# Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Radical Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia

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Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Radical Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia

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Indonesia provides a fruitful case study of differences between radicalization processes in liberal and authoritarian regimes. Political Science hereby tends to emphasize regime type as the determinant of Islamist political strategy (radical, militant or moderate) and therefore as the main explanatory factor for radicalization processes. Although this is true of the role of Islamists in various Middle Eastern countries, where electoral participation has moderated political programs and strategies, it is of little relevance to Indonesia. The democratic opening in 1998 provided Islamists with new opportunities to participate in electoral politics, and even become co-opted by formally “secular” forces, but at the same time opened up spaces for militant, radical Islamist groups. Whereas radical Islam faced severe state repression under Suharto’s New Order, we now find a highly ambiguous relationship between the state and radical Islamists, expressed in operational terms as a parallelism of repression and cooptation. This article tries to make sense of the relationship between the post-authoritarian state and radical Islam in Indonesia by transcending the institution-centered understanding of the role of Islam through an examination of the configurations of social forces that have determined the shape, scope, and practices of radical Islam within Indonesia’s new experiment with democracy.

More than 85 percent of Indonesia’s population of more than 230 million are Muslim, making it the largest Muslim-majority nation in the world. Hence there are nearly as many people of Islamic faith living in Indonesia as there are in the entire Arab world. Since the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia has made significant strides toward democracy. Its democratization featured a general overhaul and liberalization of the political system, including the establishment of a multiparty system, freedom of the press, and the first free and fair elections since 1956. Indonesia’s democratization furthermore encompassed the decentralization of a highly centralized political system in which political power was to a large degree concentrated in the hands of Suharto and channeled through his vast patronage network. The transition to democracy also saw attempts to reform the powerful military that had backed Suharto’s New Order and had been the main instrument to repress any form of opposition movement in the country, as well as attempts to reform the economic system once dubbed “Suharto’s crony capitalism.”

The latter included, amongst other issues, the fight against endemic corruption and tackling the disastrous effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on the national economy. Most reviews of Indonesia’s transition to democracy have so far been very positive. It is widely acknowledged that, for the time being, Indonesia does not seem to be in danger of falling back into authoritarian structures. Many researchers (Rieffel 2004, Qodari 2005, Mujani and Liddle 2010), as well as international institutions such as the World Bank or the UN, describe the free, fair, and peaceful elections of 1999, 2004, and 2009 as historic landmarks for the country. The country has seen several changes of government, and legislatures and courts have gained formal independence from central government. Indonesians also enjoy extensive political freedoms, while countless civil society organizations and other pressure groups try to exercise some sort of a “watchdog function” over elected governments on the national and local level (Nyman 2006). Along these lines, Indonesia possesses many attributes of a consolidated democratic political system and has remained largely stable during the post-Suharto era. Such observations first of all...
contradict culturalist theories of Muslim exceptionalism, although a Muslim-majority country, Indonesia did not descend into theocracy after the fall of Suharto. Despite being the country with the largest Muslim population, Islamist parties never gained sufficient voter support to challenge the secular state. Neither the 2004 nor the 2009 national elections featured any significant increase in votes for parties with Islamist agendas. The most important issue for voters throughout the 2009 election was the economy, and there has been little evidence that factors such as religion or ethnicity had any significant influence on voting behavior (Mujani and Liddle 2010, 37).

Indonesia therefore makes an interesting case study, as culturalist theories on the relationship between Islam and democracy claim that the two are incompatible because the former does not provide for a separation of church and state and does not allow secular law to be translated into divine law. This is not to say that Indonesians see no place for religion in politics. In 2010, 89 percent of respondents to a PEW Global Attitudes survey said that Islam played a large role in politics in Indonesia, and that Islam’s influence in politics is positive (91 percent). However, in the same survey a 65 percent majority of Indonesians believed that democracy was preferable to any other kind of government, whilst only 12 percent said that in some circumstances a non-democratic government can be preferable. Therefore it seems safe to state that the majority of the population, as well as the country’s political elite, regard the idea of an Islamic state as counterproductive (Fealy 2004). The country has remained on course toward democracy, and many (mostly foreign) observers reiterate the importance of a democratic Indonesia as a potential model for the whole Muslim world, demonstrating the compatibility of Islam and democracy (Kingsbury 2010; Hughes 2004). That is not to say that the country has not experienced a radicalization amongst certain Islamic actors or the development of a militant fringe committed to wage jihad on what it perceives to be opponents of the establishment of an Islamic state. The emergence of radical Islamist groups has consequently sparked concerns amongst foreign observers and Indonesians alike. Asked about Islamic extremism in Indonesia, 42 percent of respondents said they were either very concerned or somewhat concerned, while 42 percent said they saw a struggle between modernizers and Islamic fundamentalists. Of the 42 percent who saw a struggle, 54 percent identified with modernizing forces and 33 percent with fundamentalists. However, these figures are not to be equated with support for Islamist militancy. In fact support for Islamist militancy has decreased. While in 2003 59 percent of all respondents expressed support for Osama bin Laden, the figure dropped to 26 percent in 2011. Similarly, in 2009 65 percent stated that suicide bombings can never be justified.

The existing theoretical literature finds two divergent explanations for the small role radical Islam has played in Indonesia’s recent history (Hamayotsu 2010). One basically turns the aforementioned general culturalist argument against itself and attributes the success of Indonesia’s democratization process despite a Muslim-majority population to the specific characteristics of Indonesian Islam. According to this argument, the different ways in which Islam was blended with earlier, largely animist, religious beliefs and traditions weakened the rigidity of Middle Eastern interpretations of Islam. This in turn led to the establish-

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1 The theory of “Muslim exceptionalism” is backed by the rather general claims of authors such as Huntington (1997, 1991), Lipset (1994), or Gellner (1994), who see Islam as responsible for the absence of democracy or, where democracy has been introduced to a Muslim state, as responsible at least for the aforementioned challenges of democratic consolidation. What underlies this is the belief in a “unique relationship between religion and politics in Islam that precludes the separation of the religious and political spheres” (Ayyoub 2006, 2). In other words, political thought and action in the Muslim world are mainly driven by religious goals, or at least by religious convictions.


ment of moderate, liberal traditions of Islam in Indonesia since its arrival in the thirteenth century. Hence the peculiarly moderate form of Islam developed over the centuries all over the Indonesian archipelago leaves little room for fundamentalist interpretations and is thus compatible with democratic, liberal forms of government (Geertz 1960).

The other argument emphasizes the existence of democratic institutions since the fall of Suharto. In this interpretation, the establishment of free and fair elections, freedom of the press, and a multiparty system has helped to marginalize radicalism by giving radicals an opportunity for political participation. Here, the regime type seems to determine the strategies and politics of the Islamists. If we consider the experiences of various Middle Eastern countries with radical Islamist movements, this hypothesis seems to make sense as political liberalization allowed the participation of radical Islamists. Given the opportunity to participate, however, Islamists were ready to adjust former radical positions and in the end became increasingly moderate (Nasr 2005). In a very simplified form, the main argument would be that inclusion through participation leads to moderation, exclusion through repression leads to radicalization (Hafez 2003).

How far does this argument carry us with regard to the case of Indonesia? In Indonesia, democratic, or at least reform-oriented Islamists did – amongst other groups – in fact play a vital part in ousting Suharto. They took part in the re-formasi movement demanding free and fair elections and press freedom, and founded democratic parties and civil society organizations. But as well as opening up a space for moderate Islamists to participate in electoral politics, the transition to democracy also made room for a more radical fringe of political Islam. Taking these processes into account it seems that political liberalization has been a double-edged sword: on the one hand it fostered the emergence of moderate Islamic civil society organizations and Islamic parties; yet on the other hand violent Islamist groups emerged after the fall of Suharto. The ambiguous role Islamists have played in post-Suharto Indonesia thus calls into question the assumption that political liberalization fosters a moderation of Islamist actors. Post-authoritarian Indonesia not only witnessed moderate Islamists playing a reform-oriented role within electoral politics, but also saw Islamist militants conduct an armed struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state. Thus, the assumed correlation between democracy and a moderation of radical Islamists seems to be highly ambiguous: the existence of democratic institutions alone obviously cannot be directly equated with a moderation of Islamist forces. As we have observed, both processes – radicalization/militancy and moderation – followed Indonesia’s transition to democracy.

I therefore argue that the “liberalization = moderation” hypothesis does not adequately describe the realities in post-Suharto Indonesia. While political Islam in Suharto’s New Order stood in stark opposition to the state, and consequently even moderate Islamists faced intense state repression, we now find a highly ambiguous relationship between state and political Islam, which expresses itself in operational terms through a parallelism of policies of repression and co-optation.

In order to make sense of the ambiguous relationship between the post-authoritarian state and political Islam in Indonesia, we need to go beyond an institution-centered understanding of democratization processes and look at the configurations of social forces that have determined the shape, scope, and practices of Indonesia’s transition to democracy. For this we need to link the resurgence of political Islam in Indonesia with a critical examination of the power politics behind the democratic institutions that evolved after 1998. I will begin by providing some insights into the historical relationship between Islam and politics in Indonesia, before moving on to explore the resurgence of political Islam after the ousting of Suharto, and examine the specifics and limitations of Indonesia’s transition to democracy. I will conclude with an outlook on the prospects and perils of Islamism in Indonesia more than ten years after the reformasi.

1. Indonesian Islam and Politics in Historical Perspective
Taking into account Marx’s observation that religion serves as the “sigh of the oppressed creature,” it is no surprise that Islam as a political ideology came to Indonesia during the colonial era. During (and beyond) Indonesia’s struggle for independence from the colonial rule of the Dutch,
Islam competed for mass support with two other ideological currents: nationalism and communism. Unlike the history of nationalism, the history of political Islam in Indonesia is one “crowded with failure” (Fealy 2005, 161). Fealy identifies three main periods. The first, from 1949 until 1959, was shaped by independence and the country’s first experiments with democracy, which were characterized by relatively free political competition between parties and the first free and fair elections. The second period, from 1959 until 1998, was in turn shaped by a faltering of the flirtation with democracy. This period consisted of decades of authoritarianism, first under Sukarno’s “guided democracy” (1959–1965) and then under Suharto’s “New Order” (ordre baru). After the initial experiment with democracy in the 1950s, both regimes that followed placed tight restrictions on political Islam. The third period, which began following Suharto’s ousting in 1998 and continues through the present, is also shaped by the past (Fealy 2005, Hadiz 2011).

After Indonesia became independent from Dutch colonial rule in 1949, the main line of political conflict between Islamist and more secular forces concerned the question of whether Indonesia should become an Islamic state. The Islamists favored the inclusion of the sharia in the Indonesian constitution and the establishment of a Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia). More secular forces, amongst them Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, feared that an Islamic constitution could lead to secessionist aspirations among the then mainly Christian eastern provinces of the archipelago and ultimately cause the break-up of the young nation. These fears tipped the scales in favor of a constitution that excluded notions of an Islamic state. The majority of Islamic actors, although deeply disappointed by Indonesia’s “secular” constitution, took comfort in the prospect that the Islamic parties would, if united, certainly win Indonesia’s first elections and would then change the constitution. A minority of Islamists even began local uprisings with the goal of establishing an Islamic state (Negara Islam) through military force. The so-called Darul Islam movement (House of Islam) eventually managed to establish Islamic rule in parts of Sumatra, Java, and Sulawesi, but these were eventually crushed by the central government after a decade-long civil war (Dahm 2007, 203).

The first free elections in 1956 brought bitter defeat for the Islamist parties. While the dream of a politically unified Islam had been dashed by various political splits between 1949 and 1956, hopes of electoral victory were disappointed too when the Islamic parties gained only 43.1 percent of the votes. While from 1956 Islamic parties participated in coalition governments under Sukarno, their political influence was often overshadowed by the secular nationalism of Sukarno and the PKI (Partai Kommunis Indonesia, the Communist Party of Indonesia). When Suharto came to power after a military coup in 1965, his first move was directed against the powerful PKI. With the help of Islamic militias and the military, an estimated half a million PKI members were killed. Despite the close involvement of many Islamists with the military during the transition from Sukarno’s “guided democracy” to Suharto’s New Order, the demise of Sukarno and the PKI did not mean greater influence over state power for political Islam.

On the contrary political Islam, as the only potential source of opposition to Suharto, was quickly marginalized (Hadiz 2011, 18). This marginalization included requiring Islamic groups to conform to the state philosophy, restricting the use of Islamic symbols and language, and limiting the number of Islamic parties. In 1973, all Islamic parties were forced to merge and form the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party). The very name of the party demonstrates the nearly complete marginalization of political Islam under the first decades of the New Order, as it no longer bore any direct reference to Islam. Under the New Order no independent power centers existed outside the state apparatus, which is why Benedict Anderson describes the ordre baru as the victory of the state vis-à-vis society (1990).

Intensifying state repression forced many of the more radical Islamist activists into exile; amongst them most notably many of those who were later involved in the creation of Jamaah Islamiyah. As a result of the heavy state repression political Islam had very little political influence for decades in Indonesia (Baswedan 2004, 671). The Suharto regime legitimized the authoritarian politics of the New Order through state-led developmental strategies. New Order delivering continued high economic growth rates and rising living standards, for which, in the mindset of the architects of the New Order, political stability was a precondition. The latter was achieved through the backing of the state se-
curity apparatus and massive support from the West. For the West, Suharto was an effective ally to help prevent Indonesia from shifting to either communism or Islamic theocracy. As economic growth rates began to decline from the 1980s onwards, Suharto – aware that his secular power base had started to crumble – began a turn toward Islam in order to legitimize his authoritarian regime.

What followed was a whole bundle of policies that led to a gradual Islamization of Indonesian society: the appointment of pious Muslims to leading government and military positions, increased support for Islamic teachings in schools and universities, the lifting of the ban on girls wearing the headscarf in school, and an expansion of the authority of sharia courts, to name only a few. Along with the new policies came the foundation of the IMCI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals) as well as the establishment of an Islamic bank and insurance agency. Suharto’s public persona changed in line with these developments: he took part in the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca and in general showed more public commitment to Islam than in previous years. During the late 1990s, Suharto even briefly tried to co-opt Islamist forces as a tool against the emerging pro-democratic reformasi movement. Within a decade, Islam transitioned from being at the margins of the state to occupying a favored status within the regime (Singh 2004) – although one must acknowledge that this turn mainly comprised a drive for an increase in personal piety among the citizens of Indonesia. Political Islam, still largely defined in opposition to the authoritarian and corrupt regime of the New Order, was facing state repression like any other opposition group.6

The Islamization of the late New Order, which still influences the trajectories of Indonesian Islam to this day, must be understood against a variety of interconnected factors. Perhaps most importantly, tensions between the regime and the military, which had been one of the main pillars of regime stability, drove Suharto to look for other supporters and sources of legitimacy. In addition, mounting divisions within the regime were accompanied by the rapid growth of the traditionally very pious middle classes, caused by the economic boom of the 1970s and 1980s. The middle classes embraced Suharto’s gradual renunciation of the military insofar as “they welcomed the opportunity to gain access to senior government positions” (Fealy 2005, 164).

Hence, on the one hand, the Islamization of Indonesia owes, much to a rising middle class seeking moral orientation and identity in a rapidly changing sociopolitical and economic environment. For many, Islam became a reference point, a reliable and consistent element of identification within an ever-changing, modernizing order (Hefner 2005). On the other hand, the rise of Islam is to some extent intertwined with the Islamization policies implemented by the Suharto regime itself. This is what Ruf (2002, 51) calls an “irony” of the aforementioned macro-political developments: that “secular” regimes in the Muslim world, such as the Suharto regime in Indonesia, became promoters of the Islamization process by pushing for the implementation of a wide variety of Islamic policies in an attempt to regain or strengthen their own legitimacy and control rising political support for Islam (see also: Hasan 2007a, 88). It is against this background that the often ambiguous relationship between Islam and politics in post-Suharto Indonesia must be analyzed.

While one cannot fail to notice the growing influence of conservative (Wahhabi) interpretations of Islam through charitable foundations and other Islamic organizations...

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6 One example of this is the “Tanjung Priok massacre.” On September 12, 1984, following the arrests of several individuals accused of giving anti-government sermons at Tanjung Priok Rawa Badak Mosque, an anti-government demonstration was held in the Tanjung Priok harbor area of north Jakarta. The participants were protesting against a law requiring all organizations to adopt the sole ideology of the state, the Pancasila. They were encircled by security forces, who opened fire on the demonstrators. Survivors claimed that several hundred people were killed during the incident.

7 While the impact of 9/11 and its aftermath is not part of this analysis, it needs to be noted that the ramifications of 9/11, the “war on terror,” and the invasion of Iraq certainly had implications for the resurgence of political Islam in post-Suharto Indonesia. Von der Mehden (2008) argues that these events reinforced a sense of Islamic identity amongst Indonesia’s Muslims while at the same time amplifying perceptions of a clash between the “West” and the “Muslim world.” Furthermore, 9/11 and its aftermath facilitated the radicalization of elements within Indonesia’s Muslim community and increased support for the goals and actions of these radicalized elements. The general public and the majority of the political elites, while initially condemning the 9/11 terrorist attacks, reacted very negatively to the “war on terror” and the invasion of Iraq, leading to an increased negative perception of the United States and its allies amongst Indonesia’s Muslims.
based in the Arab world from the 1970s onward (Bubalo and Fealy 2005), various forms of Islamic militancy and the struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state can be traced back to the pre-independence era (Sidel 2006; Hadiz 2011). Above all else, the range of historical events described here questions the prominent image of Indonesian Islam as being inherently tolerant and moderate. However biased such an image has been, it most certainly reflects the fact that Islam as a political force was for decades marginalized or even repressed under Suharto’s New Order. With the ousting of Suharto this was to change drastically.

2. The Resurgence of Political Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia

The end of the New Order led to the opening of the political sphere for a great variety of new political actors. Moderate Muslim intellectuals were active in the pro-democratic reform movements that took to the streets in 1997 and early 1998 and demanded Suharto’s resignation. While playing a vital role in the immediate events leading to the downfall of Suharto, the “movement for a democratic Muslim politics in Indonesia” (Hefner 2005, 274) was soon effectively marginalized by a rising conservative (and often militant) spectrum of Islamist actors, ranging from transnational terrorist networks like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Islamist militias to legal Islamist political parties and civil society groups. The radical fringe of political Islam has displayed a heterogeneous array of organizational structures, goals, applied strategies, and relationships with the state.

The opening of the political system was closely followed by an outbreak of inter-communal violence between Muslims and Christians, the establishment of Islamist militia groups, and attacks by the Jemaah Islamiyah terror network on Christian churches (2000), nightclubs in Bali (2002 and 2005), the Australian embassy (2004), and the Marriott Hotel (2003, 2009) (Mapes 2005). Shortly after the ousting of Suharto, nominally Christian paramilitaries sprang up, attacking what happened to be nominally Muslim communities in Poso (Sulawesi), Central Kalimantan, and the Moluccas. While the roots of these conflicts – all of which had been effectively suppressed by the iron rule of Suharto – were to be found in competition over political and economic power, local leaders effectively mobilized support amongst “their” constituencies by portraying the conflicts in religious rather than in political/economic terms (van Klinken 2007). Sectarian violence between Christians and Muslims in the three aforementioned provinces has cost more than twelve thousand lives since the fall of Suharto. The outbreak of sectarian violence in 1998–1999, paralleled by the intensification of long-running separatist conflicts in the provinces of Aceh, West Papua, and East Timor, led many analysts to conclude that a break-up of Indonesia (often termed “Balkanization”) could very well be underway (Wanandi 2002; Mally 2003).

Even more worryingly, the escalation of violence in Ambon (Moluccas) owed a great deal to the establishment and deployment of Islamist militia groups such as the currently disbanded Laskar Jihad (Jihad militia), which was reportedly heavily involved in the deadly conflict between Muslims and Christians on the Moluccas. Besides the Laskar Jihad, the Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Defenders of Islam Front), another Islamist militia, made headlines by patrolling the streets of Jakarta and other cities in order to prevent what their members perceived as “vice” (e.g., massage parlors, nightclubs, the selling of “pornographic” literature, etc.). Furthermore, the FPI conducted raids during Ramadan, targeting businesses and individuals who were deemed disrespectful to the holy month. In April of 2006 the organization attacked the newly founded office of the Indonesian edition of *Playboy*, as well as organized gatherings and demonstrations in 2007 against the newly established left-wing Papernas party, which it accused of spreading communist ideals (Sabarini 2007b). In 2010 and 2011 the number of religiously instigated assaults by Islamic militias such as the FPI increased significantly. For example, in September 2010 alone more than thirty attacks on Christian churches took place, twelve more than during the whole of 2009. As Kimura notes, the government response was “lukewarm, if not provocative” (2010, 190). On the day before the FPI launched an attack on one Christian church, its representatives met with Jakarta’s governor and police chief to discuss cooperation between FPI and the police to better ensure “law enforcement support” during Ramadan.

What is more, the activities of various militia groups were often backed by state officials. Laskar Jihad, for example,
was reportedly armed and trained by members of the Indonesian military (Hasan 2006). According to cables from the U.S. embassy in Jakarta published by Wikileaks, sources within the Indonesian security forces had such close ties to the FPI that they were able to warn the U.S. embassy of an FPI attack hours before it actually took place. One cable states that a member of Indonesia’s BIN intelligence agency managed to provide the U.S. embassy with “advance notice of FPI’s hostile intent hours prior to the February 19 vandalism of the Embassy.” The cable also states that “National Police Chief Sutanto had provided some funds to FPI” prior to the attack, but cut off funding after the attack. The FPI is described as an “attack dog,” and thus as a “useful tool” for the police, “that could spare the security forces from criticism for human rights violations.”

Islamist militias were also involved in a number of attacks on Ahmadiyah, an unorthodox Muslim sect. These attacks made international headlines in February 2011, when some 1,500 people attacked a small group of members of Ahmadiyah and killed three of them. Whilst these attacks were publicly condemned by many politicians, intellectuals, and religious authorities, who all made public statements in favour of religious tolerance, the state apparatus has usually responded by limiting Ahmadiyah’s public activities to safeguard public order (Olle 2009, 114). For example, when members of the Front Pembela Islam, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and other radical groups attacked a demonstration organized by the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Faith for its support of Ahmadiyah, the Department of Home Affairs and the Department of Religion issued a joint decree consisting mainly of warnings to followers of Ahmadiyah not to promote deviant teachings, while at the same time prohibiting vigilantism. The inaction of the government, the law enforcement agencies, and the judiciary in condemning the violence, preventing attacks, and bringing perpetrators to justice has been accompanied by a growing number of provincial and local regulations that limit, or at times even de facto ban, the activities of Ahmadiyah (Crouch 2011). Government reaction to the violent attacks of February 2011 on Ahmadiyah members and supporters was also lukewarm. While some of the perpetrators were actually tried and convicted, the sentences of a few months in prison were nowhere near the maximum of twelve years. What is more, a ministerial decree issued in 2008, which banned Ahmadiyah followers from expressing their religious beliefs publicly, actually provided the legal background for nationwide discrimination and violent attacks (Heiduk 2008).

The resurgence of Islamist militias has, however, by and large been overshadowed by the existence of the Jemaah Islamiyah terror network. While until 2009 their attacks were aimed mainly at Western nightclubs, embassies, and luxury hotels, Indonesian officials and government institutions have increasingly become targets. This was most spectacularly exemplified by a failed plot to assassinate President Yudhoyono in 2009, but also by various attacks on police officers in 2011. Threatened by attacks against state officials and institutions, the Indonesian government has in turn made significant efforts to crack down on terrorist networks operating in the country. In 2010 for example, a jihadist training camp in Aceh became the target of a police crackdown that left eight rebels dead, amongst them the alleged mastermind of the Bali bombings. Following the crackdown in Aceh, President Yudhoyono decreed the establishment of a National Anti-Terrorism Agency to coordinate the efforts of different government agencies involved in anti-terrorism. Overall, the increased counter-terrorism efforts vis-a-vis jihadist networks since 2005 have resulted in the arrest of over two hundred militants associated with Jemaah Islamiyah as well as the police killings of JI splinter group leaders Mohammad Noordin Top and Dulmatin in 2009 and 2010 respectively.

Apart from the state’s ambiguous relationship with “uncivil society” (Hefner), another striking feature of the resurgence of political Islam in Indonesia is the remarkable rise since 1998 of the PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera – Prosperous Justice Party) inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood. After gaining less than 2 percent of the votes in Indonesia’s first free and fair elections in 1999, the PKS managed to win more than 7 percent in 2004 and 2009. As a result, it became Indonesia’s seventh-strongest political party and joined the ruling coalition of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The PKS even saw its leader, Hidiyat Nur Wahid, chosen as speaker of the Indonesian parliament. Analysis of the 2004 elections shows that PKS won many votes through its somewhat secular agenda (demanding reform of the welfare system and pushing for stronger anti-corruption policies). It differed from other Islamist groups by not openly demanding the establishment of sharia law and mainly concentrating on governance issues. Furthermore, the cadre-based organizational structures of the PKS, which were modeled on Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, and the party’s internal disciplinary system not only ensured that the majority of its members abide by to the party’s programme and refrain from activities that could be detrimental to the PKS’s image, such as conducting or supporting violent actions, but have at the same time served as a “preventive radicalisation mechanism.” Noor argues that it is “this internal mechanism that PKS hopes to use in order to maintain the cohesion of its membership and to distance itself from the more radical and violent Islamist groups in Indonesia today” (2011, 26).

It seems obvious that Indonesia’s democratization has opened up space for a great variety of Islamist actors, which have in turn further enhanced the general political importance of Islam. Democratization encompassed the establishment of a multiparty system, the lifting of restrictions on the freedom of press, and an enormous decentralization process that has allowed Islamists to spread their ideas legally through extensive communication networks. It also enabled the Islamist parties to return to the political arena. The lifting of repression of oppositional groups permitted the establishment of various Islamic civil society organizations, including moderate, liberal organizations, but also the “uncivil society.” While post-Suharto Indonesia certainly disproves the hypothesis that democratic institutions automatically lead to Islamist moderation, the developments also challenge the assumption that there is a clear dividing line between Islamists and the state’s authorities. While the latter appears to be true with regard to jihadist networks such as Jemaah Islamiyah and its splinter groups, which faced strong state repression, other militant Islamists such as Front Pembela Islam or Laskar Jihad have often operated in a gray zone between repression and cooption. The varying relationship between the state and militant Islamist actors – ranging from (at least temporary) cooperation to repression – seems to emphasize how even parts of political Islam’s militant fringe can be instrumentalized by elites to serve their specific sociopolitical interests.

This picture is further complicated by the International Crisis Group investigation into the killings of police officers in West Java in 2011, which found that the perpetrators of the bombings were not members of terrorist groups but had been radicalised in the context of the street politics of Islamist militias. “The 2011 suicide bombings of a police mosque in Cirebon, West Java and an evangelical church in Solo, Central Java were carried out by men who moved from using sticks and stones in the name of upholding morality and curbing ‘deviance’ to using bombs and guns” (ICG 2012, 1). Similarly, a study on religious radicalism in Java by the Sentara Institute published before the 2011 attacks found that radical Islamist groups in the area had served as “incubators” for the two suicide bombers involved in the attacks but that neither of the two had any links to known terrorist groups. Neither the Islamist actors nor the Indonesian state can be considered to be a “monolithic bloc”; rather, it is a stark characteristic of post-Suharto Indonesia that the relationship between the state and Islamist actors has lost its cohesion. The ambivalent relationship between political elites and the “uncivil society”, as well as the rise of the PKS in the 2004 elections, again must be understood within the wider context of Indonesia’s transition to what Hadiz terms “illiberal democracy” (2003).

3. Contextualizing Political Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia: The Oligarchic Continuum

The aforementioned positive reviews of the democratization process that brought about Indonesia’s transition to
democracy and the end of the New Order focus mainly on factors such as elite choices, leadership, and the importance of political institutions to the course and outcome of the democratization process (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Accordingly, the crafting of democratic rules and institutions, combined with democratic forms of governance and the existence of an enlightened, pro-democratic civil society serving as a “watchdog” to the government, is equated with the consolidation of democracy (Rieffel 2004). While such new institutional arrangements may be pivotal for the establishment of a democratic political system, they largely exclude the constellations of social forces (or classes) that “determine the parameters of possible outcomes in any given situation. … The direction of political change following the end of authoritarian rule is primarily the product of contests between these competing social forces” (Hadiz 2003, 592). Bellin points out that social forces are therefore by and large “contingent, not consistent, democrats” (2000) – that is, support for democracy or the authoritarian state depends on whether these specific social forces see their political and economic interests served by the respective form of rule. When political and economic conditions change, interests may change, too. Thus social forces might see the need to redefine their position toward the respective regime (Bellin 2000).

The change in political and economic conditions in Indonesia was brought about by the Asian financial crisis in 1997. With the New Order descending into deep economic crisis, more than one third of the population slid under the poverty line, living standards of large parts of the population declined, and economic growth rates fell to less than zero. Once legitimized by high economic growth rates and rising living standards, the New Order regime, personalized by Suharto, who was often referred to as Pak Pembangunan (father of development), saw itself confronted with political and economic crisis. As Suharto proved incapable of solving the crisis and hundreds of thousands demanded reforms, supporters withdrew their loyalty and forced him to step down (Smith 2003).

The fall of Suharto and the institutional reforms that followed are not to be equated with the establishment of democracy and a “free” market economy. Yet they did change the “balance of power” and the “terms of conflict” (Robinson 2001, 120), as the formerly dominant political/business oligarchs and bureaucrats lost the powerful centralized state apparatus that had guaranteed their privileged positions and secured their interests. A new and more open political system came into being, one in which politics was no longer channeled exclusively vertically through the state apparatus and Suharto’s cronies, but increasingly through parties and the parliament. The “diffusion of politics” after the fall of Suharto made it necessary for the old power-holders to adapt to the politics of reform and consequently to engage in wider and more horizontal alliances in order to protect their own resources of political and economic power (Slater 2006, 208). A coalition of moderate reformers and old elites under the leadership of Suharto’s deputy Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie took power and initiated moderate democratic political reforms – effectively marginalizing those social forces that had demanded more radical reforms. At the same time, the system of collusion, corruption, and nepotism amongst officials and politico-business oligarchs did not cease to exist. The de facto elimination of any mass-based opposition during the New Order era meant that there were no simply social forces strong enough to break up the old power structures. Therefore, while political institutions were widely reformed, the socioeconomic power structures of the New Order (the vast, informal patronage networks of the elites) remained largely unaffected throughout this “quasi-evolutionary” elite-driven transition process. The result was what Slater calls the construction of a “political cartel” (2004). Although elections are formally competitive, the cartel of political elites protects those in power from outside competition. Slater argues that the political cartel has made Indonesia’s oligarchy “practically irremovable through the electoral process, even though elections themselves have been commendably free and fair” (2006, 208).

The “money politics” is fueled by a party system in which political parties have not emerged out of “broad-based social interests” with the backing of different, often competing social forces (which was precluded by the elite-controlled transition process) but exist instead mainly as “patronage machines” of elite factions. This has also been described as a
“trend toward personality-based political parties in recent years.”

Striking examples for this type of political party are the Democrat Party led by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra, led by ex-General Prabowo Subianto) and the People’s Conscience Party (Partai Hanura, led by ex-General Wiranto). The “commodification of politics” (Ufen 2010, 30) has various dimensions. First, the mobilization of voters, which often begins months ahead of the actual campaigning periods, involves spiraling costs for the candidates in terms of advertisements and marketing. These costs are often at least partially shouldered by business elites backing one or sometimes even all candidates to ensure their interests are met by office-holders after the elections. Second, on the local level candidates need to bribe party bosses to secure slots on their party’s lists. So, money politics also affect the internal process by which a political party designates its candidates. In order to ensure that candidates have at least some support, they officially have to be put forward by parties. In reality candidates start campaigning before they have the support of a political party, and later seek support from any party, regardless of ideals or platforms. “Parties were a ‘vehicle’ minus ideology” (Simandjuntak 2009, 93).

One example is the backing of former deputy governor Fauzi Bowo by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) during the 2007 local elections in Jakarta. This decision, which was made only weeks before the elections, came as a surprise to the PDI-P party chapters and the public, as Bowo had previously been registered with former Suharto party Golkar. Despite his lack of roots within his new party, and although other candidates had already been selected, Bowo was immediately given a chance to register as an independent candidate for PDI-P.

Disappointed party members as well as political analysts described this as a “political ploy played by the elite,” which holds the tickets to enter the race for lucrative and sought-after posts within the local and national government. These tickets are usually sold to the highest bidder, which effectively marginalizes democratic decision-making processes within the parties (Sabarini 2007a). In line with this, Buehler and Tan show that the relationship between party and candidate is formed at a later stage, on an ad-hoc basis shortly before the elections, and often based on personal bonds not political bonds (2007). Virtually all local candidates had no roots in any party and originated from outside the parties. “The parties expected to be paid by candidates for their services in the elections” (Buehler and Tan 2007, 65). Thirdly, trying to ensure a good ticket for posts after the elections also involves the “mobilization of delegates as voters at party congresses through campaigning and different forms of vote-buying” (Ufen 2010, 30). In a country where, according to the World Bank definition of less than $2 per day, more than 50 percent of the population continues to live below the poverty line, the practice of money politics severely restricts political decision-making to competing wealthy elite factions (Hillman 2006, 27).

Vote-buying is common in all districts of Indonesia, with more than seven thousand election violations, including multiple vote-buying incidents, reported during the 2004 parliamentary elections. During the 2004 presidential elections the NGOs Indonesian Corruption Watch and Transparency International Indonesia suspected nearly all presidential candidates of vote-buying. Australian journalist Michael Backmann was left wondering whether corruption runs so rampant as to completely undermine democracy (2004):

Democracy is a good thing. But what is the point of it when the state apparatus is so corrupt that most laws are subverted to the point of irrelevancy? Who cares whether this or that leader is elected when corruption will mean that their policy platforms are unlikely to be implemented, and certainly not in the way that they would intend?

Indonesia is today still among the thirty most corrupt nations according to Transparency International’s annual Corruption Index. A survey conducted by Gallup right before the 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections showed that nine out of ten Indonesians perceive corruption
to be endemic throughout government surveyed. Moreover, 52 percent believe that corruption actually became worse between 2004 and 2009 (Gallup 2008). Corruption is so endemic, that 85 percent of judges and 60 percent of police officers are estimated to be corrupt (Webber 2006, 408) and companies working in Indonesia are reckoned to use about 10 percent of their overall budgets to “smoothen” business operations (Henderson and Kuncoro 2004).

While collusion and nepotism under the New Order were largely channeled through Suharto’s patronage networks, today the democratic political parties serve as patronage vehicles for Indonesia’s “new” elites. Thus Robinson and Hadiz describe Indonesia’s transition process as the “oligarchization” of democracy (2004). Within the democratic oligarchy, as opposed to the authoritarian New Order of Suharto, the once extremely centralized state apparatus has lost its cohesion. It must therefore be understood not as a monolithic bloc, but rather as a focal point of competing social forces. The deployment of Islamist militias serving as instruments in the hands of competing elite factions and the success of the Islamist PKS must be understood against this background. Against what many Indonesians perceive as the “old,” ineffective, and corrupt political establishment, the PKS presented itself as an “anti-establishment” party with a political agenda focusing mainly on anti-corruption policies and socioeconomic reforms. The success of its “clean and caring” message during the 2004 and 2009 elections was a product of the many shortcomings of the “new” democratic order.

4. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Radical Islam Ten Years after Reformasi

The foregoing analysis of the substance of democracy and the realities of “democratic” practices in post-Suharto Indonesia identifies a widening gap between the formal aspects of democracy (such as free elections, democratic institutions) and the democratic rhetoric of elected elites on the one hand, and the realities on the ground. The growing political importance of radical Islam in Indonesia must be interpreted as a response to this gap. The oligarchic continuum has triggered different responses from different strands of radical Islam, which have in turn resulted in different policies adopted by the Indonesian state towards the respective groups. Transnational jihadist networks like Jemaah Islamiyah and their followers have quickly come to regard the new Indonesia as more of the same secularism that they despise as sinful (though formally more democratic). Terrorist acts carried out to establish an Islamic state have been met with increasingly successful counter-terrorism measures by the Indonesian state. Whilst Islamist militants waging jihad as part of a struggle for an Islamic state in Indonesia have faced increasing repression by the Indonesian state and as a result have been weakened over the years, local Islamist militias like Front Pembela Islam and their “anti-vice” politics have been tolerated or in various incidents even actively supported by and used as a tool for political elites. Islamist vigilante groups have carried out with impunity a variety of militant actions against what they perceive as a “Christianization” of Indonesia and for the application of the sharia in public life. This is first of all because these militias, unlike Jemaah Islamiyah, accept the Indonesian government as legitimate in principle, and do not actively strive to establish an Islamic state in its place. In addition, nearly all political parties (as well as other private actors) employ “their” respective private militias for protection and to intimidate opponents. Hence political support in Jakarta for imposing a ban on militias is low. With new studies highlighting the blurring divisions between Islamist militias and terrorists, a wider question emerges: Is it possible to differentiate between radical Islamist militias and jihadist terrorism? One preliminary conclusion, based on present research on the attacks in West Java, could be that jihadi ideologies and tactics have merged with the agendas of vigilante groups, thus establishing “individual jihadists” or “self-made terrorists” with no connections to larger terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah as a new variant in Indonesia’s spectrum of radical Islamists.

And then there is the moderate strand of radical Islam. Islamist parties, especially the PKS, have employed a “clean and caring” message in response to what especially the urban middle class perceives to be but the continuation in a democratic institutional framework of the old patterns of collusion, nepotism, and corruption that dominated Indonesian politics for decades. Within this context, the PKS managed to mobilize the votes of many disappointed members of the middle class through its commitment to
clean government and social reforms. Because of its success in the 2004 national elections the PKS even became part of the coalition led by President Yudhoyono. But realpolitik has caused the PKS some serious setbacks over the last few years. By being a part of the Yudhoyono government, the party had to carry some of the responsibility for “tough” policies such as the cuts on fuel subsidies. More damage to the party’s “clean and caring” image was done through corruption charges against PKS members serving in regional governments. Ironically, the PKS was unable to successfully transform the “clean and caring” campaign that gained it many votes during the 2004 elections into realpolitik under the Yudhoyono government, and thus currently finds itself in a state of decline. Thus while Islamist parties like the PKS managed to gain electoral success with an agenda focused on governance issues, it has been difficult for them to deliver on those promises. Accordingly, the party failed to gain more than 7.9 percent of the votes in the 2009 national elections. Opinion polls seem to provide further evidence for this development, recently showing flagging support for Islamist parties in general. Moreover, in a society that has been in a process of Islamization for nearly two decades, attempts to gain political legitimacy through moral, faith-based politics are not the sole domain of the PKS. Local sharia laws for example are increasingly supported by “normal” Muslim and even “secular” parties such as Golkar in order to boost their political legitimacy amongst their constituents (Buehler 2011). Therefore Tanuwidjaja argues that the decline of Islamist parties in post-Suharto Indonesia is not to be equated with a crisis of political Islam (2010). Instead, he argues, Islam has penetrated all political parties to an extent that makes it hard for Islamic parties to monopolize Islamic aspirations of their constituents. The fact that all major political parties have accommodated Islamic aspirations can be interpreted as a victory of radical Islamists in a formerly “secular” political environment.

Hence, it would be wrong to conclude that the recent weakening of political Islam in Indonesia is irreversible. The continuum of predatory interests, graft-ridden political institutions, rampant poverty, and unemployment still – despite high economic growth rates – makes political Islam seem a credible alternative to many. While these findings certainly do not link up directly with the individual motivations of radical Islamists to engage in violence, interviews with jailed militants show that perceived inequality and perceived corruption often served as a justification for Islamist violence. Especially endemic corruption has contributed to “the negative impression that the government is immoral and thogut (evil)” (Ungerer 2011, 11). The oligarchic character of Indonesia’s democracy has to a large extent minimized the positive effects of moderate Islamist parties. The real challenge for Indonesia’s democracy is therefore not political Islam per se, but rather the appropriation of the democratization process by the power politics of predatory elites. This, combined with an ongoing Islamization of society in general, has further complicated the aforementioned ambiguous relationship between the state and radical Islam. However, the (selective) instrumentalization of radical Islam by the state has also, much to the distaste of those in favor of the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia, discredited it in the eyes of many Indonesians looking for a credible opposition force to what Webber terms Indonesia’s “patrimonial democracy” (2006).
References


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