direct exposure did not have any significant effect on attitudes we concentrate in the following on the variable “talking with friends frequently about migration issues.”
Table 2: “Immigration negatively affects German culture” (unstandardized logistic regression coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education (ref. = high level of education)</td>
<td>0.985***</td>
<td>1.351***</td>
<td>0.997***</td>
<td>0.989***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation (ref. = left)</td>
<td>0.927***</td>
<td>0.929***</td>
<td>1.104**</td>
<td>0.959***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking with friends (ref. = occasionally or never)</td>
<td>1.137***</td>
<td>1.131***</td>
<td>1.164***</td>
<td>1.739*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (ref. = 18-54)</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (ref. = female)</td>
<td>0.386**</td>
<td>0.386**</td>
<td>0.388**</td>
<td>0.374**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (ref. = western states)</td>
<td>0.609***</td>
<td>0.616***</td>
<td>0.606***</td>
<td>0.626***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date (ref. = 27.08.-30.08.10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 1: 31.08.-02.09.10</td>
<td>-0.343</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td>-0.212</td>
<td>-0.457*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 1: 03.09.-06.09.10</td>
<td>-0.395*</td>
<td>-0.225</td>
<td>-0.579</td>
<td>-0.392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 1: 07.09.-10.09.10</td>
<td>-0.415*</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>-0.462</td>
<td>-0.451*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 2: 09.11.-11.11.10</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>0.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 2: 12.11.-15.11.10</td>
<td>-0.353</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
<td>-0.313</td>
<td>-0.258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 2: 16.11.-19.11.10</td>
<td>-0.314</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>-0.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 2: 20.11.-24.11.10</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>-0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions (ref. = 27.08.-30.08.10 × variable)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.08.-02.09.10 × Education</td>
<td>-0.511</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.09.-06.09.10 × Education</td>
<td>-0.312</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.09.-10.09.10 × Education</td>
<td>-0.446</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.11.-11.11.10 × Education</td>
<td>-0.340</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.11.-15.11.10 × Education</td>
<td>-0.491</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.11.-19.11.10 × Education</td>
<td>-0.662</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.11.-24.11.10 × Education</td>
<td>-0.235</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.08.-02.09.10 × Political orientation</td>
<td>-0.209</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.09.-06.09.10 × Political orientation</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.09.-10.09.10 × Political orientation</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.11.-11.11.10 × Political orientation</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.11.-15.11.10 × Political orientation</td>
<td>-0.086</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.11.-19.11.10 × Political orientation</td>
<td>-0.539</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.11.-24.11.10 × Political orientation</td>
<td>-0.575</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.08.-02.09.10 × Talking with friends</td>
<td>0.612</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.09.-06.09.10 × Talking with friends</td>
<td>-0.464</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.09.-10.09.10 × Talking with friends</td>
<td>-0.255</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>09.11.-11.11.10 × Talking with friends</td>
<td>-1.050</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.11.-15.11.10 × Talking with friends</td>
<td>-1.206</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.11.-19.11.10 × Talking with friends</td>
<td>-1.890+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.11.-24.11.10 × Talking with friends</td>
<td>-0.397</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.044***</td>
<td>-2.251***</td>
<td>-2.165***</td>
<td>-2.080***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R2</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
With respect to the perceived impact of migration on German culture (Table 2), the picture outlined above is overall confirmed. The basic model reveals that migration-related attitudes do not show a clear pattern over the course of the debate: The variable “date of interview” yields only a few statistically significant negative (!) effects. Along with the characteristics that increase perceived migration-related cultural threat in general (low levels of education, conservative political orientations, living in eastern Germany), talking with friends about migration-related issues is associated with a substantially more negative assessment of the cultural impact of migration. The models including interaction terms show that attitudinal stability over the course of the debate is also found for subgroups differentiated by level of education and political orientation. Contrary to our theoretical expectation that exposure to the debate would render respondents more immigration-skeptical in their attitudes, model 4 shows that those who talked about migration-related issues with their friends became slightly less rather than more skeptical in the course of the debate. Of course, we do not know what kind of causality is at work here, but in this case it seems unlikely that the effective theoretical mechanism is that those talking to friends had more exposure to the debate. It seems more likely that those respondents who are more immigrant-friendly started to talk about the issue more often, most likely because they were outraged by the debate. This would also explain what we briefly mentioned above: that direct exposure (“following the news on the issue very closely”) does not have an effect – as models not presented here show. Given the very specific conditions under which media effects on public attitudes become evident (Zaller 1996) this finding should not come as a surprise, as we will discuss in more detail in the last section.
### Table 3: “Immigrants are a burden on social services like schools and hospitals” (unstandardized logistic regression coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education (ref. = high level of education)</td>
<td>0.503**</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>0.518**</td>
<td>0.492**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation (ref. = left)</td>
<td>0.354*</td>
<td>0.356*</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>0.353*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking with friends (ref. = occasionally or never)</td>
<td>0.420+</td>
<td>0.422+</td>
<td>0.470+</td>
<td>1.227+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (ref. = 18–54)</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (ref. = female)</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (ref. = western states)</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 1: 31.08.–02.09.10</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.359</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>0.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.09.–06.09.10</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>0.393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.09.–10.09.10</td>
<td>-0.686+</td>
<td>-0.477</td>
<td>-0.950</td>
<td>-0.619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 2: 09.11.–11.11.10</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>-0.162</td>
<td>0.684*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.11.–15.11.10</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.11.–19.11.10</td>
<td>-0.169</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.11.–24.11.10</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td>0.347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10 × variable)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.08.–02.09.10 × Education</td>
<td>-0.212</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.09.–06.09.10 × Education</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.09.–10.09.10 × Education</td>
<td>-0.321</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.11.–11.11.10 × Education</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.11.–15.11.10 × Education</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.11.–19.11.10 × Education</td>
<td>-0.263</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.11.–24.11.10 × Education</td>
<td>-0.115</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.08.–02.09.10 × Political orientation</td>
<td>-0.522</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.09.–06.09.10 × Political orientation</td>
<td>0.408</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.09.–10.09.10 × Political orientation</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.11.–11.11.10 × Political orientation</td>
<td>0.954</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.11.–15.11.10 × Political orientation</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.11.–19.11.10 × Political orientation</td>
<td>-0.802</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.11.–24.11.10 × Political orientation</td>
<td>-0.367</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.08.–02.09.10 × Talking with friends</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.09.–06.09.10 × Talking with friends</td>
<td>-1.813+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.09.–10.09.10 × Talking with friends</td>
<td>-0.628</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.11.–11.11.10 × Talking with friends</td>
<td>-2.302+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.11.–15.11.10 × Talking with friends</td>
<td>-0.480</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.11.–19.11.10 × Talking with friends</td>
<td>-1.494</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.11.–24.11.10 × Talking with friends</td>
<td>-0.677</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.681***</td>
<td>-1.723***</td>
<td>-1.703***</td>
<td>-1.761***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R2</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.077</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
The models on migrants’ perceived economic impact (see Table 3) yield similar results, though the model fits the data less well. This confirms the above-mentioned suspicion that the survey question does not capture the debate on this issue in the German context.

Notwithstanding this note of caution, we can see in model 3 that those who hold conservative or moderate political attitudes became somewhat more skeptical in the course of the debate with a peak in skepticism at the beginning of wave 2. However, this finding is again not statistically significant. Model 4 shows once more that those who talked about migration-related issues with friends became less skeptical in the course of the debate whereas at the beginning of wave 1, those who talked about this issue with their peers had been significantly more skeptical.

Our multivariate analyses on attitudes about Muslim migrants’ integration show that these are unrelated to respondents’ education (see Table 4). This finding is in sharp contrast to what we know about the factors influencing the sort of anti-immigrant attitudes that are mostly captured in surveys (Coenders and Scheepers 2003).
Table 4: “How well do you think that Muslim immigrants are integrating into German society?” (unstandardized logistic regression coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education (ref. = high level of education)</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>-0.624</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation (ref. = left)</td>
<td>0.519**</td>
<td>0.544**</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.537**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking with friends (ref. = occasionally or never)</td>
<td>0.274</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>0.335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (ref. = 18–54)</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (ref. = female)</td>
<td>0.466**</td>
<td>0.496**</td>
<td>0.456*</td>
<td>0.457*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (ref. = western states)</td>
<td>0.746**</td>
<td>0.791**</td>
<td>0.802**</td>
<td>0.743**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 1: 31.08.–02.09.10</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.09.–06.09.10</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.190</td>
<td>0.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.09.–10.09.10</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>-0.129</td>
<td>-0.488</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 2: 09.11.–11.11.10</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
<td>-0.879*</td>
<td>-0.325</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.11.–15.11.10</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>-0.300</td>
<td>-0.393</td>
<td>0.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.11.–19.11.10</td>
<td>-0.385</td>
<td>-0.857*</td>
<td>-0.743</td>
<td>-0.350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.11.–24.11.10</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>-0.755</td>
<td>-0.256</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10 × variable)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.08.–02.09.10 × Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.09.–06.09.10 × Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.09.–10.09.10 × Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.528</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.11.–11.11.10 × Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.146**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.11.–15.11.10 × Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.021</td>
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<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.079</td>
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1 “very well” or “well” = 0; “very poorly” or “poorly” = 1
Note: + p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001; Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2010, own calculations.
However, we can see in model 2 that the attitudes of native Germans with high and low levels of education became more polarized during the debate. Native Germans with low levels of education became significantly more skeptical, more educated native Germans less so. This polarization peaked at the beginning of wave 2. With respect to respondents’ assessment of Muslim migrants’ integration, there is no evidence that political orientation influenced reactions to the debate. Talking with friends about migration issues did not have any significant impact on integration-related attitudes either, even though the coefficients show a similar pattern as in tables 2 and 3.

For ease of interpretation, the predicted values for educated and uneducated native Germans’ attitudes towards Muslim migrants’ integration are shown in Figure 4. We calculated these separately for the groups that run a high versus a low risk of being skeptical about Muslim migrants’ integration in term of the other independent variables included in the model: The “low risk group” includes younger, female, liberal Germans living in the western part of the country who talk about migration issues rarely or occasionally whereas the high risk group includes older conservative males living in Eastern Germany who talk about migration issues with friends frequently.

* “low risk group”: liberal female from West Germany between 18 and 54 who is talking “occasionally” or “never” about migration issues
** “high risk group”: conservative or centrist male from East Germany at least 55 who is talking “frequently” about migration issues

Note: Predicted values were calculated based on Model 2 in Table 5.
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration (TTI) 2010, own calculations

We can see that the increase in skepticism was strongest for uneducated individuals in the low-risk group, while individuals in the high-risk group were already so skeptical about Muslim migrants’ integration before the debate started that a further increase was by nature limited. In both groups, educated respondents became more positive in their assessment of Muslim migrants’ integration during the debate. Apparently they either wanted to distance themselves from Sarrazin’s statements or they received new information on the issue during the debate (e.g. from those criticizing Sarrazin) that rendered their assessment of Muslim migrants’ integration more positive.
5. Summary and Discussion

We used data from the “Transatlantic Trends: Immigration” survey to investigate whether and to what extent the heated German debate about Thilo Sarrazin’s Deutschland schafft sich ab, published in late August 2010, had an impact on migration-related attitudes. We analyzed public opinion data from 2009, from the days before and the first weeks after the release of the book in 2010, from about two months after the end of wave 1, and from 2011, one year after the publication of the book.

Our most important finding is that there was no substantial and enduring change in migration-related attitudes during the period considered here. The slight increase in general worries about migrants being a burden on social services is most likely unrelated to the debate, but reflects instead a general instability in responses to this question. We further analyzed if overall attitudinal stability can also be found for specific subgroups that usually differ in their evaluation of the consequences of migration, i.e. native Germans with high and low levels of education, with right and left wing political orientations, and with weak or strong exposure to the debate. Most importantly, these analyzes reveal that native Germans with low levels of education were evaluating Muslim migrants’ integration significantly more negatively by mid-November (i.e. by the beginning of wave 2) than at the time of the book’s pre-release or one year before. With regard to both topics, migrants being an economic burden and Muslim migrants’ integration, the moderate increase in migration-skeptical attitudes peaked by the beginning of wave 2. This finding is in accordance with results from earlier studies which show that news reports on migration are most likely to affect attitudes with a time lag of about one to two months. In fact, it is quite possible that skepticism was temporarily even higher between the end of wave 1 and the onset of wave 2.

Overall, however, public opinion on the issue is not as volatile as one might think. People seem not to have taken the alleged “facts” the book claims to have “revealed” at face value. Those who were skeptical about immigration and integration before the book’s appearance probably felt confirmed by Sarrazin’s statements while those with a more positive opinion remained optimistic and joined the broad alliance of those who met its publication with criticism. While both sides held onto their beliefs, there is only limited evidence that they became more polarized during the debate. In terms of their attitudes, the societal subgroups differentiated here did not in most cases react differently to the debate. One exception is the polarization of attitudes on Muslim migrants’ integration between native Germans with high and low levels of education. Our findings do not support the idea that educated and liberal native Germans became more likely to express immigration-skeptical attitudes during the debate, as might have been expected on the basis of research on social desirability.

Even though we are confident that the modest dynamic in attitudes we found, mainly with regard to uneducated native Germans’ perceptions of Muslim migrants’ integration, was in fact related to the debate that evolved during fieldwork, it is, strictly speaking, difficult to link the debate causally to attitudinal change using the indicators at hand. Rigorous empirical proof that whatever change we found was caused by the publication of the book and the subsequent debate would require more detailed information on respondents’ indirect and direct exposure to the debate via discussions with friends and consumption of different media outlets – plus a content analysis of the way the debate was covered in these various outlets. Research shows that what is important is not whether migrants are present in the media, but whether they are evaluated positively or negatively in news reports (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009). Unfortunately, the data we used contained no information on the kind of news outlets respondents were exposed to.

The fact that we found little overall increase in migration-related skepticism raises the question of why these attitudes remained rather stable in the course of a debate that was in many regards unique in its intensity. There are two possible explanations for this: First of all, it is possible that the “Sarrazin debate” was perceived not so much as a debate about migrants being a problem for the country but more about whether or not Sarrazin’s assumptions were racist. As we describe in the introduction, this led to a polarized debate with some media outlets asserting that Sarrazin was bravely
discussing fundamental problems and others criticizing the book and commenting on the positive aspects of migration for the country. An important precondition for media effect on public opinion was thus missing: overall consonant coverage of the issue in the national media (Peter 2004; see also Zaller 1996). Secondly, it is known that news reports affect attitudes on immigration primarily when there are additional external shocks such as high levels of immigration (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009). As outlined above, the topic of migration was not very salient in Germany before the book was published, so it did not fall on very fertile ground in terms of already heightened levels of perceived threat.

One rather unfortunate shortcoming of our analyses is the fact that TTI data enabled us to study the impact of the debate on the attitudes of native Germans only. As in many surveys, the number of migrants included in TTI is too small to analyze them separately, especially if one is interested in migrants with a Muslim background (for exceptions see Fassmann 2011; Kühnel and Leibold 2003).

What it meant to Muslim minority members living in Germany to be the focus of a debate on their adverse impact on the society to which they belong is hard to say though easy to imagine. Our analyses thus cannot answer the tricky question of whether the debate had a negative impact on integration processes in Germany. Given native Germans’ overall attitudinal stability it seems unlikely that there will be a direct effect, for example, in terms of increasing levels of discrimination against Muslims. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that Muslims’ perceptions of their social acceptance have become more pessimistic. Being sociologists we know that this can itself have an impact on societal reality, according to Thomas’ famous dictum “if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.”

References
Fischer, Peter, Tobias Greitemeyer, and Andreas Kastenmüller. 2007. What Do We Think about Muslims? The Validity of Westerners’ Implicit Theories about the Associations between Muslims’ Religiosity, Religious Identity, Aggression Potential, and Attitudes toward Terrorism. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 10:373–82.


### Independent variables

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<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
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<td>.989* (.126)</td>
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### Control variables

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### Nagelkerke R2

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### Control variables

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### Interactions (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10 × var.)

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<td>.135 (.728)</td>
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<td>-.677 (0.949)</td>
<td>-.677 (0.949)</td>
<td>-.677 (0.949)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.681* (.292)</td>
<td>-1.723* (.387)</td>
<td>-1.703* (.413)</td>
<td>-1.761* (.306)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nagelkerke R2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.077</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education (ref. = high level of education)</td>
<td>.251 (.183)</td>
<td>-.624 (.491)</td>
<td>.253 (.185)</td>
<td>.247 (.185)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation (ref. = left)</td>
<td>.519* (.182)</td>
<td>.544* (.185)</td>
<td>.020 (.482)</td>
<td>.537* (.184)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking with friends (ref. = occasionally or never)</td>
<td>.274 (.290)</td>
<td>.308 (.294)</td>
<td>.264 (.293)</td>
<td>.335 (1.135)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Control variables

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (ref. = 18–54)</td>
<td>.071 (.183)</td>
<td>.053 (.185)</td>
<td>.032 (.186)</td>
<td>.072 (.184)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (ref. = female)</td>
<td>.466* (.179)</td>
<td>.496* (.182)</td>
<td>.456* (.181)</td>
<td>.457* (.180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (ref. = western states)</td>
<td>.746* (.265)</td>
<td>.791* (.270)</td>
<td>.802* (.268)</td>
<td>.743* (.267)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 1: 31.08.–02.09.10</td>
<td>.155 (.349)</td>
<td>.273 (.523)</td>
<td>.385 (.516)</td>
<td>.123 (.359)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.09.–06.09.10</td>
<td>.293 (.356)</td>
<td>-.026 (.519)</td>
<td>-.190 (.512)</td>
<td>.217 (.372)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.09.–10.09.10</td>
<td>.064 (.362)</td>
<td>-.129 (.539)</td>
<td>-.488 (.504)</td>
<td>-.014 (.379)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 2: 09.11.–11.11.10</td>
<td>-.124 (.344)</td>
<td>-.879* (.447)</td>
<td>-.325 (.532)</td>
<td>.055 (.365)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.11.–15.11.10</td>
<td>.161 (.361)</td>
<td>-.300 (.495)</td>
<td>-.393 (.550)</td>
<td>.189 (.376)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.11.–19.11.10</td>
<td>-.385 (.334)</td>
<td>-.857 (.468)</td>
<td>-.743 (.496)</td>
<td>-.350 (.349)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.11.–24.11.10</td>
<td>.026 (.343)</td>
<td>-.755 (.468)</td>
<td>-.256 (.512)</td>
<td>-.032 (.354)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Interactions (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10 × var.)

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31.08.–02.09.10 × Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.057 (.710)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.09.–06.09.10 × Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>.750 (.712)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.09.–10.09.10 × Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>.528 (.729)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.11.–11.11.10 × Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.146* (.783)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.11.–15.11.10 × Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.021 (.724)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.11.–19.11.10 × Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.025 (.666)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.11.–24.11.10 × Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.739* (.702)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nagelkerke R2

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<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.199 (.288)</td>
<td>.562 (.362)</td>
<td>.465 (.369)</td>
<td>.194 (.293)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R2</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.076</td>
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</tbody>
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