The Dark Duo of Post-Colonial Ideology: A Model of Symbolic Exclusion and Historical Negation

Chris G. Sibley, Department of Psychology, University of Auckland, New Zealand

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Focus: Collective Memories of Colonial Violence

Guest Editors: Chiara Volpato and Laurent Licata

Editorial (p. 3)

Introduction: Collective Memories of Colonial Violence
Chiara Volpato / Laurent Licata (pp. 4 – 10)

Learning About Our Shameful Past: A Socio-Psychological Analysis of Present-Day Historical Narratives of Italian Colonial Wars
Giovanna Leone / Tiziana Mastrovito (pp. 11 – 27)

Collective Memories of Portuguese Colonial Action in Africa: Representations of the Colonial Past among Mozambicans and Portuguese Youths
Rosa Cabecinhas / João Feijó (pp. 28 – 44)

Holocaust or Benevolent Paternalism? Intergenerational Comparisons on Collective Memories and Emotions about Belgium’s Colonial Past
Laurent Licata / Olivier Klein (pp. 45 – 57)

The Shadow of the Italian Colonial Experience: The Impact of Collective Emotions on Intentions to Help the Victims’ Descendants
Silvia Mari / Luca Andrighetto / Alessandro Gabbiadini / Federica Durante / Chiara Volpato (pp. 58 – 74)

Atoning for Colonial Injustices: Group-Based Shame and Guilt Motivate Support for Reparation
Jesse A. Allpress / Fiona Kate Barlow / Rupert Brown / Winnifred R. Louis (pp. 75 – 88)

Dealing with Past Colonial Conflicts: How Perceived Characteristics of the Victimized Outgroup Can Influence the Experience of Group-Based Guilt
Ana Mateus Figueiredo / Bertjan Doosje / Joaquim Pires Valentim / Sven Zebel (pp. 89 – 105)

The Dark Duo of Post-Colonial Ideology: A Model of Symbolic Exclusion and Historical Negation
Chris G. Sibley (pp. 106 – 123)

Indigenous Suicide and Colonization: The Legacy of Violence and the Necessity of Self-Determination
Keri Lawson-Te Aho / James H. Liu (pp. 124 – 133)

Open Section

Conflicts between Afar Pastoralists and their Neighbors: Triggers and Motivations
Bekele Hundie (pp. 134 – 148)

Declining Fertility in Eritrea Since the Mid-1990s: A Demographic Response to Military Conflict
Gebremariam Woldemicael (pp. 149 – 168)
The Dark Duo of Post-Colonial Ideology: A Model of Symbolic Exclusion and Historical Negation

Chris G. Sibley, Department of Psychology, University of Auckland, New Zealand

Post-colonial nations experience a specific set of socio-structural conditions that foster a unique duo of ideologies. These are the ideology of Historical Recognition versus Negation (or HRN) and the ideology of Symbolic Projection versus Exclusion (or SPE). These ideologies operate in tandem to legitimize material and symbolic inequality in response to specific and contested aspects of post-colonial social structure and history. HRN is promoted by the dominant group to legitimize inequality in outcomes experienced by Indigenous peoples in post-colonial societies where historical injustice is objective fact (objective historical injustice). SPE is promoted by the dominant group to claim ownership of the national category in post-colonial societies where there is an inability to logically deny that Indigenous peoples “belong” to the nation (undeniable belongingness). I present the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale (PCIS-2D), which assesses these two distinct “dark” ideologies. Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analyses validated the factor structure of the PCIS-2D in undergraduate (N = 373; Study 1) and community (N = 447; Study 2) samples of New Zealand (NZ) citizens. The PCIS-2D evidenced good construct validity, as SPE and HRN predicted unique variance in voting preferences and social policy attitudes controlling for demographics, Big Five personality, and System Justification ideology (Study 2). These results indicate that HRN and SPE are distinct ideologies that explain unique variance in support for a range of social and political issues. At the systemic level, HRN and SPE form a joint ideological system that legitimates inequality in two critical social domains: one relating to resource allocations, the other relating to representation and ownership of the national category.

Integration, as stated, implies some continuation of Maori culture. Much of it, though, has already departed and only the fit-test elements (worthiest of preservation) have survived the onset of civilisation. Language, arts and crafts, and the institutions of the marae are the chief relics. Only the Maori’s [sic] themselves can decide whether these features of their ancient life are, in fact, to be kept alive; and, in the final analysis, it is entirely a matter of individual choice.

Excerpt from the Hunn Report, commissioned by the New Zealand Government in 1961 (p. 15).

Let me be quite clear. Many things happened to the Maori people that should not have happened. There were injustices, and the Treaty process is an attempt to acknowledge that, and to make a gesture at recompense. But it is only that. It can be no more than that. None of us was around at the time of the New Zealand wars. None of us had anything to do with the confiscations. There is a limit to how much any generation can apologise for the sins of its great grandparents.

(Excerpt from speech on Nationhood delivered by National Party leader Don Brash, 27 January 2004).

Ideology matters; it has power. Let me be quite clear what I mean by this; power in the sense that ideologies are persuasive on a broad societal level. Ideology can be used to sway opinion and alter the way in which people think.
about or view social issues within a particular frame of reference. A successful ideology achieves this power by providing a standard rhetoric or discourse that permeates or is consensually endorsed by a wide section of society. Ideologies therefore exert social control to the extent that they shape public opinion in a direction intended by elites; be it opinions about a group or social issue, or political or voting preferences. The psychological study of ideology has been something of a dead area for the last few decades, and has only been recently reinvigorated by researchers such as Jost (2006), Sidanius, and Pratto (1999), and Jackman (1994). Jost’s review (2006) was particularly influential in this regard, and provided a direct response to claims that ideology was irrelevant for understanding the voting behavior of ordinary citizens.

In this paper, I propose a model of ideology specific to post-colonial nations where “former colonizers” live side by side with “former colonized” peoples. I argue that the history of injustice experienced by Indigenous peoples in many post-colonial nations, paired with a tension in recognizing Indigenous culture as a fundamental or inherent aspect of the nation, has resulted in two distinct ideologies that are central to many aspects of post-colonial intergroup relations. The epigraphs with which I began this manuscript provide good examples of these two distinct ideologies in the New Zealand (NZ) context. The first quote, by Hunn in 1961, relates to the role and fitness of Indigenous culture, symbols, and practices. The second quote, by Brash in 2004, is a recent example of political discourse negating the contemporary relevance of historical injustices experienced by Māori, the Indigenous peoples of New Zealand.

I present a new measure, the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale – 2 Dimensions (or PCIS-2D) that indexes these dual “dark” ideologies, which I label Symbolic Projection versus Exclusion (SPE) and Historical Recognition versus Negation (HRN). I define SPE as a measure assessing the prescriptive belief that Indigenous culture is irrelevant in representations of modern national identity [exclusion], versus the belief that markers and symbols of Indigenous culture provide a meaningful addition to representations of national identity and the national category [projection]. I define HRN as a measure of the prescriptive belief that historical injustices experienced by Indigenous peoples in the colonial era are irrelevant in contemporary society [negation], versus the belief that such injustices are of continued relevance and that current generations of settler/colonial members of the population have an obligation to address such injustices [recognition].

I argue that SPE and HRN are distinct and independently coherent ideologies that arise from different social-structural factors of post-colonial society. As I argue below, these two distinct ideologies will often co-occur because in post-colonial societies, the Indigenous peoples have experienced objective historical injustice (which should produce HRN as a response) and have a claim of undeniable nationality (which should produce SPE as a response). I argue that these two ideologies operate additively to target dual central aspects of intergroup relations, and articulate a pair of discourses that draw upon culturally sanctioned repertoires to “make ok” or dismiss calls for reparation and representation. SPE and HRN therefore constitute distinct ideologies, as defined by Rokeach (1968, 123–24), who argued that "an ideology is an organization of beliefs and attitudes—religious, political, or philosophical in nature—that is more or less institutionalized or shared with others, deriving from external authority". I evaluate the proposed Dark Duo Model of Post-Colonial Ideology by first assessing the psychometric properties of the PCIS-2D in the NZ context. I then extend this analysis to demonstrate that SPE and HRN predict substantial unique variance in political voting preferences and social policy attitudes in NZ after controlling for plausible alternative explanatory variables (demographics, personality, and System Justification ideology).

1. A Dark Duo Model of Post-Colonial Ideology

Ideologies are not plucked from thin air; their content is dependent upon specific social conditions. Ideologies will therefore differ across cultures and groups to the extent that social conditions differ. Put simply, socio-structural conditions provide a more fertile environment for some ideologies than others; and once an ideology takes root, it reciprocally influences socio-structural conditions by shaping the way in which people view existing arrangements, and the political and social policies that they will or will not support.
Perhaps the most widely-researched example of the socio-structural geneses of ideology is Glick and Fiske’s Ambivalent Sexism Theory (1996), which states that socio-structural relations between men and women have produced, and in turn legitimize and maintain, two related forms of sexism: Benevolent Sexism and Hostile Sexism. The duality of sexist ideology is theorized to result from mutual interdependencies between men and women, such as the need for heterosexual intimacy, paired with continued gender inequality (Glick and Fiske 1996). This promotes a pair of ideologies that prescribe that women should be both protected and controlled by men, while at the same time stating that women should be vilified if they fail to conform to traditional gender roles. Ethnic group relations, in contrast, are not characterized by dyadic needs in the same way, and thus ideologies relating to race relations often differ dramatically from those relating to gender relations as they do not emphasize to the same extent this ideological component positioning subordinate or disadvantaged group members as wonderful but weak (e.g., a woman as her male partner’s “better half”). Ethnic group ideologies (of which racism is a good example), in contrast, tend, in most contexts, to be focused more directly on hostile or antipathetic beliefs (Jackman 1994).

Post-colonial nations, I argue, experience a specific set of socio-structural conditions between Indigenous and more recent settler/immigrant populations that differ in important regards from ethnic group relations in other nations. This results from a unique history in which historical injustices are in many cases undeniable, paired with the inability of the dominant (former settler) group to logically deny that Indigenous peoples “belong” to the nation. In contrast, ideologies expressing sentiments along the lines of “they should go back to their own countries as they are not wanted here” seem to be a common aspect of contemporary prejudice toward many recent non-Indigenous immigrant groups (e.g., Asian peoples in the United States, Turkish people in Germany).

The dual socio-structural conditions of objective historical injustice and undeniable nationality engender as a response distinct ideologies prescribing opposition versus support for (a) the relevance of historical injustices experienced by Indigenous peoples for contemporary post-colonial society and (b) the symbolic projection of Indigenous symbols in representations of the national category. I discuss each of these ideologies in turn in the following two sections.

1.1. Historical Injustice and the Ideology of Historical Negation

History—or at least consensually shared representations of history—tend to favor majority or dominant groups. NZ, where the current research was conducted, like many other post-colonial nations, can trace a history of considerable injustices experienced by Indigenous peoples. Like minority ethnic groups in many nations, the Indigenous peoples of NZ (Māori) also remain disadvantaged relative to the dominant majority group (NZ Europeans) in contemporary society. Māori, for example, earn on average two New Zealand dollars less per hour than NZ Europeans, and their life expectancy is 8.2 years lower (The Social Report 2006). One might reasonably argue, as many have (Belich 1996), that present day inequalities between Māori and NZ Europeans are at least partially the product of historical injustices experienced by Māori during the colonial period; injustices such as the alienation of communally owned land from Māori, and bans on the use of Māori language in schools. Despite this, claims for reparation on the basis of historical injustice often incite considerable controversy and opposition in mainstream (NZ European) society (Sibley et al. 2008).

Liu and colleagues argue that the positioning of history constitutes a powerful ideology for mobilizing opinions about resource allocations for historically disadvantaged groups in contemporary post-colonial society (Liu and Hilton 2005; Liu and Sibley 2009). In this regard, the negation of historical injustices can be seen to reflect a political ideology of considerable power. More generally, Liu and Hilton argue that history provides a charter, or central and binding ideology, for the ingroup and nation that provides “an account of its origin and historical mission. . . . Such charters are constitutional: they serve the function of a foundational myth for a society, defining rights and obligations for a group and legitimizing its social and political arrangements” (2005, 538). The manner in which historical charters
are constructed and interpreted can have enduring implications for what is considered fair in society, whether specific historical events constitute injustices, and how resources are to be allocated in contemporary society.

In an initial examination of this position, Sibley et al. (2008) demonstrated that HRN was a critical mediator of policy preferences on issues impacting Māori, and indeed explained around 60 percent of the variance in resource-specific policy preferences among NZ Europeans. Sibley and Liu (in press) argue that HRN is partially produced by the motivation to protect the glorious history of the ingroup (and the related perception of the group’s ancestors as decent hard-working people who earned what they achieved). Discourses positioning the ingroup as being accountable or as having a responsibility for the actions of previous generations of their group, or as even being directly linked and therefore “alike” to the perpetrators of previous historical injustices and crimes constitute a dramatic threat to positive representations of the dominant ingroup. So long as Indigenous peoples have a collective voice and can continue to call the majority group to account for historical injustices, I argue that an ideology of Historical Negation, as indexed by the measure of HRN originally developed by Sibley et al. (2008) will likely occur as a result in order to negate such calls.

1.2. Undeniable Nationality and the Ideology of Symbolic Exclusion

Along with the ability to define the relevance of specific aspects of history, the ability to define the national category is also of central importance for the legitimation of the status quo in post-colonial society. Representations of history and representations of the nation form two critical building blocks for defining who “we” are and where “we” have come from.

The importance of definitions of the national category for understanding prejudice and discrimination is underlined by Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) in their Ingroup Projection Model. The Ingroup Projection Model begins with the premise that superordinate categories, by definition, include all constituent groups. In the case of the national category, this would include all citizens, regardless of their specific ethnic group identification. The model states that tolerance versus discrimination is in turn predicted by the extent to which a group is seen to “fit” or be representative of the national or inclusive category. Thus, while all groups of citizens are seen to constitute the national category, not all groups will be seen as equally representing the values and character of the national prototype. Indeed, as predictions derived from System Justification Theory (Jost and Banaji 1994) also emphasize, consensual representations of the prototypical features of the inclusive category—that is, the characteristics that are seen as most typical for defining members of the category—should be unduly determined by the majority or dominant group within society (see also Sidanius and Petrocik 2001). This model is well supported by experimental data. Numerous studies indicate that groups that are seen as less representative of superordinate categories tend to be judged more harshly than groups that are seen as fitting the national prototype (e.g., Waldzus et al. 2003; Wenzel et al. 2003).

Representations of the majority or dominant group as the prototypical exemplar of the national category may help to promote and maintain hierarchically organized social structures, especially when they are consensually shared by both majority and minority group members. Under such conditions, appeals to national identity and values become synonymous with appeals to the identity and values of the dominant majority. As Devos and Banaji stress (2005), such appeals may therefore function to reduce the opportunity of ethnic minority groups to contribute to concepts of national identity and nationhood (or in some cases marginalize or directly exclude such contributions). Sidanius and Petrocik discuss a similar phenomenon which they refer to as exclusionary patriotism (2001). This seems to represent a central process in intergroup relations that likely occurs across a diverse range of stratification criteria (including ethnicity, gender, and age).

I argue that an ideology of exclusion (versus projection) is also fundamental to governing intergroup relations in post-colonial nations. This ideology of SPE is extremely similar to prescriptive beliefs relating to the exclusion versus projection of various groups in the national prototype for say, recent immigrant groups, but must be managed differently in post-colonial nations because Indigenous groups have what I refer to as undeniable nationality. That is, their status as
members of the national or superordinate category cannot be questioned in definitional terms. Given that Indigenous peoples within a given nation have a collective voice calling for cultural representation and recognition as part of the nation, I argue that an ideology akin to that I describe here in terms of SPE should occur as a result because it provides a mechanism for negating the collective voice of the Indigenous peoples.

However, as I articulate in Study 2, SPE may vary in mean level; and this is perhaps the most troubling aspect of this ideology. In short, a low level of SPE (that is, support for symbolic projection of Indigenous culture) may, when paired with high HRN (the positioning of historical injustice as irrelevant) form a particularly effective and insidious method of social control in post-colonial society. This is because support for the projection of symbolic and possibly tokenistic aspects of Indigenous culture may diffuse dissonance, or allow majority group members to legitimate, both to themselves and others, expressions of opposition toward calls for reparation for historical injustice relating more directly to material or resource-based issues.

1.3. Overview and Summary
I present two studies assessing the reliability and validity of the PCIS-2D. Study 1 provides an initial test of the factor structure of the PCIS-2D, and uses Exploratory Factor Analysis to examine the proposed scales assessing respective ideologies of HRN and SPE. Study 2 provides a confirmatory test of the proposed two-dimensional structure of the PCIS-2D using Confirmatory Factor Analysis of a large community sample. Study 2 also examines the predictive validity of the HRN and SPE scales of the PCIS-2D by testing whether these two distinct ideologies predict unique variance in, and thus provide unique explanatory power for explaining, specific social policy issues and political party attitudes.

2. Study 1: Development of the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants and Procedure
Participants were 372 undergraduates who completed the questionnaire in their own time at the end of tutorials (117 men, 253 women, 2 unreported; \( M_{\text{age}} = 19.46 \) \( SD_{\text{age}} = 4.68 \)). All participants were NZ citizens (279 Pākehā/European, 31 Māori, 19 Pacific Nations, 20 Chinese, 11 Indian, 2 Middle Eastern, and 10 other/unreported).

2.1.2. Measures
I administered the PCIS-2D (Post-Colonial Ideology Scale – 2 Dimensions), which contained balanced eight-item scales assessing SPE and HRN. Items were rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). See Table 1 for the full item list. The scale assessing HRN were originally developed by Sibley et al. (2008). As discussed by Sibley et al. (2008), the item HRN05, as listed in Table 1, was taken from the measure of collective guilt developed by Doosje et al. (1998).

2.2. Results
I examined the factor structure of the PCIS-2D using Maximum Likelihood Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). Comparison of actual and parallel eigenvalues generated using the procedure provided by O’Connor (2000) supported a two-factor model that explained 56 percent of the variance. Only the first two eigenvalues (6.86, 2.07, 1.15, .73, .68, .66) were greater than those the 95th percentile of chance eigenvalues generated from random data with the same number of participants and items (1.44, 1.34, 1.28, 1.22, 1.16, 1.12). This indicates that, as hypothesized, only the first two factors explained more variance than could be attributed to chance.

Item loadings for a two-factor solution, estimated using an oblique rotation, are presented in Table 1. I opted to employ an oblique rotation as I saw no reason to restrict the model by assuming that the two hypothesized factors would be orthogonal (that is, uncorrelated). As shown, items assessing SPE loaded cleanly on the first factor, and items assessing HRN loaded cleanly on the second. The SPE and HRN subscales both evidenced high internal reliability (as \( \alpha = .86 \) and .90), and were moderately to strongly positively correlated (\( r(370) = .55, p < .01 \)).

2.3. Discussion
Study 1 provided promising support for the factor structure and internal reliability of the two distinct but correlated dimensions of ideology assessed by the PCIS-2D.
Table 1: Item content and pattern matrix coefficients from an Exploratory Factor Analysis for the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale (PCIS-2D)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbolic Projection vs. Exclusion (SPE)</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPE01 I think that Māori culture helps to define New Zealand in positive ways. (r)</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPE02 I reckon Māori culture should stay where it belongs—with Māori. It doesn’t concern other New Zealanders.</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPE03 Māori culture is something that all New Zealanders can share in, even if they are not themselves Māori by descent. (r)</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPE04 I reckon New Zealand would be a much better place if it stopped trying to promote Māori culture and just got on with other things.</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPE05 I think Māori culture is just as important as European culture for defining what true “New Zealandness” is. (r)</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPE06 When we’re honest about it, Māori culture has very little to do with what it actually means to be a true New Zealander.</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPE07 New Zealand would be a much more boring place to live if it was all just based on White/European culture. (r)</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPE08 New Zealand would be a better place to live if we forgot about trying to promote Māori culture to everyone.</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical Recognition vs. Negation (HRN)</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HRN01 Grievances for past injustices should be recognized and due compensation offered to the descendants of those who suffered from such injustices. (r)</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRN02 We should not have to pay for the mistakes of our ancestors.</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRN03 New Zealand law needs to recognize that certain ethnic minorities have been treated unfairly in the past. People belonging to those groups should be entitled to certain benefits and compensation. (r)</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRN04 We should all move on as one nation and forget about past differences and conflicts between ethnic groups.</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRN05 I believe that I should take part in the efforts to help repair the damage to others caused by earlier generations of people from my ethnic group. (r)</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRN06 It is true that many things happened to Māori people in the past that should not have happened, but it is unfair to hold current generations of NZ Europeans/Pakeha accountable for things that happened so long ago.</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRN07 We as a nation have a responsibility that see that due settlement is offered to Māori in compensation for past injustices. (r)</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRN08 People who weren’t around in previous centuries should not feel accountable for the actions of their ancestors.</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Pattern matrix coefficients > .25 are printed in bold. Exploratory Factor Analysis was conducted using Maximum Likelihood Estimation with oblique rotation. N = 374 undergraduates born in New Zealand. (r) indicates reverse scored items. For shortened (three-item) versions of these measures, I suggest using items SPE01, SPE02 and SPE08 to assess Symbolic Exclusion, and items HRN02, HRN04 and HRN08 to assess Historical Negation. This version of the PCIS refers to the New Zealand context. Items could easily be reworded by simply replacing references to the relevant nation and Indigenous group.
3. Study 2: Validation of the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale

I extended my analysis of the factor structure of the PCIS-2D in Study 2 using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) of data from a large community sample of NZ citizens. CFA is a powerful technique that allows formal tests assessing how well a model (in this case a model of two distinct but correlated factors representing SPE and HRN) fits the observed data. CFA also allows tests of whether the hypothesized model fits the data significantly better than plausible alternatives (in this case a single-factor model in which I modeled SPE and HRN as representing a single ideology).

3.1. Ideology Should Predict Voting Preferences and Social Policy Attitudes

I also evaluated the construct validity (both discriminant and convergent) of the PCIS-2D. Discriminant validity refers to whether the proposed measure or measures differ from other measures that might plausibly assess the same construct. Convergent validity refers to whether the proposed measure or measures are similar to, or predict other measures for which we can make strong theoretical predictions that they should be related. In order to evaluate these properties of the PCIS-2D, I tested whether the SPE and HRN subscales predicted unique variance in support for the two primary political parties in New Zealand: the Labor Party (the primary center-left party) and the National Party (the primary center-right party).

Central to Rokeach’s aforementioned definition of ideology (1968) is that it is promoted by political elites to forge consensus of opinion among ingroup members. If SPE and HRN constitute distinct and meaningful political ideologies in the NZ context, then I reasoned that both scales should predict unique variance in support for the two primary NZ political parties. I also predicted that SPE and HRN would explain unique variance in support for another widely debated contemporary policy issue in NZ society: that of government funding of a full-time free-to-air Māori television channel (which is now up and running).

I also examined the incremental validity of SPE and HRN by controlling for a range of alternative explanatory variables in the analysis: demographics, Big Five personality, and System Justification. Tests of incremental validity assess whether a proposed measure explains novel variance in an outcome variable that was previously unexplained by an existing model (or prior set of measures). Tests of incremental validity are therefore very similar to tests of discriminant validity, and can be seen as a more specific aspect of this form of validity. What, then, would constitute an alternative model containing other constructs that could more parsimoniously explain voting preferences and social policy attitudes?

Personality has been shown to reliably predict political orientation (Carney et al. 2008). Likewise, the power of System Justification in explaining political conservatism and various intergroup attitudes has been extensively documented (Jost et al. 2003; Kay and Jost 2003). System Justification indexes an ideology akin to just world beliefs, prescribing that society is generally fair and that people get what they deserve. Combined with demographic indicators, Big Five personality and System Justification ideology therefore seemed to provide reasonable alternative explanations for social and political preferences. I therefore deemed it important to control for these constructs when evaluating the hypothesized unique effects of SPE and HRN on voting preferences and policy attitudes.

3.2. Ethnic Group Differences in SPE and HRN

I assert that a low level of SPE ideology emphasizing how much “we like them” or perhaps how much “we enjoy their culture” may combine with the negation of claims for reparation based on historical injustice (HRN) (“let bygones be bygones”) as a way of justifying the status quo. Ideologies promoting support for symbolic aspects of Indigenous culture may therefore operate to legitimize the existing system in a manner similar to how Benevolent Sexism is theorized to operate by both disarming women’s resistance to gender inequality and also allowing men to maintain a positive self-image as protectors and providers for their “better halves” (Glick and Fiske 1996). This should result in a pattern of relatively low SPE but high HRN across society as a whole. This might be summarized as reflecting something like the following reasoning: “Indigenous culture is an important part of our nation, but the past is still the past, and although bad things happened to the Indigenous people, we, the majority, are not accountable.”
If this reasoning is correct, then Māori and non-Māori New Zealanders should exhibit very similar levels of SPE (and generally be supportive of the symbolic projection of Māori culture). However, Māori and non-Māori New Zealanders should differ dramatically in the positioning of history, with non-Māori New Zealanders displaying higher levels of HRN than Māori. To test these predictions, I examined mean differences in SPE and HRN across three different groups of NZ citizens: Māori, NZ-born non-Māori, and foreign-born citizens. I also controlled for other demographic variables (gender, age, income, marital and religious status) in these analyses in order to rule out the possibility that any mean differences might result from these alternative factors. I hypothesized that there would be an interaction in which Māori and NZ-born non-Māori citizens would be similar in SPE, but that NZ-born non-Māori citizens would exhibit significantly higher HRN. I also predicted that foreign-born NZ citizens would exhibit high HRN, but did not have clear predictions about whether or not this group would display high or low levels of SPE.

3.3. Method

3.3.1. Participants and Procedure

Participants were 447 NZ citizens who were approached in public places (e.g., parks, bus stops, other outdoor seated areas). Participants (176 men, 271 women; $M_{\text{age}} = 31.16$ $SD_{\text{age}} = 14.06$) were invited to complete the questionnaire on the spot or take it with them and post it back at a later date. Thirty-two percent of participants were married, and 44 percent identified with a religion and/or congregation. Median reported household income was within the $\$NZ 71,000 – $NZ 80,000 bracket.

Participants were offered a $5 grocery voucher as an incentive to participate. The measures analyzed here were included within a larger unrelated battery. Analyses of other aspects of these data, which also included non-NZ citizens, are reported in Sibley and Duckitt (2010).

The Big Five dimensions of personality were assessed using items from the Big Five Aspects Scale (BFAS; DeYoung, Quilty, and Peterson 2007). The BFAS measures two distinct aspects of each Big Five dimension. Items were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (very inaccurate) to 7 (very accurate). I averaged the items assessing each pair of Big Five aspects to create broad-bandwidth (twelve-item) indicators of each Big Five dimension (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience). Descriptive statistics, Cronbach’s alphas for all scales, and correlations between scale scores, are reported in Table 2.

3.4. Results

3.4.1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis

I conducted a CFA testing the hypothesized dual-factor structure of the PCIS-2D. As shown in Figure 1, the eight items assessing each subscale were modeled as loading on
two distinct but correlated latent variables representing SPE and HRN. All items were strongly related to their hypothesized latent factor, as shown by the standardized coefficients reported in Figure 1.
When evaluating model fit, Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest that reasonable measurement models should generally have a standardized Root Mean Square Residual (sRMR) of near or below .08, values of around or above .95 for the Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Incremental Fit Index (IFI), and a Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) of near or below .06. Fit indices for the hypothesized model were: $\chi^2(103) = 719.72$, $p < .01$; sRMR = .065, NNFI = .94, CFI = .95, IFI = .95, RMSEA = .12. The hypothesized model performed reasonably well according to most of these indices, indicating reasonable model fit. The exception was the RMSEA, which indicated that model fit was fairly poor according to this specific index. Critically, however, the sRMR was within acceptable bounds (less than .08), and the hypothesized dual-factor model depicted in Figure 1 also provided a substantially better fit than an alter-
native model in which items assessing SPE and HRN loaded on a single latent variable ($\chi^2_{df}(1) = 1633, p < .01$).

### 3.4.2. Ideology Predicts Voting Preferences and Social Policy Attitudes

I conducted a series of hierarchical multiple regression analyses examining the extent to which a model containing HRN and SPE improved the variance explained in three outcomes, beyond that already explained by an initial set of other predictor variables. These other predictors, I argue, represent a plausible alternative model that explains individual differences in voting preferences and social policy attitudes in terms of demographics (gender, age, income, religious affiliation, and marital status), Big Five personality (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience), and the relatively universal ideology of System Justification. I first tested a model containing this set of initial predictors, and then a revised model also containing SPE and HRN, and their interaction. Results for the final regression models (containing all variables) predicting (a) support for the Labor Party, (b) support for The National Party, and (c) support for government funding of a dedicated free-to-air Māori television channel are presented in Table 3.

| Table 3: Multiple regression analyses examining the unique effects of Symbolic Projection vs. Exclusion (SPE) and Historical Recognition vs. Negation (HRN) on support for the Labor Party, the National Party, and government funding of Māori television in NZ |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                   | Support for the Labor Party | Support for the National Party | Support for government funding of Māori TV |
| Gender (.50 male, -.50 female) | .03 | .68 | .04 | .83 | .04 | 1.09 |
| Age               | -.06 | 1.02 | -.12 | 2.27* | .07 | 1.56 |
| Household income  | -.03 | .66 | .02 | .46 | .05 | 1.38 |
| Marital status (.50 yes, -.50 no) | -.07 | 1.21 | .05 | .96 | .03 | .66 |
| Religious (.50 yes, -.50 no) | -.08 | 1.71 | .12 | 2.69* | .04 | 1.10 |
| Extraversion      | .01 | .22 | .08 | 1.59 | .01 | .26 |
| Agreeableness     | -.02 | .41 | .02 | .38 | .07 | 1.61 |
| Conscientiousness | -.01 | .23 | .11 | 2.36* | -.08 | 2.08* |
| Neuroticism       | .06 | 1.25 | -.04 | .83 | .05 | 1.24 |
| Openness to Experiences | .05 | .93 | -.00 | .08 | .05 | 1.14 |
| System Justification | .13 | 2.74* | .18 | 3.84* | -.04 | .98 |
| SPE               | -.13 | 2.18* | .18 | 3.19* | -.40 | 8.21* |
| HRN               | -.22 | 4.16* | .21 | 4.14* | -.33 | 7.52* |
| SPE x HRN         | -.01 | .27 | -.02 | .46 | .01 | 1.12 |

Note: The Labor Party is the primary center-left political party in NZ. The National Party is the primary center-right political party in NZ. Support for government funding of Māori TV refers funding of a free-to-air Māori television channel. SPE x HRN refers to the interaction term created by multiplying centered SPE and HRN scores. $\beta =$ standardized beta coefficient, * $p < .05$. 
The initial model containing demographics, Big Five personality and System Justification predicted 5 percent of the variance in individual differences in support for the Labor Party ($R^2 = .05, F(11,435) = 1.88, p = .04$). This same model predicted 10 percent of the variance in support for the National Party ($R^2 = .10, F(11,435) = 4.34, p < .01$) and 6 percent of the variance in support for government funding of Māori television ($R^2 = .06, F(11,435) = 2.70, p < .01$). Thus, in all three cases, the initial model explained a significant, but reasonably small percentage of variance (5–10 percent) in individual attitudes toward these three political and policy-related outcomes.

A revised model also including SPE and HRN (and their interaction) predicted a significant and substantial proportion of additional variance in all three outcomes beyond that explained by demographics, personality and System Justification. The revised model containing SPE and HRN predicted an additional 8 percent of variance in support for the Labor Party, yielding a combined model explaining a total of 13 percent of the variance ($\Delta R^2 = .08, \Delta F(2,433) = 20.37, p < .01$; final model $R^2 = .13, F(13,433) = 4.87, p < .01$). Likewise, the revised model predicted an additional 10 percent of variance in support for the National Party, yielding a combined model explaining a total of 20 percent of the variance ($\Delta R^2 = .10, \Delta F(2,433) = 26.74, p < .01$; final model $R^2 = .20, F(13,433) = 8.22, p < .01$). The revised model containing SPE and HRN also predicted a whopping 34 percent additional variance in support for government funding of a free-to-air Māori television channel, yielding a combined model explaining a total of 41 percent of the variance in attitudes toward this policy issue ($\Delta R^2 = .34, \Delta F(2,433) = 124.04, p < .01$; final model $R^2 = .41, F(12,433) = 22.67, p < .01$).

These results clearly indicate that, when predicting all three outcomes, a model including SPE and HRN exhibited substantially greater predictive power than one based solely on demographics, personality, and System Justification ideology.

Standardized betas and t-values for the final model assessing the unique effects of all predictor variables on support for the Labor Party, the National Party and government funding of a free-to-air Māori television channel are presented in Table 3. Higher SPE and HRN scores predicted increased support for the center-right National Party, and decreased levels of support for the center-left Labor Party and government funding of a free-to-air Māori television channel. Critically in all three cases, SPE and HRN exerted unique main effects. This indicates that, despite being moderately-to-strongly positively correlated, both ideologies provided unique explanatory power when predicting these three outcomes. The inclusion of HRN and SPE dramatically increased the explanatory power of a model explaining political and voting preferences in terms of individual differences. Moreover, the effects of these dual ideologies appear to be additive rather than interactive, as evidenced by the non-significant SPE x HRN interaction terms in all three models.

### 3.4.3. Ethnic Group Differences in SPE and HRN

To explore ethnic group differences in mean levels of SPE and HRN, I tested a three (citizen group: foreign-born NZ citizens, NZ-born non-Māori citizens, Māori) by two (ideology: SPE versus HRN) interaction using a mixed-design ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor. This interaction was significant ($F(2,444) = 3.59, p = .03$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$), and persisted after controlling for demographic differences in gender, age, household income, and religious and marital status ($F(2,439) = 3.83, p = .02$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$).

**Figure 2:** Adjusted mean levels of SPE and HRN in a community sample of foreign-born, New Zealand-born non-Māori, and Māori New Zealand citizens

![Adjusted mean levels of SPE and HRN](image-url)

Note Adjusted means represent intercepts after controlling for centered gender, marital status, and religion, and mean age and income. Error bars represent the standard errors of these intercepts.
Adjusted mean levels of SPE and HRN across the three citizen groups (foreign-born NZ citizens, NZ-born non-Māori citizens, Māori) are presented in Figure 2. These adjusted means represent intercepts controlling for centered gender, marital status, and religion, and mean age and income. As shown, the interaction occurred because NZ-born non-Māori citizens seemed similar to Māori in that both groups were reasonably low in SPE, but more similar to foreign-born NZ citizens in that both groups were reasonably high in HRN. Additional analyses supported this interpretation, as the main effects for both SPE ($F(2,439) = 24.34, p < .01$, partial $\eta^2 = .04$) and HRN ($F(2,439) = 7.57, p < .01$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$) across citizen groups were both significant (demographics were entered as covariates in all analyses). Importantly, Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons indicated that, as hypothesized, NZ-born non-Māori citizens and Māori expressed similar (non-significantly different) levels of SPE ($p = .13$), and both groups expressed significantly lower levels of SPE compared to foreign-born NZ citizens ($ps < .02$). As expected, a different pattern emerged when examining mean levels of HRN. NZ-born non-Māori citizens were extremely similar to foreign-born NZ citizens in this regard, and both displayed extremely similar levels of HRN ($p = .99$), and were both significantly higher in HRN than Māori ($p < .01$).

4. Discussion
Study 2 validated the PCIS-2D and tested novel predictions derived from the proposed dark duo model of post-colonial ideology using a large community sample. The study tested and found reasonable support for the proposed dual-factor structure of the PCIS-2D assessing SPE and HRN. In particular, this dual factor model provided a substantially better fit than an alternative single-factor model. This provided additional evidence that, although positively correlated, the exclusion of Indigenous culture from representations of the national category and the negation of historical injustices experienced by Indigenous peoples represent distinct ideologies.

By definition, political ideology should shape political preferences, voting behavior, and social policy attitudes (see Jost 2006, for recent discussion). This, I argue, is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for defining political ideology. As such, tests of the ability of ideology to predict political party preferences provide an excellent test of construct validity when developing new measures of political ideology. Study 2 indicated that SPE and HRN both predicted substantial unique (non-overlapping) variance in individual differences in three important political questions in NZ: support versus opposition for the two major NZ political parties (the Labor Party and the National Party), and support versus opposition on a topical social issue that generated much debate at the time these data were collected in 2008 and early 2009: government funding of a free-to-air Māori television channel. The findings provide good evidence for the convergent and discriminant validity of PCIS-2D and indicate that the scale provides important information that increases the accuracy of models predicting voting behavior in NZ. Indeed, this is something of an understatement, as HRN and SPE together increased the predictive power of the baseline models by 8-10 percent when predicting political party support, and by 34 percent when predicting support for a Māori television channel.

Finally, analysis of mean differences across ethnic groups indicated that non-Māori NZ-born citizens and Māori were similar in their level of support for the symbolic representation of Māori culture in national identity (as evidenced by comparably low SPE scores). Non-Māori NZ-born citizens were readily distinguishable from Māori however, in that they maintained that historical injustices should be forgotten or no longer viewed as relevant (as evidenced by significantly higher HRN scores).

5. General Discussion
As far as I am aware, this is the first psychological study to have attempted to identify and develop psychometric measures of the contemporary ideologies that result from the specific and unique socio-structural circumstances present in many modern-day post-colonial nations. There is a plethora of literature documenting the ideologies that arose in colonial periods, in contrast. Colonial ideology centered on the notion of Indigenous peoples as “noble savages” who were childlike and in need of protection and civilization afforded by Europeans (see Jackman 1994, for an excellent review). As Glick and Fiske comment (2001), this colonial ideology of civilizing paternalism and protection “for their
own benefit”, was aptly characterized by the so-called prophet of British imperialism, Rudyard Kipling in the first verse of the poem, “The White Man’s Burden” (1899, 290):

Take up the White Man’s burden—
Send forth the best ye breed—
Go, bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives’ need;
To wait, in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild—
Your new-caught sullen peoples,
Half devil and half child.

Much as modern forms of racism have supplanted classical or old-fashioned racism (McConahay 1986), I argue that modern post-colonial ideology has supplanted ideologies of colonial imperialism such as that expressed in Kipling’s poem.

I proposed and tested a Dark Duo Model of Post-Colonial Ideology. The dark duo contains two related, but clearly distinct, ideologies: one reflecting Historical Recognition versus Negation (HRN), the other reflecting Symbolic Projection versus Exclusion (SPE). HRN indexes the prescriptive belief that historical injustices experienced by Indigenous peoples in the colonial era are irrelevant in contemporary society. SPE indexes the prescriptive belief that Indigenous culture is irrelevant in representations of modern national identity.

Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis indicated the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale – 2 Dimensions (PCIS-2D) provided a valid and internally reliable measure of these two ideologies in the New Zealand context.

The SPE and HRN scales evidenced a strong and unique ability to predict political party support in a community sample of NZ voters (Study 2). These effects persisted after controlling for a host of other predictors of political party support, including demographic factors such as age and income, broad-bandwidth indicators of Big Five personality, and the general ideology of System Justification. That these effects persisted after controlling for System Justification is particularly promising, given that this latter ideology has been shown to have strong and pervasive effects on intergroup and political attitudes across numerous domains (see Kay et al. 2007, for a review). SPE and HRN index something unique in this regard, although the belief that the political system is fair and operates as it should (system justification) is also a good general predictor of political preferences. It seems that the positioning of historical injustice as irrelevant, and of Indigenous symbols as being something that is irrelevant for modern conceptions of the national category, provide an axis of meaning that aids in the creation and mobilization of political opinion.

5.1. Implications, Caveats, and Directions for Future Research
The identification of SPE and HRN as distinct ideologies that predict voting and policy preferences raises intriguing questions about the role and function of realistic/resource-based versus symbolic representations of Indigenous culture in national identity. For instance, the Ingroup Projection Model and the Common Ingroup Identity Model both state that creating a superordinate representation that includes both subgroups should serve to increase tolerance and decrease discrimination (see Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 2009, for a review). The Common Ingroup Identity Model also emphasizes that interventions aiming to create a superordinate categorization can have the reverse effect because they may threaten positive distinctiveness of the constituent groups. In their review, Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy (2009) emphasize the importance of mutual intergroup differentiation, which proposes that to be effective, the superordinate representation should recognize and equally emphasize both subgroup identities (see also Hornsey and Hogg 2000).

The Common Ingroup Identity Model has important implications for social policy aiming to promote a more inclusive national identity. Although social policies that emphasize symbolic integration and equality of identity contribution might strengthen a mutual ingroup national identity, it seems less likely that they will affect support for material allocations or representations relating to the guardianship of resources. As my colleagues and I propose (Sibley, Liu, and Khan in press), it would be interesting to compare manipulations that emphasize mutual intergroup identity in terms of representations of belongingness (which seems to be already in place or at least easily accessible in NZ) with manipulations that emphasize shared responsibility for looking after and protecting material resources, such as NZ national
assets, forests, fisheries, and the natural environment. These latter interventions might help to further change public opinion about material allocations aiming to promote social equality and address historical injustices experienced by Māori.

There are numerous avenues for future research extending the model of post-colonial ideology that I propose here. One obvious next step is to ensure that the model holds in post-colonial nations other than NZ. As I argue above, I expect that the model should predict political party preferences in all post-colonial nations where “former colonizers” live side by side with “former colonized” peoples, and where the following conditions are also met: (a) there is a history of objective historical injustice experienced by Indigenous peoples, and those peoples have a voice to call modern day society to account, and (b) Indigenous peoples have undeniable nationality and a collective voice calling for cultural representation and recognition.

Future research could, for instance, test whether the mean levels of SPE and HRN expressed by non-Indigenous citizens vary systematically according to objective indicators of material inequality experienced by different Indigenous groups. For instance, in the NZ context the Treaty of Waitangi (signed between the British Crown and Māori in 1840) provides a legal basis for claims for reparation under common law. NZ seems fairly unique in this context. I suspect that HRN may become more salient in this context, because there is a strong legal basis for claims for reparation. In nations with less legal basis for claims for reparation, endorsing HRN may be less pertinent in legitimating continued levels of inequality. Thus, HRN may, for example, be lower among Australian Europeans than among NZ Europeans, as Australia does not have a similar treaty between the British Crown and Indigenous Australian peoples.

Another obvious direction for future research is to extend the PCIS-2D to incorporate other dimensions of ideology not limited to the unique socio-structural conditions present in post-colonial nations. SPE and HRN form two central ideologies in post-colonial society, but this is not to say that other ideologies do not also play an important part. Obvious candidates for a unified and comprehensive model of the dimensions of ethnic-group ideology include System Justification Ideology (Kay and Jost 2003) and Color-Blind Ideology (Knowles et al. 2009). These two ideologies have been identified in general research on ethnic group relations, and should also be relevant for understanding intergroup relations between Indigenous and more recent settler/immigrant populations in post-colonial society.

5.2. Concluding Comments and Reflections

I began this manuscript with a quote from the Hunn Report commissioned by the New Zealand government in 1961. The Hunn Report talked about integration of Māori culture in terms of “the chief relics” being those “worthiest of preservation.” This epigraph reflects an ideology relating to beliefs about the projection and maintenance of symbolic aspects of Māori culture, and the manner in which those aspects are positioned, which I have tried to articulate and develop a reliable measure of here. I refer to this scale as a measure of Symbolic Projection versus Exclusion (or SPE). My analysis paints a dark view of integration; and suggests that Māori culture and practices may be strategically positioned as distinct from national identity, or as not belonging in representations of the superordinate or national category. What is key to this analysis is that SPE reflects a prescriptive belief that positions Māori cultural elements and symbols as being maladaptive, or a thing of the past that is of little relevance for contemporary national identity, as opposed to an important and integral part of New Zealand.

The ideology of symbolic exclusion does not operate in isolation. I argue that it forms one part of a dual ideological system, which when paired with an ideology of Historical Recognition versus Negation (HRN), functions in tandem to legitimize systemic inequality in the allocation of resources and the cultural representation of Indigenous versus more recent settler/immigrant populations. Together, these two ideologies form a “dark duo”; they articulate a pair of discourses that draw upon culturally sanctioned repertoires to “make ok” or dismiss calls for reparation and representation. This interpretation is grounded in Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) and Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan and Stephan 2000). Integrated Threat Theory emphasizes a distinction between symbolic and realistic or material threats, which parallels the more specific
distinction between SPE and HRN which I present here. Social Dominance Theory locates these dual ideologies as two central or proximal legitimizing myths operating in post-colonial nations to justify different aspects of inequality in intergroup relations between immigrant/settler and Indigenous populations.

I wish to finish on a personal note. When reading political speeches and elite discourse used to develop items for the PCIS-2D, I was struck by the lack of alternative formulations available. This is evident in the way the pro-trait items included in the PCIS-2D in many cases closely mirror actual political discourse, whereas I wrote the reverse-worded items in response to such discourse because alternative counter-formulations were few and far between in the available media and political discourse. There is a very real need to provide alternative ideological positions. This is difficult; however, it is by no means impossible. Indeed, there are some powerful and evocative exceptions to the dominant ideological position; one of these, in a speech made by New Zealand Prime Minister Norman Kirk shortly before his untimely death in 1974, I will end with here:

We are not one people; we are one nation. The idea of one people grew out of the days when fashionable folk talked about integration. So far as the majority and minority are concerned, integration is precisely what cats do to mice. They integrate them. The majority swallows up the minority; makes it sacrifice its culture and traditions and offer its belongings to conform to the traditions and the culture of the majority. . . . We are one nation in which all have equal rights, but we are two peoples and in no circumstances should we by any law or Act demand that any part of the New Zealand community should have to give up its inheritance, its culture, or its identity to play its part in this nation.

(Norman Kirk, 5 July 1974)

References


