Atoning for Colonial Injustices: Group-Based Shame and Guilt Motivate Support for Reparation

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Vol. 4 (1) 2010

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An investigation of the role of group-based shame and guilt in motivating citizens of ex-colonial countries to support restitution to former colonized groups which were the target of violence and oppression. Study 1 (N = 125) was conducted in Australia during the lead-up to the first official government apology to Aboriginal Australians. Among white Australians, guilt and shame were associated with attitudinal support for intergroup apology and victim compensation. However, only shame was associated with actual political behaviour (signing a petition in support of the apology). Study 2 (N = 181), conducted in Britain, focussed on Britain's violent mistreatment of the Kenyan population during decolonization. It tested a hypothesis that there are two forms of shame—essence shame and image shame—and demonstrated that image shame was associated with support for apology, whereas essence shame was associated with support for more substantial material and financial compensation. The findings are discussed in light of promoting restitution and reconciliation within nations with histories of colonial violence.

1. Colonization and a New International Morality

The process of colonization was generally associated with systems of violence and discrimination against indigenous peoples around the world. In many instances the colonizing country robbed the colonized groups of land, resources, culture, and dignity. In the worst instances indigenous peoples were forcibly displaced or massacred. Regrettably, such legacies of colonization can be found throughout the world. European nations such as Portugal, France, Germany, Italy, Holland, and Belgium were quick to institute ruling systems around the globe that, by today's standards, were often racist, violent, and exploitative (Ferro 1997; Mosse 1985; Pakenham 1992). British colonial rule in particular led to profound disadvantage and suffering among indigenous groups, particularly in African, Pacific, and Asian regions (Porter 1984; James 1997; Ferguson 2004). We focus in detail on two examples, Kenya and Australia.

Recently there has been a growing international recognition of the lasting effects of colonial violence and discrimination on the colonized, and an increasing willingness to address these issues (Barkan 2000; Nobles 2008; Thompson 2002). In many countries, offers of apology and reparations from former colonizing groups have been forthcoming in recognition of unjust past policies and as a means to restore a more moral intergroup relationship (Nobles 2008). Such acts have the potential to promote reconciliation between groups (Barkan 2000). For example, Queen Elizabeth II and a number of New Zealand prime ministers have apologized to Indigenous Maori for violations of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi; U.S. president Bill Clinton issued an apology to Hawaiians for violations of their sovereignty in 1893; and the Canadian government has apologized to the Indigenous Canadian population for extensive historical mistreatment (e.g., see Nobles 2008).

The authors would like to thank Aarti Iyer for her helpful comments on an earlier version of this manuscript. The research and preparation of this paper was supported by a New Zealand Tertiary Education Commission Bright Future Top Achiever Doctoral Scholarship, awarded to the primary author. We would also like to thank Olivia Barlow, Rory Barlow, Phillipa Diedrichs, Anna Cooke, Mark Howarth, Daniel Stjepanovic, and Katie Greenaway for help with data collection for Study 1.
Barkan (2000) suggests the rapid and widespread increase in restorative actions by powerful groups around the world points to a new moral awareness within the international community. Although there are a number of political, historical, economic, and social conditions that have led former colonizing groups to attempt to make amends with the colonized, the present paper focuses specifically on the psychological processes that motivate members of colonizing groups to support restitution for past wrongs and desire reconciliation with members of “victim” groups. Particularly, we focus on a relatively new concept within social psychology, group-based emotions, as motivators of collective moral action (Eliot R. Smith 1993).

1.1. Shame and Guilt

Our specific focus is on the self-conscious emotions of group-based shame and guilt (Lewis 1971; Tangney and Fischer 1995). At the individual level, one of the most influential distinctions between the two emotions was provided by Lewis (1971). Lewis described both shame and guilt as negative self-focused emotions that arise from the violation of a moral or social code; she posited, however, that they differ in the degree to which the self is implicated in the behaviour. She proposed that guilt primarily results from a focus on how a person’s behaviour has negatively affected someone else, whereas shame results from a focus on how the behaviour reflects a globally flawed self. The distinction can be summarized thus: guilt arises because one has behaved badly, whereas shame arises because one is a bad person.

Given the theoretical differences between shame and guilt, one would expect the emotions to be associated with different motivational and behavioural outcomes. Because guilt derives from a focus on an act of negative behaviour that is specific and controllable, it is believed to be associated with attempts at restitution (Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton 1994). On the other hand, because shame is associated with a perception of the self as flawed, it is typically more aversive and debilitating than guilt and is thought to be associated with withdrawal and hiding (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, and Barlow 1996; Wicker, Payne, and Morgan 1983). These predictions have received some empirical support at both the individual (e.g., Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavanski 1994; Tangney, 1991) and group levels (e.g., Iyer, Schmader, and Lickel 2007; Johns, Schmader, and Lickel 2005), although, as the present paper will demonstrate, there is growing evidence that shame at the group level can also be associated with pro-social outcomes.

Research at an interpersonal level identifies guilt as fulfilling an important social function by both preventing future transgressions and motivating efforts to make amends after their occurrence (e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton 1994; Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, and Gramzow 1996). Shame has been linked with feelings of worthlessness, powerlessness, and anger, and research at the interpersonal level suggests that it is associated with victim-directed antagonism and a desire to withdraw from and avoid the situation in question (Rodogno 2008; Roseman, Wiest, and Swartz 1994; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, and Gramzow 1992). We can thus see that both shame and guilt have influential effects on interpersonal interaction.

1.2. Group-based Emotions

Group-based emotions are emotions that are experienced when group membership, and therefore social identity is salient (Eliot R. Smith 1993). These emotions, which may be either positive (e.g., pride) or negative (e.g., shame), can act as important motivators of intergroup behaviour. Our focus is on group-based guilt and shame, which differ in two important ways from individual-level guilt and shame. Firstly, they can arise in response to moral violations by members of a group to which one belongs, even if those experiencing the emotions were not directly implicated, or may not even have been alive at the time (Eliot R. Smith 1993). Secondly, the experience of these emotions can motivate behaviour toward members of the “victim” outgroup, even if these members were not personally victims of the original maltreatment.

Several studies have investigated the effects of guilt at the group level. Two studies that specifically investigated group-based guilt in relation to colonial injustices were conducted by Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead (1998) and McGarty et al. (2005). In the first, Doosje and colleagues (1998) found that feelings of “collective” guilt among Dutch students predicted their willingness to advocate both personal and governmental compensation to Indonesians.
for past colonial injustices perpetrated by their group. Similarly, McGarty and colleagues (2005) demonstrated that although group-based guilt tended to be low among non-Indigenous Australians, it was strongly associated with support for an official apology to Aboriginal Australians for discriminatory practices occurring in both the nineteenth (Study 2) and twentieth centuries (Study 1). A number of other studies demonstrate the positive associations between guilt and support for reparation in various intergroup conflicts. Examples include non-Indigenous Chileans’ treatment of Indigenous Chileans (Brown et al. 2008), intergroup relations in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina (Brown and Cehajic 2008), illegitimate (majority) ingroup advantage in the United States and Europe (Iyer, Leach, and Crosby 2003; Mallett and Swim 2007; Swim and Miller 1999; Harth, Kessler, and Leach 2008; Harvey and Oswald 2000; Leach, Iyer, and Pederson 2006; Miron, Branscombe, and Schmitt 2006), and national involvement in war (Allpress and Brown forthcoming; Iyer et al. 2007).

Despite the evidence demonstrating positive associations between guilt and support for reparation, recent research suggests that the pro-social effects of guilt may be limited only to abstract support for restitution. For instance, with regard to Aboriginal Australians’ disadvantage within Australian society, Leach and colleagues (2006) showed that non-Indigenous Australians’ guilt predicted attitudinal support for compensation, but did not predict intentions to act on these attitudes after accounting for respondents’ prejudice and anger. Similarly, Iyer and colleagues (2007) found that feelings of guilt amongst American and British students over the invasion of Iraq did not predict support for any reparative actions after accounting for feelings of shame and anger. In the present paper we build upon the above studies by proposing that the predictive power of shame may render collective guilt less important a predictor of actual collective action. In Study 1 we evaluate this proposal in relation to a marker of actual political activism: signing a political petition advocating apology toward Aboriginal Australians.

There is less research into shame at the group level, and no research that we know of has investigated group-based shame specifically in relation to historical cases of colonial violence. Furthermore, the findings of the extant studies are somewhat inconsistent. In line with research on interpersonal shame, a small number of studies have found an association between shame and distancing motivations (Iyer et al. 2007; Johns et al. 2005; Lickel et al. 2006; Schmader and Lickel 2006). For example, Lickel and colleagues (2005) found that feelings of shame elicited by the wrongdoing of others were associated with a desire to distance oneself from both the situation and those responsible for the wrongdoing. Similarly, Johns, Schmader, and Lickel (2005) demonstrated that U.S. citizens’ feelings of shame in response to prejudice exhibited against people of Middle Eastern descent in the aftermath of 9/11 was associated with a desire to distance oneself from the ingroup perpetrators of the discrimination and, in some instances, a desire to distance oneself from the ingroup in general.

Not all research investigating group-based shame has been consistent with the above studies, however. Other work has found an association between shame and various pro-social attitudes. For example, Brown and colleagues (2008) conducted three studies in Chile investigating non-Indigenous Chileans’ feelings of shame about the treatment of the country’s largest indigenous group, the Mapuche. They found that shame had cross-sectional associations with attitudinal support for reparations to the Mapuche (a composite measure consisting of support for: apology, compensation, outgroup economic benefits, and a tolerant society) and that this association was mediated by a desire to improve the reputation of non-Indigenous Chileans. In a similar manner, Brown and Cehajic (2008) found that Bosnian Serbs’ feelings of shame about their group’s actions during the 1992–95 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina predicted attitudinal support for reparations to Bosnian Muslims (consisting of apology, compensation, and a desire to assist the outgroup).

1.3. Present Research

As we can see, although a number of studies have investigated the effect of guilt and shame in group contexts, a number of questions remain unaddressed. The present paper focuses on two distinct questions. The first relates to whether shame and guilt predict an instance of actual political behaviour—petition-signing (Study 1; conducted
in the context of the mistreatment of Aboriginal Australians. The second question is whether shame is related to pro-social outcomes (Study 1), and if such an association is observed, what might account for the association between shame and anti-social outcomes in some studies and pro-social outcomes in others (Study 2; conducted in the context of Kenyan decolonization). The paper therefore provides a novel contribution to the literature in two respects.

2. Study 1: Shame and Action in Australia

2.1. Historical and Political Context

The colonial treatment of Aboriginal Australians was both violent and discriminatory. In the twentieth century, the policy of removal of Aboriginal children from their families and placement into white homes or state care—the “Stolen Generations”—became a focus of activism and advocacy. We focus on this issue not only because it caused considerable damage to Aboriginal individuals, families, and communities, but because our research was conducted in the days prior to the first official national apology to the Stolen Generations by the federal government.

Aboriginal children in Australia were taken from their families from the very first days of colonization. The Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (1997) estimates that “between one in three and one in ten Indigenous children were forcibly removed from their families and communities between 1910 and 1970”, and that consequently all Indigenous families were affected in one or more generation in the last century. The removal of children in the twentieth century was a dramatic manifestation of the government’s policy of assimilation and the institutionalized racism within Australia. The practice caused extensive trauma to Indigenous families and a loss of identity and culture (Pilger 1989).

The consequences for Aboriginal Australians of two centuries of deprivation are powerfully represented in the group’s statistics. Compared to non-Indigenous Australians, Aboriginal Australians’ life expectancy is approximately eighteen years lower; the rate of infant mortality is three times higher; rates of both chronic and communicable diseases are between two and ten times higher; the rate of self-harm and suicide is approximately twice as high; incarceration rates are fifteen times higher; unemployment is three times higher; two thirds of the Aboriginal population are without post-secondary education, and Indigenous people are between six and nineteen times more likely to live in overcrowded housing (Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission 2006).

The purpose of Study 1 was to evaluate the relationship between white Australians’ feelings of group-based shame and guilt and their support for actions designed to repair this historical damage. We hypothesized that both guilt and shame would positively predict attitudinal support for apology and compensation. Additionally, in light of research demonstrating the weak or non-existent relationship between guilt and action intentions (e.g., Leach et al. 2006; Iyer et al. 2007), we hypothesized that shame, but not guilt, would predict political behaviour (petition signing).

2.2. Method

2.2.1. Participants

A sample of 136 participants was recruited during lunch hours in a shopping mall food-court in central Brisbane, Australia. Of those recruited, 125 (47 male, 78 female) participants who self-identified as “European/white Australian” were included in the final analysis. The ages in the sample ranged from 15 to 72, with a mean of 32 years of age.

2.2.2. Procedure

Questionnaire data were collected on February 11, 2008, two days prior to the incoming Labor government’s scheduled apology to the Stolen Generations. The event was highly publicized and there was significant public discussion around the issue at the time. This is reflected in the present sample, in which 93 percent of respondents were aware of the forthcoming apology. Thus, the intergroup apology was a highly salient and relevant topic for participants.

Participants were approached while they were sitting, often while they were eating lunch. They were told of the nature of the questionnaire, that it was being run in connection with the University of Queensland, and asked if they would like to share their views. Upon completing the questionnaire, participants were debriefed and thanked for their in-
volvement in the research. A small chocolate compensation was offered to each participant as a “thank you” for helping with the research.

2.2.3. Measures

All items were measured on nine-point scales. To accommodate the busy sample population, all scales consisted of just one or two items.

Shame was measured using two items: “Due to the long history of discrimination against Aboriginal Australians, I feel ashamed” and “I feel shame when I think about how non-Indigenous Australians have behaved towards Aboriginal Australians”, \( r = .76, p < .001 \).

Guilt was measured using two items: “I feel guilty about the negative things non-Indigenous Australians have done to Aboriginal Australians in the past” and “I feel guilty about the present social inequality between Aboriginal and non-Indigenous Australians”, \( r = .76, p < .001 \).

Support for apology was measured using two items: “I am supportive of the government’s apology to the Stolen Generations” and “I agree with the government’s apology to the Stolen Generations”, \( r = .96, p < .001 \).

Support for compensation was measured with a single item: “Monetary compensation to the Stolen Generation is a good idea”.

Petition signing. Participants were also given the opportunity to sign what they believed to be a real petition to be sent to their local member of parliament, indicating their support for the upcoming apology. The reported score reflects whether participants actually signed the petition (1) or not (0).

2.3. Results

The means of, and correlations among the five key variables are presented in Table 1. As can be seen in the table, the levels of shame, guilt, and support for the apology were moderate, with support for financial compensation somewhat lower. To test the effect of our two predictors, shame and guilt, three regression analyses were conducted to predict apology support, compensation support, and petition signing.

Table 1: Means of and inter-correlations among variables, Study 1

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<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Shame</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>.79**</td>
<td>.60**</td>
<td>.56**</td>
<td>.60**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Guilt</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>.61**</td>
<td>.54**</td>
<td>.56**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Apology support</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.65**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Compensation support</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>.48**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Petition signing</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

** Correlation is significant at the .001 level

2.3.1. Distinguishing Guilt and Shame

A high correlation was observed between shame and guilt (see Table 1), and therefore a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to determine whether the separation of these two variables was warranted. A model in which guilt and shame items were specified as loading on separate factors was tested first. The factors were allowed to correlate and no observed items were allowed to cross-load. All items loaded significantly onto their predicted factors (all loadings > .81), and the model fitted the data well, \( \chi^2 (1) = .39, p = .53, \text{NFI} = .999, \text{RMSEA} < .001 \). Consistent with the theoretical distinction between the two constructs, a model in which both shame and guilt items were specified as loading onto a single factor provided a significantly worse fit to the data, \( \Delta \chi^2 (1) = 8.38, p < .05 \).

2.3.2. Regression Analyses

Support for apology. The model containing shame and guilt explained 40 percent of the variance in support for apology, \( R^2 = .40, F(2,122) = 42.65, p < .001 \). Both shame \( (\beta = .33, p < .005) \) and guilt \( (\beta = .35, p < .005) \) were significant positive predictors of support for the apology.

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1 Given that the second guilt item refers specifically to present inequality, analyses were also conducted with this item omitted. This analysis did not differ meaningfully from the analysis presented below, indicating that the focus of this item did not specifically influence the reported results.
Support for compensation. As with support for apology, the model explained a significant proportion of the variance in support for compensation, \( R^2 = .33, F(2,120) = 30.86, p < .001. \) Again, both shame (\( \beta = .36, p < .005 \)) and guilt (\( \beta = .25, p < .05 \)) significantly predicted support for compensation.

Petition signing. A logistic regression analysis was conducted to predict, from feelings of shame and guilt, the likelihood of signing a petition to be sent to parliament pledging support for the upcoming apology. The model accounted for 31 percent of the variance in petition signing, Nagelkerke \( R^2 = .31, \chi^2 (2) = 32.08, p < .001. \) Inspection of the coefficients revealed that shame was significantly linked to petition signing, \( \text{Exp}(B) = 1.44, \text{Wald} = 7.37, p < .01. \) This finding means that the odds of signing the petition were 1.44 times higher for each one-point increase in reported shame. Guilt was not significantly linked to an increased likelihood of petition signing, \( \text{Exp}(B) = 1.16, \text{Wald} = 1.56, p < .22. \)

2.4. Discussion
The present study indicates that both shame and guilt were associated with pro-social attitudes toward apology and compensation. When taken into account simultaneously, only shame predicted behavioural action (petition signing) in support for the forthcoming apology. The findings in relation to guilt are consistent with past research demonstrating that although group-based guilt is associated with abstract attitudinal support for restitution (e.g., Doosje et al. 1998; McGarty et al. 2005), its positive effects may not translate into behavioural intentions (Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006). The present study extends this work by evaluating actual behavioural support for group-based apology. It is important to reiterate that both attitudinal support for apology and behavioural support for apology action reflected the degree to which participants supported their ingroup’s apology. The key difference between the two measures was that the petition measure reflected a concrete behavioural action in support of the apology, whereas the attitudinal measure reflected abstract support for the apology.

One methodological concern arises from the high intercorrelation between guilt and shame: namely, that response bias present in the items may have blurred the distinction between the two variables. The support provided by confirmatory factor analyses for the theoretical distinction between the variables, as well as the differential predictive power of shame and guilt for the behavioural measure, petition signing, suggest that such bias is unlikely to account for the present findings, however. Methodological constraints notwithstanding, the finding that shame is predictive of positive attitudes toward apology, compensation, and political behaviour is inconsistent with some previous theorizing and research on shame (Johns et al. 2005; Lickel et al. 2005; Rodogno 2008; Schmader and Lickel 2006; Tangney et al. 1992). Study 2 investigates a possible explanation for the inconsistency between the present findings and previous literature: that there are two different forms of shame with different effects: “essence shame” and “image shame”.

3. “Essence Shame” and “Image Shame”
Study 1 provided further evidence that shame can have pro-social correlates. Although our data are inconsistent with some previous work (Johns et al. 2005; Lickel et al. 2005; Rodogno 2008; Schmader and Lickel 2006; Tangney et al. 1992), two recent studies support our findings. The first showed that shame predicted not only British participants’ desire to apologize and provide compensation to those harmed during the recent war in Iraq, but also a desire for future contact with Iraqis (Allpress and Brown 2010). The second, conducted in Norway and focussing on the historical mistreatment of the Norwegian Gypsies (called Tatere), reaffirmed the pro-social associations of shame by providing evidence that shame predicts pro-sociality (empathy, restitution, desire for contact) when controlling for feelings of rejection (which predict self-defensive responses) and inferiority (Gausel et al. forthcoming). There is mounting evidence, therefore, that shame may be associated with pro-social outcomes. However, it remains unclear why shame is associated with avoidance in some instances and support for restitution in others.

We propose that there are two primary types or forms of shame, and that the differences between these two forms can explain the inconsistencies within the shame literature. Although group-based shame has widely been regarded as arising from a global negative evaluation of the ingroup, it is unclear whether this negative evaluation refers to an internalized perception that the ingroup has a negative es-
sence, or from the perception that others see the ingroup in a negative manner, that its image is tainted in some way.

The “image” component of shame, which has been widely emphasized as a crucial aspect (e.g., Scheff 2000; Richard. H. Smith, Webster, Parrott, and Eyre 2002), is captured by Branscombe, Slugoski and Kappen’s remark that “collective shame involves being publicly exposed as incompetent, not being in control, weak and potentially even disgusting in the eyes of others.” A subtly different emphasis can be found in the suggestion by Lickel, Schmader and Barquissau (2004) that shame is associated with a perception that the ingroup has a negative “essence”: “collective shame stems from perceiving that the actions of the ingroup confirm or reveal a flawed aspect of one’s social identity” and “implicate something about the very nature of who they are” (2004, 42–43). We treat these two different descriptions as reflecting two different forms of shame, with different associated outcomes, rather than simply an argument over the definition of shame. One form—which we term image shame—arises from the perception that the ingroup is perceived negatively in the eyes of others, while the other—which we term essence shame—arises from an internalized perception that the ingroup has some inherently negative quality.2

We believe “essence shame” arises when deeds done in the name of the ingroup are perceived by the ingroup member to have violated an important moral standard and when the individual recognizes the effects of the ingroup’s deeds on the “victims”. Furthermore, we propose that essence shame arises when individuals believe, or fear, that their group’s actions reflect some underlying negative aspect or characteristic of the ingroup. We predict that, because essence shame is associated with an internalized belief that the ingroup’s behaviour reflects something negative about the group’s essence, individuals will cope with their feelings of shame in three different ways. The first is to sub-categorize those members of the ingroup who are perceived to have perpetrated the misdeeds, thus distancing the ingroup from those who committed the wrongdoing; the second is to disidentify with the ingroup, thus distancing oneself from the ingroup (both strategies have been proposed by Lickel et al. 2004 and Lickel et al. 2005); the third, and most important for the present study, is to attempt to restore the ingroup’s moral standing by behaving in a pro-social manner.

We view “image shame” as being based on a perception that the ingroup’s standing, image, and reputation within the wider community are threatened. Because image shame is associated with an external criticism of the ingroup, we predict that there will be four ways individuals may cope. As with essence shame, participants may sub-categorize the perpetrators or disidentify with the ingroup (Lickel et al. 2004; Lickel et al. 2005). Differently from essence shame, however, group members may avoid the issue or withdraw from the situation—a strategy often seen as a typical shame reaction. Finally, and somewhat counter-intuitively, group members may also support limited acts of restitution if they believe this support is likely to improve the ingroup’s reputation and image in the eyes of third parties. Indeed, as noted earlier, Brown and colleagues (2008) found such a relationship, where a positive association between (undifferentiated) shame and support for restitution was mediated by reputation concerns. We address some of these predictions empirically in Study 2.

4. Study 2: Essence and Image Shame about Kenya

4.1. Historical and Political Context

Britain maintained colonial rule over Kenya from the 1880s through to 1963, as part of a larger African empire. Space constraints preclude a full description of the long history of Kenyan resistance, but several general histories may be of interest to readers (Ferguson 2004; James 1997; Pakenham 1992). Below we describe the lead-up to Kenyan independence, a bloody struggle known as the Mau Mau revolution.
The Mau Mau revolution grew largely out of social and economic pressure on the Kenyan Kikuyu population during the 1940s and early 1950s (Anderson 2005; Berman 1976; Throup 1985). Mau Mau, Kenyans who took an oath against British colonial rule, typically members of the Kikuyu ethnic group, began destroying settler properties in the early 1950s, killing a small number of white settlers and assassinating a larger number of loyalists—Indigenous Kenyans, often Kikuyu, who “collaborated” with and profited from colonial rule. In 1952 the colonial government responded by declaring a state of emergency and increasing military control over the country. The majority of the Kikuyu population was relocated to detention camps and guarded villages (Anderson 2005; Elkins 2005) while British forces attempted to detain or kill those Kenyans who had taken the Mau Mau oath.

The atmosphere in these camps, which has been likened to both the Soviet gulags and Nazi concentration camps, was one of ritualized dehumanization, forced labour, physical and psychological violence, torture, and death (Elkins 2005). Elkins (2005) provides examples of the mistreatment of detainees, including regular beatings, forced sodomy among male prisoners, gang rape of female prisoners, beating of children, and sleep deprivation. Figures indicate that, in total, the Mau Mau killed thirty-two white settlers, over two thousand African civilians, and approximately two hundred British soldiers. The death toll for the Kikuyu was significantly higher, with between twelve thousand and one hundred thousand Kikuyu killed by British forces (Anderson 2005; Corfield 1960; Elkins 2005).

That is the background to Study 2. We hypothesized that after making ingroup wrongdoing salient to British participants, essence shame would be positively associated with support for both apology and (financial and material) compensation. We predicted that image shame would be positively associated with support for apology. However, because image shame arises primarily out of a concern for how the ingroup is viewed by third parties and not a desire to restore an equal intergroup relationship, this positive association was not predicted for support for compensation, which is also a potentially more costly political action. Rather, we reason that because compensation requires a tangible and often prolonged commitment to addressing the ingroup’s wrongdoing, individuals high in image shame will avoid this strategy, producing a negative association between image shame and concrete support for reparation.

4.2. Method
4.2.1. Participants
Participants were 183 first-year undergraduate psychology students from a British university. The 161 participants who self-identified as “British” (25 males, 136 females) were included in the final analysis. Their ages ranged from 18 to 55, with a mean of 20 years of age.

4.2.2. Procedure
Data were collected in early 2009. Students were informed that participation was entirely voluntary. The questionnaire contained a short article, written for the purposes of Study 2, on the response of the British government to the Mau Mau revolution between 1952 and 1960. The article was ostensibly sourced from the *Guardian*, a reputable British newspaper. It gave an account of the number of British and Kikuyu killed during the uprising and information about the often horrible conditions in the British-run detention camps. The article contained brief details of the beatings, starvation, and torture that occurred within the camps, and ended with a statement that there have been recent discussions about Britain’s need to apologize and offer reparations to those Kenyans affected during this period. The dependent measures then followed.

4.2.3. Measures
All items were measured on nine-point scales and were positively scored.

*Essence shame* was measured using two items: “Our treatment of Kenyan people makes me feel somewhat ashamed about what it means to be British” and “I feel ashamed to be British for the way we have treated the Kenyan people”, \( r = .80, p < .001 \).

*Image shame* was measured using two items: “I feel humiliated when I think of how Britain is seen negatively by the rest of the world for how it has treated the Kenyan people” and “I feel bad because the behaviour of British people towards the Kenyan people has created a bad image of us in the eyes of the world” \( r = .73, p < .001 \).
Guilt was measured using two items adapted from Brown et al. (2008): “Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behaviour of British people toward the Kenyans” and “I feel guilty for the manner in which Kenyans have been treated in the past by British”, $r = .67, p < .001$.

Support for apology was measured with one item: “The British government should issue an apology for the atrocities committed against the Kenyan people”.

Support for material and financial compensation was measured with two items: “I support the idea of the British government compensating Kenyans financially for past injustices” and “I agree with the idea of the British government making material reparations to Kenyans”, $r = .83, p < .001$.

4.3. Results

4.3.1. Distinguishing Image Shame, Essence Shame, and Guilt

As in Study 1, high inter-correlations were observed among the key independent variables (see Table 2). Confirmatory factor analyses were accordingly performed to assess the factor structure of the items measuring essence shame, image shame, and guilt. In the first model, the factors were allowed to correlate but no observed items were allowed to cross-load. As expected, the factors were inter-related ($66 < r_s < .77$), and all items loaded significantly onto their predicted factors (all loadings $> .80$). The model provided an acceptable fit to the data, $\chi^2 (6) = 10.08, p = .12, \text{CFI} = .993, \text{RMSEA} = .065$. In addition, the hypothesized three-factor model proved superior to two alternative models. A model that specified the essence and image shame items as loading onto one “shame” factor, in addition to a guilt factor, provided a significant decrease in fit, $\Delta \chi^2 (2) = 46.57, p < .001$. A third model, in which all items loaded onto one omnibus “negative emotion” factor, also proved inferior, $\Delta \chi^2 (3) = 78.12, p < .001$. Thus, the data support the contention that image shame, essence shame, and guilt are separate factors, consistent with our expectations.

### Table 2: Means of and inter-correlations among variables, Study 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Essence shame</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>.66**</td>
<td>.62**</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>.39**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Image shame</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>.56**</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Guilt</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>.46**</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Apology support</td>
<td>7.27</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.53**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Compensation Support</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Correlation is significant at the .01 level

4.3.2. Regression Analyses

The means of, and correlations among the five key variables are presented in Table 2. To test the effect of essence shame, image shame, and guilt on support for restitution, two regression analyses were conducted in which apology support and compensation support were regressed onto the three predictors.

Support for apology. The model containing essence shame, image shame, and guilt explained 25 percent of the variance in support for apology, $F(3,157) = 19.05, p < .001$. Both guilt ($\beta = .28, p < .005$) and image shame ($\beta = .24, p < .05$) were significant positive predictors of support for an apology being offered to Kenyan people. Essence shame was not a significant predictor of support ($\beta = .07, p > .45$).

Support for material and financial compensation. The model containing the three predictors also explained a significant proportion of the variance in support for material and financial compensation, $R^2 = .21, F(3,157) = 15.49, p < .001$. Both essence shame ($\beta = .24, p < .03$) and guilt ($\beta = .36, p < .001$) were significant positive predictors of support for monetary and material compensation being offered to Kenyans. Image shame was not significantly associated with support for compensation, although the trend was in the predicted direction ($\beta = -.11, p < .26$).

4.4. Discussion

The present study provides preliminary evidence for the different predictive effects of essence and image shame. Essence shame was associated with support for monetary and material compensation, whereas image shame was associated with support for apology.
Although we predicted that essence shame would be positively associated with both apology and compensation support, we found that it was in fact only positively associated with support for compensation. While we believe that support for compensation more strongly represents a desire to restore intergroup equality, the observed lack of association with support for apology warrants further investigation. The lack of association may stem from methodological issues in the measurement of the two types of shame. Only two items were used for each shame scale. Thus, although the construction of the independent variables was supported by confirmatory factor analysis, it may be that more reliable measurement, in future research with more comprehensive sets of items, would yield more power to detect the hypothesized relationship. Alternatively, the finding may signal instability across contexts in the cultural significance of apologies and their perceived appropriateness to restore the group’s positive distinctiveness, such that the utility of apology may be perceived differently in the Kenyan situation, relative to, for example, the case in Australia. It may be that respondents in Study 2 perceived verbal apology and concrete compensation as competing rather than complementary strategies, and that those participants with higher essence shame perceived words as relatively empty and endorsed action instead. The positive inter-correlation between support for apology and support for compensation is more consistent with the former argument, however.

We also predicted that image shame would be positively associated with support for apology but negatively associated with compensation support, reflecting a desire not to address the inequalities between British and Kenyans, but merely to enhance the international reputation of the ingroup. We observed partial support for this hypothesis, with image shame being positively associated with support for apology—a distinctly public act. Image shame was not significantly associated with compensation support, and the trend was for higher shame to be accompanied by lower values for concrete action. Again, on a methodological level, the negative relationship between image shame and compensation support may reach significance using additional measures with greater face validity, more reliable scales, or a larger sample. Even at face value, however, the present data suggest that image shame may spur support for “quick fix” gestures, such as apologies, without generalizing to concrete, longer-term solutions.

5. General Discussion
The present research illustrates the importance of understanding the effects of group members’ emotional reactions of shame and guilt over colonial injustices. The findings contribute to a growing literature that demonstrates that people can experience emotions for wrongs committed by a group to which they belong—even before they were born and against people no longer alive—and that these emotions can have important effects on contemporary intergroup relations. Indeed, feelings of guilt and shame explained between 21 and 40 percent of the variance in our measures of support for intergroup restitution, across contexts and in relation to different forms of restitution—considerable explanatory power, given the complex historical, political, and economic conditions influencing intergroup relations.

Both Study 1 (general population) and Study 2 (student population) provide evidence that group-based guilt is associated with positive attitudes toward apologizing to and compensating a victim outgroup. Study 1, however, demonstrated that guilt may not be associated with actual behaviour directed at bringing about outcomes such as an apology. This implies that although guilt may be an important factor in determining whether an individual holds positive attitudes toward reconciliatory acts, guilt feelings may have little effect upon behaviour (Iyer et al. 2007). Other emotions, such as shame, may be particularly important in motivating individuals to act upon their attitudes.

In Study 1, group-based shame was shown to be associated not only with attitudinal support for apology and compensation, but also the politically active behaviour of petition signing in support of the upcoming apology. There is growing evidence, therefore, that shame can be associated with pro-social outcomes (see also Allpress and Brown forthcoming; Gausel et al. 2009). Study 2 demonstrated that different forms of shame may motivate different responses to intergroup wrong-doing. Image shame was positively associated with apology sup-
port. Essence shame, on the other hand, was associated with support for financial and material compensation—a less public act than apology, and therefore potentially a stronger indicator of a desire to restore an equal intergroup relationship. Although Study 2 provides preliminary evidence that essence and image shame are different constructs and that they may be associated with different outcomes, future research is needed to address the methodological limitations concerning the image and essence shame scales, and broaden the scope of the dependent measures. A greater range of anti-social measures such as avoidance, victim-blaming, and a desire to cover up ingroup misdeeds, as well as additional pro-social measures, such as desire for contact and behavioural measures of pro-sociality, would allow a stronger test of the differential effects of image and essence shame.

6. Implications for Post-Colonial Reconciliation and Nation-Building

Previous papers on group-based guilt and shame have often concluded that guilt is a productive emotion in the promotion of post-conflict restitution and reconciliation, whereas shame is likely to hinder such processes (e.g., Branscombe et al. 2004; Lickel et al. 2004). The evidence from the present studies allows us to add an important qualification to these conclusions. Our research implies that guilt is indeed useful in promoting support for policies of restitution, but its effects do not always generalize to the level of actual behaviour (this finding is consistent with Iyer et al. 2007). If individuals are to act in support of the establishment of intergroup equality it is likely they need to be experiencing some form of shame.

On an applied level, it appears that groups attempting to address histories of colonial violence would face less internal resistance if group members were experiencing a degree of essence shame and guilt. It is unclear as to how malleable these emotions are. However, research suggests that guilt arises primarily when group members perceive the ingroup to be responsible for harming another group (e.g., Branscombe and Doosje 2004), and our theorizing on essence shame leads us to believe that essence shame arises when a person perceives the actions of the ingroup as being inconsistent with the idea that the ingroup is moral and just. It may therefore be helpful to provide information about how the actions of the ingroup have affected the victim group and simultaneously to highlight the importance of morality for the ingroup.

One implication of our theorizing on image shame is that for those experiencing this emotion, apologies may serve more a desire to improve their image in the eyes of others than a desire to right a past wrong or bring about a more equitable intergroup relationship. An apology motivated by image concerns may not necessarily lead to a meaningful improvement in intergroup relations. If our theoretical model is supported, future research may find that image shame promotes avoidance and concealment of ingroup wrongdoing, as well as lower support for reparation unless third parties expect and demand such gestures. If the victim group becomes aware of a self-serving dynamic, shallow apologies may actually further damage the intergroup relationship. This speculation of course does not necessarily imply that apologies are always motivated by a desire to enhance the ingroup’s image. Indeed, the fact that guilt is reliably associated with support for apologies highlights that a number of other motivations are likely to underlie apologies, and is in keeping with the finding that apologies can be a crucial step toward more favourable intergroup relations (Nobles 2008).

To sum up, we believe the present research not only provides theoretical clarification regarding the differential effects of shame and guilt at the group level, but also contributes to a growing awareness of the complex emotional experiences of group life. Investigation into specific emotions allows more precise predictions of intergroup behaviour that are not possible using more generalized measures of ingroup bias or prejudice. Although intergroup relations are characterized and influenced by complex political, historical, and economic factors, recognition of the varied and powerful emotional influences on group members’ intergroup behaviour allows a more nuanced treatment of intergroup violence and conflict.
References


