“I Am First and Foremost a Man of Logic” – Stereotyping, the Syndrome Character of Prejudice, and a Glance at Anders Breivik’s Manifesto

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Attitudes, stereotyping, and prejudice are often conceived of as inner, mental or cognitive processes. Drawing on discursive psychology and critical theory, this article proposes a language-based understanding of stereotyping and the “syndrome character” of prejudice that is able to avoid certain epistemological shortcomings and connect social-psychological and sociological research. Stereotyping is outlined as a relational concept that denotes a linguistic mode of relating to the world, whilst the syndrome character of prejudice is conceptualized as a phenomenon that shows in particular stereotypical speech acts, but does not completely coincide with them. The impact of this conceptual figuration is empirically illustrated using Anders Breivik’s manifesto.

Introduction
The concept of a syndrome character of prejudice has long been a subject of quantitative and qualitative research on prejudice (Adorno et al. 1950; Heitmeyer 2002; Zick, Hövermann, and Krause 2012). The essential core of approaches that use this concept is probably that if a person is prejudiced against one outgroup, they are most likely to be prejudiced against other outgroups as well. Whilst the substantiability of the syndrome character of prejudice has been proved by long term quantitative empirical research (Heitmeyer 2012), less attention has been paid to the theoretical derivation of the concept. Theodor W. Adorno and colleagues noted the interconnection of different prejudices in their study on the Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al. 1950), arguing that unconscious, deep-rooted character traits may be responsible for this stereotyped devaluation of various outgroups. Thus, they dislocated the object of their interest to a place where it cannot be observed, at least not directly: the minds of their subjects.

In the following I will outline a relational concept of stereotyping. By locating the process of stereotyping in language, it will be possible to avoid shortcomings associated with approaches that conceptualize stereotyping as a primarily “inner” or “mental” occurrence. Because the researchers of the Frankfurt School themselves partly applied an epistemologically and methodically problematic differentiation between “inner” phenomena and their outward appearances, I will in a first step illustrate the approach of discursive psychology to problems of social psychology (1.1.). Subsequently I will show that the Dialectic of Enlightenment (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997) includes considerations on stereotyping as a linguistic phenomenon that may shed new light on the notion of a syndrome character of prejudice as it is applied in the Authoritarian Personality as well as in contemporary research on prejudice (1.2.).

Then I will illustrate the impact of this approach using the manifesto of Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian mass murderer (2.). In a last step, I will outline theoretical and methodological consequences of this approach (3.).

1 It is not my intention to present a new interpretation of the Dialectic of Enlightenment or the Authoritarian Personality. Rather, I would like to show that if one shifts the focus of the interpretation of those classical texts from ‘inner’ processes to language, certain problems of the conceptualization of stereotypes and the syndrome character of prejudice vanish.
1. The Concept of Stereotyping

1.1 Discursive Psychology and the Study of Attitudes and Stereotypes

What is the medium of stereotyping? According to Gordon Allport, a stereotype is “an exaggerated belief associated with a category” and an aspect “of a complex mental process” (1958, 187). A stereotype may influence what we are able to perceive, but the stereotype itself is never directly observable, and we can only indirectly infer from behavior or language that a stereotyped mentality exists. The same goes for his concept of attitudes, which, according to Allport, “are never directly observed, but, unless they are admitted, through inference, as real and substantial ingredients in human nature, it becomes impossible to account satisfactorily either for the consistency of any individual’s behavior, or for the stability of any society” (1935, 839). Stangor admits that nowadays there are “tens, if not hundreds of definitions in the literature, although they are mostly based on the general idea of stereotypes as knowledge structures that serve as mental ‘pictures’ of the group in question” (2009, 2). Accordingly, the main problem concerning the understanding of stereotypes is not so much whether the approach is a social psychological or sociological one, whether it is quantitative, experimental, or qualitative. Rather, the problematic aspect that seems to provoke the multiplicity of definitions is the location of stereotypes, that is, whether they are conceived of as hidden inner states that are not directly observable or as a linguistic phenomenon. Thus, I will not give a review of definitions, which has been done elsewhere (Ashmore and Del Boca 1981, Miller 1982), but outline what could be meant when we speak of “stereotypes.” Given that the concept originally meant a printing plate used in the publishing industry and was – as far as we know – first borrowed for the social sciences by Walter Lippmann (1949), its metaphorical character becomes immediately clear. Its original, non-metaphorical meaning was “a relief printing plate cast in a mould made from composed type or an original plate,” and in the following we will take a closer look at what it could reasonably mean if we switch the focus of research from unobservable inner processes to language as the medium of stereotypes.

For several years, discursive psychology led the way in challenging this conception of attitudes, stereotyping, and prejudice as ostensibly inner and nonverbal processes or structures that somehow attach to language, leaving language as mere trace for those unobservable processes or structures. As Billig puts it: “Thus, much of social psychology, especially cognitive social psychology, has objects of study – whether ‘attitude systems’, ‘social identities’ or ‘cognitive schemata’ which are presumed to be internal processes and, as such, hidden from view. These objects are the focus of considerable social psychological investigation, but are ghostly essences, lying behind and supposedly controlling what can be directly observed” (2001, 210). To avoid dealing with those “ghostly essences” and to put (social) psychology on a discursive/rhetorical basis, extensive research has been done, for instance in the field of attribution and the psychology of memory (Edwards and Potter 1992), racism (Wetherell and Potter 1992), or nationalism (Billig 2006). The common ground most studies in discursive/rhetorical psychology share is

a) A far-reaching critique of approaches that conceptualize attitudes, prejudice, stereotyping, or ideology as somehow or other “inner” states or processes. If, it is argued, words have no objective or intrinsic meaning, but acquire their meaning only in concrete social contexts, then such approaches miss their goal of discovering basic mechanisms of the human psyche. Ironically, this happens in the course of efforts to ensure access to those mechanisms, assuming that only a language “sanitized and shorn of context and usage” (Edwards and Potter 1992, 157) will bring this result.

b) Based on this, a concentration on everyday language. If, in and by the medium of language, the individual does not express a mentality or an inner psychological

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2 The authors of the Authoritarian Personality—albeit rather relying on Freudian psychoanalysis—very similarly distinguished between the “surface” of language and underlying personality traits and needs (Adorno et al. 1950, 2ff.).

dynamic, but first and foremost “discourse is actively constitutive of both social and psychological processes” (Wetherell and Potter 1992, 59), then studying everyday language must be the priority of psychology.

The goal of rhetoric and discursive psychology is not to deny that there are inner processes happening in the human mind or to assert that all psychological problems could be reduced to language problems. Rather, the focal point of attention is turned from language as a trace of inner processes to language as a kind of action that first and foremost socially constitutes activities like “remembering” or “hoping.” Let us examine what it means when we, for instance, say that “I hope that X will arrive today.” If someone asks us how we could know that we hope that X will arrive today, we will not somehow “turn inside” and reveal an inner process of “hoping,” but perhaps say something like “Well, I’m pretty nervous; I can’t concentrate; I’m looking out of the window pretty often; I’m pondering if I should buy the ingredients for X’s favorite dish, just in case she arrives today” and so on. That is to say, a discursive understanding of “hoping” does not deny that there may be inner processes that go along with “hoping” (such as being nervous, unable to concentrate, etc.), but it does deny that there is a distinctive mental process of “hoping” going on and, thus, we rather have to take a closer look at the various speech acts that may be connected to “hoping” in everyday language: “When I think in words, I don’t have ‘meanings’ in my mind in addition to verbal expressions; rather, language itself is the vehicle of thought” (Wittgenstein 2009, 113). Consequently, “hoping,” “remembering,” “believing,” etc. are no longer seen as hidden individual mental processes, but as social activities (Billig 2001, 213), and in the following we will further examine what that could imply for “stereotyping.”

Despite this view of language as a social praxis, discursive psychological research often leaves the interconnection between society and language, between social power relations and individual attitudes, relatively dim and fragmentary, concentrating on the qualitative empirical study of the communicative construction of attitudes or prejudices in interviews, newspaper articles, or focus groups. Billig (1991, 8), following Roland Barthes, suggests that this is not a simple power relation between the dominant and the dominated class, the former dominating the language and therefore the thoughts of the latter. Rather, he writes that “the speaker simultaneously is in charge of language and is captured by it,” and that the speaker “can be portrayed as both master and slave” (ibid.). He or she is at the same time a slave of language, because he or she has to use and “recycle” (Billig) a preexisting language which he or she did not influence, and a master because he or she is able to (at least partly) creatively combine and change this given language. This implies that stereotyping and prejudice can be conceptualized neither as mere indoctrination by dominating classes (as in some Marxist approaches) nor as phenomena that are solely due to the individual (as in some psychological approaches). Language, in short, mediates the social and the individual; it is the medium in which society and the individual meet. For when we speak, we make use of words that already exist and have been used over and over again; that convey a particular content which may have changed over time and certainly is – at least to a certain extent – variable, but nonetheless necessarily refers to a past and present social context. Therefore, language is essentially social and cannot be reduced to the individual – we cannot reasonably think of a private language (Wittgenstein 2009, 98ff.). Thus, if we do not think of stereotyping as an “inner” or mental process, but as a process that happens in the medium of language, what, then, is it?

1.2. Critical Theory and Its Concept of Stereotyping

Critical Theory, in some of its most famous studies, offered a theoretical approach that enables us to conceptualize language as the medium of stereotypes and simultaneously as the medium where the individual and the social meet. That may surprise the reader, for the critical theory of the Frankfurt School has seldom been read as a philosophy of ordinary language is concerned, Schatzki (1996) and Winch (1990) elaborated its relation to sociology and social science.
language, and in Habermas’s *Theory of Communicative Action* (1986) and the ensuing discussion it was criticized as an old-fashioned piece of social ontology. In the following I will show that reading the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* as a theory that comprises a philosophy of language allows us a productive new insight into the Authoritarian Personality and stereotyping in general.

It was especially the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* fragment “Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of Enlightenment” and in particular the notion of “ticket thinking” that sparked controversy concerning its impact for research on anti-Semitism and prejudice. The concept of ticket thinking, in short, denotes a way of thinking that has deteriorated so much in the process of enlightenment that stereotyped thought:

is all that remains. A choice is still made, but only between totalities. Anti-Semitic psychology has been replaced by mere acceptance of the whole fascist ticket, … Just as on the voting papers of the mass party the elector is given names by the party machine to vote for en bloc, the basic ideological elements are coded on a few lists.

(Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 200–201)

Thus, Horkheimer and Adorno assume a thinking that has lost the ability to judge by individual categories – all that remains is “blind subsumption” (ibid., 201) – and, therefore, even anti-Semitism as a distinct prejudice has come to an end: “But there are no more Anti-Semites” (ibid., 200). Especially with respect to the ticket thesis, Rensmann and Schulze Wessel wrote that Adorno and Horkheimer abandoned the possibility to understand specific historical mechanisms of prejudice, its specific functions and cultural embedment (Rensmann and Schulze Wessel 2003, 124).

This may hold true if ticket thinking is conceptualized as a kind of mentality. But we will see that it is fertile to accentuate the role of *language*: in a deteriorating language Horkheimer and Adorno saw the ability to make distinct judgments supplanted by merely stereotyped thinking:

In the world of mass series production, stereotypes replace individual categories. Judgments are no longer based on a genuine synthesis but on blind subsumption. At an earlier stage of history judgments were based on hasty distinctions which gave impetus to the process, and in the meantime exchange, circu-

lation and legal precedents and convention have contributed their share. The process of judgment passed through the stage of weighing up the relative merits of individual cases, which gave the subject some measure of protection against brutal identification with the predicate. In late industrial society, there is a regression to illogical judgment. When fascism replaced involved legal procedures by an accelerated form of judgment and retribution, the up-to-date were economically prepared for this new development; they had learned to see things through the conceptual models, the *termini technici*, which remain as the iron ration when language disintegrates. The perceiver is no longer present in the process of perception. He no longer uses the active passivity of cognition in which the categorial components can be appropriately formed from a conventionally pre-shaped ‘given’, and the ‘given’ formed anew from these elements, so that justice is done to the perceived object. In the sphere of the social sciences, and in the world of individual experience, blind observation and empty concepts are grouped together rigidly and without mediation. In the age of three hundred keywords, the ability to make the effort required by judgment disappears, and the distinction between truth and falsehood is removed.

(Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 201–202)

Thus, it is not primarily a certain character structure or mentality that is dealt with in the relevant fragments. Rather, in the fragment on the “Elements of Antisemitism” in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* language is the mediator of the social and the individual and the medium of stereotypes. Apparently, in this excerpt the notion of “judgment” is used in two senses: On the one hand, its literal sense, describing the difference between a “fair” trial in which the accused had the chance to be judged fairly in their own right in a process “of weighing up the relative merits of individual cases.” In a metaphorical sense, this idea of an appropriate judgment is transferred to perception (and vice versa): Just as fascism transformed fair process into a propaganda trial where a pre-existing judgment was merely executed, the (potentially) fascist perceiver is no longer able to do justice to the perceived object. This is not because – in a first step – his or her ability to perceive somehow deteriorated, but because he or she “had learned to see things through the conceptual models, the *termini technici*, which remain as the iron ration when language disintegrates,” his or her perception deteriorates. That is to say, what we are able to perceive is due not to the “ghostly essence” of an antecedent inner state or structure, but to the language that we have at our disposal. The “up-to-date” are not prepared for fascism because they are fascists or have an antecedent fascist character structure which somehow attaches to lan-
language, but the other way around: because their language and, therefore, their thinking and feeling has already dis-integrated to the “iron ration,” they are susceptible to a fascist world view, to fascist ideology. Real living perception is an active-passive process: We perceive through our language, but unless we are able to enact a process of “doing justice” to the perceived object, we fail to perceive it in a fair, emphatic sense. But how can we comprehend this process? Language, as it is conceptualized in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, is two-sided, as it is especially evident in the fragment on “The Concept of Enlightenment” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 4ff.). By the means of language we are on the one hand able to fix an object and, thus, to build a distance between subject and object. If we are not able to name distinct objects, we are not able to make differences, and everything remains chaotic. Using a language is an act of freedom, for it frees us from the chaotic and immediate proximity of objects. But on the other hand this is an act of alienation and dominion. Giving attributes to an object is at the same time (at least temporarily) abstraction from and abandonment of other qualities of this object. Simultaneously, language is a means that inherently offers the possibility to serve up justice for the object: By the means of language, we are not only able to fix the object, but also to “express the contradiction that something is itself and at one and the same time something other than itself, identical and not identical” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 15). That is, we are not necessarily able to express the non-identical, but we are able to express this contradiction as well as to reflect what we do with our words and concepts (Plug 2010, 57–58). And it is exactly in this sense that the abovementioned excerpt from the “Elements of Antisemitism” can be understood: Stereotyping in its most advanced form is the complete lack of this kind of reflection and passive-active perception. The stereotyping subject is not able to use his/her language in that two-sided manner; s/he uses language to fix, but not in a way where the categorial components “can be appropriately formed from a conventionally pre-shaped ‘given’, and the ‘given’ formed anew from these elements, so that justice is done to the perceived object.” All that remains is the pre-shaped given. Thus, proper judgment vanishes and gives way to fascist judgments, in perception as well as in the fascist trial. It was Zygmunt Bauman who pointedly recapitulated this notion of language for his diagnosis of modernity:

Ambivalence, the possibility of assigning an object or an event to more than one category, is a language-specific disorder: a failure of the naming (segregating) function that language is meant to perform. The main symptom of disorder is the acute discomfort we feel when we are unable to read the situation properly and to choose between alternative actions. It is because of the anxiety that accompanies it and the indecision which follows that we experience ambivalence as a disorder – and either blame language for lack of precision or ourselves for linguistic misuse. And yet ambivalence is not the product of the pathology of language or speech. It is, rather, a normal aspect of linguistic practice. It arises from one of the main functions of language: that of naming and classifying.

(Bauman 1991, 1)

For Horkheimer and Adorno, this necessity of the ambivalence of language at the same time comprises the possibility of a perception where subject and object are properly mediated – a just reflection that is able to likewise self-consciously reflect on its own (necessary) stereotyping: “Only in that mediation by which the meaningless sensation brings a thought to the full productivity of which it is capable, while on the other hand the thought abandons itself without reservation to the predominant impression, is that pathological loneliness which characterizes the whole of nature overcome” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 189). Language itself inherently and necessarily involves both possibilities (and, for Horkheimer and Adorno as well as for Bauman, this is no failure of language but marks the possibility of freedom): an ultimately stereotyped language that solely fixes its object with rigid notions, and a living language of fair perception. Those possibilities are evidently not clearly separated or separable.
sides of language, one evil and one sound. For if we use concepts we do fix objects in the first place. It is rather a constant effort of critical reflection on the possibilities as well as on the futility of language (Plug 2010) that breaks the spell of stereotyping, and in this respect the concept of ticket thinking denotes instead an ideal-typical extreme of a continuum.

That implies on the one hand that the fight against stereotypes can never come to an end: Stereotyping does not depend entirely on a certain social organization, but inheres in language. On the other hand, Horkheimer and Adorno conceptualized the process of enlightenment as a process of increasing freedom as well as a process of disintegration of reason in the medium of language and thus, in society, where “in the sphere of the social sciences, and in the world of individual experience, blind observation and empty concepts are grouped together rigidly and without mediation.” This disintegration marks the influence of an increasingly deteriorating society on language, for language and social development are irrevocably intertwined. Enlightenment, which “has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 3) must fail, paradoxically, if it does not reflect on its own impossibility. For if enlightenment is basically the effort of understanding and, thus, conceptualizing ever increasing parts of our social and natural world, then we could say, following Bau-

man, that it coincidentally and inwardly produces ambivalence. This relationship constitutionally affects all fragments of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, and in this respect, the fragment on “The Culture Industry” deals with the link between a general decline of language and the rise of fascism. It is not so much a deliberate mass deception that the authors fear from the rise of culture industry, not in the sense that, for example, we are all manipulated in a well-thought-out manner by advertising. Rather, the commodification of culture hastens not only cultural standardization, but likewise the standardization of language and perception:

The blind and rapidly spreading repetition of words with special designations links advertising with the totalitarian watchtower. The layer of experience which created the words for their speakers has been removed; in this swift appropriation language acquires the coldness which until now it had only on billboards and in the advertisement columns of newspapers. Innumerable people use words and expressions which they have either ceased to understand or employ only because they trigger off conditioned reflexes; in this sense, words are trade-marks which are finally all the more firmly linked to the things they denote, the less their linguistic sense is grasped.

(Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 165–66)

Culture, in short, “now impresses the same stamp on everything” (“Kultur heute schlägt alles mit Ähnlichkeit”) (ibid., 120). In other words, due to capitalist commodification not only of culture, but basically of all areas of life, it is not only objects that are subject to comparability and reproducibility, but every kind of social relations as well as the subject itself. Ticket thinking, in this sense, does not denote a mental process, but a conceptual praxis of judging the world with precast categories. Thus, this kind of praxis would mean the end of particular perception and of the perception of the particular. It is this completely stereotyped language and therefore completely stereotyped mode of thinking that brings about an accomplished objectification of the subject, because the subject:

is no longer able to return to the object what he has received from it, he becomes poorer rather than richer. He loses the reflection in both directions: since he no longer reflects the object, he ceases to reflect upon himself, and loses the ability to differentiate. Instead of the voice of conscience, he hears other voices; instead of examining himself in order to decipher the protocol of its own lust for power, it attributes the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” to others.

(Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 189–90)

Far from being a mere critique of modern culture, the fragment on culture industry debates the link between the essence of our language, its disintegration in a process of enlightenment that lacks critical self-reflection, and a subject that turns more and more into a potential fascist because s/he becomes increasingly unable to accomplish fair and emphatic judgments.

1.3. “Stereotyping” as Relational Concept

In this respect, the Authoritarian Personality can be read as an empirical litmus test for those theoretical considerations. To read the Authoritarian Personality as a mere piece of individual psychology that may have the ambition to
include contextual factors, but fails in its implementation (for example Zick 1997), means to desist – at least partly – from its theoretical embedment. Of course, the Authoritarian Personality is basically a psychoanalytically inspired empirical study that offers traces of the above-mentioned theoretical fragments rather than systematically building upon them. Of course it can be read as a study on the authoritarian character or personality, but it likewise offers hints for a re-interpretation inspired by a critical philosophy of language:

This [manipulative] syndrome, potentially the most dangerous one, is defined by stereotypy as an extreme: rigid notions become ends rather than means, and the whole world is divided into empty, schematic, administrative fields. There is an almost complete lack of object cathexis and of emotional ties. … However, the break between internal and external world, in this case, does not result in anything like ordinary “introversion,” but rather the contrary: a kind of compulsive overrealism which treats everything and everyone as an object to be handled, manipulated, seized by the subject’s own theoretical and practical patterns. … The ingroup-outgroup relationship becomes the principle according to which the whole world is abstractly organized.

(Adorno et al. 1950, 767–68)

It is obvious that Adorno et al. conceptualize this “potentially most dangerous” syndrome in line with the reflections in the Dialectic of Enlightenment. They do not describe a character structure that shows itself in language (even if, once again, this excerpt can be read as such a description). But, clearly, the stereotyping itself happens in language, in “rigid notions” and “empty, schematic fields.” This empty language works in two directions: One direction is what can be described as perception of the outside world. Because we perceive and interpret the outside world by the means of language, rigid notions are not able to trigger the perception of anything new or ambivalent. Stereotyping, thus, is to identify something or someone with precast and rigid concepts. The other direction is inward: Exactly because the subject is not able to really perceive, s/he “becomes poorer rather than richer. S/he loses the reflection in both directions: since he no longer reflects the object, he ceases to reflect upon himself, and loses the ability to differentiate” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 189) – s/he lacks the “emotional ties” and therefore the ability to feel empathy.

But this most “advanced” form of stereotyping does not imply a lack of specificity in the analysis of stereotyping. That would only be true if we conceptualize ticket thinking as a mentality or an inner state of mind; for as such it would be invisible and, thus, basically inexplicable. In today’s research on prejudice, it is common ground that prejudices against different out-groups are very likely not to occur separately (for example, a person is prejudiced against Turkish immigrants, but not against any other groups), but are embedded in a syndrome of somehow interrelated prejudices: If a person is prejudiced against one out-group, s/he is most likely to be prejudiced against other out-groups as well. Recently, Zick and colleagues reconfirmed this hypothesis on a European level (Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann 2011). Their argument is that different prejudices share a common core, which they (following Heitmeyer 2002) identify as “an ideology of unequal status” (Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann 2011, 38). With regard to the Authoritarian Personality, we can now add a decisive hypothesis to the research on the syndrome character of prejudice: If prejudice is a phenomenon that is not antecedent to language, but inheres and happens within language, then its syndrome character must be identifiable in language as well. Thus, if we figure our concept of “stereotyping” as a linguistic phenomenon, the relationship between stereotyping, ticket thinking, and the syndrome character of prejudice can be grasped coherently: stereotyping is a matter of language. It happens when the fixed elements of language prevail over its possibility to enable – in an act of active-passive reflection – the subject to open up different (ambivalent, non-identical) facets of the object, that is, to perceive in an emphatic and just sense and, thus, to do justice to the object. This function of fair judgment comes to an end in ticket thinking, which is a metaphor used to illustrate an absolutely stereotyped, therefore reified and reifying language. The syndrome character of prejudice is the conceptual and empirical result of these considerations, for if the world is perceived in “empty, schematic, administrative fields,” the particular necessarily vanishes for the benefit of mere stereotypy. The finding that a person “who is hostile toward one minority group is very likely to be hostile against a wide variety of others” (Adorno et al. 1950, 9) follows from that, because if stereotyping is the general mode of perception there is no room for individual judg-
ments. People are not judged individually, but ordered, for example according to antecedent ingroup-/outgroup differentiations. Nonetheless, ticket thinking is specific, for a general tendency in thinking and speaking has to appear in particular phenomena; otherwise we would not be able to speak of a general tendency. For Adorno, Horkheimer and the authors of the Authoritarian Personality, ticket thinking is both: It is a general social phenomenon that nonetheless shows up in specific manners, for example the stereotypical view of “the Jews” is different from that of “the Irish,” but the overall mechanism is that of rigid notions.

I began by outlining basic assumptions of discursive psychology. Instead of searching for the “ghostly essences” of mental or somehow “inner” states, it was argued, attention has to switch to discourse, to everyday language and the specific context in which it is situated. I showed that the fragments of the Dialectic of Enlightenment are centered on a concept of language that allows us to understand the dialectic of enlightenment as a history of an increasing social disintegration that accompanies and is interdependent with a decline of language. Ticket thinking can be understood as the triumph of a blind enlightenment that left nothing but stereotyped language: “empty schematic fields” and, therefore, “blind observation.” This process is associated with an inner exhaustion of the individual, for its inner richness or poorness, its ability for recognition (Honneth 1996) and empathy are essentially linked to the way it may or may not perceive the social world. However, if stereotyping is not bound to a specific form of social organization, but inheres in language, it is not (only) the fight against all reifying and totalitarian tendencies that protects against it, but constant critical self-reflection: “We are wholly convinced – and therein lies our petition principii – that social freedom is inseparable from enlightened thought” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, introduction, xiii). In this respect, the manipulative syndrome, as depicted in the Authoritarian Personality, is the opposite of enlightened thought: It is conditioned by compulsive overrealism which “treats everything and everyone as an object to be handled, manipulated, and seized by the subject’s own theoretical and practical patterns” (Adorno et al. 1950, 767).

So far, two conceptions of stereotyping have been discussed: The idea of a somehow “inner” state or mentality that attaches to language and, likewise, the idea that stereotyping could be identified in single notions or words. For if stereotyping is a particular linguistic mode of relating to the world, it becomes rather problematic to speak of a stereotype. Stereotyping denotes a relation to the world where we “do not first see, and then define, [but where] we define first and then see” (Lippmann 1949, 81) what we already defined. That is, if we do not conceptualize stereotyping as a “mental state of readiness” (Allport), but as the linguistic modality in which a person relates to someone or something, the focus of research switches from “inner” states to language. Thus if stereotyping denotes a process where X relates to Y in a stereotyped mode, stereotyping has no existence beyond language, but happens in and by language. It seems to be a particularity of the concept of stereotyping that it strongly refers to discourse. For whether someone relates stereotypically to persons, things, or groups can only be decided on the basis of his or her speech, the mode or the way in which s/he speaks. Inasmuch as this concept of stereotyping refers to discourse, critical theory and the Authoritarian Personality seem to be systematically adaptable to discursive and rhetorical psychology, though it is not the aim of this paper to accomplish that task.

In a second step, I will now illustrate this relational concept of stereotyping and the syndrome character of prejudice using a concrete example, the manifesto of the Norwegian mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik.

2. Ticket Thinking in Breivik’s Manifesto

Studying Anders Breivik’s Manifesto is a weird task. Not only are there hundreds of pages of quotes, mostly from Islamophobic and conspiracist weblogs. One way of doing research on the text would certainly be to take definitions

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6 Pantucci (2011) draws on the manifesto to discuss lone wolf terrorism. Just (2011) examined what he called Breivik’s parasitic use of other texts, and Sandberg (2013) analyzed the manifesto in terms of narrative criminology.
Thus, Breivik draws a line between himself and supporters of National Socialism not because of their inhuman ideology, because the genocide of six million European Jews, but because to him National Socialism is an old fashioned ideology that activates defense mechanisms in society and is therefore counter-productive in the current struggle. Instead, the “cultural conservative movement” he claims to be a member of is designed “to resist these defensive mechanisms or ‘baits’ if you will” (ibid.). His approach to Nazism is instrumental: because it is a taboo, it is useless in today’s struggle and an obstacle to the victory of cultural conservatism.

One of the other groups he discusses is Odinists. On the one hand, he argues, he is extremely proud of his “Odinist heritage” “as it is an essential aspect of my culture and my identity” (ibid., 1360). But at the same time he rejects the idea that Odinism and Odinist symbols can serve to unite Europe to defeat cultural Marxism and Muslim immigration:

There are pragmatical considerations Odinists have to evaluate as well. Do they really believe the symbolism of Mjollnir (Thors [sic] hammer) has the potential to unite the Nordic peoples against the forces we are facing? Do they really believe Odinistic symbolism would be more suitable compared to the uniting force of Christendom’s symbolism and that of the cross? Anyone with half a brain will know that only the symbolism of the cross (which is a part of all the Nordic flags btw with the exception of Germany) has the potential to unite us for this cause.

The form of the argumentation is the same as on Nazism. Odinism is discussed not in terms of its content, but according to considerations of instrumental reason: Is Odinism an ideology that may serve to unite “us” against “our” enemies?

2.2. Breivik’s Position Towards Other (Minority) Groups

In fact, Breivik vehemently tries to avoid the impression that he is (at least in an essentialist sense) a racist. He does not tire of asserting that other cultural minorities have the right to live in Europe (as far as they “assimilate”) and that cooperation with other (non-Muslim) countries is desirable:

(Berwick 2011, 1367).
support the continued consolidation of non-Muslim Europe and an unconditional support to all Christian countries and societies (Israel included), in addition to continuing our good relationships with all Hindu and Buddhist countries. As such, I don’t support the deportation of non-Muslims from Europe as long as they are fully assimilated (I’m a supporter of many of the Japanese/Taiwan/South Korean policies/principles).

( Ibid., 1384)

The relation to other cultures remains fixed: If minorities inside Europe fully assimilate (and therefore vanish), they may be welcome, but not in too large numbers. If they do not, they will be deported. The whole set of possible cross-cultural relationships is subordinated to one single issue: do these cultures “fit” to our culture? If they do not, they are enemies or, at least, must be kept out of Europe. Islam is and will forever be the main enemy, because it is a culture fundamentally opposed to the European, as Breivik argues at length in large parts of the manifesto: “The Islamic world on the other hand should be completely isolated and Islam reclassified and banned as a fascist/imperialistic and genocidal political ideology” (ibid., 1384).

A second group he deals with is women. Several times in the text he describes himself as a pragmatic and rational individual: “I am first and foremost a man of logic.” (Ibid., 1404). Nonetheless, even if he endorses a society that is built upon those principles, there is one exception: women. For if women fully adopt rationality and logic, a problem may emerge: “I support the propagation of collective rational thought but not necessarily on a personal level. Because, if a woman was purely rational, she would choose to not have babies at all, and instead live her life in a purely egotistical manner.” (Ibid., 1386). That is, men like him may adopt rationality and the collective. But in order to secure the reproduction of the (European) society, women must be exempted. Once again, individuals are subordinated to groups and groups are subordinated to their function for a “cultural conservative” Europe.

2.3. The Holocaust in the Self-Interview

Even if Breivik might not be a Holocaust denier, he certainly relativizes it. The European “multiculturalist elite,” he writes, uses the “Jewish Holocaust” to relativize “other Holocausts” like, in particular, the “Islamic Holocausts” of Christians and Hindus (Ibid., 1366). According to his account, Islam has “slaughtered 300 million people since its creation” (Ibid., 1366), and appears as a much worse ideology than Nazism. By completely abstracting from the Nazism ideology, the circumstances and particularities of the genocide of the European Jews, he manages to make the Holocaust appear a minor incident in world history. But the decisive argument is, once again: How can we deal with the Holocaust so that it may serve today’s struggle against Islam and “multiculturalism”?

The “holocaust religion” has grown into a destructive anti-European monster, which prevents nationalistic doctrines from emerging. And without nationalistic doctrines, Europe will wither and die, which we are seeing today. It’s quite ironic that Even Israel would appear to have become a victim of it. Needless to say, while I am a strong supporter of Israel and of all patriotic Jews I acknowledge that the anti-European holocaust religion must be deconstructed, and instead replaced with an anti-Islamic version. (Ibid., 1366)

Thus, history must be re-written: In order to encourage European youth and strengthen their self-awareness, the Holocaust has to be put in its “right” (and therefore minor) place. Like everything, the interpretation of the Holocaust is not about truth, but about instrumentality. Of course the Germans wrong were to kill the Jews. But the main issue now must be to “deconstruct” this “Holocaust religion” in order to back European nationalism.

3. Stereotyping in Breivik’s Manifesto and the Syndrome Character of Prejudice

Regarding those thoughts of Anders Breivik, it is clearly not the amount of different and separate prejudices towards other outgroups that is their decisive feature, but the stereotypical interconnection of different social groups and sectors like politics, minorities, and (potential) allies. Every single group, every single world view is subordinated and judged according to one single principle: the instrumental practicability of installing a culturally “pure” Europe rid of competing world views (in particular: “cultural Marxism”) and cleansed of all traces of Islam. The overall goal of all ideological fragments developed in the manifesto is homogeneity at all points. That is, it is not a particular logic that each prejudice follows, for example an anti-feminist, anti-
Semitic, anti-multicultural, or anti-Islamic. Conversely, every single issue is ordered according to the “pre-shaped given,” and that is Breivik’s fixed worldview. In his ideology, anti-feminism has no discrete logic, but conveys the overall logic of this single idea that is applied to each and everything: “It seems plain that what one has to deal with here is not a single specific attitude but a system that has content, scope, and structure” (Adorno et al. 1950, 42), and both “ingroups and outgroups are thought of in the same general terms; the same evaluative criteria are applied to groups generally, and a given characteristic, such as clanishness or power, is good or bad depending on what group has it” (ibid., 44) In this respect the authors of the Authoritarian Personality – by their concepts of stereotyping and the syndrome character of prejudice – described a way of stereotypically relating to the world, a linguistic mode of relation. That also implies that figuring out the content of this mode is the task of empirical social research; for if there is no stereotype in the sense of an inner entity or mental structure, but “stereotyping” is a metaphorical way of describing a linguistic relation, the content of this relation may vary. In Breivik’s worldview, everything is subordinated to his concept of a cultural “pure” Europe, and applying this ticket, this pre-shaped concept of purity, to everyone and everything is his particular stereotyped way of relating to the world. Thus, the particular syndrome character of Breivik is this particular linguistic mode of relation – the syndrome character of prejudice may be an ideology of unequal status (Zick, Küpper and Hövermann 2011), but that is a particular content that may vary. And what is more, the syndrome character is not limited to prejudices against outgroups. For if the concept denotes a stereotypical relation to the world, it may by definition affect not only outgroups, but government, religion, family issues, and so forth.7 The special contribution of Horkheimer, Adorno, and colleagues therefore is to identify a social process that enforces this deterioration of language – which would mean, in the sense discussed in the present paper, a general tendency of stereotypically relating to the world, to outgroups, politics, and so forth.

Finally, I want to outline at least three methodological consequences that the precedent thoughts may imply for research on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination:

a) If stereotyping does not happen inside and hidden, but in language, researching stereotypes does not mean searching for traces of an unobservable mentality or cognitive structure. What prevails in Breivik’s language is “blind subsumption” and the “iron ration” that remains “when language disintegrates” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 201–202). Breivik is not able to see the individual because he pre-judges everything with fixed notions. And likewise, because by this he is not able to perceive anything new, anything individual, the process of perception as a whole comes to an end: “He no longer uses the active passivity of cognition in which the categorial components can be appropriately formed from a conventionally pre-shaped ‘given’, and the ‘given’ formed anew from these elements, so that justice is done to the perceived object” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, l.c.). That is, ticket thinking leaves its bearer as empty as his/her perception of the world. This, needless to say, does not argue against a (social) psychology of stereotyping, but stresses the role of language as both mediator and medium of psychological traits. Analogously to the example given at the beginning, concerning how we know that someone has a stereotyped world view. We would for instance say that s/he relates in the same way to everyone, that s/he – in behavior as well as speech “impresses the same stamp” on everything and everyone. But figuring out what exactly the stamp is remains a task of critical social research. For the Anders Breivik’s Manifesto I showed that it may be an idea of homogeneity, but likewise we could conceive of an idea of productivity to which the whole society and its members are subsumed, or of obedience/disobedience to authority as the overall logic of a syndrome.

7 It seems reasonable to assume that this may also be why Adorno and colleagues never offered a definition of authoritarianism, but rather thought of it as a conglomerate of different facets (Adorno et al. 1950, 255ff.) that may vary in scope and content from respondent to respondent.
b) If there is no antecedent psychology that expresses itself in language, but language forms and mediates individual psychology (and therefore turns it into a social psychology in the first place), then the study of a syndrome character of prejudice is primarily a study of language. The syndrome character of prejudice is not identical with devaluing a couple of outgroups. Rather, it is a second level that shows in particular stereotypical speech acts, but does not completely coincide. For the case of Breivik’s manifesto, I have shown that this second level is a political idea of homogeneity that is stereotypically applied and constitutes the general coherence of the particular syndrome, or to put it in another way: it is a specific form of thinking and speaking that shows itself in specific stereotyped content. Thus, a qualitative and mixed method research on stereotyping has to do research on stereotypes in their particular contexts, for example in texts or everyday language.

c) Our conception of what stereotypes really are influences the way we try to fight them. If the problem is not a prejudgment that can be easily corrected by, for example, telling prejudiced people that “we are all equal” and they do not have to be afraid of outgroups, or that the Jewish religion is nothing to bother about by showing them a synagogue, then education on stereotyping has to change. Adorno clearly saw that and, in his haunting text on “Education after Auschwitz” (2005, 28), outlined an educational program that sets out first and foremost to instill reflection the self and the social mechanisms he identified as partly responsible for the emergence of the manipulative type:

For this disastrous state of conscious and unconscious thought includes the erroneous idea that one’s own particular way of being – that one is just so and not otherwise – is nature, an unalterable given, and not a historical evolution. I mentioned the concept of reified consciousness. Above all, this is a consciousness blinded to all historical past, all insight into one’s own conditionedness, and posits as absolute what exists contingently. If this coercive mechanism were once ruptured, then, I think, something would indeed be gained.
References


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