# Racism, Differentialism, and Antiracism in Everyday Ideology: A Mixed-Methods Study in Britain

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Racism, Differentialism, and Antiracism in Everyday Ideology: A Mixed-Methods Study in Britain

Peter Martin, Anna Freud Centre, London

Racism is ostracized in British public life, but continues to exist and exert influence in various forms. One such is the ideology of differentialism that enforces racialized distinctions by emphasizing culture and difference in place of biology and hierarchy. Although differentialism has been described by various authors, there has been no prior attempt to operationalize it in an attitude scale that could be used in national surveys. This mixed methods study of differentialism in a context of official antiracism presents an attitude scale of Everyday Differentialism and applies it in a postal survey in two areas of London. Scale quality was tested using psychometric methods and qualitative interviews with a sub-sample of survey respondents. The analysis suggests that quantitative and qualitative data converge toward the same classification of individuals: differentialists, antiracists, and those of ambiguous opinion. A detailed qualitative analysis reveals how respondents deal with ambiguity and contradictory attitudes within the ideological field of differentialism and anti-racism. Although the denial of racism is now part of racist ideology itself, we also find evidence of genuine ambiguity in respondents’ thinking about issues of racism.

The study of racism in Britain today takes place within a social context that largely ostracizes blatant racism. Since the “race relations” legislation of the 1960s, Britain has been officially antiracist. The aim of integrating immigrants into British life was summarized at the time by Home Secretary Roy Jenkins: “equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (quoted in Solomos 2003, 83). Racist violence and hate speech are denounced by public opinion. And survey indicators of racial prejudice – operationalized as “social distance” – appear to show a decline in racial prejudice for the period for which time series data are available (1983 through 1996; Ford 2008).

On the other hand, there is evidence for the persistence of racism as a force in British society: classical biological racism continues an existence at the fringe of public life, while racist groups and networks use modern communication technologies to create new public spaces using internet and e-mail (Solomos and Schuster 2002). More subtle racism may also live on without being expressed openly, in a state of what Bergmann and Erb (1986) have called “communicative latency”. Evidence that racism still profoundly influences the chances of individuals within British society comes from studies using “discrimination testing” of employment practices using actors (Wrench and Modood 2000), as well as research on the labour market (Cheung and Heath 2007), education (Gillborn 2008), and housing (Modood et al. 1997, 184ff).

If blatant racism is now largely a “non-public opinion” (Adorno [1959] 2003), the question arises whether survey indicators of racial prejudice are able to provide valid estimates of the prevalence of racism in contemporary Britain.

The research was supported by a studentship from the UK Economic and Social Research Council. I am grateful to the editors of this focus section and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on a previous version.
This question is not a new one. It arose in the United States in the post-civil rights era, and led to a fierce debate about the validity of the concept of a “new racism” – a form of racism that rationalizes the defence of white privilege without recourse to the discredited topos of blatant racism (e.g. Sniderman et al. 1991, Sears et al. 1997). In Europe, a variety of authors have tried to address the problem by devising scales to measure “modern racial prejudice” (Akrami et al. 2000), or “symbolic racism” (Kleinpennig and Hagendoorn 1993). The most widely cited European study in this vein is the work of Pettigrew and Meertens” (1995, 2001), who contrasted “blatant” and “subtle” prejudice, and operationalized the latter with survey items designed to offer respondents a socially acceptable rationalization for expressing their prejudice. The authors used confirmatory factor analysis to demonstrate that subtle and blatant prejudice are indeed separate dimensions, and that the “subtle prejudice” scale does indeed measure racism. However, the validity of their analysis has been questioned, both in terms of the quality of the latent variable model (Coenders et al. 2001), and in terms of the face validity of some of the items involved. For example, one dimension of “subtle prejudice” is measured by the “exaggeration of cultural differences” subscale; however, as Brown (1995) has pointed out, recognition of differences is part of the agenda of multiculturalism, and indeed of official antiracism, and it is not clear whether we should take pronounced perception of cultural differences as an indicator of prejudice per se. Moreover, attempts to replicate Pettigrew and Meertens’ results have produced mixed results regarding whether subtle and blatant prejudice are really separate attitudes, with some evidence in favour (e.g. Vala et al. 2002), and some against (Ganter 2001).

I wish to highlight two methodological difficulties common to studies attempting to develop “new racism” scales. First, in all cases validation relies exclusively on correlations between survey items, employing factor analysis and construct validation techniques whose results are open to alternative interpretations by the critics of the “new racism” concepts. Second, the theoretical idea of “subtle prejudice” relies on the assumption that respondents, at least superficially, accept an egalitarian, antiracist norm; this is the basis for their need to resort to subtle, rather than blatant, expressions of prejudice. Yet antiracism has not been measured directly – neither by Pettigrew and Meertens nor by other proponents of “new racism” scales.

This paper presents a mixed methods study of everyday racism in times of official antiracism, and attempts to add a new methodological approach to the debate around the measurement of “new racism” by explicitly investigating the relationship between contemporary racism and antiracist norms, and by taking into account evidence from qualitative interviews as well as surveys. We address two questions:

1. Do survey data and evidence from qualitative data cross-validate one another? Are differences between respondents, as measured by survey questions, reflected in different discursive performance in a more in-depth interview situation? This is the question of validation by triangulation (Erzberger and Prein 1997).

2. How do respondents to qualitative interviews negotiate the complex field of racist and antiracist ideologies? How do they deal with the contradictions of their potentially racist “non-public” opinions and their desire to conform to antiracist norms?

1. Differentialist Racism and Antiracism

What is the ideological form of contemporary racism in Britain? Many theorists have described the emergence of a “new racism” in Europe: a racism that shuns classical racist themes of a biological hierarchy of races – thus trying to avoid the accusation of being racism – and instead argues that cultural differences between “us” and “them” make it impossible to integrate in a single society (Barker 1981; Räthzel 1994; Balibar [1988] 1991). The most theoretically thorough account of this ideological change was put forward by the French philosopher Pierre-André Taguieff ([1987] 2001) in his description of what he called differentialism, or differentialist racism. He argued that while the hierarchical aspect of racism emphasizes the superiority of “us” over “them”, the differentialist aspect points out the importance of keeping “us” separate from “them”. Differentialism does not naturalize a hierarchy of groups, but naturalizes the inevitability of group conflict and the impossibility of conviviality, and argues that within-group homogeneity and between-group separation are both natu-
ral and desirable states. Although apparently denying any assumption of hierarchy, differentialist arguments often subtly imply the superiority of a group’s own culture, for example by asserting that “Western cultures” display more tolerance toward diversity than non-Western cultures.

Taguieff exposes as reductionist the classical definition of racism as a belief in biological hierarchy: it captures but one aspect of racism. In fact, biology and culture, hierarchy and difference are almost invariably mutually reinforcing elements of racial theories (Hund 2006). Differentialism and the argument from culture, rather than biology, are not in themselves new features of racism. But they have become a prevalent mode of racist expression under conditions of an official antiracism, whose definition of racism tends to reduce the phenomenon to ideas of racial hierarchies based on biological endowments.

Taguieff criticizes mainstream antiracism ([1987] 2001, esp. chap. 5) – not in order to defend racism, but to point out that popular and official antiracism rely on a simplified model of racism, and fail to criticize, or even grasp, current practices of racialization. On the level of ideology, mainstream antiracism contents itself with the knowledge that, as there is no scientific basis for racial hierarchies, racism is factually wrong. This simplistic conceptualization fails to account for differentialist racism, which often relies on arguments that are not easily falsified through scientific evidence, but are arguments about values. Differentialism is a “subtle racism” in the sense that it is not recognized as racism, and that its expression frequently involves rhetorical devices designed to present it as a “reasonable” position.

2. Why Mixed Methods?: “Attitudes” in Discursive Psychology and Survey Research

Taguieff has described differentialist racism as an intellectual ideology. It is the task of social research to find out how it is expressed as an “everyday ideology” (Billig et al. 1988), by ordinary people. Another task is to estabish how prevalent differentialist views are in a population. These two tasks are rarely approached jointly, because of the continuing chasm between “qualitative” and “quantitative” research, which is often linked to substantial theoretical differences between proponents on either side of the divide. Discursive psychologists study racism as a discourse (Wetherell and Potter 1992), while the study of survey data employs the concept of “attitude”. Discursive psychologists have argued that attitude scales are unable to adequately capture the nature of racism, which they see as situated in discursive performance rather than mental representation (Potter and Wetherell 1987). Attitude researchers rarely take account of qualitative evidence at all.

This paper aims to unite the two perspectives. It takes the view that attitudes are stances that individuals take within social contexts of controversy (Billig et al. 1988; Martin 2010), such as the controversy between racism and antiracism. In agreement with Michael Billig’s rhetorical psychology (1991), attitude is conceptualized as a response to a social situation: an argument, an experience, or indeed a research interview or questionnaire. To help refine this concept, I will first discuss criticism of the attitude concept brought forward by discursive psychologists, and second consider results from the psychology of survey response that suggest a conceptualization capable of taking into account both quantitative and qualitative evidence.

Potter and Wetherell (1987) have criticized the concept of attitude as a “psychologization” of socially constructed discourse. As an alternative, they have put forward the notion of “interpretive repertoires” to suggest that people use arguments flexibly in response to a given dialogic situation. These interpretive repertoires are seen as features of discourse, rather than features of an individual’s cognitive make-up. Their approach has allowed Wetherell and Potter (1992) to show how their interviewees use apparently liberal, egalitarian arguments in order to discursively defend racial privilege.

However, Potter and Wetherell’s focus on discourse does not address the question why different people living in the same society, and thus exposed to the same “discourses”, nonetheless differ in their opinions – or why people persist in holding on to outdated opinions (such as biological racism) even while the mainstream discourse has moved on. Without some concept of attitude, how would we explain that there are antiracists as well as racists? May not dis-
cursive performance, in turn, be structured by more or less stable (albeit context-flexible and changeable) mental representations that we may study as “attitudes”?

Survey research has by and large relied on the traditional attitude concept, where an attitude was seen as a relatively stable mental disposition that influenced both speech acts and behaviour. In the context of survey methodology, this gave rise to the “file drawer model” of attitudes: a survey question was understood to prompt the respondent to search her mental file drawer for a pre-existing attitude that would allow her to determine her response. This file drawer model, however, was challenged by the increasing body of evidence for the sensitivity of attitude questions to variations in context (such as recent significant political events or priming by preceding questionnaire items) and to apparently minor alterations in wording. If attitudes are such stable evaluative responses to stimuli, why were the measures used to tap them so sensitive to method effects? The survey methodologists Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski (2000) have considered this question and presented an alternative conceptualization, which they call the “belief sampling model” of attitudes. This conceptualizes the survey response as follows: When called upon to answer an attitude question, people recall considerations – impressions, values, and specific beliefs – related to the question. However, at any one time they are likely only to recall a selection of all related considerations. Which considerations come to their minds can depend on many features of the situation, including interviewer characteristics, questionnaire design, question wording, and extraneous circumstances such as events reported in the media in the period immediately preceding the interview.

The belief sampling model involves a new definition of the concept of attitude. Rather than a stable evaluation of an object, an attitude is seen as “a kind of memory structure that contains existing evaluations, vague impressions, general values, and relevant feelings and beliefs” (Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000, 194).

An attitude, then, may be regarded as a pool of potential considerations. It is not necessarily the case that all considerations are logically or evaluatively consistent. Nor does the “attitude” necessarily exist before the need to respond to a survey question prompted the search for relevant considerations (Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000, 197). When faced with a survey question, we construct an attitude response, rather than reporting a pre-existing mental representation.

In social psychology, it is an issue of some debate whether attitudes are relatively stable dispositions stored in memory or are constructed on the spot, or whether the truth lies somewhere between these two extremes (Bohner and Dickel 2011). The belief sampling model would suggest that people construct attitudes spontaneously when they are faced with an unfamiliar attitude object, or with a request to evaluate a familiar object in an unfamiliar context (such as a survey) – but that this construction is accomplished with reference to a pool of considerations, which themselves are stored in memory and which may be more or less stable.

I suggest that such a process also occurs when people respond to a research interview by a qualitative researcher: people “make up their minds” about what to say in the course of the interview, responding to interviewer identity, interviewer behaviour, and other features of social context (including, say, the newspaper front page of the day). I assume, therefore, that both survey and interview methods tap into the same human capability for constructing attitudes in response to a social situation – they only observe these attitudes in a different way. To some extent, we can hope that narrative or semi-structured interviews offer more space than surveys to explore complex and contradictory attitudes. Yet in most qualitative research, this remains an assumption that cannot, within the framework of qualitative methodology, be put to a rigorous empirical test. It would therefore be naïve to assume that data from qualitative interviews, although they may be “richer” than survey data, are also truer representations of the respondents’ “attitudes”, or “discourse”. Like survey data, qualitative interview data are subject to being influenced by social context – an observation that is recognized in qualitative research through the emphasis on researcher reflexivity, which includes for example taking into account how the interviewer’s social identity may impact on the view
respondents take of the interview, and therefore on their answers. Like surveys, then, qualitative interviews may only access a subset of the whole potential “pool of considerations” that informs an interviewee’s actions and life decisions. At the same time, we should remember the limitations of most qualitative research. It is one task to describe the features of contemporary racist discourse, as Wetherell and Potter have done; it is another to try and establish how many people endorse it, how many reject it, how many adopt ambiguous positions, and so forth – and yet another to try to find structural reasons (represented, for example, by variables such as education, residence, or age) for people’s positions. For the latter two tasks, surveys may prove more useful than discursive psychologists have acknowledged. A mixed method approach to the study of everyday differentialism – its discursive features as well as its prevalence as an attitude – would therefore seem promising. This does not involve the use of two separate methodological paradigms; rather, both qualitative and quantitative methods are different ways of accessing respondents’ “pools of considerations”, different ways of evoking contexts of controversy in response to which they take a stance. Both qualitative and quantitative methods, then, serve to cast light on the phenomenon of racism from different angles, but within a single theoretical perspective. Both yield valuable, but partial, insight. One may serve to fortify or cast doubt on the conclusions drawn from the other; but neither is superior to the other. It is to the methods that we now turn.

3. Data Collection : Postal Survey and Semi-Structured Interviews

This study combined a postal survey with semi-structured interviews of a sub-sample of survey respondents. The postal survey was conducted in two boroughs of Greater London: Barking and Dagenham, and Havering. Both are untypical for London, in that at the time of data collection (May and June 2008) both had a large majority of white British residents, according to the latest available census (Barking and Dagenham 81 percent, Havering 92 percent; Office for National Statistics 2009). Barking and Dagenham is an area of inward migration (Keith 2008). It became nationally notorious for the strong showing of the extreme right-wing British National Party (BNP) in the 2006 local elections (at the time of the study, the BNP held 12 out of 51 seats in the council). Havering is more affluent, and the BNP was not nearly as successful there, but did hold one local council seat in 2008.

The sampling frame for the survey consisted of the Electoral Registers of each borough. I employed simple random sampling with implicit stratification by area of residence (electoral ward) to select 250 voters for each borough. A total of 237 completed questionnaires were received, 111 for Barking and Dagenham and 125 for Havering¹. The overall achieved response rate was 47.4 percent. The current analysis examines only White British respondents (n=174), who self-identified as “White British”, “White Other: English”, or “White” with British nationality in survey questions on ethnicity and nationality.

The demographic composition of the “White British” sample is shown in Table 1. Comparison to relevant 2001 census data revealed that the overall achieved sample slightly overrepresented the middle aged (in the age category 40–59) and the well-educated, and underrepresented the young and the old, as well as the less well-educated.

¹ The counts for completed questionnaires in each borough do not add up to the total, because one respondent removed the serial number from their questionnaire, so that their residence could not be identified.
The survey questionnaire was presented as a study of “Neighbourhood and Community”, and began with questions about the quality of life in the respondents’ local area. Questions relating to racial attitudes appeared later in the questionnaire, but were not explicitly labelled as such. The questionnaire also included a request to participate in the study. The survey sample of “White British” people indicated their willingness to take part. They were contacted in June and July 2008. In the end, twelve agreed to be interviewed in person. Table 2 shows the characteristics of the qualitative sample, according to survey responses. This sample is clearly not representative of either the survey sample, or the population of the two boroughs. Unfortunately, no person under 40 years of age could be persuaded to take part. This represents a major limitation, since attitudes and the way they are framed by individuals may well differ by age. Furthermore, like the samples of many qualitative interview studies, the interviewees are a self-selected group, having volunteered their participation, and by this token are likely to be untypical of the general population. It is clear, also, that interviewees’ perception of the interview purpose may have been influenced by their perception of the preceding postal survey. In fact, as will become clear below, several interviewees referred back to their survey responses in their interviews. This may be considered a weakness of the study, since quantitative and qualitative observations were not independent of one another – but also constitutes an advantage, as respondents had the opportunity to explain the thinking behind their “tick-box” answers.

For the qualitative part of the study, I conducted semi-structured interviews. Interviewees were told that the interview’s purpose was to explore the topic of the questionnaire in greater depth. At the point of interview, I was blind to the survey responses of my interviewees. The general interviewing strategy was to first ask respondents about their neighbourhoods, what they like and dislike about them, and changes they may have seen while living there. If respondents broached issues of race and ethnicity of their own account, I did ask probing follow-on questions to explore their attitudes. Only if respondents did not mention immigration and race relations at all did I initiate a conversation about these issues through direct questions.

### Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of “White British” Respondents (n=174)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 or under</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19–29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–39</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–49</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–59</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60–69</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 or older</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<th>Highest qualification</th>
<th>NVQ 1</th>
<th>NVQ 2</th>
<th>NVQ 3</th>
<th>NVQ 4 or higher</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>No qualification</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>NVQ 1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>NVQ 2</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVQ 4 or higher</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Cases with missing values are not reported; the total numbers within each demographic variable vary due to missing values. NVQ: National Vocational Qualification. NVQ level 3 is equivalent to A-levels (completed high school), NVQ level 4 is equivalent to an undergraduate university degree (bachelor’s).

### Table 2: Interview Sample Characteristics (n=12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barking and Dagenham</th>
<th>Havering</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–49</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–59</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60–69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest qualification (NVQ level*)</td>
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<td>NVQ1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None or missing</td>
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<td>NVQ1</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVQ4 or higher</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</table>

Total 12

Note: NVQ: See note to Table 1
4. Survey Measures of Differentialist Racism and Antiracist Principles

Everyday differentialism was measured using a four-item Likert scale. Item wordings are shown in Table 3. Item development was based on a review of evidence from qualitative studies on discourses on race in Britain (Martin 2010), and operationalizes differentialism through three components: a preference for cultural homogeneity, the belief that peaceful coexistence of different cultures in the same social space is impossible, and a subtle sense of moral superiority of one’s own culture.2

Table 3: Items Comprising the Scale of Everyday Differentialism

| CULTURES            | With all the immigrants living here, I’m beginning to feel like a stranger in my own country. [reverse coded] |
| STRANGER            | All in all, people from different cultures can live side by side and get on well with one another. |
| TOLERANT            | The average immigrant is just as tolerant as the average British person. [reverse coded] |
| THREAT              | The British way of life is under threat from too much immigration. |

Each item was scored on a five-point response scale.3 A scale score was constructed by summing responses across the four items, and calibrating the scale to have a range from 0 to 10. Item non-response was very low (1.6 percent of values were missing across the whole survey, with 86 percent of questionnaires providing complete information). Missing values were imputed using the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm (Wirtz 2004).

Psychometric evaluation indicated that the scale was of good quality. Cronbach’s alpha was $\alpha = 0.733$, indicating acceptable internal consistency. There was also evidence for construct validity. The scale was correlated to indicators of social distance and Everyday Differentialism ranged from 0.26 to 0.47 (all coefficients were significantly different from zero; $p<.001$ in all cases).

Table 4: Everyday Differentialism and Antiracist Principles: Descriptive Statistics (n=174)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Everyday</td>
<td>6.56</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differentialism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiracist</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An index of Antiracist Principles was derived from the two items displayed in Table 5, which focus on antiracism in education and the police. It may seem likely that such general antiracist principles are all but unanimously endorsed. Yet as Hewitt (2005) documents, some White Britons harbour considerable resentment against what they perceive to be an unfair focus on white racism in both the education system and the police.

Table 5: Items Comprising a Scale of Antiracist Principles

| POLICE             | It is important to put a stop to racism in the police. |
|                    | Schools should teach equality between people from all ethnic backgrounds. |

The two items of the Antiracist Principles Index were moderately correlated with one another (Pearson’s $r = 0.35$). The index was formed by summing responses to both items and calibrating the result to have a range from 0 to 10.

The level of racist resentment in the sample was rather high. As Table 4 shows, the mean Everyday Differentialism score was 6.56, which indicates that respondents were more...

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2 Item development involved a questionnaire pretest using a convenience sample of university students (n=53), and cognitive interviews (n=8, not all students) to explore respondents’ comprehension of items. Nine “everyday differentialism” items were included in the postal questionnaire. The four items presented here were selected on the basis of three criteria: (1) coverage of all three theoretical dimensions, (2) inclusion of items in both attitude directions (pro- and contra-differentialism), (3) maximization of Cronbach’s alpha.

3 Definitely disagree [score: 1], Disagree to some extent [2], Neither agree nor disagree [3], Agree to some extent [4], Definitely agree [5]. Note that scoring was reversed for two of the four items (see Table 3).
likely to agree with the differentialist premise of the questions than to disagree. As Table 6 shows, the majority of the sample had a tendency to resent the presence of people other than “White British” in their area. No matter which of the seven categories we consider, only a minority of respondents “would not mind at all” having an “outgroup” member as a neighbour. We also note that the category “Gypsies / Romanies / Travellers” met the strongest rejection.

Table 6: Social Distance Items (“Please tell us whether you would mind or not mind having each of these kinds of people as neighbours”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wouldn’t mind at all %</th>
<th>Would mind a bit %</th>
<th>Would mind a lot %</th>
<th>Total (base)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People who don’t speak English</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>100 (171)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100 (161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100 (162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100 (162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies/Romanies/Travellers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100 (158)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100 (160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum seekers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>100 (162)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the high level of differentialism and social distance measured in the sample, antiracist principles were endorsed by a large majority of survey respondents, as evidence by the high mean of the Antiracist Principles Index.

Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the survey scales “Everyday Differentialism” and “Antiracist Principles”. Pearson’s r measures the linear relationship between the two variables as negative and of moderate strength, at $r = -0.31$ ($p<.001$). However, the scatterplot indicates that the association between the two variables may not be linear. The lower left quadrant of the plot is empty: no respondent rejected both Everyday Differentialism and Antiracist Principles. On the other hand, simultaneous endorsement of both Everyday Differentialism and Antiracist Principles was commonplace. There were also “consistent antiracists” (who reject differentialism, but endorse antiracism), and “consistent racists” (who reject antiracism and endorse differentialism). The plot is consistent with the interpretation that endorsement of antiracist principles is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the rejection of differentialist racism.
It is possible that this result is due to a measurement problem: psychometrically speaking, the antiracism items are “too easy”, since the majority of respondents endorsed them. The nonlinear relationship may therefore be an artifact of the inability of the Antiracist Principles Index to distinguish between attitudes at the higher end of antiracist commitment. Indeed, the two antiracism items formulate statements that typify a broad social consensus on the rejection of blatant racism. Nonetheless, it is an interesting empirical result that even in the current sample, where Everyday Differentialism is endorsed by the majority of respondents, basic antiracist principles are widely accepted.

So far, the results appear to confirm the proposition formulated at the beginning: antiracist principles are generally accepted, but racist ideology continues to thrive in a differentialist, culturalist form. Do the interview data bear out this interpretation? And if so, how do interviewees negotiate the ideological tensions between antiracist and differentialist commitments?

5. Discussing Differentialist Racism: Outgroups and Ingroups

It is almost commonplace now to say that the social construction of outgroups is intimately connected to the social construction of the ingroup. We need the “Other” to reassure ourselves of our own identity (Räthzel 1994). In biological racist discourse, the supposedly inferior racial Other functions as a reassurance of the racial ingroup’s supposed superiority. In differentialist racism, the assertion of “our” homogeneity only begins to make sense if a heterogeneous “Other”, who is held to disrupt this homogeneity, can be defined.

The analysis of interview data was aimed at establishing the respondents’ construction of their (racialized) ingroups and outgroups, however they themselves labelled and defined them. In line with the tenets of rhetorical psychology, I paid particular attention to argumentation – that is, the analysis aimed to establish the particular versions of reality that respondents promoted, and the ways in which they attempted to render them plausible and persuasive. The result was a summary of the interpretative repertoires used by each interviewee. To allow inter-individual comparisons of interpretative repertoires, a system of codes had to be constructed. Coding followed the “structural analysis of group arguments” (SAGA) method put forward by Reicher and Sani (1998), which is specifically designed for the summary and comparison of arguments across individual interviews.

6. The Interpretive Repertoire of Everyday Differentialism

In the short space of a journal paper it is impossible to present the whole coding frame in detail. I shall concentrate on the themes most closely related to Everyday Differentialism and Antiracism, namely arguments about outgroups, the ingroup, and rhetorical devices related to both. A full analysis can be found in Martin (2010).

6.1 Arguments against Outgroup Members

6.1.1. “They Keep to Themselves”: The Idea that Ethnic Minorities Do Not Want to Integrate

Four out of twelve interviewees argued that immigrants and/or ethnic minorities were unwilling to integrate into British social life. In all cases, integration was explicitly or implicitly understood as an assimilation to the cultural codes of conduct in Britain.

Extract 1

The respondent in Extract 1 portrays Asians, a category which he incorrectly equates with Muslims, as members of an “indoctrinating religion” that allegedly make an unjustified demand for expansion into a political space that the respondent views as belonging to “this country” and whose rules are not negotiable (“our rules”). It is clear for this respondent, then, that the Asians are not included in the category of those to whom “this country” belongs.

The same topos was used against different outgroups by various respondents: whereas one criticized the lack of integration by Africans and Poles, but specifically excluded “most of the Asians” from this criticism, Asians/Muslims are precisely the subject of the complaint quoted above.
Two other respondents specifically referred to the perceived unwillingness of “Nigerians” to integrate.


Another argument that some respondents made against racialized outgroups was the outgroup’s perceived lack of politeness. One respondent reported her perception of customers in the bank where she worked:

Extract 2

The way they speak to me when they’re coming to work as well. […] They come in and they’re very arrogant, they straightaway give the – not, the majority of them once they get to know you they soften, but on their first three or four visits they’re very arrogant and they think that you’re going to do them wrong. They won’t say please for it, they think straight away, they’re on your case, they say to you: “I want this.” I get: “No, you’re going to do it.” I worked in a branch the other day and because I wouldn’t serve a gentleman, yeah? I got I was not going to serve him only because he was black. […] And that is the way they treat you. And I’ve had it from Polish, I’ve had it from all nationalities. I’m not just picking out certain ones because they’re black, all nationalities, but they are the most arrogant of them all at the moment.

The respondent describes what she perceives as the impolite attitude of many of her customers, whom she portrays as making unreasonable demands, and as complaining of racial discrimination if the demands are not met. She singles out “black” customers as particularly “arrogant”.

6.1.3 “Everything Seems to Be Geared for the Ethnic People”: The Idea That White British People Are Disadvantaged

Most interviewees spontaneously categorized themselves and their ingroup as “white”. For them, whiteness was not just a routine self-categorization in response to a survey question; it was a salient category used to make sense of social life. Seven out of twelve respondents argued that “white British people” are disadvantaged relative to minorities.

Extract 3

Things should be fair. Everyone should be treated the same. Your skin colour shouldn’t matter. But now the white people are disadvantaged. The councils and the government are so worried about political correctness that they now don’t look after their own, I mean, don’t look after the people who have lived here for forty years. […] A friend got a parking ticket. She got a parking ticket because she was a few inches over the line. But two other cars, which belonged to Asians, didn’t get a parking ticket, because the council is afraid of upsetting anybody. But I think everyone should be treated the same.

This respondent asserts that both in her local area (represented by the council) and in Britain as a whole (represented by the government) the white people are the victims of inequality. She introduces this argument with a statement in support of racial equality, which allows her to make a claim to be a non-racist, but simultaneously introduces the category of skin colour, which she then uses to argue that Whites are disadvantaged. In the next sentence, the category “white” is invested with further significance as those who are the natural constituency of the council and government (“their own”). When the respondent claims that councils and government “don’t look after the people who have lived here for forty years”, she avoids a blatantly exclusionary categorization of the “indigenous” people as solely “white”. Her formulation leaves open the possibility that migrants who have settled in Britain a long time ago may be included in the category of the “not looked after”. Nonetheless, her indignation at the disadvantaging of whites is given greater force by the implication that whites have been disenfranchised within their established place of belonging.

6.1.4 “If I Went to Another Country”

We now turn to rhetorical devices that respondents used to support their arguments. One such may be called the “If I went to another country” device, in which the demand for cultural assimilation of immigrants is portrayed as a matter of fairness to the host society, with the help of a counterfactual, hypothetical scenario that involves the respondent imagining himself or herself moving abroad. “If I went to another country,” the respondents argue, “I would have to assimilate, too.” Consider the following interview extract:

Extract 4

I’m also of the view that if you come to this country and you want to work, fine I don’t have a problem with that. But what I do have a problem with is people that come over here, slag the country off, earn the wages and then what they want to do, is they want to set up their own churches, they want to set up their own parliaments. I mean, and they want to ram it down your throat.
Interviewer: Like what?

Like the Muslim. If I was working in, we’ll say Bahrain, I would live by the rules out there. If there’s no drink, there’s no drink. If you had to say the Koran three times a day because that was the done thing in the country, I would have to do it wouldn’t I? If I wanted to work there. But I’m seeing it where youth clubs are shutting up and they’re turning them into mosques.

The counterfactual scenario serves to criticize the supposed lack of integration by Muslims living in Britain as a violation of a norm that holds for all. This norm, as evoked by this respondent, is complete assimilation, at least in terms of outward behaviour, to the receiving culture. In the respondent’s argument, Muslims who create spaces for worship are constructed as violating this universal norm of assimilation.

6.1.5 Credentialing (“I Am Not a Racist, But …”)
The single most frequent rhetorical device respondents used was a disclaimer of the form “I am not a racist, but …” This is a case of what Hewitt and Stokes (1975) have called credentialing: by naming a possible accusation against herself, a speaker gives herself credentials as someone who is aware that what they are about to say may be construed as racism. Examples for credentialing phrases are “I am not a racist, but …” or “Some of my best friends are blacks – but …” When a speaker uses such phrases, she displays her knowledge about racism in order to pre-empt typification as an ignorant racist.

Extract 5

[The respondent had complained that parking tickets are not given fairly in his area. In particular, he reported that on a certain street in his neighbourhood, cars are often parked illicitly without penalty.]

Interviewer: But why do you think that is? Why is the law not applied?

[Short pause] I’m going to say it. I think it’s a black thing. Because it’s only the black drivers that park on there or drive on there.

Interviewer: Okay.

You know, I must sound awfully racist but I’m not. I’ve got black friends, I’ve got yellow friends, green, you know, so it’s not a racial thing, it’s something that I feel strong about. If I’m going to get penalised for doing something so should everyone else in fairness, you know. And that’s whether it’s Mr Brown, Gordon, Blair, it doesn’t matter who. You know, if you break the law and I break the law we all get treated the same. It doesn’t happen.

The respondent suspects that black drivers are systematically advantaged over white drivers. He is aware that this perception may be construed as racism, but argues that his motivation is a principle of universal fairness that is unrelated to skin colour (“it’s not a racial thing”).

6.2 Criticizing the Ingroup
I shall now turn to arguments that are used to challenge racist accounts. The racist arguments that we have encountered above did not only appear in the discourse of those who used them; they were also referred to by respondents who wanted to make a counter-argument. This was sometimes prompted by an interviewer question, but not always.

6.2.1 “An Element of Double Standards”: Arguments Against Racism
The next extract takes one of the argumentative strategies we have seen used in anti-outgroup discourse above, and turns it on its head. Instead of arguing that “If I went to another country, I would have to assimilate,” this respondent argues that British people who decide to live abroad actually don’t assimilate. The respondent contends that this reveals double standards in British people’s perception of immigration and immigrants.

Extract 6

Yeah, maybe there’s, there’s always a lot publicity isn’t there, around, there’s a lot of publicity around immigration. [...] That, a friend, a comment a friend of mine said, well people shouldn’t come and live here unless they can speak the language. And I said, but you, you’re watching the Place in the Sun, it’s English people going and building houses in Spain, and they’re completely, and the kids are going to Spanish schools. And in some of these schools, it’s, a lot of it’s English, so they can’t speak Spanish at all. So I do find at times, we are, if there are, there’s an element of double standards really.

The respondent argues that “double standards” are applied in the demands some British people would like to place on immigrants: they demand, the respondent contends, higher standards of assimilation from immigrants than they would from people who emigrate out of Britain to live in a different country.
6.2.2 “It Was Just Stupid Ignorance”: The Acknowledgement of Ingroup Racism

Another form of ingroup criticism was the relating of experiences of racism. The difference to the previous category is that the reported racism is not answered with a sustained counter-argument, but rather brought into the conversation as evidence of the existence of racist views that in themselves are not discussed. One respondent refers to friends who have been harassed in public spaces due to their physical appearance as non-Whites.

Extract 7

There’s one example I could give you that one of my friends who lives in Rush Green in Romford, he is Chinese/Hong Kong. He’s born and brought up in Romford but, and he has told me on many occasions that he gets racial abuse I suppose, people who shout insults at him. […] He tells me that people have shouted Paki at him for example, which is just so ignorant it’s not true, because he’s Chinese, not Pakistani, it’s just this level of ignorance.

7. The Discursive Negotiation of Racism and Antiracism

On the basis of the codes applied to their interviews, the twelve respondents were classified into three groups, which are presented in Table 7: “Antiracists” who do not make anti-outgroup arguments and put forward sustained, reflected critique of racism amongst their own ingroup members; “Ambiguous Differentialists”, who make anti-outgroup arguments based on differentialist ideas, but also present some arguments against ingroup racism; and “Strong Differentialists”, whose differentialist discourse is not tempered by antiracist arguments (although a shallow affirmation of antiracist ideals in the form of disclaimers invariably features in their rhetoric). If the Everyday Differentialism scale is a valid indicator of the underlying attitudes it purports to measure, we would expect clear group differences in Everyday Differentialism scores – where the “Antiracists” would score lowest and the “Strong Differentialists” score highest. As Table 7 shows, this expectation is confirmed. The mean of the Antiracists is firmly below the scale midpoint at around 3; the mean of the “Strong Differentialists” is clearly above the midpoint, at 8; and the “Ambiguous Differentialists” all score slightly above the scale midpoint, with an average of around 6.

Table 7: Typology of interview discourses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group label</th>
<th>Everyday differentialist arguments</th>
<th>Sustained anti-racist arguments</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Everyday differentialism score (means)</th>
<th>Antiracist principles score (means)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antiracists</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Present (strong)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguous differentialists</td>
<td>Present (weak)</td>
<td>Present (weak)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>9.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong differentialists</td>
<td>Present (strong)</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite some qualitative researchers’ scepticism against the validity of survey data, it turns out that the survey questions did not perform badly, as far as the task of indicating the respondents’ stances on differentialist arguments and antiracist thinking was concerned. Yet we may interrogate the interview data more closely. How do respondents negotiate, in their thinking, antiracist norms and differentialist convictions? Those interviewees who brought forward anti-outgroup arguments invariably used rhetorical devices such as disclaimers to distance themselves from the label “racist”. On the other hand, interviewees who made sustained anti-racist arguments, criticizing positions of other members in their ingroup, did not use such devices; since their opinions did not come close to violating antiracist norms, they had no need for them.

Scholars of racism have long pointed out that the denial of prejudice and racism is a part of racist discourse, and that the apparent acceptance of egalitarian norms as such does not necessarily indicate immunity to attitudes that defy
these very same norms (Condor et al. 2006). This is confirmed by the current study. Yet I shall argue that there may also be genuine ambiguity of attitudes. The logical contradiction between racism and antiracism is not necessarily an empirical contradiction, insofar as both attitudes are found within the discourse of individual respondents, and in particular those of the “Ambiguous” group.

Between the polar extremes of differentialism and antiracism there is a grey zone of ambiguity of thought where racialization pervades a respondent’s discourse to varying degrees, but is counterbalanced, and even explicitly opposed by what appears to be a genuine commitment to non-racism. Below, I present extracts from interviews with two respondents who engaged in this highly ambiguous discourse.

When I phoned the respondent cited in Extracts 8 and 9 to ask for an interview, she referred back to her survey answer about having Poles as neighbours. I quote from my research notes, made immediately after the telephone conversation:

Extract 8
I laugh because I said [in the survey] that I don’t want Poles or Africans as neighbours because they’re noisy. We have West Indians next door, and Poles one house removed. And they’re quite noisy. […]

In the interview, we returned to this issue:

Extract 9
People are, I mean I can sit at this road and look out. I think they’re African.

Interviewer: The people who live in the opposite house?

Yeah, and then it’s Asian and Asian, British Black next to us, West Indians, who are super.

Interviewer: Who are super?

Yeah, lovely they’re nice people. Actually it’s a very nice road. The gentleman that’s moved into the house there, said they wanted to move here because it was a nice road, people talk to you. It is a nice road, it’s a very tolerant road. We’ve got Chinese, Somalians who were refugees who have stayed, it’s a Peacock House, Trust House so, and we’ve got Polish next door but one. It’s just that they’re very noisy, they sit out, they sit in the garden at night, that’s why I said.

Interviewer: You mentioned that […], you’ve got problems with some neighbours?

No it’s not problems, they’re not doing anything than sitting out, they’re young, they’re sitting outside because there’s a lot of them, they’re sitting outside and smoking and drinking and talking. But Polish people talk very, I mean I know I’ve got a loud voice, so and they’re all conversing so sometimes the row gets a bit much but you think, well they’re not doing, they’re not having all night parties or anything else it’s just a, and you just, they live next door to you I think was the question.

Interviewer: In the survey?

Yeah, it was that, it was being selfish rather than prejudiced.

Interviewer: So there were certain people whom you said you would mind living next to …?

No, I don’t, just if you were picking people. People are people, you can put a characteristic to somebody and then you can meet somebody that’s not like that.

The respondent is evidently keen to downplay the significance of her ticking the “would mind a bit” box when asked about having Polish and African neighbours. Yet her attitude to her multicultural neighbourhood is not generally negative, and it would be difficult to justify classifying her as a differentialist on the basis of these extracts or the remainder of her interview. It is interesting to reflect that the same respondent also ticked that she minded “Gypsies” “a lot”, but felt no need to defend her choice. In fact, during the interview this respondent made quite clear her view that gypsies “do an awful lot of stealing”. It is true in general that gypsies were the only racialized outgroup about whom respondents voiced racist opinions without using rhetorical manoeuvres to qualify and defend their own views against the accusation of racism. Anti-gypsy prejudice, it appears, is not currently subject to the taboos that ostracize overt racism against almost any other racialized outgroup in Britain.

Social scientists that analyze qualitative interview material with the intention of informing theories of racism commonly think of respondent discourse in terms of rhetorical strategy, and consequently view racism denial and rhetorical devices such as disclaimers as attempts to save face vis-à-vis an interviewer (Bonilla-Silva 2006). This may be true in many cases, but often an alternative explanation is equally plausible: namely that respondents are genuinely contradictory in their thinking. One respondent explicitly
addressed the contradiction between her own interview discourse and her self-image as an open, tolerant person; she wondered aloud whether she was a racist or not. Consider the following two extracts.

Extract 10

[…] Perhaps talking to you it sounds like I’m a racist but I’m not. I don’t think I am.

Interviewer: Why do you think it sounds like a racist?

Well because I seem to be sort of blaming people, and blaming different people. But I mean I know, it does sound it. Perhaps I didn’t think I was. Perhaps I am now, I don’t know. No, I’m not really.

Interviewer: But I mean can I ask, what do you think is a racist then … [unclear]. What would racism be?

Well people that are always down on, if I was racist I’d always be sort of like down on one particular type of person.

At the end of the interview, she returns to this point:

Extract 11

Actually I’m going to be thinking whether I’m racist now, I must admit, whether I’m – I hope not. I hope I’m not down on them. Got me worried, you’ve got me worried about that.

With her worry that she may be a racist, the respondent expresses an implicit theory of racism: namely, that racism is something that the racist may not recognize in herself. The tendency to be “down on one particular type of person”, which for the respondent constitutes the distinguishing characteristic of racism, may be one that escapes the racist’s own recognition.

This respondent had a high Everyday Differentialism score, and had voiced anti-Black views during her interview. Yet she was one of the few respondents who also displayed curiosity about outgroups (in her case, Nigerians who had joined her Catholic church). Compared to most other respondents, her answers on the “Neighbours” questions were distinctly on the tolerant side: she didn’t mind having any of the mentioned groups as neighbours, except “gypsies”, whom she indicated she “would mind a bit”. We should not simply (and maybe smugly) dismiss this respondent’s ambiguity as an attempt to save face vis-à-vis an interviewer. It is at least as plausible that her combination of resentment and tolerance, accusation and curiosity represents a contradictory but not necessarily insincere position within the dilemmatic ideological field of racism and antiracism.

8. Discussion

The aims of this study were to investigate whether survey questions devised to measure everyday differentialist racism would stand up to validation by evidence from qualitative interviews, and to explore how British people with different attitudinal stances discursively negotiate the ideological field of racism and antiracism. Qualitative analysis produced a descriptive account of the relationship between antiracist and racist elements in respondents’ discourses. There is a continuum of commitment to antiracism that ranges from superficial to profound. None of my respondents openly endorsed hierarchical racism. But some respondents, the “differentialists”, made only perfunctory antiracist statements that had the function to pre-ventatively fend off the accusation of racism when they presented anti-outgroup arguments. They did not refer to the existence of racism in their own ingroup in any but a token manner.

In a second group of respondents, the “Antiracists”, racializations were all but absent, and they were not only aware of racism amongst their ingroup, but offered sustained and reflected arguments against racialized thinking. A third group of respondents appeared to argue with themselves over their interpretations. While racializations pervaded their discourse, they considered and endorsed antiracist counter-arguments against their own statements, and showed awareness of the existence of racism among their ingroup.

This description could not have been obtained by survey methods alone. But it is important to note that the scales on Everyday Differentialism and Antiracism, as a whole, were well able to pick up the differences between these three groups. The range of opinions in the interview discourse is reflected relatively well in the survey evidence.

We have seen that the coexistence of racist and antiracist themes in a respondent’s account need not necessarily mean that antiracism is only adhered to in a perfunctory
way. Although perfunctory antiracism does exist, and plays a prominent role within racist discourse, we also find, in some respondents’ statements, a profound ambiguity. The attitudes of these respondents lead them to make rather complex evaluations of local and national issues; and although they do not always manage to shake off the spectacles of racializing perception, in many ways they also question racist stereotypes, including their own. If what they said in the interview is representative of what they say in everyday interactions, these ambiguous differentialists may sometimes perpetuate racialized discourse in their social networks; but at other times may well be a force against racism through their opposition to blatantly racist views and discriminatory behaviour.

It is possible that what appear to be contradictory or ambiguous opinions are the result of a methodological artifact due to the two modes of asking used in this study. From the methodology of survey research it is well known that data from self-completion questionnaires are subject to less social desirability bias than data from survey interviews (Tourangeau and Smith 1996). It is plausible to assume that a tendency to (consciously or unconsciously) edit opinions in the direction of conformity with the antiracist norm may have played a role in the qualitative interviews. In fact, it would be surprising if this was not the case at least to some extent, especially as the interviewer’s nationality and accent (German) highlighted to respondents that “immigrants” to their country come in different kinds and colours. Qualitative researchers sometimes assume that in-depth interviews, as they offer the interviewer the chance for probing and the detailed inquiry into the structure of respondents’ thinking, will bring out the respondent’s true opinions better than a survey with its necessarily brief and superficial questions. Yet we do not have solid evidence to either verify or falsify this claim.

In any case, both the survey and the interview, both quantitative and qualitative analysis of attitudes, share a common weakness: both are only ever able to investigate what people are prepared to say (to a researcher); not more, not less. Yet this is but a small part of the phenomenon we call racism. People may hold implicit attitudes that they are not conscious of and are not able to verbalize (Kawakami et al. 2009). Neither surveys nor qualitative interviews are well suited to uncovering implicit attitudes; experimental methods have the capacity to provide much clearer and less ambiguous evidence (Hodson et al. 2005). I am not suggesting that speech acts are unimportant—they are not—but that, in racism as in other areas of social life, many significant motives that determine human action (such as, say, discriminatory behaviour), may not be fully conscious, and would be missed by both quantitative and qualitative research methods that focus solely on verbalizable attitudes.
References


