Understanding the Other’s “Understanding” of Violence: Legitimacy, Recognition, and the Challenge of Dealing with the Past in Divided Societies

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Post-conflict societies which have achieved a cessation of violence and embarked on a political conflict transformation process cannot in the long-term avoid a process of dealing with the past. Case studies of South Africa and Northern Ireland confirm this normative claim, showing that within the post-war society as a whole a social consensus on how to “understand” and “recognize” the use of violence that occurred during the conflict is necessary: understanding the other’s “understanding” of violence. A mutual understanding must be reached that both sides fought a campaign that was just and legitimate from their own perspective. The morality of the "other’s violence" has to be recognized.

1. Introduction

If we don’t live together, we’ll die together. (Bobby Philpott, March 7, 2000)

Bobby Philpott was one of the leading members of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), which is the largest Loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland. He was directly involved in the peace process as part of the UDA delegation that met British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland during her controversial visit to the Maze prison in 1998, when Mowlam talked with UDA prisoners to avert a crisis in the peace process. Philpott’s statement leads to the central question of this essay: How can divided post-conflict societies constructively deal with the past in order to rebuild their social fabric in such a way that the conflicting ethnopolitical communities (the former enemies) are able to live together in peace? In order to answer that question this paper will elaborate on the following thesis: for fragile post-war societies one necessary prerequisite for dealing with the violent past is for the society as a whole to seek an empathic understanding and recognition of politically motivated violence. The term “recognition” refers to the philosophical concept of Axel Honneth who claimed that “the struggle for recognition” should be at the center of “social conflicts” (see below).

The methodological approach of discourse analysis of violence will be used in order to bring out the core argument. The term “discourse” is used in this paper not as a mere synonym for “debate” or “discussion,” but to designate a more advanced form of communication including the totality of communicative acts (speech acts) that can be analyzed according to their common structures, practices, rules, resources, and meanings (Keller, 2004, 64). The discourse analysis of violence will focus on the strategies used by armed groups—like the Irish Republican Army (IRA)—to justify or legitimize their acts of violence. Violent acts are seen within an interpretative “discourse process”

The idea for this article came from a paper entitled “Understanding the other’s ‘understanding’ of violence: Legitimacy, recognition and the ‘violent’ challenge of dealing with the past in post-conflict societies” given by the author at the 49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (“Bridging Multiple Divides”), San Francisco, March 26–29, 2008. This was a presentation in the March 27th panel on “Reassessing the past in divided societies: Human rights, memory and reconciliation policies in cross-regional perspectives.”

Bobby Philpott, in an interview for the three-part documentary “Loyalists” produced by high-profile British journalist Peter Taylor and shown on BBC Two on March 7, 2000.
taking place within the affected community. This process aims to legitimize acts of violence in the perception of the community so that violence becomes self-affirmative and independent. The meaning of violence will be the central focus of analyzing the discourse on the “morality of violence” (Hamber 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2003). The morality of violence is expressed through a process of rationalization of violent acts, a process that is instrumentalized as a deliberative strategy by the non-state armed groups.

This article will make the case for a quite contentious normative argument: Having achieved a cessation of violence and embarked on a political conflict transformation process it becomes absolutely vital to reach a social consensus within the post-war society on how to recognize and understand the use of violence during the conflict in moral and ethical terms. It is a rather uneasy and uncomfortable challenge, both for the victims and the perpetrators of violence, but a debate that cannot be evaded. The prerequisite for the divided communities being part of the same post-conflict society is to achieve a common, not a divided understanding of the violent past in order to move forward: understanding the other’s “understanding” of violence means to reach a mutual understanding that both sides fought a campaign which from their own perspective was just and legitimate. The morality of the “other’s violence” has to be recognized.

The viability of that approach becomes obvious if we consider the basic need of a divided post-war society. Put simply, the communities will have to live together in future and cannot risk being divided over the past. The basic human needs of the individuals living in them can be identified using the terminology and concepts of Rosenberg (2003a, 2003b, 2004), J. W. Burton (1987, 1990, 1995), Burton and Dukes (1990), and Ropers (1995a, 1995b), who focus on the “needs” of the conflicting parties as a starting point for conflict transformation processes. According to Norbert Ropers, a distinction has to be drawn between conflicts of interest and conflicts of identity in the analysis of any ethno-political conflict (1995a). While conflicts of interests can in theory be worked out by adjusting the diverging interests through more or less “mutual” accommodations, conflicts of identity cannot be resolved by accommodation—it is almost “all-or-nothing.” For example, the demand for political and cultural acceptance by a particular ethnic identity is simply non-negotiable (Ropers 1995b, 206). However, an effective conflict transformation strategy can be arrived at when interests are separated from attitudes and opinions on the one hand and from needs on the other hand. Opinions are always associated with politically articulated goals, for example the demand for secession of territory. They are basic mindsets and viewpoints, which must be distinguished from interests which suggest that certain “motives” were the causes of or reasons for ethno-political conflict. A transformation of the conflict cannot take place if the conflict is understood as a “tragic expression of unsatisfied needs” (Rosenberg 2004, 27). The same basic assumption is made by Kelman, who perceives conflict as a process driven by collective needs and fears (1997, 195). These needs are primarily of an individual and human nature; however they are articulated and demanded through groups which represent certain interests (ibid.). The concept focusing on the “needs” of the conflicting parties leads to the acceptance of an inclusive definition of “victim”: there can be no hierarchy of victims; no one can claim sole ownership of “victimhood” for himself. Rather, everyone who died as a direct or indirect consequence of the conflict should be qualified and treated as a “legitimate” victim. On that basis societies can move forward towards resolving the conflicting “morality of violence” and the contentious “memories” of a divided violent past.

Naturally there are important limits to this line of reasoning, e.g. there are limits to the demand for understanding and recognition. The following arguments are more or less explicitly linked to post-war societies where former enemies have to live together. Of course these normative implications cannot be transferred to all cases where violence happened on a massive, organized scale, for example in the case of genocide. It is very important to make the point that the political nature of violence in divided societies, where former enemies have to live together after war, is an essential requirement for the “understanding approach” to violence which is the core of this article. This line of reasoning is based on the notion of “divided societies” that perceives post-war societies as being divided by conflicting “identities.” These divisions already existed before the war and continue to shape the post-war society, for example as
“majority/minority” situations. This means that although any post-war society by its very nature could be regarded as “divided”—and we should keep in mind that “ethnicity” rarely exists in a pure form, rather it is usually combined with factors such as religion, race, or class in mutually reinforcing ways—it is important to understand that the conflict-generating cleavages are based on identities that are derived from certain ethnic or cultural aspects of “belonging.” In particular, cases like Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Nigeria, and the Philippines are examples for this understanding of divided societies.

It is precisely the relevance for divided societies which allows the central argument of this article to move beyond the purely normative basis of the argument which favors an approach of “understanding” of violence. While achieving an understanding of the other’s “understanding” of violence might indeed be difficult in the short-term, since it can and does open wounds and may even put the post-war society at risk of a return to violence, in the longer term every post-war society has to find a way to deal with the past. This can even be seen in European countries like Spain, where the conflict-generating cleavages are not based on ethnicity or race. In the Spanish case an informal “pact of forgetting” (pacto de olvido) was established after the civil war. Although this pact was quite “successful” for seventy years, its recent breakdown demonstrates the need for a process of dealing with the past in Spain. This process had been “frozen” for seventy years, but the demand never went away: the strategy of forgetting could not last forever. According to the well-known British historian Antony Beevor, in effect “two Spains” developed. His new book on the Spanish civil war makes a strong case for a process of dealing with the past (Beevor 2008). In an interview he emphasized: “The Pact of Forgetting has to be broken. All Spanish citizens—citizens of one of the most modern and most optimistically minded peoples in the European Union—have to learn to understand how this tragedy could have happened” (Die Zeit, July 17, 2006).

A lot has been written on “dealing with,” “managing,” “coping with,” or “overcoming” the past (“delete as appropriate”), and following the South African experience (see below) quite a number of “truth commissions” have been set up around the world. Priscilla Hayner compared fifteen truth commissions established world-wide before 1994 (Hayner 1994, 1995, 2000). In the South African context, however (serving as the prime example), it is highly disputed whether the “truth commission” remedy actually led to forgiveness and reconciliation. Take this statement from Sonny Venkathrnam, a former prisoner on Robben Island whose middle ear was removed with a spoon and genitals cut off: “I will never forgive my torturers. Because for twenty-four hours a day it reminds me that I’ve been tortured. So, I am not asking for revenge, but don’t ask me for forgiveness” (Venkathrnam 2003).

Although there were completely different voices too, Venkathrnam’s statement illustrates the core of the dilemma confronted by applied science: What right does “peace science” (Baumann 2008a) have to claim or postulate that the affected societies or communities should forgive or become reconciled? What moral and ethical justifications allow us to tell a suffering community that it has to recognize the other side’s suffering and to reach a social consensus? There is no universal remedy in dealing with the past; indeed there are ethical constraints and dilemmas which should be recognized by peace science, for the “easy” recommendation of “truth commission,” as it is commonly applied to post-war societies, can have serious and counter-productive effects.

Therefore, the approach taken in this paper is to take a critical look at the South African case with the aim of trying to learn from its successes and failures. Instead of opening some magic, universal peace-building toolbox, we might identify some basic common features. The case of South Africa has been chosen because it is internationally hailed as a “role model” for truth and reconciliation. In addition to the fact that the South African truth and reconciliation process led to a series of similar “experiments” around the world, it can be argued that with respect to the disputed issue of the “moralties of violence,” “recognition” of the political nature of violence in South African was the main rationale of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Therefore, it appears appropriate to compare South Africa with Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland can be seen as a case where a political peace settlement has been reached.
but the process of dealing with the past has not started yet. And because of that the (short-term) political achievements of the Northern Irish peace process might prove irrelevant in the long term if the divided communities find no way to overcome their hostility and learn to live together.

2. Voluntary Apartheid in Northern Ireland: Peace-Building through “Chosen Amnesia”?

We are now in a new era in Northern Ireland. It’s long past time that people decided they should move on and leave the past behind. (Edwin Poots, Belfast Telegraph, August 9, 2007)

This statement was made by Edwin Poots from the British-Loyalist Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) when he was confronted with the necessity of dealing with the past in Northern Ireland. Poots became Minister of Culture, Arts, and Leisure in the new Northern Ireland executive which was formed in May 2007. For the first time in the history of Northern Ireland the government included the two former enemies: the DUP, the most radical Unionist party (which strongly supports ties with Great Britain), and Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA. Although both parties were part of the first administration until its suspension in October 2002, the DUP had never spoken directly with Sinn Fein representatives and had consistently refused to engage with them in any form. All cabinet meetings of the first administration were boycotted by the DUP ministers. The new power-sharing government became possible after the St. Andrews Agreement signed by the British and Irish governments in October 2006, which built on the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.

The debate over a truth and reconciliation commission for Northern Ireland actually began quite a long time before the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. Given the historical fact that 1,800 of the almost 4,000 killings since 1969 have not been solved yet, the community’s desire for disclosure has a particular relevance (detailed victim statistics can be found in Smyth and Fay 2000). Norman Porter distinguishes two sides which have dominated the Northern Irish “reconciliation debate”—the “cynics” and the “enthusiasts” (Porter 2003, 13ff.). He considers himself one of the enthusiasts and argues for an empathetic embrace of reconciliation, although it might be difficult and dangerous (21). At the same time, Porter severely criticises the official churches and religious leaders for their very limited engagement in reconciliation: “It is a curious thing that many who boast the purest Christian motives are among those most threatened by the possibility of political reconciliation in the North” (Porter 2003, 27).

The main Protestant churches, for example, proclaimed that they would reject a Northern Ireland truth commission based on the South African model (The Newsletter, May 2, 2004). Porter’s critique is absolutely plausible, since in Northern Ireland there is simply not enough strength in the political leadership to be able to support or lead a social reconciliation process or any institutional process of that kind. At the national level, the necessary degree of political leadership does not exist. This is the main difference to the political leadership in South Africa (M. Burton 1999), as witnessed on several occasions: the “Saville Inquiry” into the events of Bloody Sunday is a quite obvious example showing a lack of political leadership for a process of dealing with the past (see section 4.2.). Martin McGuinness, who was Sinn Fein’s chief negotiator during the peace process and a leading member of the IRA in the 1970s, was the only person with a Republican background to give evidence at the inquiry, where he cited a “Republican code of honor” that prevented him from giving evidence against fellow Republicans. But the British security forces were also more than reluctant to come forward: the British government has not yet had the courage to start an official, independent truth process or even give its consent to an internal body dealing with the issue in a completely independent way.

The British government regularly consulted South African politicians and policy-makers. At the end of May 2004, for example, the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Paul Murphy, visited South Africa to find out what lessons could be learned about dealing with a history of violence and human rights abuses (BBC News, June 1, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/3767455.stm). Among others, Murphy met with Charles Villa-Vicencio, who was the National Research Director of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Villa-
Vicencio led Murphy to the crucial conclusion that the TRC is “not exportable”: “Ultimately it came out of the womb of this place. They [in Northern Ireland] probably need to find some way, but I am certainly not suggesting it should be a TRC” (Belfast Telegraph, June 2, 2004).

This conclusion could at the same time be characterized as the lowest common denominator in the context of the Northern Irish “reconciliation discourse”: the belief that the past needs to be dealt with is shared by all political parties and groups, but at the same time all also agree that the South African TRC cannot simply be adopted in the form of a “Northern Ireland TRC.” The TRC was part of the democratization process and a political compromise. This opportunity has already been lost in the negotiations that led to the Good Friday Agreement, because the section of the Good Friday Agreement addressing the question of victims is very abstract and was left wide open for interpretation. The agreement established a Victims Commission and the position of a Victims Commissioner, to which Kenneth Bloomfield was appointed. Bloomfield published a report (We Will Remember Them) in which the idea of a Northern Ireland truth commission was mentioned in very distanced, sensitive, and even shy language: “The possibility of benefiting from some form of Truth and Reconciliation Commission at some stage should not be overlooked” (Bloomfield 1998, paragraph 5.37).

At the same time he also emphasized one fundamental restriction on a “Northern Irish truth commission”: “Unhappily, “truth” can be used as a weapon as well as a shield. If such a device were to have a place in Northern Ireland, it could only be in the context of a wide ranging political accord” (38).

In today’s Northern Ireland, in Bloomfield’s words, “truth” would most likely be a weapon. The overwhelming consensus in this discussion is that Northern Irish society is not ready to bear the complete and utter truth of the violent past: “Post the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland it is clear that a broad level of consensus on the need to uncover the past is not forthcoming. It would probably also be a mistake to use the structure of the South African model of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a starting point for dealing with the past” (Hamber 1999a).

The main reason for this consensus, as this paper argues, can be traced back to the existence of two conflicting memories of that past that are linked with two contradicting moralities of violence: a Protestant and a Catholic “version.” The communal divisions defined by these “two versions” are still manifest in Northern Ireland’s post-conflict society. This is especially the case in those areas that were worst affected by the violence during the “Troubles,” namely the working-class areas. It was indeed a “working-class war” that had taken place in Northern Ireland.

The post-conflict society can be characterized as a situation consisting of and based on a chosen “voluntary apartheid” (Baumann 2008b). “Voluntary apartheid” as a theory includes all relevant endogenous factors governing the post-war society’s communal divisions. The underlying assumption of the theory posits that a lasting and secure “peace” can only be achieved by the absence of voluntary apartheid; since as long as these negative, endogenous structures are left over as virulent factors, the danger of society’s return to violence is eminent. Thus, the peace process remains fragile. In contrast to violently enforced apartheid, the concept of “voluntary apartheid” characterizes a deliberately chosen ethno-political strategy used by post-war communities to uphold community division and separateness. “Voluntary apartheid” can also be seen as a critical indicator of society’s willingness and ability to enter peaceful conflict transformation. As an alternative terminology the traditional sociological theory of “social closure” could be adopted—in the sense of “ethnopolitical closure.” Social closure can be traced back to Max Weber: the process leading to “closure” is the result of the strategy pursued by each community to maximize their own privileges, advantages, and communal success at the expense of the “other” communities within the same society (Weber 1922, 52).

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2 The complete text of the Good Friday Agreement can be found at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.htm.
The ethno-political strategy of total separation uses several tools or categories: sectarianism, a skeptical common sense, a strong focus on territoriality, a highly explosive potential of symbols and symbolism, and manifest collective traumata (Baumann 2008b). To understand the category of sectarianism in the context of post-conflict societies we can go back to the sociologist Georg Simmel, a fellow of Max Weber, who used the concept of “socialization through conflict” (Simmel 1958). This comes close to what John Paul Lederach called the process of “Lebanonization” of society: “Cohesion and identity in contemporary conflict tend to form within increasingly narrower lines than those that encompass national citizenship. In situations of armed conflict, people seek security by identifying with something close to their experience and over which they have some control. In today’s settings that unity of identity may be a clan, ethnicity, religion, or geographic/ regional affiliation, or a mix of these” (Lederach 1997, 12f).

The final result is a post-war society in which any form of social interaction is determined by the “system” of sectarianism: “Sectarianism is about what goes on in people’s hearts and minds, and it is about the kind of institutions and structures created in society. It is about people’s attitudes to one another, about what they do and say and the things they leave undone or unsaid. Moreover, ‘sectarian’ is usually a negative judgement that people make about someone else’s behaviour and rarely a label that they apply to themselves, their own sectarianism always being the hardest to see (Liechty and Clegg 2001, 102).

One of the most remarkable features of Northern Irish society is that even several centuries before the outbreak of violent conflict in 1968, society as whole was sharply divided along religious lines. Though Protestants and Catholics lived next to each other without violence, they did not live together with each other—and they had nothing to say to each other. This was the finding of Rosemary Harris’s ethnographic study conducted shortly after the Second World War: Catholics and Protestants had created two separate worlds, there was no social integration, even in mixed areas (Harris 1972, 146).

This situation was characterized by Frank Wright as “communal deterrence,” in which “serious communication” is not possible (Wright 1987, 1990, 1996). If there was any contact between Catholics and Protestants at all, if they passed each other on the streets for example, the division and “ethnopolitical separateness” was overplayed by what Harris called “over-friendliness”: they chatted about the weather, the high prices in the stores, etc. But the coping mechanism of “over-friendliness” prevented any serious dialogue on substantial matters: “People in Ulster are, as a rule, cheerful, courteous, and helpful to one another. The deep political divisions of which I write, and on which the international media focuses so much attention, are avoided in daily conversations. It is considered to be rude to bring up issues of religious affiliations or anything that would reflect these divisions. One never asks a person if he or she is Catholic or Protestant, for instance; it is simply not done” (Santino 2001, 61).

As a strategy for avoidance of dialogue, over-friendliness is still a common feature in today’s Northern Irish society. In 2001—almost four years after the Good Friday Agreement and seven years after the ceasefires—Peter Shirlow carried out an ethnographic study of Protestant and Catholic interaction in North Belfast. His quite remarkable results gained a lot of attention, since his main finding was that the features of “sectarianism” had not decreased during the peace process (Shirlow 2003). This finding was verified in a later study he did together with Brendan Murtagh (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006).

The most problematic feature of voluntary apartheid, and the one which is most resistant to change, however, is connected to the divided past and the existence in both communities of collective traumas based on conflicting collective memories. According to Maurice Halbwachs the memory of the individual is to a large degree determined by a collective foundation. In any society there are as many collective memories as existing (ethnopolitical) communities (Halbwachs 1966, 1967, 2002). Halbwachs emphasizes the enormous importance of the community as the primary context of communication and symbolic manifestation of memories of the past. Thus, the act of remembering becomes a social practice. Halbwachs emphasizes that
memory has to be seen as social memory of the group or community: “The group must have a memory of itself that recounts a sense of origin and distinctiveness. A social memory becomes a central facet of the ideological armoury of the group, helping to legitimise and rationalise difference by rooting it in the far-distant past and thus placing weight on the primordial and essential nature of the antagonists or otherness” (Halbwachs 1992, 6).

Because of the collective conditioning of memory, the simple act of remembering is not reduced to the individual’s own experience, but rather goes far beyond and encompasses the memories and experiences of people from his or her own community: stories and experiences that have been communicated. Thus, remembering is an active as well as culturally-sensitive process since the collective memory has to be re-built and re-formulated on an ongoing basis: “Social memories are not recollections of times past but part of the present understandings of the past, people use images of the past as a justification for the present relationship and not ‘images from the past’” (Jarman 1997, 4ff.).

Collective memories as “images from the past” for the present have to be monitored, checked, and evaluated by the community on a regular basis in order to fit present (political and/or strategic) purposes. As a consequence it is quite a common practice (memory practice) to delete specific historical events from the collective memory, while other events are mystified or “de-contextualized,” i.e. removed from their concrete historical context (Jarman 1997, 7).

This collective orientation towards remembering opens up opportunities for instrumentalization of past events with the aim of establishing and enforcing communal division through divided memories. This makes them the crucial and most dangerous feature of voluntary apartheid: divided memories of the violent events of the past leading to conflicting moralities of violence. As a result violent “macro-events” can be either upgraded or downgraded arbitrarily—to serve the needs of the community, i.e. the community’s collective memory. Vamik Volkan’s concept of “chosen traumas” helps us to illustrate this point in more detail: “I use the term chosen trauma to describe the collective memory of a calamity that once befell a group’s ancestors. It is, of course, more than a simple recollection; it is a shared mental representation of the event, which includes realistic information, fantasized expectations, intense feelings, and defenses against unacceptable thoughts” (Volkan 1997, 48).

Instead of “downgrading” the violent “macro-event” as a “chosen trauma,” it can alternatively be upgraded to become a “chosen glory” for the community’s collective memory (Volkan 1997, 81). The prime example for the instrumentalization of “historical” violent events is the annual commemoration of Bloody Sunday (January 30, 1972), when fourteen Catholic civilians were killed by British paratroopers (see below). The fourteen people killed represent human loss and life-long tragedies for the families; there are many annual commemorative events, for example the Bloody Sunday march in Londonderry. But what is important to recognize is that the Catholic rationalization of the violent event, predominantly articulated by the IRA, perceives it as a “chosen glory” and not as a “chosen trauma.” This became all too obvious in the year 2000 when Martin McGuinness was the keynote speaker at the annual Bloody Sunday Memorial Lecture. Referring to the fourteen dead civilians, he said: “They are not victims. They are heroes” (I was in the audience during the speech). McGuinness used a clever semantic and symbolic trick of communication: while acknowledging the loss of the grieving families he also conveyed that for the IRA Bloody Sunday was by no means a “chosen trauma.” Before Bloody Sunday, the IRA was almost defeated, with only a handful of weapons left and no significant support within the Catholic community. That changed dramatically in the aftermath of the killings, with a massive increase in support and volunteers: “This afternoon 27 people were shot in this city. 13 of them lay dead. They were innocent, we were there. This is our Sharpeville. A moment of truth and a moment of shame. And I just want to say this to the British government: You know what you have just done, don’t you? You have destroyed the civil rights movement and you have given the IRA its biggest victory it will ever have. All over this city tonight, young man, boys will be joining the IRA.”

In the famous movie “Bloody Sunday” (2002) by Paul Greengrass, this statement was attributed to Ivan Cooper,
who was one of the leaders of the (nonviolent) human rights movement in Northern Ireland and also a member of the British House of Commons. In retrospect, Bloody Sunday destroyed the last chances of any peaceful settlement at that time. As a commemorative event, Bloody Sunday shows how active memory practice can rebuild and consolidate the voluntary apartheid at the communal level. However, “Bloody Sunday” is not remembered collectively by both communities. Rather, the Protestant collective memory chooses its own events to commemorate “its own victims,” like “Bloody Friday” (see below).

It can be concluded that the instrumentalization of the divided past proves to be the key tool to uphold ethnopolitical separateness and division. It is far too early for the Northern Irish situation to be qualified as a “zone of stable peace” (Boulding 1978).

Coming back to the political arena, it becomes very clear that the recently elected politicians are all too eager to ignore or leave the past behind (see the quote from Poots at the beginning). Their macro-political strategy is one of “chosen amnesia” (the term was coined by Buckley-Zistel [2006]), because they want to move forward with political consolidation of the process while ignoring the evident structures of voluntary apartheid. As Buckley-Zistel found out, a similar strategy was employed in Rwanda: “remembering to forget” became the rationale of both communities. However, while this strategy might achieve some short-term rewards, it bears considerable long-term risk of a return to inter-ethnic violence because the structures that created the conditions for the outbreak of violence in the first place are not changed (Buckley-Zistel 2006).

3. Truth-Seeking Exercises and the Morality of Violence


During the past twenty-five years, truth commissions as a tool for political and social stabilization of post-conflict societies have received increasing attention worldwide (Hayner 2000, 34). International interest in the idea of truth commissions grew even more in the 1990s in the wake of the South African and Chilean developments: “The increased interest in truth commissions is, in part, a reflection of the limited success in judicial approaches to accountability, and the obvious need for other measures to recognize past wrongs and confront, punish or reform those persons and institutions that were responsible for violations” (Hayner 2000).

From the outset “Chile” and “Nuremberg,” were instrumental in the South African policy debate on the specific format and design of the TRC, because each represents an “extreme” type of “dealing with the past”: “If post-war Germany represents one extreme of the justice policies pursued in transitional societies, namely prosecution, then Chile represents the other, namely, blanket amnesty for those who committed gross violations of human rights” (Simpson 2002, 221).

It soon became very clear that “prosecuting everybody” was simply unworkable while trying to take over the apartheid state machine, whereas a “blanket amnesty” would be unacceptable to a black populace that had only just fought for and won the concessions that had resulted in negotiations (Bell 2003; Villa-Vicencio 2000a, 2000b, 2003a). As a consequence, the South African policy-makers decided to go down the road Desmond Tutu called the “third way” between “Chile” and “Nuremberg.” The TRC was officially commissioned to uncover “the truth” about apartheid’s human rights violations and to publicize its findings. The TRC was made up of seventeen commissioners, selected from all political parties and groupings. After two years they presented their final report (for further description of the structure see Coetzee 2003 and Cherry, Daniel, and Fullard 2003).

The third way realized in the amnesty process gave the TRC far-reaching “semi-legal” authority and was the crucial
factor for which the TRC gained the most international recognition. The South African version of amnesty was the central innovative feature of the TRC:

“Our amnesty process has been quite unique in the world. We have conditional amnesty. We would not have had all of these revelations if we had just gone for a blanket amnesty and families would still have been deprived of the knowledge.” 4

Amnesty was only granted in exchange for “truth”; “Applicants had to make a “full disclosure” of their human rights violations in order to qualify for amnesty. In most instances applicants would appear before the Amnesty Committee, and these hearings would be open to the public” (Boraine 2003, 165).

The bottom line was that the South African “invention” of amnesty was a limited version (Boraine 2003) termed “qualified amnesty” (Villa-Vicencio 2003b). Granting amnesty was conditional upon the applicant (i.e. the perpetrator of violence) publicly stating the “truth” (Hayner 2000, 37). Within this hybrid “truth-seeking exercise” amnesty was inextricably linked with truth and reconciliation: “At the heart of this hybrid approach was the reliance on a notion of “truth recovery” as a restorative alternative to punitive justice—through full disclosure by perpetrators (and their supposed shaming) in exchange for amnesty, as well as through voluntary testimony about apartheid’s gross human rights violations given by victims (and their supposed healing)” (Simpson 2002, 221).

The question of the “morality of violence” became relevant in the context of the amnesty decision because in this hybrid version, amnesty was also conditional upon the political “quality” of the violent act committed by the amnesty applicant: in order to qualify for amnesty the act of violence had to be “justified” as a politically motivated act of violence.

3.2. “Discriminatory Truth-seeking” in Northern Ireland

However, achieving the desired social consensus on the morality of violence is an uphill struggle. According to Brandon Hamber the challenge for post-conflict societies is to be willing to adopt a totally different moral starting point for the analysis or assessment of acts of violence in order to move forward: “Violence during times of political conflict is by definition a political action fraught with the hidden hands of political agendas and posturing. It is for this very reason that consensual strategies for dealing with the past should be sought. It is only through taking control of the apparatus of memory and history that societies coming out of violence can begin to engage with and develop constructive collective memories of the conflict” (Hamber 1999b).

The tension between morality, ethical considerations, and violence (or “performative acts” of “meaningful” violence) can be analyzed by critically questioning the communication, justification, and legitimization strategies of violence. Acts of violence are embedded in an interpretative discourse that takes place within the communities whose perceptions are the central focal point; the communities’ perceptions are addressed, they become the target of the discursive process. Through this process, violence becomes more and more self-driven and independent (Apter 1997, 10). Using the language of anthropologists, this argument is based on the assumption that politically motivated violence is presented as an intentional, calculated “performative act” (Aijmer 2000, 1) and, therefore, must be assessed according to its “performative quality.” The same analytical backdrop is used by anthropologists like Anton Blok (2000) or Allen Feldman (1991, 1998) and by sociologists like David Apter (1997). The important factor is to consider the meaning and significance of the violent act instead of claiming a priori illegality, senselessness or irrationality: “Violence without an audience will still leave people dead, but is socially meaningless. Violent acts are efficient because of their staging of the same analytical backdrop that takes place within the communities whose perceptions are the central focal point; the communities’ perceptions are addressed, they become the target of the discursive process. Through this process, violence becomes more and more self-driven and independent (Apter 1997, 10). Using the language of anthropologists, this argument is based on the assumption that politically motivated violence is presented as an intentional, calculated “performative act” (Aijmer 2000, 1) and, therefore, must be assessed according to its “performative quality.” The same analytical backdrop is used by anthropologists like Anton Blok (2000) or Allen Feldman (1991, 1998) and by sociologists like David Apter (1997). The important factor is to consider the meaning and significance of the violent act instead of claiming a priori illegality, senselessness or irrationality: “Violence without an audience will still leave people dead, but is socially meaningless. Violent acts are efficient because of their staging of the actual physical results” (Schröder and Schmidt 2001, 5f.).

Seen within this framework violence by the IRA and others was directed against the “institutions” of the British crown and according to their “discourse processes” violent acts were not directed against the community, i.e. not against individual members of the Protestant community in Northern Ireland. This point was reinforced in July 2002, when the IRA made a public apology to the “innocent victims,” namely to “non-combatants” killed during acts of “legitimate” violence: “While it was not our intention to injure or kill non-combatants, the reality is that on this and on a number of other occasions, that was the consequence of our actions. . . . We offer our sincere apologies and condolences to their families” (An Phoblacht, July 18, 2002).5

Thus, the basic analytical assumption of this paper is that violence is a means of communication, disseminating (symbolic) meaning which is open for interpretation: “Rather than defining violence a priori as senseless and irrational, we should consider it as a changing form of interaction and communication, as a historically developed cultural form of meaningful action” (Blok 2000, 24).

However, these discursive legitimation strategies cannot be left unchallenged, because “recognition” and “understanding” are not a one-way street. The challenge to the legitimation discourse is that during war there will always be civilian fatalities and combatants who decide to participate in a war, i.e. choosing violence or armed conflict, thereby accepting the loss of innocent civilian lives. Thus when demanding that victims and surviving families understand the violent acts of armed groups as having been carried out for politically motivated reasons, the armed groups must in return also recognize how difficult it is for victims and surviving families to comprehend the rationalization of violence that distinguishes between “legitimate targets” and “civilians.”

The police is a prime example illustrating this point. Members of Northern Ireland’s then overwhelmingly Protestant police force were seen as “legitimate targets” because they were the manifest institutions of British “foreign rule” in Ireland. But the moral challenge to such legitimation strategies is this: a police officer was not only a “military” servant of the state, but also “off duty” a private citizen, a family man, a father, and a civilian. And he even might not even have supported the government he was serving under. So for a large part of his life he was indeed a “non-combatant.” Only through the eyes of the IRA can he be seen as a legitimate target.

On the other hand we can also take the conflicting moralities of violence one step further and ask critical questions from a completely contrary point of view: are there reasons or “rationalizations” that could persuade survivors whose relatives fell victim to violent acts “perpetrated” by the IRA and others that the armed groups and their families can be recognized as victims, too? Or in other words, is it feasible or justified to classify armed combatants not only as “terrorists” or “perpetrators,” but also as “victims”?

To understand this point we need to take a look at the biographies of the individuals involved in violence and the circumstances and living conditions of their families. Not only did they serve very long prison sentences, but their families were destroyed, “innocent” lives were ruined. In addition, many family members who had no IRA connection were murdered. “Civilian” family members of the armed groups were drawn into the civil war and many of them were killed. One example out of many is Tommy McKearney, a former IRA member who served seventeen years in prison. All three of his brothers were murdered, none them members of the IRA, and Tommy himself almost died during the famous IRA hunger strike of 1980. Tommy and his family can thus be qualified as “victims” of the Northern Ireland conflict. When asked in an interview, “Was it all worth it?” he replied: “I am by no means a philosopher, but I can only answer this question philosophically. I played all the cards which were dealt to me. I have no problem with my past. Sure, it caused a lot of pain for me and my family” (Tageszeitung, July 30, 2005).

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The difficult debate on the linkage and relationships between violence, legitimization, and morality ultimately leads to the conclusion that every attempt to compare or quantify individual or communal suffering is doomed to fail: “The whole process becomes unfortunate if you start to compare suffering” (Villa-Vicencio 2003b).

In the reality of post-conflict societies, communities keep being torn apart with each side claiming to be the “real” and “legitimate” victims, thereby belittling the other side’s suffering. The social-psychological feature of voluntary apartheid (see above) reinforces the difference between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” (“real” and “unreal”) victims as the predominant societal viewpoint: the members of one’s own community who lost their lives through violence are regarded as victims whereas the members of the “other” group are not accepted as such.

How do we get societies to a point where they are ready to understand and even accept the other side’s suffering and start to abandon cognitive hierarchies of victimhood? The political dimension of the reconciliation process is especially significant in this case. If the exclusive definitions of victims prevailing in society are not overcome, the success of the political conflict transformation process will also be constrained for a long time. Thus, the political consolidation of the Northern Irish peace process might soon prove to be temporary if the divided past resulting in a divided society is left unresolved (voluntary apartheid).

4. Speech Acts Not Speaking for Themselves

4.1. Innocence of a “Guilty Victim” or Guilt of an “Innocent Victim”

Brandon Hamber made it clear that Northern Irish society must engage in the challenge of resolving the divided past by analyzing and engaging with the “moralties of violence,” although it is questionable whether a consensus can ever be reached (Hamber 1999a). The perceptions and rationalizations of violence on both sides face each other quite irreconcilably. One symbolic example illustrating the lack of understanding and recognition for the Republican discourse on violence in the broader Protestant community occurred when a new mural was formally inaugurated in January 2004. The mural portrays five major IRA bomb attacks that struck the Protestant community of the Shankill Road area in West Belfast (in one, the Shankill Road bombing of October 23, 1993, nine Protestants and one of the IRA men carrying the bomb lost their lives in the attack on Frizzel’s fish shop). The mural includes two straightforward messages from the Protestant community for the IRA and the British government: “No Military Targets, No Economic Targets, No Legitimate Targets” and “Where are our inquiries? Where is our truth? Where is our justice?”

Two declarations by the IRA can be seen as responses to the Protestant claim, epitomized by the mural, that their victims are “forgotten” and not recognized in the same way as Catholic victims. First, the public apology of July 16, 2002 (quoted above), which was hailed as a “historic” step internationally. Yet, as that apology was made only with respect to “non-combatants,” it implies that the IRA’s military targets—institutions and symbols of the British state—were legitimate and therefore required no apology. The second “historic” IRA statement, issued on July 28, 2005, followed the same ideological pattern. The organization announced the end of its armed campaign, but at the same time stated that the armed struggle had been legitimate: “We are very mindful of the sacrifices of our patriotic dead, those who went to jail, volunteers, their families and the wider republican base. We reiterate our view that the armed struggle was entirely legitimate. We are conscious that many people suffered in the conflict. There is a compelling imperative on all sides to build a just and lasting peace.”

The reactions of the victims reflect the ambiguity and contradictions of the qualified IRA apology, which was not received positively by the Protestant community: “While apologies such as this are easy to formulate, where is their declaration that the war is over, that they were not justified in their use of violence and will never resort to it again—or do they continue to believe that they were justified and wish to hold the option of returning to murder to further their ends if the ballot box ceases to deliver?”

FAIR is an advocacy and lobby group acting for IRA victims and their families. Aileen Quinton, who lost her mother in the Enniskillen bombing, reacted to the IRA’s declaration of July 28, 2005, in a similarly negative way: “Why should I be grateful to the IRA for stopping doing what they’d no right to do in the first place? You shouldn’t get brownie points for not murdering people” (Sunday Tribune, July 31, 2005).

There have been some more positive reactions on the other hand. Alan McBride, who lost his wife in the Shankill Road bombing, said: “You have to recognise the fact that the IRA have not gone this far before. I do welcome it from that perspective. But I would urge caution. Words are not enough and this needs to be backed up by action. Having said that, it could be the start. If they are true to their words this could breathe some much needed air back into the peace process, which has been sadly lacking of late” (Guardian, July 29, 2005).

But by and large the prevailing conditions of Northern Ireland’s post-conflict society are those of voluntary apartheid, where there is a strong perception of “one-sided victimhood” and a moral competition for primary “victim status”: “A political culture that is based on competing claims to victimhood is likely to support and legitimise violence, and unlikely to foster an atmosphere of political responsibility and maturity” (Smyth 1999).

From the perspective of the victims and surviving relatives, the following critical questions arise with respect to the violence discourse of the non-state actors in war: Is it possible to distinguish at all between civilians and non-civilians, between civilian victims and military victims? It is a difficult task to explain to the family of a murdered RUC policeman that their dead father was not a civilian. But in return, the state forces, the police and the army, must also ask themselves the critical question: How do you explain to a mother of a twelve-year-old child killed by a police plastic bullet, that the police was not a part of the “occupation force,” not a “legitimate target”?

The search for answers to these difficult questions can be facilitated by focusing on the “needs” of the conflicting parties as a starting point for a conflict transformation process (see section 1). The various concepts focusing on the “needs” of the conflicting parties (Burton 1987, 1990, 1995; Burton and Dukes 1990; Kelman 1990, 1997a, 1997b; Kelman and Cohen 1976; Rosenberg 2003a, 2003b, 2004) lead us to conclude that all victims of the civil war in Northern Ireland have the same need, namely recognition of their suffering. For this reason, all victims of violence must be given equal status in the sense of an “inclusive definition of the victims.” However, if everybody becomes a victim the value of the category becomes questionable: indeed, the category of “victimhood” becomes almost irrelevant. So it makes more sense to talk about “lost lives” instead of applying the contentious concept of “victims” versus “perpetrators.”

4.2. Morality of Violence: Lives Lost Are Lives Lost?
Northern Ireland is still far away from a consensus on how to assess the victims of the ethno-political conflict; inclusive and exclusive definitions and perceptions of “victimhood” collide, while the exclusive definition is clearly predominant at societal level.

The political attitude of Sinn Fein pretends to be based on an inclusive definition of the victims. Eoin O’Broin, a party spokesman, describes a memorial plaque in front of the Wave Trauma Center in North Belfast, which lists all the people who lost their lives in the conflict in this area since 1969: “Often the IRA volunteer’s name or the British...”

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7 Families Acting for their Innocent Relatives (FAIR), press release, July 16, 2002.
“discriminatory truth-seeking” against the Bloody Sunday Inquiry (also called the Saville Inquiry), which was set up by Tony Blair in January 1998 to find out the “truth” about the events of January 30, 1972, when fourteen Catholic civilians were shot dead by British paratroopers.8 Presided over by Judge Lord Saville of Newdigate, the inquiry has heard almost one thousand witnesses over the years, but has still not published a final report. Throughout the life-time of the inquiry serious criticism has been directed against it, for example because of the total costs of about £150 million (Guardian, March 29, 2004). But the central point of criticism was that the victims of Bloody Sunday came exclusively from the Catholic community. There are increasing demands for IRA attacks resulting in the loss of hundreds of Protestant lives to be investigated with the same attention and the same financial investment as the events of Bloody Sunday. Those making that case usually refer to the Enniskillen bombing, and to “Bloody Friday” in Belfast, when the IRA exploded twenty-six bombs on July 21, 1971. If the request for an inclusive definition of victims is taken seriously, then the needs of the Protestant victims and their families cannot be ignored.

5. Conclusion: Understanding, Recognition and (Critical) “Self-Analysis”

The only thing I can imagine that is more painful than self-analysis is child-birth. Why is it that we hate people we don’t know? How is it that we can live with ghosts and myths and shibboleths whilst having no credibility whatsoever or foundation to our touchstones of what passes for political policy or political philosophy? And of course: Is that a political philosophy at all? (Ervine 2001)

David Ervine was a member of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), a Protestant paramilitary group and chief enemy of the IRA. He served almost ten years in prison before becoming the leader of the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and an outspoken supporter of the peace process. Northern Irish society as a whole still has extensive “self-analysis” to cope with, because if there is any consensus at all in Northern Ireland, it is the negative or skeptical “common sense” that Northern Ireland is not ready for the truth of the

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8 Website: http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk.

Although it is official Sinn Fein policy to approve a truth and reconciliation commission, the party recognizes that society is not yet ready to think in inclusive victim categories (O’Brien 2002). Nor should we forget that Sinn Fein is totally opposed to any form of amnesty for the “state forces,” i.e. the police and the British Army. In their eyes the British “crown forces” were not legitimate actors of violence.

If the dilemma of conflicting moralities of violence is to be resolved and a social consensus of inclusive “understanding” of victimhood achieved, the difficult question of amnesty must be addressed. There are very clear signals coming from all armed groups that they would be ready to contribute to clearing up the 1,800 deaths still unresolved—depending on whether or not amnesty would be given in exchange for this act of clarification. Michael Stone, a former combatant of the Protestant Ulster Defence Association (UDA), made the connection with South Africa in an interview with Tim Sebastian on BBC Hardtalk (June 11, 2003), emphasizing that he would be ready to make his knowledge public if he were guaranteed amnesty.

The central problem for the implementation of any version of a “Northern Ireland TRC” is connected to what was called the danger of “discriminatory truth-seeking” (Moltmann 2002, 43f). The danger of “discriminatory truth-seeking” is linked to the question of amnesty. The Protestant mural cited earlier is a vehement example of “discriminatory truth-seeking”: “Where are our inquiries? Where is our truth? Where is our justice?”

Bernhard Moltmann made the very strong accusation of “discriminatory truth-seeking” against the Bloody Sunday
violent past. A positive sign might be the overarching consensus within Northern Irish society that the past cannot be left “untouched” and that is has to be dealt with, but there is no plausible agreement on how to do this (Hamber 1999a).

What is important, however, is that post-war societies like Northern Ireland can never be transformed into Aldous Huxley’s “Island” or a pre-modern “Ladakh.” Post-war societies will never be free of conflict, since new conflicts will arise in the future. The right “peace prescription” can only cure a society of its divided past, heal its memories, and reassert a society’s capacity to establish common institutions for peaceful conflict management. In order to reach this capacity the sociological concept of “recognition” is a helpful tool. In his ground-breaking study, the German philosopher Axel Honneth argued that “the struggle for recognition” is, and should be, at the center of social conflicts (Honneth 1996, see the comments in the introduction). Putting the “journey” towards mutual “recognition” by society as a whole at the center of the conflict puts the concept at the center of the transformation of the conflict, too. The debate that followed Honneth’s publication is quite illustrative. Honneth’s philosophical considerations were strongly challenged by Nancy Fraser, who criticized that within the philosophical debate there was too much emphasis on “recognition” while the important questions surrounding the idea of “redistribution” were marginalized (Honneth and Fraser 2003). Leaving aside the Honneth-Fraser debate, mutual recognition comes into play as a “soft factor” within the realm of conflict transformation and acquires an enormous potential for post-conflict societies since it can lead to a weakening of voluntary apartheid. The main focus must be on mutual recognition of victimhood while acknowledging the suffering and loss on both sides.

One impressive example of recognition occurred in May 2007, when Sir Mike Jackson, who was an officer in the Parachute Regiment in Londonderry at the time of Bloody Sunday, said: “I have no doubt that innocent people were shot.” Jackson had previously consistently refused to give evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry.

Another example is the proposals of the Consultative Group on the Past, an independent group established in 2007 to seek views across the community on the best way to deal with the legacy of the past in Northern Ireland. The group, co-chaired by Lord Robin Eames, the former archbishop of Armagh and Primate of All Ireland, and Denis Bradley, a prominent public figure and former vice-chairman of the Police Board, published its final report on 28 January 2009. Most controversially it included the proposal that a payment of £12,000 pounds should be made to all who lost relatives as a result of the troubles: civilians and members of the non-state groups (Consultative Group on the Past 2009). The Consultative Group characterized this payment as “recognition payment” aimed at recognizing that everybody who died as consequence of the Troubles was a legitimate victim. Unsurprisingly, a storm of anger followed. For example, Lord Morrow from the DUP argued that “mothers’ tears are not the same”: “The question has been asked, ‘Are the tears of the mother of a paramilitary killer any different from the tears of the mother of a victim who had no involvement whatsoever in violence?’ I happen to think there is a difference, in particular, when that mother declares her support for the murderous activities her offspring was engaged in” (The Newsletter, February 3, 2009).

Even before publication, the Consultative Group made a similarly controversial proposal which was excluded from the final report: On January 8, 2008, it proposed that the British government should formally declare and “recognize” that it had fought a “war” against the IRA. Throughout the “Troubles” successive governments and the security forces claimed they were dealing with “criminal activity” and a “breakdown of law and order” in Northern Ireland. Declaring that a “war” had been fought would give some moral and ethical legitimacy to the “fallen comrades” of the IRA, who would then be considered as “victims of war”—on an equal basis with police officers and soldiers.

Willie Frazer responded very angrily to the proposal: “If there was a war it justifies the murder of our loved ones. It was not a war, it was a terrorist campaign” (BBC News,

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January 8, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/7176271.stm). However, Jude Whyte, whose mother was killed by a UVF soldier, was quoted as saying that it was important to move forward: “What Denis Bradley and Robin Eames are doing is asking people together to cross the rubicon and forgive, not to forget, but to hand the next generation something better” (ibid.).

6. References


